CONVERSATION BETWEEN (SANITIZED), JUDGE PRETTYMAN, MR.BROSS, MR.HOUSTON.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R002200080010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 25, 1962
• Content Type: COURTFILE

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land it on the field which would have given them a plane that they really
could have told what it was all about rather than piecing a lot of wreckage
together. That factor right there is the moot potent factor in my mind.
1 :1
soon as we got the assessment of what happened.
JUDGE PR,12T')MT: I can't see why they would make a deal for
a wrecked plane -- that he would deliver a wrecked plane when it was just
as simple for him to deliver a pla in perfect condition.
MR. BROSS: From his point of view I would think he would prefer it.
There is his side too.
JUDGE' P10=11-10: If they were going to make a deal and pay him
the money it is just as easy for hiss to deliver a plane in perfect condition.
G- AL BULL; To carry it to the extreme when you realize that
all of the evidence you have is Soviet oriC;in -- even the comaunications -- it
all cane from the Soviet originated source -- all of it -- and there is no
reason that I know why that couldn't have been provocated and he had landed
at a field as far as that goes. That's a rather extrer:ie view but if Powers
were a defector and the stories were agreed upon you can't wipe that out
completely. In some respects it seems rather absurd. They would have to
fake their com=.uaunications intelligence at the far end of it wouldn't they:
MR. I OUSTOII; Well, you can argue this one.
GUIERAL BULL: Yes, I I mow. On the question of defection I
t hint: we have to keep in mind all this information is coming from Soviet
sources.
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JUDGE PRETTYMAN: -- but from our point of view, looking
at it in the raw, it is something you have to analyze.
MR. H0U8`t'0N: Then you have the further consideration of how
defectors are treated when they defect -- if you put them on trial and hold
them, whereas the normal treatment to the defector is to give encouragement
for more to come over. His treatment is not consistent with any known
defector policy.
JUDGE PEETIZMAN: No, except to throw a caveat in -- if what
took place with Mrs. Powers -- she came back to the United States and she
took the money -- as far as he was concerned he accepted the punishment
on account of his assurance that she was taken care of. It's a rather
involved improbable sort of reasoning, but from what we know about the
relations between the two --
MR. SEOSS: If the defection story is to have any plausability
at all I think you have to believe that Powers at this moment is a very
crafty Soviet agent who was prepared to go through this trial, go through
all this business and come back here with some sort of a mission to continue
espionage against the United States. Now r will hardly comment on the
probability of this story in view of the impression which we have of him.
This would make Cicero look like a three-year old child.
D
We weighed that very point against the value of
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told them everything and our estimate is that the value of the information
that he seemingly has withheld --
MR. BROSS: How do you know he has withheld it? It didn't
come out in the trial, but how do you know he didn't tell all these
things to his interrogators?
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MR. BROSS: Maybe they used it to our disadvantage by concealing
the fact that he did not. Thhs is getting very speculative.
MR. HOUSTON: It would appear to have great propaganda value.
MR. BROSS: I am saying if you want to carry this to ultimate
JUDGE PRETTXMAN: Let me ask this, and don't answer if you
can't, but would counter intelligence have a staff, or whatever you call
it -- people close enough in to the authorities in Russia that if Powers
had told them a lot of stuff that didn't come out in the record you would
have been advised?
That would be the ideal situation. To my knowledge, no.
MR. HOUSTON: Let's say that if it had been widely circulated
in Soviet circles we might have picked up some rumors of it and probably
would have.
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We have received no indication from any source of
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a little startling to us that in light of past experiences with Soviet
interrogation methods that they did not pressure this man and they did
not pressure the MB-47 fliers to the extent that we thought they would
pressure them. I don't know what this signals, but apparently they have
thrown away their thumb screws.
MR. HOUSTON: Are there any more questions on a defection?
Just briefly you also studied and considered
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there have been a number of reports. I think the most recent was a state-
ment by Jack Anderson in'!Parade Magazine" Sunday paper here about a month
ago as to the security of the Base and the improbability of sabotage -- no,
that had to do with Base security.
MR. HOUSTON: We have had some testimony on that but you have
nothing to lead your staff to thing that sabotage was a problem.
MR. HOUSTON: I think the third area you did make what you call
damage studies.
