PLANNING OUTLINE FOR KIDNAP-HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000200260001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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RETIRED FILE
JOB ?5 -OO_lr.
BOX_Q FOLDER CQ7
DESENSITIZED
PLANNING OUTLINE
FOR
KIDNAP-HOSTAGE SITUATIONS
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INDEX
INTRODUCTION........
. .. ..... ...... ......... ....
SUMMARY............. .......... a..
CHECKLISTS
TERRORIST THREAT ANALYSIS
Page
i
Threat Analysis ................................. 5
Possible Terrorist Objectives,........ 6
Terrorist Fact Sheet.......,,..............,..... 6
Personal Security ......... ................. ,.... 7
Local Security Measures ......................... 9
Communications-Related Defense..... ........ ..... 11
Records Systems............................,..... 14
TERRORIST INCIDENT PROCEDURES
Reaction Questionnaire.....................,,., 15
Incident Procedures... ......................,.... 18
Potential Hostage Notes....................,,.... 20
DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES SUPPLEMENT
Hostage Codes ......... ......................... 21
Command Center Operations.......... 22
Skyjacking Precautions.......................... 23
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INTRODUCTION
This working paper presents a set of basic outlines and
checklists as a quick reminder of planning factors to be con-
sidered when official personnel are.exposed to kidnap-hostage
threats. Manpower and other resource limitations, political
sensitivities, environmental factors and varying degrees of
threat will determine which of the suggested points will apply
in any given situation. For this reason, this paper should
not be considered an absolute guide for contingency planning
and is not intended to represent Headquarters doctrine.
Further, no attempt is made in this paper to make specific
recommendations or to detail individual actions which should
be implemented. Adjustments must be made to meet each threat
in its own environment.
The outlines provided in this paper are based on analysis
of several kidnap-hostage operations conducted by different
terrorist gangs including Al Fatah, the Black September
Organization and various other national groups. The conceptual
approaches indicated herein are oriented toward preventing or
recovering successfully from future acts of terrorism regard-
less of their sponsorship or intended impact.
The contents which follow are divided into five categories
for convenience in reference; i.e., Summary, Threat Analysis,
Defensive Measures, Incident Procedures and Defensive Techniques
Supplement.
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SUMMARY
Overall
1. The large number of unresolved national and inter-
national conflicts and socio-political revolutions undoubtedly
will lead to further terrorist acts by discontented persons
who see no other alternative for achieving their goals.
Terrorism begets terrorism; thus the impact and frequency of
terrorist acts will rise or fall with the success of the
terrorists.
2. Since terrorist demands cannot be met without
encouraging further acts of terrorism, there are no simple
solutions for resolving a hostage situation. The key to
the solution lies in repidly collecting intelligence on the
circumstances under which the hostages are being held. This
permits an assessment of the possibilities for saving the
hostages before time becomes critical. In some cases the
terrorists can be convinced of the futility of their operation,
and thus be motivated to release hostages in exchange for
their own safe passage to a friendly country. Fanatical
terrorists should not be expected to accept this latter
solution, commonly referred to as "The Bangkok Solution"
because of its successful use by the Thai Government in that
city on 29 December 1972.
Local Government
3. The local government usually is anxious to end the
incident quickly without providing a target for terrorist
retaliation and will favor the least amount of adverse pub-
licity. There is a strong tendency for top government
officials to become directly involved, which usually com-
plicates the situation unnecessarily and gives the terrorists
an inflated idea of their power. The government usually is
experiencing the hostage situation for the first time, for
terrorists tend to pick an area where they can achieve
surprise. The effectiveness of the government's :response
hinges on the magnitude of the threat perceived against its
national interests, and demands for its success the presence
of skilled intelligence and security officers.
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Holding Site
4. The site chosen for holding hostages in public view
is usually a building associated with the hostage's pattern of
action and which can be guarded by a limited number of people.
