DOCUMENT CONTAINING MARCH 1951 RESOLUTION OF PHILIPPINE COMMUNIST PARTY POLITICAL BUREAU ON CHINESE BUREAU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R009200110011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 14, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CLASSIFICATIQ
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
1-
A
Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP8 M00457R00920011025X1p10
A
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.
COUNTRY Erai.1.ip sin s
SUBJECT Document, Containing arch 1951 Resolution
25X1 A of Philippine Core t Party Political ..Bureau
PLACE
ACQUIRE
DATE DISTR., 14 Nov, 1951
NO. OF PAGES 3
0. OF ENCLS.
25X1A
DATE OF CULATE RUPPPLETM~EONT TO
INFO. 25X1X
The following report is based ona document containing a resolution of the
Political Bureau (PB) of the Philippine Communist Party on the relations of
the Party with the Chinese Bureau (CB), a liaison group originally designed
to coordinate the activities of the Pbnilippine and Chinese CorrwAist Parties,
which was dated 12 Perch 1951. This document was included with other docu---
mentary material which was captured by Manila. Police Department officials in
raids on HNl3 and Co uma.ist centers in Manila during late September 1951.
SO 73911..*, which this report supplements, was based on a summary of this
document, and it referenced previous reports on certain persons and Party
organs which appear in the docent.
1. The CB is an organ of the CP functioning am^ng the Party and masses of the
Chinese in the Phi:lipnines. At 'present, however, although it renains
nominally an or .n of the CP, in reality, it acts independently of the CP;.
(Since the arrests in Manila, this situation is inevitable, since con-
nectlons have been out).1-
2. Such was not the case at the beginning. Before the Japanese War of
aggression, the Chinese corrades in the Philippines were members of the
CP in nrime and in fact. They belonged to different organs of the CP, and
It was- only because of the certain difficulties in language and underground
work that they were forced to establish separate groups, but all the tiaae,
they were carrying out the policies and decisions of the CP. During the
Japanese occupation of the PHiliinines the Chinese Bureau remained a
part of the CP in mint of fact. Chinese corrade3 were members of "fifferent
organs of the CP, from the national to the regional organs? There were
others who were in the .Army, organized into separate squadrons. During the
early part of "Liberation" it continued its early relations. Houaver, during
this period, there already appeared signs of separAtisrm among the Chinese
comrades in the Philippines. They consistently refused to make their finan-
cial and organs national report to the CP. T1iis, in spite of the fact that
there was a Chinese comn'ad.e in the PB, e1
a 9/g.2 Document No. _---
No Charge In Class. El
lkeslasstled
Class. C Angpd To: TS S Q
Auth.s HR 70.2
Date: ~' AUG 1915 __ '
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. OFFICIALS ORLY 25X1 A
MATION
DICE ACEHCI
3.
4.
The relations of the OP (as a whole) and (its part) the CB, progressively
deteriorated from here on. The Chinese eomradee in the PB left the Philip.
pines without approval of the PB. Severs, other members of the CB followed
suit without CP approval. This happened when the Chinese comrades in China
were starting to get the upper hand in their struggle against CHIABG KaL-sh?k.
Almost simu1taneousl,7 there appeared in the Philippines an organ called "OR O"
(thee initial for Overseas Chinese Office), whose real identity, function and
power', the CP never got to knowing f lly.3 During the Amnesty Period, the
eplittere, Castro, Lat eeta, and others utilized the issue of amneet3r to get
the support of the Chinese comrades in the Philippines in their splitting
tactics directed against the OP. The MO believed C,estro and his group,
and it wrote a memo to the PB castigating the PB for expelling Castro and
his group and defending the latter, calling for a reconciliation of the two
lrree oncil3able ideologies.
The PB wrote a memo to the ORO eritioizing the ORO for its unscientific out.
look, in making conclusions without factual foundations, and without even an
attempt to ascertain the facts. They made conclusions based entirely on the
gossip of Castro, and that the latter were expelled because of their opposi-
tion to the Amnesty, from then on, the relations of the OP to the CD has
been a ^thing but corrupt.4 The pro3ected sending of Comrade Torres and
p5 to China to study, and the projected meeting of some PB members with a
genuine representative of the CPC never n aterialized.6 The real reason behind
this Is still unknown to the OP. At present, the CB to functioning either
by itself or as part, of the CPC, and having some horizontal relations with
the CP. Hence, the anomalous situation of the part functioning independently
of the whole.