JUDGE PRETTZMAN: You say sabotage.
0
JUDGE PRETTZMAN: Something secretly put on that plane to make
The possibility of putting something on thatplane.
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of an internal explosion.
MR. HOUSTON: Presumably no.
MR. BROSS: Not necessarily, because some types of explosives
could be put on the tail assembly of the aircraft which would be timed to
explode at a certain period of time after take-off and this would be an
ideal way of accomplishing the results that actually happened.
May I make an observation? You will recall three
aircraft where involved during the immediate days preceding. It would have
been extremely difficult for anyone to know which aircraft would be used on
the mission. If this was so it would have to have been done immediately
poor to take-off and at that time there were many security guards in the
area and they were guarding the plane very rigidly.
MR. HOUSTON: In assessing the damage resulting from Powers'
capture and the information he gave, I'd like to deal with two points:
One, do you feel that if he did give information not known to the Soviets
which was of a highly sensitive nature -- not at all probably known to the
Soviets.
II
MR. HOUSTON: We know he probably gave some information such as
0
successfully withheld them. He had no way to judge that at the time. The
fact that he was able to withhold the names of the pilots is an indication
of the inefficiency of the Soviet interrogators.
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That's right.
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MR. HOUSTON: You think he was able to withhold certain
sensitive information. Can you identify what you think he successfully
withheld?
By playing down his own role and belittling
his own knowledge he was-able to avoid questioning to detail in the
general areas of administrative procedure a, installations and operations
techniques and procedures. In our damage report we line these out as to
one, two, three, and we have a long lists of what he might have been expected
to know.
I will give a few examples here. We estimated that he would
know the CIA/Air Force personnel procurement method for this Project.
He played this one by saying that he left the Air Force. He resigned, or
completed his tour, or what have you, and he was looking for a job and he
was scouting around and was recruited by CIA for this Project.
MR. HOUSTON: This is what he told you since?
1 :1
Yes. Nov by doing so -- by selling them this bill
on this point -- he avoided telling thew what he actually knew about the
arrangements between CIA dnd the Air Force for the acquisition of personnel
for this Project. On the various methods, the Air Force units involved in
the procurement methods and the personnel procedures for the Project, he
didn't get into that at all.
Jf E PRETT (AN: When you say he didn't get into it, you have
no information about that except what he says.
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GENERAL BULL: -- and the Russian trial.
JUDGE PRUMTKAN: In this area of the things that he did not
tell I come back to this same somewhat fantastic question. Let's may the
matter of the altitude. He says he insisted the maximum altitude was
68,000 feet in order to keep from them that it was a capacity altitude of
72,000, maybe. Now if he lied all the way through to us, telling you and
everybody that has talked to him and as a matter of fact he did tell them
the maximum altitude, would that have been a subject that would have been
talked about in Russian circles and rumored about and discussed -- the
fact that this American plane they knew had this maximum altitude because
he told them? Would that have been the kind of thing talked about !Hough
in Russian circles for your people to have probably picked it up?
Not from talk. I think that the Air people) and I
don'b want to testify for them, would have received indications of Soviet
knowledge along these lines, yes.
JUDGE PRETflMAN: If that had happened -- if he were lying on
that point you would have picked up some indication or some sign or something
that the Russians knew that?
Well, our experience not only on this is that
if they have information they give indications of using that information
sooner or later in one way or another.
22 regard to this matter of testifying to the altitude of
08,000 feet our inqueries into this matter disclosed that he was instructed
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to underestimate this capability of the plane's altitude by I believe up
to 5,000 feet, if possible. All through the trial 68,000 feet was mentioned.
When we opened the debriefing of him the other day we said, "Why 68,ooo feet?"
His explanation to me was that if they had hit him or got him with a near
miss from the ground they probably knew the capability of their fire and
if he said 65,000 they would probably know that they could put that missile
higher than 65,000. On the other hand, since they didn't confront him with
70,000 -- of course, they were confronting him with a figure in meters
that approximated 68,000. "Okay, let it be 68,000. I am still underestimating
the capability of the plane" and his explanations are so spontaneous.
JUDGE PRL'iflfaN: His instructions were to do it. We know
that he says that is what he did, and the record of the trial shows up that
so far as the Russians brought it out in public, that is what he did.