It can be assumed that the terrorist has preplanned the location
of the holding site but that the location is not necessarily
invulnerable to rescue attempts. Vulnerabilities might include
such things as a power supply which can be cut, food supplies
which are limited or can be denied, lines of approach unknown
or unobserved by the captors, and communication facilities
which permit outside monitoring or control by the host government.
-5. Most terrorist spectaculars are planned to obtain the
greatest possible media coverage. The Munich Olympic Village
and Khartoum incidents are examples of terrorist operations
designed with the media in mind, Captital cities and multi-
national events can and do attract terrorists simply because
of the presence of the international press. Thus, control of
media coverage of the'incident becomes a significant negotiating
factor. Permitting publicity for the incident in return for
the release of hostages becomes a possible basis for saving
hostages.
Terrorists
6. These are usually young men or women who are reasonably
well educated and generally come from middle-class families.
They often are stimulated by Communism or other revolutionary
ideologies and may be willing to die for their "cause".
Generally speaking, terrorists have few interests, affairs,
sentiments, attachments, or property -- they have broken their
connection with the social order, law, convention and morality.
In one way or another they are psychotics who ideally ought to
be dealt with only with the assistance of a psychiatrist.
Understanding their objectives can be a great help in analyzing
their motivation. They usually are engaged in their first
operation of this kind and are subject to fatigue, which becomes
a vulnerability if the operation can be stalled long enough.
Evidence of poor planning on the part of their sponsors or local
support organizations also serves to weaken their resolve.
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Hostages
7. Except for mass hostage situations, such as an airline
skyjacking, individual hostages usually are selected from those
persons, groups, or governments that the terrorists regard as
symbols or instruments of oppression. The potential hostage is
selected because of his relative importance to the target group
or government which might be asked to make concessions in
exchange for the hostage's safe return. Thus, the victim is
targeted for what he represents rather than for himself.
Experience shows it is very important for the hostage to retain
his dignity and to be unrelenting in his efforts to discover
vulnerabilities in the terrorists' defense.
Communications
8. Couriers, deaddrops, cutouts, voice radio, CW, tele-
phones, mails and the diplomatic pouches of sympathetic
governments all provide a variety of communications options
that can be used by terrorists to support an operation. Each
terrorist group is likely to favor one system over another.
Under most circumstances, simple voice codes or phrases are
used for safety signals or for controlling an operation.
Several major terrorist organizations operate their own radio
stations and can use these to pass coded voice commands that
may determine the final disposition of a hostage. Cutting
communications between the terrorists and their sponsoring
organization can adversely effect their leadership and thus
produce a vulnerability for exploitation.
The Intermediary
9. Negotiations for concessions in exchange for hostage
release usually are accomplished via an intermediary who is
thought to be sympathetic to the terrorist cause ?-- or, if
the terrorists have no choice, represents a group or government
that is neutral. Such intermediaries will sometimes be given
access to hostages to prove that the latter are still alive,
or they at least will meet with individual terrorists under
prearranged conditions. This access is frequently the only
opportunity for obtaining intelligence necessary to develop
a rescue operation.
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Tactics
10. Experience shows that it is usually inadvisable to
attempt an assault on the terrorists' position, as this
probably means the instant death of the hostages. When there
is sufficient intelligence to indicate a reasonable vulner-
ability in the terrorists' defense, a rescue operation may be
planned, but it should be undertaken only if it is easily
within the capabilities of the personnel involved. Granting
the terrorists safe departure from the country in return for
the safety of the hostages is one possible alternative, but
it depends upon complete control of the situation surrounding
the terrorists' location.
Time
11. Local terrorist groups have held hostages for weeks
or months, whereas most of the international terrorist
organizations attempt to complete their hostage operations
within 12 to 48 hours. This time limitation is intended to
prevent the target government from developing an effective
response. Terrorists have learned from experience that their
best chance of success lies in an operation of short duration.
Because of the importance of time in hostage rescue operations,
it is essential that maximum advance preparations be made.
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I M_
TERRORIST THREAT ANALYSIS
Threat Analysis
1. What dissident, subversive, terrorist or other
elements reside within the host country?
