COMMUNIST CONCEPTS FOR REVOLUTIONARY WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000300050001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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DESENSITIZED
'The following discussion of Communist guerrilla warfare takes its
lead from principles outlined for that type of war by Communist China's
leader, Mao Tse-tung. Mao's guerrilla catechism was tested in action by
Chinese Communists in battles against the Japanese and against the National-
ist Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek. The Mao concepts were later to be
used by Communist Chinese terrorists in Malaya, where the enemy included
native Malay forces and specially trained British troops. Communist Viet
Minh President Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap adopted Mao's guer-
rilla principles to the war for "liberation" from the French in Indochina.
Mao's guerrilla doctrines have become the manual for Communist guerrilla
action in the Far East. Since Communist guerrilla moves are always a
possibility in future Communist aggression in the area, antiguerrilla
tactics must evolve from efforts to meet the type of guerrilla action Mao
prescribes and that Communist forces are known to use.
British and French forces developed military tactics to meet guerrilla
.situations. The British succeeded, and the French failed, though admitted-
ly in a more difficult set of circumstances. Much can be learned from both
experiences, and this study goes into the strategy of both nations.
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'No one will think of taking over the leadership in a war
without knowing its laws. But in addition to the traditional
.type of war there exists the revolutionary war, which has
its own characteristics, its own laws. Be who is not familiar
with them has not the slightest chance to catty away the
victory in such a war.'
Mao Tse-tung
? .
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Relationships of Commands . . . . . . . . 10
Operations in Malaya
Mao's Principles of Guerrilla Warfare . . . . . . . . . . I
Coordination of Guerrilla and Regular Warfare 5
Establishment of Base Areas . . . . . . 6
Strategic Offense and Defense in Guerrilla Warfare. . . . . . 8
Guerrilla Warfare Becomes Mobile Warfare. . . .. . . 9
Communist Concepts for Revolutionary War
Communist Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Min Yuen Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Communist Tactics in Malaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Types of Guerrilla Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Anti-Communist Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 20
The Briggs Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e . . . . . . 24
British and Colonial Anti-Guerrilla Tactics . . . . . . . 28
Areas of Unrest (map of trouble-areas) . .
.
Operations in Indochina
Communist Forces.
Viet Minh Strategy and Tactics.
Organization for Combat . . . . . .
. ...
Importance of Guerrilla Warfare . . .
.
Anti-Communist Forces . . . . . .
Summary. . a .
.
. . . . . 32
. . . . . 33
34
. . . . . . . 36
40
. . . . 42
45
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UNCLASSIFIED
DEF?INITI0NS
These Terms Have the Following Specialized
Meanings in This Study
DISSIDENT: One of a group in disagreement with the established
order. The differences usually result in passive acts rather
than individual or organized collective violence.
REBEL: An individual who is plotting to or is actually resisting
the established order by force. The aim is to overthrow the
established order, and to accomplish this the rebel may resort to
terrorist or guerrilla activities.
INSURGENT: A member of a group engaged in an upri sing against
the established order, where the revolt has not yet reached the
stage of a revolutionary government nor a belligerency.
GUERRILLA: A combatant member of an organized or partially
organized militant force, the functions of which include
harassing, delaying or disruptive action against the enemy, and
the destruction of an enerry either by independent small unit
action or coordinated action with the regular force.
TERRORIST: One who uses intimidation or violence or both to
demoralize either the civilian populace or the military forces
or both as a means of opposing or disrupting the established
order with the aim-of assisting in seizure and subsequent
control of an area.
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COMMUNIST CONCEPTS FOR REVOLUTIONARY WAR
Mao Tse-tung developed the following strategic uses for guerrilla war-
fare and adhered to them when he led guerrilla foroes against the Japanese,
during World War II in China and against Chiang Kai-shek before and after
World War II. Ho Chi Minh, from 1948.to 1954 in the war against the French
in Indochina, followed these principles. Communists will doubtlessly con-
tinue to follow than in any expansion of their aggression in Southeast Asia
or elsewhere in the Far East. Mao stated that the following six principles
constituted his strategic program during the entire guerrilla war against
the Japanese and that these principles serve as the necessary means for pre-
serving and expanding our (Ceannunist) forces, annihilating or ousting the
enemy, and coordinating with regular warfare to win final victory.
Six Principles of Guerrilla Warfare -- Mao Tse-tung
1. On our own initiative, with flexibility and according to
our own plan, carry out offers r. battles of quick
decision in a protracted war, and exterior ne operations within in-
terior line operation.
.2. Coordination with regular warfare. I
3. The establishment of base areas. 00
4. Strategic defensive and strategic offensive in guerrilla
warfare. u/
5. Development into mobile warfare. -
6. Relationship of commands.
Mao's discussion of these principles follows.
FIRST PRINCIPLE: On our own initiative, with flexibility and according
to our own plan, carry out offensives in a defensive war, battles of quick
decision in a protracted war, and exterior line operations within interior
line operation.
It is possible and necessary to make, in a strategically defensive
war, offensives in campaigns and battles; to wage campaigns and battles of
quick decision in a strategically protracted war; and to wage campaigns
and battles on the exterior line within the strategic interior line.
Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise
attacks, while in regular warfare, although surprise attacks should and can
be adopted, relatively few opportunities arise whereby the enemy can be
caught unprepared.
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b~.
. In guerrilla operations, concentration of the biggest possible force,
secret and swift actions, surprise attacks on the enemy, and quick decisions
in battles are required. Passive defense, procrastination, and dispersion
of forces immsdiats],y before combat mast be carefully avoided.
Although there is strategical and tactical defense to inflict attrition
on the enemy and to wear him out, the basic principle of guerrilla warfare
must be one of offense and its-offensive character must be more pronounced
than that of regular warfare. Further, such offensives must take the form
of mtrprisp_ attacks. Display and showiness are even more impermissible in
lUa-
uerr warfare than in regular warfare.
Although on occasion, guerrilla battles may continue for several days,
as in a battle against a small, isolated, and helpless enemy force; in general,
Eck battle decisions are vital to successful guerrilla warfare.
Because of its dispersed nature, guerrilla warfare can be spread wide,
and the principle of dividing up the forces applies in many of its tasks,
such as in harassing, containing, and disrupting the enemy, and in mass work;
but when a guerrilla detachment or corps is performing the tasks of anni-
hilating the enemy, particularly when it is striving to smash an enemy of-
fensive, its main force must be concentrated. "Gather a big-force to strike
at a small enemy segment," remains one of the guidelines for field operations
in guer lea f are.
We must concentrate a preponderant force in every battle and adopt,
whether in the period of strategic defense or in the period of strategic
counteroffensive, exterior line operations in every campaign or battle to
encircle and annihilate the enemy. We must encircle a part of the enemy,
i not the whole, annihilate a part of the encircled, if not the whole, and
inflict heavy casualties upon them, if not capture them.
Initiative:' Initiative for an army means choice of action. Any army
that loses its initiative will be forced into a passive position, be deprived
of its freedom of action, and will run the risk of being exterminated or de-
feated. To obtain the initiative is more siiffa strategic defensive
and interior line operations and easier ih offensive ext rior line operations.
Initiative is vital to guerrilla warfarey.for a guerrilla unit usually
finds itself in grave circumstances: the absence of a rear for its operations,
its own weak force pitted against the enemy's strong force, and in the case
of a newly organized guerrilla unit, its lack of experience and of unity.
Nevertheless, we can gain the initiative in guerrilla warfare, the essential
condition being the utilization of the enemy's defects.
The initiative results from a correct estimation of the situation (of
both the enemy's and ours), as well as correct military and political dis-
positions. Pessimistic estimatios at a variance with objective conditions
and the passiv'e`d'lspos tions which they entail will undoubtedly deprive one
of the initiative and throw him into a passive position. Similarly, over-
optimistic estimations at variance with objective conditions and the
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venturesome dispositions (an uncalled for venturesomeness) which they entail
will also,deprive one of the initiative and eventually lead him to the same
path as do pessimistic estimations.
The it i iee is not the natural gift of a ps, but ramethi Iohirrrd
by an intelligent leader who-studies with a recep ve mind and makes correct
estimations of objective conditions and correct military and political dispo-
sitions. Therefore, it is something to be consciously striven for, not ebme-i
thing ready made.
A guerrilla unit should carry out the tasks of extricating itself from
a passive position when forced into one through some incorrect estimation
and disposition or scsme overwhelming pressure. Circumstances are often such
as to make it necessary to run a ._ Running away is the chief means of
getting out of passivity and regaining the initiative, but not the only means.
Frequently the initiative and an advantageous position are gained through
one's effort at holding,, out _ a .bit_ longer.
Flexibility: Flexible employment of forces is the most important means
of changing the situation between the enemy and ourselves and gaining the
initiative. Guerrilla forces must be flexibly employed according to con
ditions such as the tar sk the enemy disposit~.on, the terrain, and the in-
hab4.tants. The chief ways of employing the forces coz -I-W-of dispersing,
concentrating, and shifting them. When guerrilla forces are dispersed we
must not incur losses through an ignorance of the situation and mistakes in
actions. In employing the forces it is necessary to maintain liaison and
communication and to keep an adequate portion of the main force on hand.
Guerrillas should constantly shift their positions.
Generally speaking, the dispersion of guerrilla forces is employed
mainly in the following circumstances:
1. When we threaten the enemy with a wide frontal.,attsc1c..because he is
on the defensive, and we are still una'5Ie_to mass our-1forces to engage him.
2. When we widely harass and disrupt the energy in an area where his
forces are weak.
3. When unable to break through the enemy's encirclement, we try to
divert his attention in order to get away from him.
4. When we are restricted by the condition of terrain or in matters
of supply.
5. When we carry on work among the people over a vast area.
In dispersed actions under any circumstances, attention should be paid
to the following:
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1. No absolutely ev _diapersion of forces should be made. A larger
part of the forces should be kept at a place conveniently situated for its
flexible employment so that, on the one hand, any possible exigency can be'
readily met and, on the other, the dispersed units can be used to fulfill
the main task.
2. The dispersed units should be assigned clearly defined tasks,
fi_QJ s _of Q eration, specific time limits and rendezvous, and ways and means
of liaison.
Concentration: Forces are concentrated largely for the annihilation
of an enemy on the offensive but sometimes for the annihilation of certain
statiori" f orces when the enemy is on the defensive.
Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the
massing of the main forces in a certain important direction while retaining
or dispatching a part of the forces in other directions for containing,
harassing, or disrupting the enemy, or for work among the people.