His conduct on debriefing still Supports the truth of what he says.
All the stories from this Government, your outfit, intelligence, Air Force
and so forth leads our people to think that he is telling the truth. Is that
right? In other words, there is no false note that comes through somewhere
or other that he is lying when he says he didn't tell them that.
II
That is right.
JUDGE PRETTmAzc The whole thing checks out.
Tea. The same thing applies to his apparent withholding
of information on his other overflights -- the ones that he seemingly didn't talk
about.-- other participations in the project, and his -- for exmple at the
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debriefing he was asked the question, "Were the Soviets interested in
the participation of anyone else in the Project?" and he said, "Yes, but
it came through to me through an interpreter and he interpreted that to
my mind, were there other nationalities involved? Tea, we have a couple
of Irishmen, Italians -- America is Made up of all nationalities but we
are all Americans and we all have the same passport. We are all down there
together on this Project."
In going over these things with him and the readiness of
his answers, if they are concocted he is an excellent actor.
JUDGE PRE7TIMA1T: You brought me to the question I was going to
ask. Were your people in on the debriefing team the last five or six days?
JUDGE PRE3TIIW: Are other members of the debriefing team
JUDGE PRETTDW: I will address this question to all of
was there for four or five days.
JUDGE PRET ThAJ(: These people,, including yourself, that participated
in this debriefing are, I assume, experts in this business of questioning people.
Wt pose as such -- iome of us on the technical aide
and some of us by experience in the field of interrogation.
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MR. HOUSTON: How many years have you been in the business, for
JUDGE PRUMM4AN: I imagine we can assume not somebody just
picked up and asked to do this but the debriefing team were experienced
people in this matter of questioning people.
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I am a member of the bar in the State of
I have 25 years of service starting with the FBI in 1935.
0
JUDGE PB TIMAN: In my profession we are engaged in this thing
every day. It is a part of our regular routine. A fellow goes on the witness
stand and he talks. An experienced prosecutor er an experienced judge has his
own method but he comes up with the answer that the fellow is a liar. Do I
make my premise clear to you? In other words, if I could pick four or five
or six trial judges from the District Court bench here in Washington and if
they had sat and listened to this fellow being questioned for four or five
days, at the end the probability is each one could say, "He is telling the
truth" or "He is a liar". That comes from experience. Nov were there any
notions on the part of any of your debriefing team that Powers was lying
during these last four or five days while he said these things, or did
you come up with a conclusion that what he told you is the truth.
25X1 I I In answer to the first part of your question, there
was no indication to us that he was lying. On the other hand, as an
interrogator, I recognize the fallacy of accepting his bare word on this
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We had, during the course of the investigation of
Francis Gary Powers and his movements and where he was and what he did -
had come up with, let us say, more than one incident of, not behavior
necessarily, but things that he did and was engaged in -- people he was
with that it wouldn't necessarily be embarrassing to him to disclose, but,
well, let me got a little-'more specific. The boys used to fly the T-33
up to Frankfurt for repairs. They would go over to Wiesbaden for R&R to
a couple of night clubs. They had "B" girls, and one thing or another,
and they would night club with these girls there and then on back to the
base. Well, maybe their wives would like that and maybe they wouldn't if
they knew they were up there drinking with the girls at that night club.
We know that Powers frequented these night clubs so we took the opportunity
to test him, not tmoconfront him with the fact that he had frequented these
night clubs, blxt from the standpoint of getting his assistance in
connection with: Did he ever see any indication of Soviet activity at Adana
or Frankfurt or Wiesbaden? What was the pattern of the movement of the
pilots? What kind of R&R was engaged in? What were the R&R facilities? --
puriply for the purpose of testing this man as to circumstances that under
these circumstances might be a little embarrassing for him to talk about,
to see how he would react. We knew already what he had done, where he had
been, who he had been associated with at these places, and approaching him
in this round about way, was he going to tell us about this? Our questions
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were of such a nature that we knew he would be thinking about the visit
to these night clubs and we were sitting around talking about this thing
from a counter intelligence point of view as to what were the Soviets doing.
He said, "Sure I was visiting this place and this place and this place, and
I was with so and so and so and so, and there was a gal up there I did some
drinking with. I wouldn't want this generally ]mown." He recounted to
us A, B, C, what his activities were that ve already knew. He left us with
the impression, here's a man who will talk about anything you want to talk
about and he will tell the truth.