2. Do international or third-country terrorist organi-
zations have support and/or action components assigned to the
host country?
3. What is the record and modus operandi of past
terrorist operations, and what is the frequency of incidents?
4. If you were targeted as a potential victim, where
would terrorists probably initiate the kidnapping, or seizure?
5. Assuming any specific terrorist group succeeded in
taking you as a hostage, where would you probably be held?
6. What factors regarding your activities and/or move-
ment patterns unnecessarily expose you to a possible kidnapping?
7. In cases of seizures, airline skyjackings, or other
mass hostage operations, why might you be singled out for
special attention?
8. What unusual events normally precede a terrorist
kidnapping or seizure -- either within or outside the host
country?
9. What disposition is usually made of the hostages of
those terrorist groups with which you are familiar, and what
time factors are involved?
10. In cases of negotiated release, what individuals or
groups might be used as a go-between?
11. What are the usual communication channels or systems
used by terrorists for command control and/or negotiations?
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12. What is the ethnic and psychological profile of
those terrorist leaders with whom you might come in contact,
and what are their grievances or political objectives?
13. Have terrorists tended to panic upon learning they
are threatened or that governments will not bargain for
release of hostages?
14. Under what conditions have most hostages been held,
and what circumstances have led to their release or execution?
Possible Terrorist Objectives
1. Publicity, propaganda, and/or influence.
2. Political concessions.
3. Finance by ransom of hostages and/or aircraft, etc.
4. Release of fellow terrorists.
5. Expanded control via induced fear.
6. Worldwide attention to grievances they have been
unable to resolve by legal means.
7. Elimination of principal opponents.
8. Consternation among all the groups, factions, and/or
nations who oppose their "cause".
9. Expanded use of target government repressive measures
which tend to create sympathy for the terrorists.
Terrorist Fact Sheet
NOTE: All potential hostages should memorize the following
assuming that they may be the primary source of intelligence
on the terrorists during an on-going incident -- provided that
some means of clandestine communication an/or monitoring
capability can be made available,
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1. Who are they, how many, how organized, what; is their
motivation, and what are their basic objectives?
2. What are their linguistic, technical, and communi-
cations capabilities?
3. Where located, how armed, how equipped, current
status, and degree of mobility?
4. What are their psychological and/or physical
vulnerabilities?
5. How is command and control exercised?
6. What are the terrorists, probable courses of action
under any given set of circumstances?
7. When, where and how might outside support be
provided?
8. What are the minimum concessions the terrorists
will accept in exchange for hostage release?
DEFENSIVE MEASURES
Personal Security
1. Instruct all personnel to periodically alter modes,
times and routes of movement.
2. Where possible, avoid making advance appointments
or establishing routine schedules.
3. Limit regular travel by personal vehicle unless
appropriate plans are made for en route protection, e.g.,
armed escort, scout vehicles, car swapping, random routes
or other techniques.
4. For private residences consider fences, dogs, geese,
ducks, and/or guinea fowl to provide exterior alarm -- while
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installing adequate hardware to preclude a hasty forced entry.
(If the situation warrants, guards also should be considered.)
5. Consider armed guards, alarms, fences, control
zones, hardware and other protective procedures to deter all
possible types of hostile action against office facilities.
6. Conduct periodic security investigations on all
indigenous employees having access to officers' residences,
vehicles, and/or place of work.
7. Initiate or accelerate intelligence/counterintelligence
efforts focused on terrorist organizations and their sponsors
or supporters.
8. Assist host government security forces in screening
internal and external travelers for suspected terrorists or
persons having similar profiles.
9. Surveil the movements of foreign diplomats or other
persons who might offer communications or other support for
terrorists.
10. Photograph and surveil all'strangers moving in or
out of foreign embassies sympathetic to the terrorist cause.
11. Establish "block warning systems" whereby local
residents can immediately alert security forces if suspect
persons or activity is observed.
12. Train all personnel in countersurveiilance techniques
and other clandestine tradecraft that may be used for personal
defense.