5. The present anomalous situation is a result of the historical background of
the Chinese Party members in the Philippines. There were Chinese party
members in the Philippines (and consequently an organ) even before the
establishment of a Philippine party. Hence their organizt tion connection
started with the CPC.7 This fact, coupled with the victory 3.n China., and the
relatively higher degree of theoretical development of the Chinese comrades
in Chine,, developed in some Chinese comrades in the Philippines a certain
degree of "Chinese" chauvinism. This phenomenon was already apparent even
during the Sap occupation. Sore Chinese eormradea showed a marked superiority
complex, which has been only too noticeable. This complex was developed from
the fact, that the CPC has really more theoretical and prn etieal understanding
of Marxism, and the Chinese comrades in the Philippines showed a greater grasp
of the, situation in the Phil..ipp3.x , especially Vmediateiy after the Japanese
occupation in 1942. Such superiority in theory and practice was not retained,
and some Filipino corral es caught up with their k^n ziedge. In spite of the . .
development, the Chinese comrade in the PB still pontificated that an Lid ian'.
comrade dubbed him a high priest. This pontification, this appearance of
superiority, Is nothing but chauvinism. It is this chauvinist ideology of
some Chinese comrades in the Philippines that caused the deterioration of
the relations between the CB and CP.
It cannot be said that the OP is blameless. The gross negligence of marr in
+he OP In undergrouni work, the use of men like lg (whose record of
finance opportunism dates way back before the war )for contacwith the B
, ,
and the belligerent attitude of some Filipinos to the Chinese comrades in
the Party, all contributed to incorrect relations.
7. In view of all the above, the Cr, decided to criticize the Filipino Party
members for their gross negligence in underground work especially in their
relations with the Chinese eoraradee. It also decided to criticize the OB
(as an organ) for its chauvinism. It further decided that the CE remain a
part of the CP, as the only correct organizational form up to the present;
that the OB report regularly (every three months) to the PB or SECon
organizational and financial mat; that the PB or qEC foranulate policies
regarding the Chinese workers and Party members in the Philippines, after
receipt of reports from the CB, and for the CB to execute such policies
Approved
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and deelsiono unconditionally; that the CB take immediate steps to facilitate
direct connections of the PB or SEC of the CP with the CPC1in order to
coordinate our national liberation struggle with all liberation movements and
proletarian movements +he world over.
It. Comradely relations shoi0d exist among all Party members irrespective of
nationality. The enirit of nationalism should be purged, and the spirit
of internationalism should always guide Communists in all their activities.
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1. Comment. CP refers to the Philippine Comrmn3s t Party. The
reference to the arrests in Manila is to the Government raids on Communist
centers beginning in October 3950 in which principal members of the
Political Bureau, as well as other key Party leaders, were arrested.
2. Comment. This person, aanparently a Chinese leader of Chinese
Communist Party activities in the Philippines, cannot be identified.
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3. Cent. These initials are believed to refer to a group
known as the Overseas Relations Office (CEO), to which reference is made
in the Communist documents captured during October 1950.
25X1A which is based on a document containing an official history of the
Philippine Communist Party.
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4.
Comment res is a pseudonym used by Casto Alejanirino who
was described as Chief of the Party Military Department
and thus a member of the Secretariat. Although the person referred to as
F cannot be positively identified, according to the documents captured
in October 1950, F was used to identify Federico Bautista who was one
of the captured Communist leaders who was sentenced to 3.i:e imprisonment
in the Manila trial of May 1951.
6.
cent
CPC here apparently refers to
the Chinese Communist
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.
.
7.
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8.
which this report supplements and the reports which it
references.
Comment. The pseudonym Bull appears in the documents captured
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9.
in October 3.950. However, the person using this name cannot be identified.
Car,~reent. SEC here refers to the Secretariat of the Philippine
25X1A
tit. The material in this resolution was included in the
documents which were captured in the Government raids on Communist
centers in Manila during October 1950. All available documentary
25X1 A material on the subject of the Chinese Bureau was summarized in
(May 1951) .
Since the ideas it contains were covered in the October 1950 documents,
it is possible that Political Bureau approval of the resolution was
delayed for some time following its preparation.
The resolution contains certain locutions and constructions, as well as
a style of writing, that would seems to indicate that it was prepared by a
Party leader of experience and ability. Although many of these ideas
have been expz~ 4iseid by JvF"e aria in Us' it cannot be identified
as his work.
ALT . b, OFFICIALS ONLY
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C ymnt. This statement apparently should be read as a condom-
nat. on of the corruption which did in fact exist.