Jt GE PRETTn4Alt: The am total of your estimate of your cross
examination of the fellow, and you did persue methods of cross examination
that would have revealed some hint that he wasn't telling the truth, but
as a result of that your teams' conclusion is that he was telling the truth.
JUDGE PRETTThAN: Does that go for you other gentlemen on
That he has told the complete truth.
1949 and joined the FBI, and since 1952 I have been doing this type of
25X1 work. Beside me is who has participated in every major
debriefing and he has over 14 years debriefing experience.
indicating] has had more experience than the other members of the
debriefing team, starting in 1938 and he has had over 30 years Government
experience.
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JUDGE PREPTVAN: And it was part of the debriefing team'
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JUDGE PRWTPZMAN: In answer to my question, as you say, as
a result of your debriefing and your cross examination and your efforts
to test whether or not this guy was telling the truth --
objective not only to find out information from it but also to ascertain --
-- to assess the reliability of the subject, yes.
25X1 MR. HOUSTON: I lalso.
Yes) that was the conclusion of the team. I was
particularly impressed by one thing -- his willingness to tell little
things that could have reflected to his disadvantage he made no attempt
to cover up.
JUDGE PRETTIIdAlt: Were you satisfied he was telling the truth?
Yes, throughout. We found no flaws in going back over
his story. He was consistent in every regard -- not one instance.
JUDGE PRETTIMAN: One other thing I had in mind.
referred to the fact that near the time when the incident occurred - when
the incident occurred, up near Sverdlovsk there was a..ground/air rocket base --
MR. HOUSTON: Surface to air missile site.
JUDGE PRETPIMAN: You just made a passing reference that it
I was so informed by the technical people.
JUDGE PRETMW: My question was, had he been told?
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MR. HOUSTON: Tea, the intelligence officer and the navigator
would brief him. Also Powers was briefed that there was a SAM site
by the people who --
II
on this point.
JUDGE PRETTVAI(: Does anybody know what a near miss from a
land/air missile would sound or feel like?
MR. HOUSTON: Not many people have been near one.
COL. GEAR(: You would have to know what kind of a missile it
was -- what kind of a warhead.
II
I would like to add a point that goes to the credability
25X1 call it alias -I He used the name) (while he was in training.
There is an indication, and we know from other experiences that it makes good
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indelibly establishes this as an intelligence operation if they come up with
code names. It was rather significant to us that Powers' actual pseudonym
assigned to him by the Agency was never disclosed, and I asked him that
question on the tapes, if he did make any such disclosure. He said, "No,
I did not." "Why didn't you disclose this?" He said, "I figured from
publicity and the records that the fact that I was in training out West
and used the name hat they could find that out rather easy, but"
he said, "I knew that the pseudonym would only be on the Agency's record
and they would have no way of finding that out, soI didn't tell them."
JUDGE PRETTIMAN: Nov, is that it?
MR. HOUSTON: I have no further questions and no further
witnesses except be in later.
. . . The Board reconvened at l4l5 hours .. . .
describe your experience with one of these U-2'a at the time you went over
your maximum speed limit. You take over and develop what you want to.
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GEIERAL BULL: We are interested in hearing your experience
in a somewhat complex situation, as you suggested, exceeding the characteristics
of speed with the U-2, in somewhat the same situation that Powers was in,
just in the event that thing happened in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk.
I understand there is some very tight limitations on the speed of the plane
that is within the safety factor of the plane, both on the short and the
long side -- slow and fast. Would you explain what your experience has
been to the Board?
Sir, during my training
we were normally flying anywhere front four, five and sometimes six-hour
missions. later on these missions were extended into eight and nine-hour
missions -- a maximum range at that time -- with simulated targets. A
normal compliment of Sight lines, turns, and such all the time making
notations. In other words, an actual simulated combat mission as we
considered it. We normally at that time used an autopilot with a device
called a mach sensor to maintain stability of the aircraft -- control of
it -- and airspeed. That is the function of the mach sensor. At the time
that I experienced the exceeding the design limits and the air speed of
the aircraft, I was on automatic pilot and had the mach sensor engaged, and
we were having some minor troubles with this piece of equipment but nothing
to be alarmed about, of course. It made the mission much more successful
if the equipment was working, although it was not necessary to complete the
mission.