13. Qualify selected individuals in the use of small
arms and provide them with appropriate weapons. Headquarters
approval., in accordance with FR 10-27, is needed in each case.
14. Retain maps of all potential target areas to include
floor plans and defense plans for key buildings.
15. Check airline passenger lists and hotel registrations
on a daily basis .against known terrorist lists by true names
and aliases.
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16. Stimulate host government security forces to maintain
port of entry surveillance and tighten passport/visa control.
17. When possible, utilize technical penetration and/or
wire taps to monitor points of terrorist contact or support.
18. Watch for thefts of automobiles, explosives or
weapons and relate stolen items to plausible terrorist
operational concepts.
19, Restrict movement and set curfews as needed.
Local Security Measures
1. Establish a focal point for all terrorist control
operations.
2. Develop special skills needed for counterterror programs.
3. Assign functions by order of priority.
4. Create filing and records management system designed
to facilitate identification and control of terrorists.
5. Identify intelligence gaps.
6. Survey and assess priority targets.
7. Determine what existing or potential assets might
be exploited to cover key targets -- assuming access exists
or is readily obtainable.
8. Solidify collection goals and performance standards
desired.
9. Develop overt and covert collection operations.
10. Monitor travel, activities, and communications of
suspected terrorists or potential support assets for same.
11. Target suspect foreign nationals and obtain available
intelligence data from third-country/international services or
sources.
Wno
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12. Establish priorities for human and/or technical
exploitation.
13. Identify existing and/or potential terrorists and
their sponsors or supporters on a local, national, multi-
national or international scale.
14. Collect all pertinent data on terrorist modus operandi.
15. Develop access to, and informant capability within,
those dissident elements which have provided personnel or
support for terrorist operations.
16. List and refine essential types of support needed by
terrorists, and attempt to control, reduce, and/or eliminate.
17. Separate, control, and/or isolate those persons who
provide the leadership, motivation, dedication or expertise
essential to the conduct of terrorist operations.
18. Locate and exploit all safe havens, contact points,
training sites, caches, communication facilities, and other
fixed/mobile installations used by suspected terrorists.
19. Review the intelligence and counterintelligence
apparatuses of human and technical sources that can be
redirected to neutralize terrorist organizations.
20. Develop the capability to monitor, exploit, and
control those terrorists under judicial control.
21. Arrange for third-country monitoring of key terrorist
personalities within their areas of influence.
22. Provide for detailed collation, analysis, targeting,
and exploitation of all information and/or intelligence.
23. Utilize agents of influence to stimulate the formation
of popular attitude and laws which will create the basis for
dealing effectively with terrorists,
24. Implement political and propaganda operations designed
to erode the terrorist's base of support.
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25. Develop counterterror contingency planning, placing
emphasis on non-repressive action which will avoid antagonizin
the general populace.
26. Stimulate the creation of programs designed to bring
dissident eloments into the national, social, economic, and
political "mainstream" thereby reducing the terrorists potential
base of support.
27. Discourage media coverage of any and all terrorist
incidents while th yg are in progress -- then after the fact,
attempt to encourage reporting derogatory to terrorists.
28. Create plans for limiting knowledge of how the govern-
ment will deal with terrorists duri.-tg an on-going incident and avoid statements of specific intent regarding future
terrorist action.
29. Identify and develop potential intermediaries who
would be acceptable to potential terrorists, but who likely
could be influenced to assist hostage release.
Communications-Related Defense
NOTE: The application of technical equipment to counterterror
operations is a particularly frustrating area. if everything
was on hand as needed, counterterror would be a lot easier to
handle. However, there is no way to stockpile enough technical
equipment for everybody and there is usually not sufficient
time after an incident has started to get needed equipment into
place. It should also be noted that in many cases the actual
equipment desired does not exist on the shelf but is something
which may have to be fabricated to fit a given situation.
1. Establish periodic radio or telephone check-in
procedures whereby all personnel advise their location and
status to an alert center having the authority and capability
to immediately react to determine why an officer has failed
to make his safety report on time -- and to initiate appropriate
action as needed.