Shifting of forces: Although flexible dispersion or concentration of
forces is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how.
to shift our forces flexibly.
When the enemy feels seriously threatened by the guerrillas he will
send troops to suppress or attack theca. Guerrilla leaders should ponder
the situation and:
1. If possible fight on the spot.
2. If not possible to fight, shift rapidly to another position.
Sometimes the guerrilla units for the purpose of smashing the enemy
units separately may, after annihilating an enemy force in one place, shift
immediately to another to wipe out another enemy force.
Guerrillas, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, may sometimes
have to disengage immediately from the enemy at that position and engage
him elsewhere.
If the enemy's forces at one position are particularly strong, the
guerrilla units should not engage him there for long, but should shift their
positions as speedily as possible. In general, th see hiftin_of forces,
should be done secretly and swiftly. Ingenious devices such as making a
noise in the east while at acktng-.in the west, appearing now in the south
and then in the north, and hit-and-run, and night action should be constantly
employed to mislead, entice, and. confuse the enemy.
Planning: Without planning it is iVolnible- to win a guerrilla war.
The idea of fighting a haphazard guerrilla war means nothing but making a
game out of it, the idea of an ignoramus.
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Operations within a guerrilla area must be preceded by the most compre-
hensive planning possible. Guerrilla leaders must consider how to grasp the
initiative, define the tasks, dispose the forces to carry out military and.
political training, procure supplies, make arrangements for equipment, and
how to secure the help of the people. These steps should all be carefully
worked out by the leader and rechecked. Without this there could be no
initiative, flexibility, or offensive. The conditions of guerrilla warfare
do not permit so high a degree of planning as in regular warfare; consequent-
ly, to attempt highly comprehensive planning in guerrilla warfare is a mis-
take, butte it is still necessary so far as obi ective conditions permit to
make plans as comprehensive as possible.
The initiative can be gained only after success has been scored in an
offensive. All offensives must be organized on our own initiative and not
launched under compulsion. The flexible employment of forces centers
around the endeavor to take the offensive; likewise, planning is necessary
chiefly for victories in offensives. Tactical defensive measures beceane
meaningless when divorced from their roles of supporting an offensive
directly or indirectly. Quick decision refers to the t__~e~n~~po of an offensive,
and by the exterior line is meant-the bco a of the offensive. The offensive
is the only means of annihilating the. enemy as well as the principal means
of preserving oneself; pure defense and withdrawal can play only a tempo-
rary and partial role in preserving oneself and are utterly useless in
annihilating the enemy.
SECOND PRINCIPLE: Coordination with regular warfare.
There are three kinds of coordination between guerrilla warfare and
regular warfare: in strategy, campaigns, and in battles.
Strategy: The roles played by guerrilla units behind the enemy's rear,
i.e., crippling and containing the enemy, disrupting his supply line, and
raising the morale of both the regular army and the people, all point to
the need for strategic coordination with the regular army. In coordinating
with the regular army, the guerrillas will play a strategic defensive role
when the enemy is launching a strategic offensive; will handicap the enema
defense when the enemy concludes his strategic offensive and turns to de-
fendthe areas he has occupied; and will also repulse the enemy forces
recover all lost territories when the regular army launches a strategic
counteroffensive.
Campaigns: When participating in a campaign, the leader of each
guerrilla base in the enemy's rear should properly dispose his forces and
adopt different tactics according to prevailing local conditions. So that
he may succeed in crippling and containing the enemy, he should take posi-
tive action against the enemy's most al and vulner be points, dis-
rupting his transport and raising the morale of our own es engaged in
interior line-camps ns. By so doing t`fiie guerr a leader thus will ful-
fill his responsibility of campaign coordination. To attain the end of
coordination in campaigns it is absolutely necessary to equip all larger
guerrilla units with radio equipment.
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Battles: Coordination of battle actions is the task of all guerrilla
units in the neighborhood of the battlefield on the interior line. in each
case the guerrilla units should take up the tasks assigned by the commander
of the regular force, usually tasks to contain part of the enemy disrupt
h., , r n o '' , sP~' an him, and sat as uid Without aar direction from
the commander o}" fie regular ford's;-i;Fie 'guerrilla units should carry out
such tasks voluntaril . There must. be no sitting back and watching, or
moving about wit Gt 1ghting.
THIRD PRINCIPLE:: The establishment of base areas.
Base areas are the strategic bases on which a guerrilla unit relies
for carrying out its strategic tasks as well as for achieving the goals of
preserving and expanding the unit and annihilating or expelling the enemy.
Without such bases there would be nothing to depend on for carrying
out all the strategic tasks and fulfilling all the war objectives. Oper-
ating without a rear area is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind
the enemy linerfor it is detached from the nation's general rear. Guerrilla
war could not be maintained and developed for long without base. areas which
are indeed its rear.
Types of base areas: Bases are mainly of three types: those in the
mountains, those in the plains, and those in the river-lake estuary regions.
We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up base areas in all mountain
regions behind the enemy lines. Mountain base areas are places where guer-
rilla warfare can hold out for the longest time. Plains are inferior to
mountains, but one must not rule out the possibility of developing guerrilla
warfare or establishing some sort of base area on the plains. The establish-
ment of base areas that can hold out for a long time is not confined, but
the establishment of temporary base areas has been proved possible and that
of base areas for small, units or for ryseasonal use ought to be possible.
The possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base
areas in the river-lake estuary regions is greater than on the plains, but
less so than in the mountain regions.
Conditions for establishment of base areas: The basic condition for
the establishment of base areas is that there should be an armed force em-
ployed to defeat the enemy and to arouse the people into ac#ion~". ~" ewers
in guerrilla war must exert their utmost_to'build up one or several guerrilla
units and in the course of the struggle must develop them gradually into
guerrilla corps and eventually into regular u ,i.ts and regular corps. With-
out. an armed force or with one that is not strong enough, not can be done.
The armed forces must be employed in coordination with the masses of
the people to defeat the enemy. If we do not repulse the enemy's attacks
and defeat him, those regions under our control will become enemy controlled,
and then the establishment of base areas will become impossible.
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All power should be employed to arouse the people to struggle against
the enemy. We must arm the people, organize self-defense corps and guerrilla
units. We must form mass organizations. Workers, peasants, youths, Women,
children, merchants, and members of the free professions, according to their
political consciousness and fighting artthusi&wn, should be organized into
the various indispensable public bodies which are to-expand gradually. We
must eliminate the collaborators in the open or under cover, a bask that we
can accomplish only by relying on the people. We =at arouse the people to
establish or consolidate the local organs of enemy political power. Where
the original organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy,
we must, on the basis of the support of the masses, proceed to reform and
consolidate than. Where destroyed by the enemy, we Waist rebuild them.
Consolidation and expansion of base areas: If we only attend to ex-
,pans on and forget consolidation in guerrilla warfare, we not only lose-
r pined but the very existence of vast areas is endangered. tots
ser nation due to lve_.szf.. Wort or an incorrect estimation of the enemy's
strength can only bring losses and harm guerrilla war.
The correct principle is e2gsflsion through gp.@4 ti to n. Choose a
base area where we can be on the defense or offense as we choose.
As tasks of expansion and consolidation are different in nature, mili-
tary dispositions and the execution of our tasks will differ accordingly.
To. shift the emphasis from one to the other according to the time and the
circumstances is the only way to solve the problems properly.
Guerrilla areas as opposed to base areas: In guerrilla war conducted
in the enemy's rear, guerrilla areas are distinguished from guerrilla base
areas.
Guerrilla areas: Areas which the guerrillas can not completely occupy
but can only constantly harass and attack, which are recovered by the guer-
rillas only when they arrive and are lost to the puppet regime as soon as
they leave and which consequently are not yet guerrilla base areas but are
only guerrilla areas. Guerrilla areas will be transformed into base areas
when they have gone through the necessary processes of guerrilla war; that
is, when a large number of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated,
the puppet regime destroyed, the activity of the people called forth, the
people's government formed, and the people's armed forces developed. To
develop a guerrilla area into a base area is therefore a painstaking pro-
cess. Whether a,guerrilla area has been transformed into a base area de-
pends on the extent to which the enemy is annihilated and the masses of
the peop.,Je are used.
As a result of our erroneous leadership or the enemy's strong pres-
sure, the guerrilla base area may change into a guerrilla area and a guer-
rilla area may become an area under the relatively stabilized occupation
of the enemy. This may occur sometimes and deserves the vigilant attention
of the leaders of guerrilla war.
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As a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between the enemy
and ourselves, any of the enemy occupied territories falls into one. of the
following three categories: (1) areas controlled by o gue farces
and our organs of political power, (2) areas in the grip of the_, ney e and
the puppet regime, and (3) arsas ooz tssts4 by both sides or srr3.L1a areas.
FOURTH PRINCIPLE: Strategic defensive and strategic offensive in
guerrilla warfare.
After a guerrilla war has been started and considerably developed,,
especially when the enemy has ceased his strategic offensive against us
on a nationwide scale and has adopted instead a policy of defending the
areas under his occupation, he will inevitably attack the guerrilla base
areas. It is essential to recognize this inevitability for otherwise the
leaders in a guerrilla war will be caught unprepared, will certainly fall
into panic and confusion, and will be routed by the enemy.
To eliminate the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy will re-
sort to converging attacks. When the enemy is launching a converging at-
tack in several columns each consisting of only a single unit, big or small,
without reinforcements, and if he is unable to man the route of advance, we
should then construct _ of4 .tificai ons,,_.pr build_ motor .roads. In our dis-
positions we should contain a number of enemy columns with our supplementary
a surprise attack on it in campaign-s-
amp gns and battles mainly sties) and-
strik-ing at it while it is on the move. The enemy weakened by our repeated surprise
attacks will often withdraw halfway.- By then the guerrillas may spring more
surprise attacks during their pursuit of the enemy so as to weaken him further.
We should en ircle the town ortpwrs which the enemy occupied before he stops
his offensive or begins to withdraw, cutting off his foodfiupply and com-
munications. When he fails to hold out we should pursue and attack him.
After. smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another,
thereby shattering separately the enemy's columns taking part in the converg-
ing attack.
In an operational plan for coping with a converging attack, our main
forces are generally placed on the interior line. 16 the case when we are
superior in strength, it is necessary to use supplementary forces such as
county or district guerrilla units and sometimes even detachments from the
main forces on the exterior line to disrupt the enemy's communication lines
and. to contain his reinforcements.
In the case when the enemy remains for a long time in our base area,
we may reverse the scheme, that is, leave a part of our forces in the base
area to besiege the enemy while employing the main forces to attack the
region whence the enemy came and to intensify our activities there, so that
the enemy long stationed in our base area may be enticed to cane out and
engage us.
During retreat the enemy often sets fire to the houses in the villages
and towns he has occupied and in the villages along his route, with the
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purpose of destroying the base areas for guerrilla warfare. In so doing he
is depriving himself of shelter and food in his next offensive, and the
damage will recoil upon himself. ' -
A leader in a guerrilla war should not think of abandoning his present
base area and shifting to another unless many attempts have been made to
smash the enemy's converging attacks, and it is conclusively shown that'they
cannot be smashed there. In such an event he must carefully guard against
pessimism. So long as the leader commits no blunder in principle, it is
generally possible for the guerrillas to smash the enemy's converging at-
tacks and to hold on to the bases in mountainous areas. It is only on the
plains that the guerrilla leader, confronted with a vigorous converging
attack, should consider temporarily shifting the main guerrilla corps to
some mountainous region. If a shift is made, numerous small units should
be left to operate in dispersion, thereby facilitating the return of the
main corps when the main forces of the enemy move away.
After we have smashed the enemy's offensive and before his new offensive
starts, the enemy is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic
offensive. At this time, our operational direction lies not in attacking
enemy forces holding stoutly to their defensive positions, which we may not
be able to defeat, but in annihilating or expelling small enemy units and
puppet forces which our guerrilla units are strong enough to attack. In
expanding the areas under our occupation, we must annihilate small enemy units
and-arouse the people into action.
The difficult problems of provisions, of bedding and clothing are
usually also tackled at this time. It is necessary to give the t oo s res
and training. and the best time for this is when the enemy is on thee di
During the strategic offensive, the leaders in the guerrilla war should
not be so elated with success as to underrate the enemy and forget to strength-
en internal solidarity and consolidate the base areas and the troops. They
should watch carefully every move of the enemy and see if there is any sign
of an offensive against us, so that the moment it comes we can properly
bring our strategic offensive to close, turn to the strategic defensive,
and smash the enemy's offensive.
FIFTH PRINCIPLE: Development into mobile warfare.
It is necessary for guerrilla units to change gradually into regular
armies in a protracted war. The development of guerrilla warfare into mobile
warfare does not mean the abandonment of guerrilla warfare but the gradual
formation in the midst of an extensively developed guerrilla warfare of a
main force capable of conducting a mobile war, round which there should still
be numerous guerrilla forces carrying on extensive guerrilla operations.
To raise the quality of the guerrilla units we must improve them politi-
cally and organizationally. We must improve their equipment, military train-
ing, and their tactics and discipline, gradually remolding them on the pat-
tern of the regular army.
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UNCLASSIFIED
Organizationally it is imperative to establish step by step such mili-
tary and political setups as are required in the regular corps. All regular
armies have the responsibility of assisting the guerrilla units in their
development into regular armed units.
SIXTH PRflC>yL1: Relationship of commands
Guerrilla units are armed bodies on a lower level than a regular army
,.-.
and are characterized by dispes. operations. The high degree of
11-Z . zation in directing regular warfare is not permitted in directing guerrilla
warfare. A highly centralized command is opposed to the high degree of
as cit of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, however, cannot be
developed steadily if centralized command is done away with altogether.
When extensive regular and guerrilla warfare go on at the same time, it
is essential to coordia to the operations of both by unified command.
The principle of cormand in a guerrilla war demands a centralized
command in strategy and a decentralized command in campaigns and battles.
Centralized strategic command includes: planning and direction of the entire
guerrilla war by the state; coordination between guerrilla and regular war
in. each zone; and unified direction of all the armed forces in each guerrilla
area or base area.
If centralization is not effected where it should be, it would mean
a neglect of duty on the part of the higher echelon and usurpation of power
on the part of the lower ranks-neither is permissible in the relationship
between the higher and lower bodies, especially in military matters.
If decentralization is not effected where it should be, it is monopoly
of power on the part of the higher echelon and lack of initiative on the
part of the lower ranks-neither is permissible in the relationship between
the higher and lower bodies, especially in the command in a guerrilla war.
Such a principle is the only, correct directive for solving the problem.
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nnnrr.+r^---
CCNMUNIST FORCES
The Oc=ulist moveosnt in Mal+ *a it unlike the Ca=unist movements
in other Southeast Asian countries in that it is not indigenous, nor did
it develop from the grievances of a down-trodden peasantry, an oppressed'
laboring class, or from any frustrated desire for national independence.
Communism in Malaya results from the direct introduction of the Cammmuniat
virus into a mall vein of the Chinese comminity by the Communist Party
in China.
In the immediate postwar period the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)
functioned as a legally recognized political party and devoted its attention
to gaining control of the new trade union movement, organizing youth
groups, and infiltrating various political organizations. These relatively
peaceful tactics changed abruptly in early 1948 after two international Comn-
munist conferences in Calcutta, where Moscow ordered the MCP and other Asian
Communist parties to instigate a program of violence that would lead to
armed revolt.
The MCP soon instituted a campaign of indiscriminate terrorism and mass
strikes that caused painful unrest in Malaya and Singapore. To cope with
..the alarming situation, the British imposed emergency regulations in Jun
48 and. outlawed the MCP and its affiliates one month later. By then, most
leading MCP personnel had vanished into the dense jungle that covers four-
fifths of the country. Underground Communists organized themselves into
the Malayan People's Anti-British Army, which later became the Malayan
Race's Liberation Army (MRLA).
When they entered the jungle, the Communists had an estimated force of
between 3,000 and 4,000 guerrillas. By recruitment and intimidation, they
were able to field, during the height of their terrorism and up to 1951, a
maximum force of 8,000 to 9,000 fanatics. Between 1948 and 1951, the Com-
munists were able to replace casualties with new recruits. It is'estimated
that the guerrilla war-still going on-has resulted in at least 11,000
Communist casualties. The Red insurgents have killed about 4,300 security
forces troops and civilians and have wounded an almost equal number.
MRLA recruitment in recent years has been negligible, but the estimated
700 terrorists still in the jungle are hard core terrorists who work under
tight discipline in mall units. They have hideouts throughout the Federation
of Malaya, but the largest concentrations are in the extreme southern state
of Johore and the northwestern states of Kedah and Perak, both of which border
on Thailand.
To combat the Communists, the Malayan Government has had to maintain
a fairly large force of about 150,000 troops, including British, Australian,
New Zealand, Gurkha, and Malayan elements. Fighting the Red guerrillas
has also been costly. In 1956 alone, expenditures for defense and internal
security amounted to $70 million.
11
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Malayan Communist Military and Political Organization: Communist
parties in Russia and China guide MCP policy. The aim has always been to
establish a Communist People's Republic in Malaya by overthrowing the law-
ful government. 'Though this objective has never changed since the MCP was
created in 1927, the plan to achieve it has altered frequently. Every
aspect of the political and economic life of the country ha, been watched
and, where expedient, has been exploited to further Communist Party aims.
The MCP is organized on orthodox Communist Party lines. The Central
Executive Committee is composed of some 12 ranking MCP executives under
the Secretary General's direction. This committee rarely assembles, and
actual policy direction emanates from a Politbureau consisting of three or
four members including the Secretary General. The Politbureau determines
overall policy in the name of the Central Committee. The Politbureau is
responsible for liaison with the Communist Party outside Malaya, controls
MRLA, and directs the propaganda of the Party Education and Propaganda
Committee.
The Military High Command is believed to exist in name only. It is
probably the title assumed by the Central Committee when it issues directives
to the Armed Forces.
State and Regional Committees: Although operational control normally
exists at the State Committee level there are cases where, because of geo-
graphic reasons, control in large states has been split between two Region-
al Committees. State and Regional Committees are, in fact, combined poli-
tical and military commands and issue directives on broad policy matters in
the name of the Regimental Headquarters.
Each State and Regional Committee directs a number of District Committees.
The number of districts varies from about four to seven according to the size
and geography of each state and region. The district is the main functional
level of the MCP.
Branch Committees work under the direction of District Committees.
Each District Committee supervises about four Branch Committees. The Branch
Committees control units known as Armed Work Forces. The rank and file of
these units are the link between the Terrorist Organization in the jungle
and their supporters living in the open.
The Min Yuen Movement: The Min Yuen Movement is controlled by District
and Branch Committees, which spearhead MCP political organization and are in
direct contact with the masses. Local Min Yuen organizations are called by
many names: Workers Protection Corps, People's Defense Corps, Peasant Union,
and so on. In spite of the variety of names, the general functions of these
organizations are similar and include the collection of funds for the opera-
tion of the MRLA, provision of supplies and intelligence information, dis-
semination of propaganda, provision of recruits for the party and the MRLA,
sabotage and participation in guerrilla warfare. Little is known about Min:
Yuen's inner organization other than that its leadership is very tightly
knit and consists of trusted Communists who maintain effective independent
liaison with MCP and MRLA units operating in their home areas.
12
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Tf=
MALAYAN COMMUNIST
MILITARY AND POLITICAL OPLGANIZATION
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Politbureau)
(Military High Command)
Regional Bureau
Party Education
and Propaganda
Department
District
Committee
State and Regional
Committee
Armed Forces
Department
MRLA
Regimental HQ
Branch
Committee
Min Yuen Movement
(Local Organs)
"Workers Protection Corps"
"People's Defense Corps"
"Anti-British Alliance"
"Peasants Union"
Company, Platoon,
Section
13
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Following a decision by the Central Committee in Jun 49, District
Committees organized and controlled their own armed units to back tip.Com-,
munist civil activities. Min Yuen executives have invariably led these
units. The n Y M.9 activist are truited Communists who have been given
some military raining and are empowered to form their own coaznande. These
commands are established to protect the political organization in the area
by conducting terrorist activities as needed to support either the MRLA or
other factions of the Min Yuen.
The Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA): The MCP's full time
mili-
tary organization is MR A, which carries out the military tasks of the MCP.
It was originally organized in regiments, but due to logistic dificulties
these were disbanded though their headquarters still exist in name. MRLA
now consists entirely of independent platoons,some of which are employed
on bodyguard duties and other Min Yuen activities.
At the beginning of the emergency, MRLA strength was estimated at be-
tween 4,000 and 5,000. Min Yuen's strength has never been accurately estab-
lished, but esti-aates both armed forces and the Malay police have put
it at between 15,000 and 25,000 during various stages of the conflict.