2. Consider equipping potential target personnel and/or
their cars, homes and offices with miniature self-activated
"bugs" or beacons that can be used to relay immediate alert when
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an attack occurs. NOTE: The equipping of personnel, etc. with
beacons is definitely subject to technical limitations. In
general, beacon performance is in inverse proportion to the
density of buildings. They are much easier to locate in a small
town than in a major metropolitan area. If their intended use
is primarily to set off an alarm, as opposed to serving as a
means of following a person or vehicle, a specific alarm system
would have to be created for each person or place. It would
have to cause an action that would draw attention, such as set
off a siren, and be readily identifiable as to who or what was
under attack. The greater the number of persons, vehicles and
places so equipped, the greater, of course, would become the
complexity of monitoring the systems.
25X1 C8
4. Provide for alternate means of communications with
higher headquarters in the event primary facilities are seized
or otherwise rendered inoperative.
5. Prepare and advise all personnel of word, phrase,
gesture, or other codes which may be used by hostages to realy
information by phone, letter or via intermediaries.
6. Consider contingency plans to control, monitor, block,
jam or cut all communications which might be used by a terrorist
group. NOTE: This is also a complex problem. communicating within a citvialem. Two groups of
thing. One y portamobiles is one
g. group receiving instructions via conventional radio
broadcasts fr
d
om a
istant country is another. The range of
25X1A3b
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25X1A3b
7. Predetermine probable conditions under which media
coverage may be granted in exchange for concessions from
terrorists. In any event, arrange to prevent, guide, limit,
and/or control media coverage of any terrorist incident until
it has reached a conclusion.
8. Consider two-way communications between teams of
officers assigned to backstop each other during vulnerable
periods of movement or operation -- and schedule activities
so that oneofficer may come to the immediate aid of his "buddy".
If circumstances warrant, two-way masked communications between
teams of officers can be readily provided -- for example RS
523s or SRS 45s.
9. Install push-button activated sirens, flares, flood-
lights or other systems at offices, homes, and on cars for
emergency alert and/or as a means to foil an attack.
10. Create a bilateral or multilateral command control
center with constant 24-hour communications, and the established
capability to coordinate all resources that might be used to
deter, negate or react to a terrorist attack. (Therein,
establish the focal point for intelligence collation and
analysis to provide potential advance alert to all hostile
actions.)
11. Be prepared to record all conversations during any
terrorist incident to facilitate on-going and/or after-action
analysis. In this connection it is suggested, in addition to
tape recorders and actuators, that an induction coil be com-
bined with a tape recorder to record conversations on an untapped
phone wire -- for example, an embassy phone which the terrorists
have called in order to announce their demands.
12. Maintain an open communications or dialogue with
liaison services and/or potential intermediaries.
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Record Systems
1. Maintain biographic and essential data files on all
personnel (plus dependents) who may be subjects of terrorist
attack.
2. Establish record systems for emergency communication,
escape, evacuation and contact plans relating to all personnel.
3. Record points of contac and contact instructions
individuals who would be
called upon for assitance in event of a terrorist attack.
4. Repeat the above procedure for previously identified
technicians, specialists, potential intermediaries, support
personnel and other unilateral assets.
5. Create and/or expand all source intelligence files
on terrorist leaders, groups and individuals, plus their
sponsors or supporters.
6. Record modus operandi for all terrorist organizations
and retain mug shots and/or biographic profiles for all known
terrorists regardless of status or location.
7. Establish a target and op plan record for all
previous incidents of terrorism.
8. Record all information relating to meeting sites,
safehouses, cover organizations, support elements, personnel,
and/or mechanisms having any known or suspected connection with
terrorists.
9. Obtain maps, diagrams, and defense plans of all
potential target and operational areas to include transpor-
tation terminals, e.g., airports, docks and rail stations.
10. Maintain in the duty officer book a detailed list of
instructions on specific actions to be taken in event of a
terrorist threat or incident -- this instruction to contain
command control procedures, alteiring sequence, chain-of-command,
and other pertinent data. Duty books also should contain a
Reaction Questionnaire and/or Incident Procedure as exemplified
in the following two sections.
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TERRORIST INCIDENT PROCEDURES
Reaction Questionnaire
25X1 C8a
Communication
8. What types of communication are believed or known
to be available to terrorists, and how might these be employed
for command/control?
9. Has action been taken to disrupt terrorist com-
munications, and if not, why not?
10. What types of communication systems are being
-used by liaison services, and how are these employed?
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11. What capability exists for immediate communication
25X1C8a between ommand elements at the embassy,
and/or the host government leadership?
12. What is the status of embassy communication
with Washington, and is there a possiblity that such commu-
nications might be delayed or disrupted?
13. In the case of a hostage, is the victim equipped
with any clandestine communication system?
Physical
14. Where, how and under what conditions are
terrorists deployed?
15. What routes of entry and/or escape might be
used to gain access to, or exit from, the terrorists'
present: location?
16, If terrorists use hostages to demand safe passage,
what routes might be used?
17. What physical attributes of the terrorist's
present location, or probable movement routes, would facilitate
an ambush and/or other surprise action?
18. Have detailed maps, building blueprints, utility
layouts, and other physical data being used in answering ques-
tions 14 through 17 above?
19. In cases of skyjacking or use of aircraft for
escape, what physical attributes of airports and/or aircraft
might be used to negate on-going or indicated terrorist action?
20. What are the physical advantages and disadvan-
tages of the terrorist's current location and/or disposition?
Logistics
21. What items of equipment are immediately avail-
able to support operations against terrorists? (Consider
weapons, ammo, explosives, starlight scopes, cameras, heli-
copters, vehicles and other appropriate items.)
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22. What equipment is now in sue by
23. What equipment is knwon to be available to
terrorists?
24. How might available equipment be employed to
negate pr.esent and/or intended terrorist action(s)?
Negotiations
25, Have the terrorists been told that their demands
will be met in order to gain time to develop the best possible
response?
26. Has every effort been made to conceal the fact
that terrorist demands might not be met?
27. What preparations have been made to meet
terrorist demands in the event no other alternative is
possible?
28. If inaction or a no bargaining position is
to be taken, have all the consequences been evaluated fully?
29. How can any bargaining be conducted best to
facilitate release of any hostages while increasing chances
that terrorists will be killed or captured?
Expertise
25X1C8a 30. What special skills are available from
(Consider bomb disposal squads, snipers, radio
direction finding units, teletap teams, camera crews, tech-
nical personnel, communicators, and other that might be
appropriate to the situation.)
31. What special skills are available from the
American and/or foreign community such as intermediaries,
and would the host government permit their use during the
current crisis?
32. What special skills have been evidenced by
the terrorists, and what other might they probably have?
25X1 C8a
25X1 C8a
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1T,.1 Tli1}7T Tr wY TT hT*R
33. Has a senior officer been put in charge of
counterterror operations and does he have the ability and
authority to really take command in time of crisis?
Incident Procedures
1. Consider a joint crisis management staff composed of
representatives from and appropriate foreign 25X1C8a
governments.
2. Activate the Joint Operations Center to assure
effective command/control of any rescue attempt.
3. Monitor, control, cur and/or "jam" all communication
systems that might be used by the terrorists.
4. If feasible, deploy host government security forces
to create a tight, effective, and inconspicuous "cordon"
which isolates the terrorists, prevents their escape, and
precludes any outside assistance.
5. Arrange the removal of all unauthorized personnel
from inside the above "cordon", and advise security forces
to keep out of terrorists' view so as not to exacerbate
tensions.
6. If terrorists escape by foot, consider use of trackers
and/or tracking dogs.
7. Screen and question local residents near kidnap
scene to attempt to determine routes of travel.
8. Be prepared to trace telephone calls and/or surveil
couriers as one means to locate general area where hostage
is being held.
9. Select possible locations "where a specific terrorist
group might hold the hostage in question, assuming you have
determined who is responsible.