The MCPts Central Executive Committee (CEC) exercised control over the
MRLA, but since CEC lacked communications and had no fixed location, actual
control was limited to issuing policy directives and general instructions.
These were passed on to the regional bureaus which in turn disseminated them
to the State and Regional Committees. Regional Committees were organized
into various functional departments, the most important being the Organiza-
tion and Propaganda Department. In theory, each State or Regional Committee
controlled one MRLA regiment, each of which contained three battalions
organized triangularly down to platoon level. In practice considerable
variation in.the composition and strength of the various regiments has existed.
None,of the regiments developed fully.
MCP's strategic policy was laid down by its Central Committee in the
Kerdau Document, which states that in order to achieve victory the Commu-
nist campaign was to be carried out in three phases. Only in the third
phase would guerrilla warfare become a conventional war of movement. The
phases are:
One -- Guerrilla warfare is envisaged from Malaya-wide temporary bases.
During this phase enemy strength will be worn down. At the same time, the
MRLA will be built up. and all its forces will be battle tested. The Min
Yuen will also be expanded, and the MCP's civil strength will be increased.
Two -- During this phase actions begun in Phase One will be intensified.
Communist forces will undergo a further expansion and will occupy enemy bases
in smaller villages and towns throughout the Federation.
14
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CCiiFi.
Three -- Min Yuen's gradual assumption of administrative control of
areas abandoned by the enemy is envisioned. This would allow large con-
centrations of Communist forces and the establishment of permanent bases.
At this time, warfare will pass from the guerrilla phase to the war of
movement. Guarril3.a forces will, then be converted into a regular army.
Communist leaders apparently have not set a timetable for advancing
through the stages of their strategic policy. They have realized that wide
popular support must be obtained before the achievement of ultimate victory.
The gaining of such support from Malaya's diversified races has proved a
major problem. Communist strategy called for the correct treatment of the
.masses so that the masses would cooperate with guerrilla forces. When cer-
tain elements of the masses did not respond to this treatment, terror riould
be used to compel cooperation.
Communist Tactics in Malaya: Communist guerrilla tactics were those
best suited to the jungle, which covers four-fifths of Malaya. The MRLA was
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characterized by the lack of permanent bases from which to operate. Its
operations were launched from temporary bases close to its targets. Since
the MLA relied on its civilian organization, the 11i.n Yuen, for supplies and
intelligence,_mobility was increased. As a result, MRLA was able to main-
tain the initiative against bass-bound, goverrnaent security forasa. a ,
Basic units of the MRLA are the company and the platoon. To them is
alloted the mission of attacking the hard targets such as the federation
.security forces, police stations, and guarded estates.
The armed members of the Min Yuen attack minor targets and commit
sabotage. As the occasion demands, armed Min Yuen personnel will join
MRLA units for specific operations.
In practice, guerrillas attack only when their forces are superior.
In addition, they depend on surprise coupled with hit-and-run tactics to
assure victory.
Since the Communists have no facilities for the production of arms,
ammunition, or equipment, they emphasize the use of captured items. To
supplement supplies of ammunition, Communist armorers have resorted to
ingenious methods of refilling used cartridge cases.
Tactical Principles: Tactical principles taught by the MRLA were those
..used successfully by Chinese Communist guerrilla units during World War II
in China. These principles include the following:
a. Refuse to enter an engagement unless there are strong indications
that the outcome will-be favorable.
b. Use the element of surprise.
c. Do not be drawn into conventional warfare. It favors the enemy's
superior armament, training, and manpower.
d. Intelligence on the enemy must be detailed, complete, and timely.
e. Before entering an engagement prepare a detailed plan which takes
into consideration all phases of the operation including withdrawal.
f. Practice camouflage,
g. Risk engagements with security forces only when guerrilla forces
exceed enemy strength.
.h. Attack aggressively, use initiative.
i. Practice deception; never let the enemy-know where your main
effort will be made.
J. Familiarize yourself with enemy weapons so as to be able to use
captured arms immediately.
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k. Practice dispersion; it will prevent the enemy from defeating the
main guerrilla force and at the same time will force him to employ more troops
to defend vital areas.
1. Constantly seek to improve tactics and techniques,
des of Guerrilla Operations: The MRLA uses several different types
of operations. They consider the ambush and the raid the most important,
.but they use the surprise attack and sabotage most frequently.
eAmbush: The MRLA attaches great importance to the technique of
ambush, Th an operation MELA utilized whenever possible. The chief purpose
of the ambush appears to be the seizure of arms and equipment. On other
occasions the ambush is used to embarrass the government, to lower civilian
morale, or to eliminate government officials, estate managers, and other
people who are cooperating with the goverment.
Whatever the motive for the ambush, always present are the elements
of surprise, detailed planning to include concealment, well-located firing
positions, and a means of rapid withdrawal.
The MLA constantly seeks to improve its ambush tactics. This is evi-
dent-from a captured MRLA document summarizing the good points, defects, and
lessons learned from ambushes accomplished. Good points observed were:
m. Harass the enemy constantly.
1. Proper selection of the ambush site.
2. Good firing positions.
3. Courage in the assaults.
4. Ability to wait long periods in position in order to carry out
the ambush.
Defects noted were:
1. Attempts to seize arms and equipment before the enemy is eliminated,
2. Failure to place the proper reliance on covering fire.
Inability to use weapons captured.
4. Failure to use cover in the assault phase.
Lessons learned from past ambushes were:
1. Casualties can be lessened by delaying the assault until op-
position has been reduced by casualties.
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2.' Armored vehicles need not be feared if the ambushing unit is
well dug in.
3. When ambushing a patrol consisting of a Jeep and an armored ve-
hicle, one section of the attacking unit is required to prevent the armored
vehicle from assisting the Jeep. The assault must be resolute, but sources
of active resistance must first be located.
The ambush of 6 Oct 51 in which High Commissioner of the Federation
of Malaya Sir Henry Gurney was killed is a classic example.of the care and
detailed planning involved in this type of operation. Tactical surprise,
complete intelligence, and careful selection of the ambush site were ex-
ploited by the MRLA with the result that Sir Henry was killed and seven
police constables were wounded. There were no known MRLA casualties.
The guerrillas apparently arrived in the area on 4 Oct, two days be-
fore the ambush. Firing positions were selected high above the road and
well sited to give both enfilading and flanking fire on all sections of
the ambush position where there were numerous large rocks. The ambush ex-
tended over about 400-yards of narrow winding road, which any passing ve-
hicle would be forced to negotiate at reduced speed. Charging sections
were organized and stationed so as to be in position to assault any vehicle
stopped within the position.
Whether the guerrillas knew of the impending visit of the High Com-
missioner is unknown; however, shortly after occupying the position, guer-
rilla intelligence apparently notified the unit of the impending visit of
the High Commissioner to Frasers Hill and that he might pass the ambush
area. Thereupon numerous vehicles that would have been profitable targets
were allowed to pass through the ambush positions unmolested. The guer-
rillas kept a detailed log of the time of arrival, description of vehicles,
and personnel or supplies carried.- Notations in the log covered a 36-hour
period. The High Cammissionerts party consisting of four vehicles passed
through Kuala Kuba Bahru without incident. Just north of the village one
vehicle, a radio truck carrying six policemen, broke down and was left be-
hind. The rest of the party traveled another six miles and entered the am-
bush area. Guerrilla fire was directed initially at the lead vehicle and
the second vehicle. No effective fire was returned until the third ve-
hicle, an armored scout-car, arrived and engaged the guerrillas with its
Bren gun. At the sound of a bugle, the guerrilla firing ceased, and the
guerrillas withdrew.
The Raid: This type of operation has not been used as extensively as
the ambush. The main purpose of the guerrilla raid is to annihilate small
security detachments. Benefits to MRLA from such raids are the capture of
arms and equipment, economic damage to installations, and a lowering of
civilian morale, which in turn makes the masses more vulnerable to Com-
munist intimidations.
As in the case of the ambush, guerrillas depend upon surprise and de-
tailed planning to insure victory in the raid. As a basis for accurate
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NO. I FIRING
SECTION
Guerrilla Ambush of the
Sir Henry Gurney Party
Plan reduced from captured map
NO. 3 FIRING
SECTION -
NO. 3 CHARGIN
SQUAD r`
wm
--------------------------=~--- f. --i
ROUTES TO BE USED.
BY RETIRING SENTRY
SECTIONS
Y#HICL ;:Zw PE`D BYf/RE
NO. 2 FIRING
SECTION
11 NO. 2SQUADGING
19
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U-1-1 L LA-L"
planning, they insist on complete and detailed intelligence. Detailed re-
connaissance of the target area prior to the attack is stressed. .This is
accomplished sometimes by a guerrilla disguised as a rubber tapper br by
a Y member living in the area. A detailed report to include a
sketch map is submitted after the reco msiasanOS. captured germ ea
document shows the detailed type of sketch map guerrillas
to obtain prior to attacking a target.
The Surprise Attack: This type of operation is particularly annoying
to Federation Security Forces. It usually involves only one or two guer-
rillas who fire at passing trains or at home guards as they open resettle-
ment area gates.
Sabotage: The manin purpose of sabotage is the destruction of the economy
of a country. A secondary consideration is the embarrassment of the Security
Forces in the eyes of the civilian population. Since this type of operation
is frequently carried out and usually affects the common man in one way or
another in his attempt to earn a living, each act lowers popular faith in
the Government's ability to protect life and property.
ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES
Goverment Program: At the end of World War II, some colonial powers
realized it was impossible to hold their colonies indefinitely. Great
Britain gave independence to Burma and India, and created Pakistan short-
ly after the war. In Malaya, nationalism threatened to aid the Communist
insurgents materially by uniting all elements in an anti-British crusade.
Recognizing this danger and realizing that Immediate withdrawal would create
a political vacuum into which the Communists could move, Britain decided that
an immediate pullout was unwise. The Federation of Malaya agreement was
proposed. It provided for a degree of self-government,, Malayan citizenship
for all who acknowledged Malaya as their permanent home, and restoration of
considerable power to state rulers. The agreement was signed on 21 Jan 48
and became effective one month later.
A few weeks after the signing of the agreement, the Communists began a
campaign of indiscriminate terrorism, rich included murder, arson, ex-
tortion, and intimidation. To protect the country from this virtual siege,
the Federation Government declared an emergency in Jun 48, and in July the
Government outlawed the MCP.
The responsibility for conducting the anti-guerrilla campaign in Malaya
rests with the civil government. The Government's normal instrument for the
maintenance of civil authority is the police, but in the current emergency
the armed forces have been called" in to support the civil power in seeking
out and destroying armed Communist terrorism. In addition, a home guard
has been formed.
Since nearly every function of goverment is affected by the emergency,
a special system of control of operations was established to provide intimate
cooperation at all levels between departments of government and the security
forces.
20
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MALAYAN RUBBER ESTATE
RUBBER
STORE
ROOM
2
CHA/NS
2
CHAINS
Special
Constable
Post
Special
Constable
Sentry
Post
TO.BIDOR MA/N ROAD
SMOKE
HOUSE
FACTORY
Ca/rr $6 fee/
THE MALAYAN RACES LIBERATION ARMY (MRLA) TRIES TO OBTAIN EXTREMELY DETAILED INFORMATION
ON POTENTIAL TARGETS. THE DRAWING ABOVE, COPIED FROM A CAPTURED GUERRILLA DOCUMENT,
SHOWS A SCHEMATIC LAYOUT OF A RUBBER ESTATE AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION DESIRED BY THE
MRLA.
UUUUUU
21
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Emergency Operations Council (SOC): This committee is responsible
to the Government of the Federation of Malaya for the overall conduct of
the campaign and for ensuring full integration of civil government and
security force measures. EOC comprises: the Prime Minister (Chairman),
Aiinisters of Defense, Finance, Health, Interior, Agriculture, Labor and
Commerce, the Federal Director of Emergency Operations, the General Of-
ficer commanding the Federation Army) Secretary of Defense, Commissioner
of Police, the Flag Officer Malayan area, the General Officer commanding
Overseas Commonwealth Land Forces, and the Air Officer commanding RAF in
Malaya. The Federal Director of Operations is responsible for the day-
to-day conduct of emergency operations. He is not in command of any se-
curity forces but exercises operational direction and control of forces
assigned for operations against Communist terrorists through respective
security force commanders. If appropriate, he issues instructions to
State War Executive Committees.
Commanders Subcommittee: This group makes policy on the use of se-
curity forces within the overall plan approved by EOC. This committee
includes: the General Officer commanding the Federation Army, Police
Commissioner, Flag Officer Malayan area, Federal Officer commanding Over-
seas Com-onwealth Land Forces, and the Air Officer commanding the RAF in
Malaya. The EOC Director is the chairman of the Commanders Subcomittee.
To assist him, especially in implementing EOC and Commanders Subcommittee
decisions, there is a small joint staff headed by the principal staff
officer.
State Warfare Executive Committees: In each Malayan state a State
War Executive Committee exists that is responsible for waging the "war"
in the state. The committee consists oft the Chief Minister, the State
Secretary, Chief Police Officer, Senior Military Commander, State Hoare
Guard officer, the Executive Secretary, and other selected community
leaders.
District War Executive Committees: In almost every civil adminis-
trative district a District War Executive Committee is responsible for
waging war in that district. The committees are made up of a District
Officer, Acainistrative Officer, Senior Police Officer for that district,
Senior Military Commiander, Home Guard officer, and others.
The emergency operational chain of command starts at the BOG and
goes down through the Commanders Subcommittee, State War Executive Ccsn-
mittees, and District War Executive Committees.
The services chain of command is used only to enable respective com-
manders,to give orders to their own forces. For emergency operations,
however, security forces are placed at the disposal of State and District
War Executive Committees.
The police force is a federal organization commanded by a police
commissioner. It consists of 10 contingents, with each contingent commanded
22
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OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND POLICY LINES
UNCLASSIFIED
FEDERATION OF MALAYA
STATE WAR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
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by a chief police officer. Contingents are further divided into police
circles; these are supervised by the next lower ranking police officers.
The police circles are themselves divided into police districts and are
directed by police of appropriate rank,
The police are divided into regular, temporary, and volunteer police.
Police force duties are:
a. Maintenance of law and order.
b. Preserving public peace.
c. Prevention and detection of crime and the capture of offenders.
d. Protection of life and property.
e. Collection of information relevant to these tasks and to internal
security
and dissemi
i
,
nat
on of this information to the Government.
f.. Paramilitary duties necessitated by the Emergency.
The primary role of the army is to seek out and destroy Communist
terrorists in the jungle and on its fringes. The secondary role of the
army is that of supporting the federal police in the populated areas by
helping to enforce food denial measures, curfews, and so forth.
The Royal Air Force and Army Air Corps are available to support
emergency, operations. The RAF may operate independently or in direct
cooperation with ground forces. The main RAF and Army Air Corps assign-
ments are air reconnaissance, offensive air support, air supply to ground
forces deep in the jungle, troop lift, casualty evacuation, and psycholog-
ical warfare (aircraft fitted with special broadcasting apparatus and
used for making voice broadcasts over parts of the jungle known to be oc-
cupied by Communist terrorists and for the dropping of leaflets).
The Royal Navy assists by carrying out antismuggling and anti-
piracy around the coast of Malaya, amphibious landings, and bombardment
of Communist terrorist areas.
The Home Guard has a part time force composed of all races. This
force is more closely linked to the people and the Government in the
fight against the Communist terrorists through: efforts to protect homes
and villages and to deny the enemy access to such areas; cooperation with
the security forces in passing information on Communist terrorist move-
ments and agents, assuring that from the
artic
l
H
'
p
u
ar
ome Guard
s area
no food reaches Communist terrorists, and active assistance to the security
forces in offensive operations.
At the beginning-of the emergency in Jun 48 the security forces in
Malaya were charged with guarding the countr
's
d
y
pro
uction centers, such
as the rubber estates and tin mines. As the security forces grew and be-
came K.,
better organized, tactics changed
In J
51
.
un
, the Briggs Plan came
into effect. It was aimed at bringing proper administrative control to
a Population-which had never before been controlled. The main aspects
of the plan were:
1. Rapid resettlement of squatters (Chinese refugees who many times
provided Communist guerrillas with food, medicine, clothing, money, and
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ALAL"
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shelter) under the surveillance of police and auxiliary police.
2.. Regrouping' local labor in mines and on estates.
The recraitment and training of special branch police personnel.
4. The army would provide a minimum number of troops throughout
the country to support the police and would simultaneously provide.a con-
centration of forces for clearing of priority areas.
The police and army were to operate in complete accord. To facili-
tate this joint operation, control was established at all levels, and
.there. was a close integration of police and military intelligence.
The Plan also established the State War Executive Committee and the
District War Executive Committee chain of command which has functioned
ever since. This organizational setup has insured:
.1. Complete integration of emergency effort.
2. Constant security force action in support of civil power.
CONSTANT PATROLLING BY HOME GUARD UNITS A SIGNIFICANT
FACTOR IN ELIMINATING COMMUNIST TERRORISM.
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,The plan was dssentially a'thorough but long-term proposition. It
envisaged a logical clearing of the country from south to north,"leaving
behind a strong police force and civil administration once an area or state
had been cleared. It also wined to isolate the ) LA from the rest of the
rural population, thus enabling the people to feel safe to come forward
with information and thereby depriving the MRLA of their means of support.
This forced MRLA members into the open where they could better be dealt
with by the security forces.
While the Briggs Plan did not achieve a clearing of the country from
south to north, Cannunist terrorist organizations have been decisively
eliminated in roughly 5413 of the Federation's territory. Consequently,
emergency regulations in these areas have been lifted.
Malayan officials explained to the people in the cleared areas that the
responsibility was theirs for keeping the area "white" and that they could
do this by refusing to cooperate with terrorists and by promptly reporting
any Communist terrorist activity to the authorities.
In Dec 52, the Malayan Goverment decided that a forward policy would
be adopted for the control of Malaya's aboriginal tribes. This would in-
volve bringing protection and administration to the aborigines in their own
areas. Resettlement of aborigines who live in the deep jungle would hence-
forth be avoided. This policy has been implemented by the following:
1. Expansion of the Federal Government Department of the Aborigines
by the appointment of additional officers as protectors of aborigines in
the states concerned and in recruitment of field teams to work in aborgi-
nal areas.
2. Establishing a series of jungle forts in selected deep jungle
areas.
3. The initiation of special operations to find parties of aborigi-
nes under Communist domination in the deep jungle and to bring them under
Government protection.
The aims of the jungle forts were defined as follows:
To establish bases from which the federal police can give local
protection to the aborigines and from which offensive operations can be
mounted when the occasion arises.
To allow the aborigines in the selected areas to continue their
normal way of life without risk of Communist terrorist domination and to
permit an intelligence penetration of terrorist activity.
To improve the morale of the aborigines by having permanent security
force garrisons in aboriginal areas and eventually by the recruitment of~
selected men to assist in local defense.
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To provide centers from which medical and trading. facilities can be
made available to the aborigines.
Pattern of Operationss Operations against the Communists in Malaya
are categorized as:
Mopping-Up O-perations: Operations to complete the destruction. and
to prevent revival of the terrorist organizations in "white" or selected
areas. Communist organizations of the masses in such areas are usually
disrupted, and the Communists terrorists rely for supplies on casual beg-
ging and extortion. Relaxation of emergency regulations prevents denial
of food to Communists. Operations consist mainly of patrols to prevent con-
tact between the terrorists and the population. The police and home guard
make jungle patrols.
Framework Operations: These are the normal offensive operations by
which a District War Executive Committee reduces its Communist terrorist
organization when no state or federal priority is allotted. It may in-
clude any or all the parts of a major operation on a limited scale, i.e.,
gate checks, patrols to prevent contact between the terrorists and the
population, ambushes, cordon and search operations, jungle patrols, central
cooking or rationing in certain villages, and mass arrests. The essentials
for success are resources, economy of effort, and a variety of methods.
State Priority Operations: Operations in which the State War Executive
Committee decides to transfer security forces to exploit opportunities in
specific areas, usually for limited periods. Examples are large-scale cor-
don operations, multiple ambushes, intensive patrols in areas where Com-
munists terrorist groups are said to be, or strict food denial in certain areas
for a short time. On occasions the State War Executive Ccimnittee may be
provided with federal reinforcements, including air support for state
priority operations.
Federal Priority Operations: Major food-denial operations are planned on
a federal level, for which security force reinforcements are provided be-
tween target dates laid down b,-,r the director of operations. Priority is
also given before and during the operation to the provision of civil and
police officers, and for central cooking accommodations, roads, wiring,
and so forth.