10. Organize a systematic search procedure using several
small teams composed of local residents to avoid giving
terrorists any advance alert.
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11. Utilize intelligence/informant networks too obtain leads
on terrorist safehouses or known locations where hostage might
be held.
12. Consider selective use of mobile surveillance teams
to help pinpoint hostage location.
13. If feasible, employ direction finding techniques
for those hostages previously equipped with concealed beacons.
14. Contact terrorists to determine if and with whom they
will negotiate for release of hostages. Use communication
techniques which will avoid exposure during initial contact.
15. Select potential intermediaries to deal with the
terrorists.
16. Once terrorists agree on a specific intermediary,
a decision must be made regarding whether or not this individual
can be trusted with the secret words, phrases or gestures the
hostage has been instructed to use for passage of information.
17. Instruct the intermediary to try to see the hostage
to assure that he is alive. He might even ask that the hostage
be allowed to write a note stating that he is alive and safe.
This might then be used to pass code words, phrases and/or
punctuation marks.
18. Avoid terrorist contact with members of the press, and
control all details concerning the incident reaching the press
until the incident has reached a conclusion.
19. Inform appropriate government agencies and leaders
immediately and fully of all the factors concerning the
terrorist incident and present specific terrorist: demands with
a request for guidance on how to respond to them.
20. The negotiations with terrorists in hostage situa-
tions will fall within the official responsibilty of the
concerned foreign government. Personnel are reminded that
the U.S. Government will not compromise with terrorists and that
it is contrary to U.S. policy to submit to international black-
mail or extortion any place in the world. In past incidents
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involving terrorist operations the U.S. has consistently
both encouraged and solicited foreign governments to main-
tain a firm posture with relation to terrorist demands.
Implementation of this policy by the negotiator must obviously
be undertaken very carefully in order to avoid precipitous
action on the part of the terrorists.
21. Plan a release operation in detail as son as it is
knwon that a hostage has been taken. When it is impossible
to bargain with the terrorists, one must assemble all necessary
forces, weapons, equipment, and/or expertise and place them
under a centralized command -- preferably that of the Joint
Operations Center. Rehearse the operation to avoid the usual
pitfalls occurring in "ad hoc" operations.
22. Accomplish the above actions within a 12-to 24-hour
time period, with the knowledge that most terrorist groups
plan to conclude their operation: before adequate responses
can be developed. (Experience has shown that a delay beyond
48 hours heightens the risks that the terrorists will kill their
hostages.)
Potential Hostage Notes
1. Maintain your dignity and avoid taking any action
which might provoke the terrorists,
2. Start thinking about escape the minute you are
captured. Your best chance to escape will usually occur
during the confusion of the attack.
3. Do not volunteer information about yourself or
any other subject.
4. Attempt to convince terrorists that the only hope
of accomplishing their objectives is to assure your safety.
5. Make careful observations regarding the terrorists
and the situation so you can provide vital intelligence to
your potential rescuers -- assuming a means of communication
has been or will be provided.
6. As one possible means of communication, remember
"key" words, phrases, and gestures you will need to signal a
friendly intermediary and/or other contact.
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7. Assess the determination of the terrorists to
accomplish their mission.
8. In appropriate situations, sympathize with the
terrorist cause and attempt to convince them of your desire
to cooperate, within limits, which would not embarrass you
with your government.
9. Avoid any outward expression of fear, panic, or
hatred which might stimulate an automatic hostile reaction
from the terrorists.
10. Convince the terrorists that patience will gain
them at least some the objectives they seek, that delays
or negative responses are inevitable but that the local
government eventually will meet part of their demands.
11. Attempt to buy time with the above techniques and
any other you can improvise, as you must give your potential
rescuers a chance to fully prepare their response.
DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES SUPPLEMENT
Hostage Codes
1. Establish key punctuation codes to be memorized by
all potential kidnap victims for possible use in written
communications, e.g., small open circles for periods might
indicate the authentication and'safety of a victim.