Deep Jungle Operations: Operations separate from the above are
mounted to gain intelligence of Communist terrorist organization in the
deep jungle, to deny the terrorists areas for rest and retraining, to
protect and bring administration to aborigines, and to isolate the aborigi-
nes from Cammznist terrorists.
After eleven years of guerrilla warfare, Camiunist terrorists in
Malaya apparently realize the futility of achieving their goal by force.
Malayan Communists now are trying to infiltrate legitimate organizations
and-thereby overthrow the Government. The guerrillas have lost ap-
proximately 11,000 men, and their remaining paramilitary manpower, re-
duced to an estimated 700, has been driven deeper into the jungle; over
half the number have been pushed into the rugged Thai-Malayan border area.
27
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The guerrillas have,largely lost-contact with the local populace that former-
ly was the principal source of recruitment and supplies; they thus have lost'
the capability for launching any organized offensive action. British Com-
monwealth and Malayan army and police elements in cooperation with Thai
police continue to press the campaign to sxtsz%d=te the last of the ' guer-
rillas; yet that all /CO will be captured or killed is unlikely. The
Malayan guerrillas no longer are a danger to the Malayan Government, and
no resurgence of terrorism is expected.
British and Colonial Anti-Guerrilla Tactics
British and colonial forces in Malaya have developed no new principles
of jungle warfare since the 1948 State of Emergency. They did discover
that tactics used against the Japanese in World War II, modified to suit a
different enemy, were applicable to Malayan operations. While the Japanese
were organized, ready and willing to fight, the enemy in Malaya is most
unwilling to risk combat; instead, it uses intimidation, extortion, and
murder to coerce the civil population into supplying food and money. It
also employs hit-and-run tactics against the army, police patrols, and outposts
to procure ammunition and equipment. To meet the guerrilla policy of avoid-
ing combat with the security forces and to overcome the challenge of the
Malayan jungle, the British High Command in Malaya developed_a special train-
ing course in guerrilla warfare. Points eihasized were:
1. Rigid individual and collective discipline.
2. Endurance through physical fitness.
3. Expert marksmanship.
4. Automatic security precautions, including a proficiency in con-
cealment and silent movement.
5. Practice in immediate action battle drills to promote instan-
taneous reaction to ambush.
In addition to these basic requisites, warfare in the jungle demands rigid
observation of these other cardinal principles:
1, Survival in the jungle depends upon close observation; individuals
must train themselves to look through, not at the jungle.
2. Patrol carnmanders must be in a position to control their units at
all times. They should not use guides as scouts, for the function of guides
is primarily to advise patrol commanders.
3. Though sufficient distance must be maintained between individuals
and groups to prevent ambushes, visual contact should be maintained so that
silent signals can be passed between individuals and so that no part of the
patrol becomes lost.
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Since the guerrillas would not stay to fight after successful raids or
ambushes, British forces had to go into the jungle after them.--Since M.
Yuen intelligence precluded any success by patrols operating from static
bases and since principal HRLA headquarters and larger supply caches are
located deep within the jungle, British forces found the best chance for
success came when patrols of platoon strength departed from static bases
at night, maintained complete security, and penetrated the jungle for a
distance of four to twenty miles to operate from a platoon base for a
period of five to thirty days. The troops carried rations for the first
two to four days. After that the platoon was supplied by air.
These bases should be situated near but not on water. They should be
far from trails and villages, and should be near an open highground area
for airdrop resupply. (See layout for a patrol base).
If enemy concentrations are found to be too large for the platoons
to handle, the platoons will be supported by battalion reserve elements,
held at the static base.
Clashes with Communist terrorists are sudden, short,, and often so un-
expected that the opportunity to inflict casualties is lost if a leader
has to give orders at the time of the encounter. For this reason, im-
mediate action drills were and are stressed so that the immediate reaction
from a well trained patrol will be immediate offensive action. Four basic
`immediate action drills are taught on a section or patrol level.
1. The encircling attack: Intended for use only against a bandit
ambush; the Malayan guerrilla tends to fight solely from fixed ambush
positions.
2. The immediate ambush: Used when a bandit party is sighted but is
unaware of the patrol's presence.
3. The immediate assault: Used in a situation when the patrol and
the guerrillas simultaneously are aware of contact.
4. The assault on a bandit camp: Security measures employed by the
guerrillas make i.T:nnediate attack an absolute necessity once a bandit sentry
is contacted. The patrol at once discards its equipment and moves on the
double to positions according to instructions received through prior brief-
ings'and training.
The military forces in Malaya, supported by the federation police, are
using the foregoing methods to eliminate guerrillas.
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NOTE: Minimum distance,
between men - 5 yards;
between groups -.30 yards.
PATROL, PORMA IONS
ALONG TRAILS IN CLdSE COUNTRY
N:REIA-TIVeLY,.,OPEN COUNTRY
LEGENp
Section Commander
Groue.Com mander
Group Membon;
Group'.
0 Guide
S Stn (Ran)
''B Bran
R Rifle
- - "Obcervotlppn
'rosponsibil itles
,~ DORING-::1UNGLE: 4PBRA'~ip
31
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i4ow
GULF
of
SIAM
; .. IOTA SHARD
?KuE1-L114
SINGAPORE
104?
SOUTHEAST ASIA
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
AREAS OF UNREST
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LEGEND
CONMtINIST
CONTROLLED
REBEL ACTIVITIES
DISSIDENT OR
TERRORIST ACTIVITY
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A 'P
OPEUTIONS IN INDOCHINA
At the outbreak of World War II in Europe, France was compelled-to
withdraw her best troops from Indochina for employment in the European
theater. This action reduced the Prarah fighting capability in Indoahi a
and laid the colony open to vastly superior Japanese forces. On 10 Mar
45, Japanese troops and secret police imprisoned all French administrators
and most Eurasians in Indochina. The colonial status of Indochina had
ended. Elimination of the French force and its contacts severely reduced
Allied intelligence, but into the gap stepped various nationalist and
Communist groups that continued to fight the Japanese as guerrillas and
passed information to OSS. When supplying these groups with weapons,
radios, and other equipment, no distinction was made between their politi-
cal ideologies or subordination to a recognized liberation movement of the
various groups. Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas, who were better organized and
trained, emerged as the dominant force. On 6 Aug 45, Ho's guerrillas be-
came the Vietnamese Liberation Army. Two weeks later Ho claimed that the
Viet Minh controlled all of Vietnam.
French forces arrived in Saigon in Oct 45 in sufficient strength to
secure 70,000 square miles in Indochina and force Ho Chi Minh to dissolve
his divisions and regiments in the south and return to guerrilla warfare.
During the next several months the French and Viet Minh held negotiations.
Throughout the period of negotiation France landed troops at Hanoi and
established small garrisons, but incidents and fighting continued until
19 Dec 46, when the Viet Minh attacked French installations throughout
Indochina and started the war between the French and the Viet Minh.
Basic objectives of the Communists in Indochina were to drive the
French out of Indochina forever and to replace the French colonial govern-
ment with a Communist-controlled "Democratic Republic of Vietnam." The
war ended on 21 Jul 54 with a cease-fire negotiated at Geneva. The Geneva
Agreements gave the Ccwunists control of all of Vietnam north of the 17th
parallel.
The Vietnamese Peoplets Army was the final product of the original
bands of Vietnamese guerrillas who entered Binh Ca Valley in North Vietnam
late in 1944 under the command of a young Communist professor of history,
Vo Nguyen Giap.
Organized officially in 1946, the Army of the Democratic Republic was,
in the words of its leader Giap, first and foremost a political army. The
Central Executive Committee controlled the Communist armed forces. A dif-
ference existed between the measures of control the committee had over reg-
ular and semiregular forces. The Ministry of Defense took control of the
regular army while local executive committees became primarily responsible
for use and maintenance of regional and militia forces.
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The Viet Minh forces were organized under a General Headquarters com-
posed of three bureaus or directorates; General Staff., Political,- and Rear
Service.
The General Staffs' field forces branch aontrolUard the regular forces
and units whose requirements took priority over those of all other branches.
The Static Forces Branch provided the staff link between Area Commands and
the Ccoamander in Chief.
The. Viet Minh envisaged three phases in the struggle: 1) The guerrilla
phase, 2) an intermediate period, and 3) the general counteroffensive.
In the first phase, emphasis was placed almost completely on widespread
guerrilla activity. Most of the rebel forces during this phase were engaged
in establishing and consolidating guerrilla bases in the enemy's rear areas.
Towards the end of the phase, selected units were grouped together into pro-
gressively larger concentrations. These units were formed into an offensive
mass for manuever, the Viet Minh Regular Army.
In the second phase, considered as beginning in 1948 by the Viet Minh,
emphasis was shifted gradually from purely guerrilla activities to a war of
maneuver. The offensive striking force made a series of sharp attacks de-
signed to annihilate enemy forces rather than to capture territory. Mean-
while guerrilla forces continued to weaken the enemy by continuous activity
in rear areas.
The third phase commenced in Dec 53 with the general counteroffensive
of Communist-forces under General Vo Nguyen Giap. This phase was under-
taken when the Viet Minh believed that the military, political, and eco-
nomic strength of the enemy had been sufficiently weakened through a wear-
ing down process.
VIET MINH STRATEGY AND TACTICS
Viet Minh strategy and tactics were conditioned by geographic and po-
litical factors. Indochina's wealth and its population were concentrated
in the fertile lowlands of the Red River delta in Tonkin and in the Mekong
delta. Since the French occupied these important areas, the Viet Minh were
restricted principally to the economically poor and sparsely populated
mountainous regions of Indochina. The Red River delta was the primary tar-
get of Viet Minh strategy because the delta was a source of food and man-
power and close to Communist supply bases in South China. The Communists
concentrated 60% of their forces in that area. In addition, the Viet Minh
by defeating the largest concentration of French forces in Indochina could
eliminate a major barrier to the establishment of Communist control over
the rest of the country.
Throughout the war the Viet Minh made great efforts to win the people
to their side. Indoctrination of their armed forces stressed the inter-
relationship, of the array and the people. Communist political commissars
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MEMO,
MILITARY COMMAND LINES (VIET MINH)
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
POLITICAL
BUREAU
GENERAL
STAFF
FIELD FORCES
BRANCH
REGULAR ARMY
FORCES
STATIC FORCES
BRANCH
AREA COMMANDS
REGIONAL
TROOPS
REAR SERVICES
BUREAU
POPULAR
TROOPS
at every echelon were responsible for constantly impressing upon the troops
a respect for the rights and property of the people. Although the majority
of the people attempted to remain neutral, they tended to drift towards
support of the faction dominant in their particular area. Civilians in
Viet Minh-controlled territory were subjected to continual anti-French prop-
aganda. In areas occupied by the French, the regional and popular forces
often engaged only in propaganda.