2. Written words or phrases should also be preplanned
to further facilitate possible victim communication. For
example, the phrase "I am safe" could be followed by "as
always" to relay the victim's message that his kidnappers
probably do not intend to take no for an answer.
3. Single written code words can be used but must be
carefully selected to avoid error. Specific colors, clock
times, or direction offer possible options for relaying a
particular message.
4. Signature codes can be used by preplanning certain
unusual characteristics in a person's signature, This is
'1'1 T T
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also a good way for a victim to indicate that he has been
told exactly what to write, and that he had no chance to use
other written codes.
5. Voice codes must also be preplanned in the event the
victime is allowed to verbally communicate by phone or via a
controlled intermediary. Usually these are short simple
sentences which convey a prearranged message in the context
of making another open statement, e.g., "give Mag and the
children my love if I don't return."
6. Gesture codes are simply prearranged signals that
provide a restrained victim with the means to relay programmed
messages to an intermediary or other controlled persons who
might be allowed to see him. Normally, these gestures would
have no meaning to anyone else not having access to the signal
plan. Examples include twitching of the mouth or eye or jerking
the shoulders as if the arm were asleep.
7. In an emergency when no communication code is available
a "sound-code chart" can be made. This is a means of identifying
a phrase -- "I'm ok" or "they mean business", etc. If nine
phrases were each located in a box on a nine box diagram and
the columns of boxes numbered three across and three down then
the intended phrase could be easily identified. One tap or
cough followed by two would indicate one over and two down, etc.
8. Codes must be kept secure and they should be developed
specifically for a particular situation including the specific
personalities involved. It is for this reason that detailed
codes are not provided herein.
Command Center Operations
1. Provide or otherwise identify a six- to ten-man
physical facility easily secured and limited in access.
2. Equip this facility for eventual use as a joint crisis
control center (C3) by installing primary and emergency commu-
nications with all internal security services.
3. Select and train a six- to 10-man C3 Staff in the
alerting, responsive reaction, and command-control procedure to
be used in the event of a terrorist incident.
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4. Identify, train and prepare those internal security
elements who will be immediately responsive to C3 requests
for commo teams, cordon units, sniper squads, technical
support, intelligence research, recovery action, medical
assistance, release negotiations, or other specializations
as required.
5. Install maps, city plans, building blueprints, air-
port layout and other essential reaction data within immediate
area of the C3 communications systems.
6. Establish necessary legal and jurisdictional authority
for operations of the C3 as the only authoritative command-
control element during a kidnap-hostage situation.
7. Initiate operation of the C3 with a "gamed" kidnap-
hostage operation or other terrorist incident, and repeat
these practice exercises on a monthly basis with the objective
of upgrading performance.
8. Seek outside assistance in C3 organization as required
remembering that efficiency and a high standard of performance
will be required in an actual kidnap situation.
9. If government elements resist organization of a
separate C3, a similar capability may sometimes be developed
within an existing police dispatch or complaint center, or
a Joint Operations Center used by military forces.
Skyjacking Precautions
25X1 C4e
2. Avoid airlines and airports not using normal security
precautions.
3. Do not reveal travel plans in advance, and deal with
cleared booking agents to make reservations within the minimum
time frame.
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4. If possible, route yourself around those airport
facilities and/or areas where terrorists have been active
within the last six months.
5. Observe for suspicious persons based on profiles
of known terrorists and be prepared to take another flight
if the situation seems insecure.
6. Survey protective cover and routes of emergency exit
from waiting areas in air terminals, and be prepared to use
if necessary.
7. Be prepared to take quick protective action while
boarding.
8. If seat selection available on aircraft, choose window
seat near emergency exit or aisle seat near doors.
9. Read and familiarize yourself with airline provided
evacuation diagrams.
10. Be prepared for a quick exit from your seat at all
times, but make sure that your seatbelt is fastened while
airborne.
11. If skyjacked, remain calm and observant while following
directions of flight crew. Few persons have the opportunity
for heroism aboard a skyjacked aircraft.
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