Other factors which aided the Viet Minh in gaining support of the
people were:
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1) In newly captured areas the Viet Minh were lenient towards those
who had collaborated with the French.
2) The French were unable to provide complete protection for the
people within areas nominally under French military control.
3) The apparent endlesensss of the struggle disrupted many aspects
of native life.
4) The,Bao Dai Vietnamese Government was pro-French, and it demon-
strated an inability to deal effectively with Indochina's political and
economic difficulties.
5) The potential for attrition was inherent in widespread guerrilla
activities, and the Viet Minh tried to give the struggle the characteris-
tics of a popular crusade.
ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT
As an instrument of Communist aggressive expansion in Indochina, the
Viet Minh created an armed force consisting of three distinct but close-
ly allied types of combat forces.
The Popular Troops: These forces were organized to function as intel-
ligence agents, propagandists, informers, guards, terrorists, and laborers.
They would also perform guerrilla functions within their capabilities,
such as assassinations, minor ambushes, small-scale warfare, and sabotage
of communications. The popular forces played a major role in the success,
of the Communist politico-military effort in Indochina, which culminated
in Communist control over North Vietnam after the 1954 armistice. The
popular forces had a three-fold purpose:
1) To create a large reserve of partly trained manpower for the regu-
lar army.
2) To provide a means of identifying the peasant masses with the Com-
munist struggle.
3) To wage guerrilla warfare in enemy rear areas as a means to cause
dissipation of military strength.
Although the status and evolution of the popular troops depends in
large measure upon future political developments in North Vietnam, these
quasi-military troops constitute a formidable fb rce, one to be reckoned
with in any future combat action.
Popular Force Tactics: The military efficiency of the popular forces
varied widely from area to area, and was largely based on the ability, ex-
perience, and initiative of the cadre personnel. Generally, the degree?of
ideological indoctrination was more intense in North Vietnam; thus the
degree of fanatic support was correspondingly greater.
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Elaborate preparations were made to resist mopping up or pacification
in areas captured by the French Union forces. Villages located near im-
portant road srr" canal junctions or at critical terrain features were desig-
nated as combat villages. Fences of sharpened bamboo stakes were construc-
ted around such sites.
1!!!..I
TYPICAL FORTIFIED VILLAGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION; THE TYPE USUALLY CONSTRUCTED BY VIET. M1NH
POPULAR TROOPS.
The villagers became expert in the construction of underground shel-
ters that varied in shape and size. Shelters for protection against aerial
bombs and napalm normally were undercut with a minimum of 20 inches of
earth. Caches for materials, rice, and munitions were large, and the en-
trances ingeniously contrived to prevent easy discovery. Entrances favored
by the Viet Minh guerrillas have been located under ashes of fireplaces,
in buffalo stables, in pig pens, or in the midst of thorny hedges. Time
permitting, tunnels were expanded to the point where the guerrillas could
remain in hiding for days at a time, or if necessary slip through the
37.
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+r li r.rt wr.. +,~a
" ~C~ llli:~::? fti ^,
*Moe
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tunnels to camouflaged exits on the outskirts of the village, and thus
escape enemy forces surrounding their village.
In many cases tunneling was extended to link up with that of neigh-
boring villages. In this way if escape from an encircling enemy-was impos-
sible by surface means, the underground routes were used. The result at
times was an apparent dissolving of villagers into thin air, to the baffle-
ment and frustration of the French Union Forces.
. The Popular Forces proved ingenious and imaginative in the employment
of ruses, mantraps, ambushes, and delaying actions between their combat
villages and strongpoints. A favorite effective mantrap was the submerging
of sharpened bamboo barbs below the surface of the mud along muddy trails.
The barbs easily penetrated the rubber-soled sneakers worn by French troops.
These troops were organized at the district and provincial level to
train and support the popular troops; assist regular units; provide trained
replacements for the regular army; and, within their zones of action, con-
duct guerrilla warfare on an extensive scale. The organization and equip-
ment of the regional forces generally matched that of the regular army
through battalion level.
The tactics of the regional and popular units were similar to those
employed by Communist guerrillas in other countries, i.e., harassment,
ambush, and sabotage. Viet Minh tactical doctrine teaches that to be ef-
fective, guerrilla action must be continuous and must be pursued wherever
the enemy is found. The principles.of guerrilla activity as revealed in
captured Viet Minh documents emphasize secrecy, speed, deception, flexi-
bility, surprise, mobility, initiative, persistency, planning, and numeri-
cal superiority over the enemy when attacking.
THE REGULAR ARMY
These forces constituted the tactical and strategic nucleus of the
rebel forces charged with conducting offensive warfare. The regular
army's organizational development and equipment decreased in direct pro-
portion to its distance from supply bases in China. Operations were con-
ducted on an individual level at Tonkin, regimental level in Annam, and
battalion level in Cochin China. Viet Minh units in Tonkin were well
supplied and attained a combat effectiveness which compared favorably
with France's Vietnamese units. The regular units in Cochin China were
weak in supporting weapons and ammunition.
The regular army employed a mixture of guerrilla and conventional
tactics. In a divisional attack, one regiment would infiltrate enemy
lines to ambush reinforcements, another would infiltrate to harass ad-
jacent enemy strongpoints, while the third would make a frontal attack
on the main objective. This combination of tactics was partly developed
by the Viet Minh but based for the most part on the guerrilla experiences
of the Chinese Communists as handed down by the Chinese Communist advisers
to the Viet Minh. The campaign for Hoa Binh, which lasted from Nov 51
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PEOPLE'S MILITIA
main assault on flank "or rear` of
enemy strong point. Other
rear to": block,reinforceme
REGIONALd TROOPS
Create `diversion at adjacent
`strong point,; harass enemy
posts,: assist Infiltrated regulars
in'blocking reinforcements.,
PEOPLE'S. MILITIA
Mine roads, destroy bridges,
carry. out acts of terrorism
designed to pin enemy'down in.
static defense
REGULAR
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through Feb 52, illustrates tactics employing all three types of forces.
When the French seized Hoa Binh, a major Viet Minh communication
center on 14 Nov 51, strong reactions from the rebels were expected.
Although prep4ring for an autumn winter offensive elsewhere, the Viet
Minh high command quickly modified its plans and within two weeks begin
concentrating three regular infantry divisions and one artillery division
in the Hoa Binh sector. The remaining two regular-divisions in Tonkin
were deployed northeast and southwest of the French perimeter.
The announced objective of the Viet Minh was to destroy the maximum
number of French troops while driving them from Hoa Binh. To do this the
Viet Minh had to create a threat elsewhere to divert powerful French mo-
bile groups from the Hoa Binh sector. Normally regional and guerrilla
forces within the French perimeter would have been entrusted with this
mission. But these forces had been so weakened by a series of French clear-
ing operations earlier in 1951 that they were no longer capable of posing
a dangerous threat. To overcome this weakness, two remaining regular divi-
sions were infiltrated into the delta to harass the French, to divert them
from Hoa Binh, and to reconstitute the weakened regional and guerrilla
forces. Viet Minh units in the rest of Indochina were ordered to carry
out extensive activity to prevent the French from reinforcing Tonkin.
Concurrently with these moves, the divisions in the Hoa Binh area began
a series of frontal assaults on 10 Dec 51 against the French strongpoints.
These troops conducted numerous ambushes of supply and reinforcement
columns on the main French line of communication. These actions, in
which the Viet Minh suffered losses almost 20 times those of the French,
continued with diminishing strength through early Feb 52. In the mean-
time the French position in the delta had so deteriorated that only the
intervention of strong mobile forces could prevent the Viet Minh from
gaining complete control over large portions of the population. Accord-
ingly, the French withdrew their forces from Hoa Binh on 24 Feb 52 to
prepare for operations against the infiltrated regular Viet Minh units and
the rejuvenated regional and popular forces. Despite heavy losses to them-
selves, the Viet Minh achieved their objective--the French were forced
from Hoa Binh with heavy losses, and guerrilla activity in the Delta
reached a new high.
In these operations, the Viet Minh demonstrated an unprecedented
staying power, the result of improved logistic support from Communist
China. Viet Minh operations showed improved tactical coordination with
the grouping of several task forces from elements of several divisions
which alternated between frontline duty, rest, and resupply in the rear.
Importance of Guerrilla Warfare: General Vo Nguyen Giap, who is one
of the most important North Vietnamese commanders and who has been describ-
ed by the French as a master of guerrilla warfare strategy, issued in Dec
51 a directive emphasizing the importance of guerrilla warfare.
Following are quotes from this directive:
40 ? .
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It has been noted that in certain cases, although our main forces
have succeeded in annihilating only certain small posts, we manage,
nevertheless, to seize extensive areas in the free zone. In other cases,
in spite of several victories won by our troops not only did the free
zone fail to expand, but on the contrary, it shrank.
In certain places, although our troops may have eliminated 70 to
80 watchtowers, we have not been successful in establishing bases in the
region in question. In other cases, although our troops managed to des-
troy only five or six village posts and subdue a dozen or so other small
posts, we were able to set up bases in relatively strong enemy country.
The aforementioned facts prove that in order to create, protect, and
enlarge guerrilla activities, the following points must be given prime
consideration.
1) We must win the people to our cause.
2) We must issue propaganda which will permit the merging of the
people's action with military action.
3) We must attach great importance to the consolidation of our guer-
rilla bases with the local forces and to the cooperation of the latter
with the regional troops and the main forces.
In a case where the enemy attacks our guerrilla bases with superior
forces and temporarily overruns them, the consolidation of the peoples
bases and those of the communal guerrilla forces should remain our most
important concern because by consolidating these bases we will maintain
the people's support.
We must follow up our minor mopping-up operations or those made in
more important raids. We must conserve our forces and use them only on
those occasions which will be to our advantage, profiting from every oppor-
tunity to reinforce or expand our bases. We must intensify our guerrilla
activity against all enemy operations whether large or small, and finally
we must protect and enlarge our bases and positions. This is the imme-
diate mission.
To succeed in this mission the most important consideration is that
we attach proper importance to the cooperation of the people to our cause,
to the consolidation of the people's bases and those of the communal guer-
rillas.
When this mission is accomplished we will have created a condition
favorable to the development of guerrilla warfare, and we will have per-
mitted regional formations to harass and exterminate enemy elements and
to perfect their own degree of technical and tactical training.
We must never fail to remember this very important principle, not only
in the occupied zone but also in the free zone.
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The Third. Phase: General Qiap, who had successfully avoided commit-
ment of his main force, started his general offensive in Dec 53.C==.
nist forces invaded central Laos, put northern Laos under attack, threat-
ened Dien mien-Phu, and deeply penetrated the Red River Delta. On 7 May
54, Dien Bien Phu fell after a terrific battles Hostilities ended on'- 21,
Jul 54 after a.cease-fire had been negotiated at Geneva. The Geneva
Agreement placed all of Vietnam north of the 17th Parallel under Communist
control.
ANTI-Caf?4UNIST FORCES
During the first six years of the war, the French forces developed
tactics for combat against the Viet Minh that checked the Viet Minh threat
but did not grasp the initiative from them. These tactics were influenced
particularly by geographic factors, the nature of the enemy, and French
strength and capabilities.
Organization: The French forces were organized on a territorial basis
into four major regional commands. Each of these regions was divided into
zones, the number varying with the geographic nature of the region. The
zones were subdivided into sectors, which in turn usually were composed of
several subsectors.
During the war there was no unified effective military control de-
spite moves to accomplish this. Administration, command, and deployment
of the French Army were hampered by complexity and division of authority
at the goverrnnental level. In addition, significant nonmilitary partic-
ipation in control of operations added to the difficulties.
Political agreements were signed with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in
1949. Under the agreements the prewar French Provinces of Tonkin and
Annam and the prewar French colony of Cochin?China combined to form the
new state of Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos had been semi-independent French
protectorates. Upon ratification of agreements with these states by the
French Government on 2 Feb 50, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos became associat-
ed states within the French Union. The military agreements providing for
continued French operational responsibility were to remain in force until
the military situation enabled the Associated States to maintain their own
internal security.
During the war, the French Training Missions exercised all command
and staff functions on behalf of the Associated States. These missions
also functioned as the General Staffs of the country to which they were
assigned. Each country had some degree of political and policy control
through its Prime Minister, Defense Minister, or Minister of the Armed
Forces. Vietnamese Chief of State Bao Dai, Cambodian King Norodom
Sihanouk Varmen, and Laos King Sisavong Vong (now dead) were titular heads
-of their respective armies.
Activities of the French Training Missions were supervised by the
Associated States and Logistic Sections of the French Permanent Secretariat
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AMLA
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"VIAMMAM
of National Defense, which fozms part of the staff of the French High
Commissioner and Commander in Chief. French and Associated States m1l-
itary cooperation was further assured by permanent military committees
composed of Frettieh and Associated States representatives.
The subsector generally comprised the defensive zone of a single
battalion and sometimes was 150 square miles in size. Within the sub-
sector, the battalion was deployed in a number of small posts,with the
garrisons ranging from a platoon to a company in size. The infantry bat-
talion usually was augmented by several national guard and militia com-
panies, which either reinforced the garrisons of the posts occupied by
the battalion or occupied separate posts and watchtowers in the subsec-
tor. In some instances individual friendly villages were provided with
weapons and organized for their own defense. The total armed strength
of some subsectors ran as high as 5,000 troops.
Mobile reserves or intervention units were maintained at most ech-
elons. These units varied from platoon or company size in the subsector
to a mobile division at regional level. The mobile division was a tac-
tical command post established to coordinate the operations of two or
more regimental combat teams. These intervention units were employed
to relieve posts under attack or in offensive operations.
A vast net ork of static defense posts was organized in the areas
under French control. These posts varied in size and construction de-
pending on local conditions. In South Vietnam, where the Viet Minh
forces were relatively weak, the posts were mostly of mud and brick with
bamboo and barbed-wire barricades. In Tonkin, where Viet Minh units
possessed bazookas and recoilless guns, there were many reinforced con-
crete strongpoints. Centrally located posts were allocated one or two
artillery pieces of various types and calibers.
Little or no night patrolling was carried out by the garrisons of
these static defense posts. The Viet Minh were free to move over the
countryside during darkness. Posts under harassment or attack at night
were supported by artillery fire from neighboring positions if possible.
Relief forces were dispatached at night if absolutely essential; but
normally they were not sent out until after daybreak. Viet Minh assaults
continuing after daybreak were subject to air counterattacks, and mobile
relief forces attempted to encircle and destroy the Viet Minh forces.
Isolated posts in outlying areas were reinforced by paratroops unless
an adjacent landing field permitted air landing of standard-infantry units.
The motor, river, and particularly air mobility of the French forces
enabled them to carry out extremely flexible defensive operations.
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Offensive Operations: Short-range offensive forays occasionally were
made into Viet Minh-held areas as a means of forcing combat with-Viet Minh
regular forces. under conditions favorable to the French-Vietnamese troops.
In this type of action several regimental combat teams, with aunor and
artillery support, would seize an important objective, such as an enemy'
communications center, and organize positions. for all-around defense in
anticipation of counterattacks. If the objective was sufficiently im-
portant, the Viet Minh would execute repeated frontal assaults on the de-
fensive positions, thus suffering heavy losses. The operation at Hoa
Binh is an example of this type of French operation.
Since the French were usually denied military initiative, such oper-
ations were infrequent.
Counter Guerrilla Operations: The objective of these operations was
to expand the area of French-Vietnamese control or to destroy enemy units.
Operations designed to incorporate a now area into the defensive zone
usually involved the encirclement of the area by local detachments, rein-
forced by mobile elements from a higher echelon, with subsequent sweeping
of the area. Occasionally the area was cleared by establishing a single
line of departure with all elements advancing simultaneously on a broad
front between neutral boundaries. The mobile units remained in the area
? until the new posts were constructed and the garrisons installed.
The largest counterguerrilla operations were conducted in Tonkin,
where elements equivalent to five regimental combat teams supported by
medium artillery were employed in a single operation. Complete encircle-
ment was almost always the goal but was seldom achieved. The use of
naval river-craft to secure one or more of the flanks was common, and
the employment of parachute elements-frequently as many as three bat-
talions--to seal a flank or rear of the area was not unusual.
Once all units were in position, one of several methods were employed
to reduce the pocket. The "hammer and anvil" method, a simultaneous in-
ward movement of all elements, or partition of the area into several pockets,
which were then reduced individually, are two maneuvers that were tried.
Frequently no enemy units were encountered during the sweeping of an
area. This failure to make contact was occasionally caused by an in-
complete encirclement but more often by the disappearance of the Viet Minh.
PATROL IN
THE JUNGLE
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Supposedly the groups were caught in the pocket. The difficulty of
screening all individuals in the heavily populated zone of operations en-
abled the guerrillas to hide their weapons and mingle with local inhabi-
tants. Many time the rebels escaped encirclement through prior know-
ledge of the operation. False intelligence planted by agents led the
offensive forces astray, or the lack of accurate up-to-date intelligence
resulted in encirclement of an area from which the guerrillas previously
had moved.
The lack of adequate administrative, political, and economic follow-
up to otherwise successful clearing operations often resulted in the sub-
sequent infiltration by and re-establishment of Viet Minh forces in areas
cleared. Attempts were made to execute the follow up with mobile adminis-
trative groups organized by the French-Vietnam Government, but funds
needed for organization and support of these groups were limited and the
follow up proved inadequate to the task of consolidation. Individual
provinces were left with the responsibility of political and economic re-
habilitation of pacified areas.
The Viet Minh were active in subverting the population outside their
areas, and by threat of reprisal prevented the natives from cooperating
with the French-Vietnamese forces. Although not actively hostile to the
French-Vietnamese forces, the people seldom would reveal Viet Minh loca-
tions and plans. The attempt to overcome this by utilizing local troops,
both regular and militia, had mixed results. The militia were not com-
pletely reliable as they were inclined to surrender without fighting when
confronted by a superior enemy force or when under threat of reprisal
against their families. For this reason they were not issued automatic
or heavy weapons, further reducing their effectiveness.
Special antiguerrilla units were of relatively little importance
during the.war. Some small lightly armed commando units were used, and
plans for their expansion were under way at the and of the war.
Psychological warfare likewise was not emphasized, apparently in the
belief that the primary task was the defeat of enemy troops and that once
the populace was free of Viet Minh intimidation and pressure, local Viet
Minh organizations would collapse, and the people would rally to the French-
Vietnamese side.
Communist aggression in the Far East, particularly in Southeast Asia,
is likely to follow in part Mao Toe-tung's principles of guerrilla warfare.
Mao emphasized flexible yet carefully planned offensive action and close
coordination of guerrillas with the regular army. He calls for strategical-
ly located base areas from which continued guerrilla offensives can emanate.
Mao advises guerrilla leaders to learn to recognize the correct timing for
offensives and withdrawals. He points up the need for a centralized com-
mand in planning broad strategy and the necessity for decentralized command'
in battle.
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affiv
Communist actions against the British and French in Southeast Asia
were patterned along similar lines. The aims were to 1) wear down the
enemy and build up Communist military and civil strength through guerrilla'.
warfare from temporary bases; 2) expand continuously civil and military
strength and intensify attacks on communications while occupying addition-
al bases in smaller towns and villages; and 3) establish large permanent
bases and convert guerrilla forces into regular units. MRLA'e failure and
Viet Minh's success may be traced to the degree and type of antiguerrilla
operations opposing them during the war.
The British succeeded in antiguerrillA warfare where the French did
not because the British recognized Communist tactics and created success-
ful counteractions. The British effectively controlled the Malayan people
and got support from them. The French did-not accomplish this in Indochina.
Maximum Communist strength in Malaya was estimated at between 25,000 and
30,000 against British combined forces that numbered about 250,000. Ex-
pansion of Communist control would have increased Communist total forces
considerably and would have forced the British to augment their forces in
proportion. Communist forces in Vietnam were estimated at about 300,000
.while the total anti-Communist forces under the French numbered same
560,000 in mid-1954.
The British concentrated on training troops for jungle warfare; the French stuck mainly to World Wai II strategies.a Britishular
strategy prevented the Communists from establishing permanent bases in the
field. French tactics failed to accomplish this. The British exploited
psychological warfare techniques and protected the people from Communist
terrorism; the French failed to do this effectively in Indochina. The
British seized the intitiative.from the Communists and went on to victory;
the French did not.
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