I am certain that you realize after an eight hour mission
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ground, ruling out wind. I had turned and the mach sensor disengaged
automatically and I had my head in the cockpit checking instruments, and
as I turned I just looked out the canopy on the left. Now this particular
equipment is on the right forward side of the cockpit -- on the right console,
as we call it. I had made the turn and I came back into the cockpit for
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some reason and something didn't feel right. I knew it immediately. The
mach sensor had already disengaged and the aircraft had gone through the
limiting mach by this time. Now I very gingerly, very lightly eased the
aircraft back to its design limitations. This again applies where we
certainly might expect the aircraft to break up and come apart. I estimated
that I was approximately ten knots above - in other words, higher airspeed
than the design limitations of the aircraft and I was very fortunate in
being able to bring it back through its mach -- limiting mach. I again
turned back on course and completed the mission. I was practically four
end a half hours away from home base at this time and I finished the mission
by flying the aircraft manually.
You say you estimated you were ten knots --
an attitude by looking outside and also come back to the attitude indicated
instruments in the aircraft. Once I had recovered and brought the nose of
the aircraft slightly up and was again checking airspeed I estimated that I
was about ten knots. I was more interested in recovering the attitude of
the aircraft than I was in knowing just how fast I had gone above design
limitations.
Nov, Mr. Powers, as Iunderatand, was hand-flying the
aircraft, as we call it. He had lost the function of his mach sensor and
possibly his autopilot. This I do not know, but throughout 1fiapd=glying the
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2/23/6237
aircraft and making notations on the card -- on the green card -- you are
much more alert to the airspeed. It can be flown very nicely and the
aircraft does fly nicely as long as you stay ahead of it. It is very
much like driving your car. You anticipate a turn and you steer into
it instead of driving to the corner and turning right immediately, and
you stay ahead of your aircraft. It is very possible to finish a long
mission this way. Granted, you will be fatigued at the end of it. As
far as maintaining an airspeed at altitude -- a desired airspeed -- hand-
flying the aircraft, there is no problem. You can do this. A lot of feel
g es into this. It's very much like sailing a boat, I think, or riding a
bicycle. After approximately 500 hours in the airplane I think you can
tell a lot of times -- provided that you have a horizon -- very much how the
airplane is acting and how close to the airspeed you are. Again, you are
still checking that airspeed indicator. You come away from the air speed
indicator and you are checking again, you come back and check again. It
is a normal cross check of the instrument panel. You are still checking
the airspeed indicator even on autopilot. You are monitoring the airplane
and its function at all times because of the very nature of the aircraft
and the small limitations at altitude -- that is, mach and stalling you have to be right at airspeed. Nov there are approximately three
knots on either side of the designed airspeed that you want.
MR. HOUSTON: Have you flown the U-2 with the J-75 engine
at 70,000 feet cruising?
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MR. HOUSTON: What is the approximate mean airspeed?
Sir, it has been almost two years since I have
flown the aircraft and I'd like to go back to the charts -- we used a
abort -- on that point.
MR. HOUSTON: Could you give an approximation?
I believe about 108 knots indicated airspeed.
This decreases with every thougand feet of
altitude above approximately 56 to 60,000 feet.
MR. HOUSTON: Your ground speed, without wind would be --
Approximately 400 knots. We used two different
cruising machs at one time. One mach was slightly higher than the one that
we found that would give us the beat cruise -- in other words, mile per
pound or gallon of fuel and so we reverted back to obtaining range. We
came back one or two knots, I believe.
MR. HOUSTON: That was an economy measure opposed to
MR. HOUSTON: I think you said 108.
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navigation you are still concentrating on the airspeed indicator.
You are navigating, yes, maintaining a stable platform for the cameras, but
you are still coming back to the airspeed indicator. It is a normal
cross-checking of the instruments and in the operation of the aircraft.
MR. HOUSTON: At the time when you vent over the design
speed maybe as much as ten knots, what was the sensation that you felt?
I felt the autopilot disengage, and being in
a feeling in the aircraft itself that it is still under control if it is
under the autopilot - if it is under autopilot control and the autopilot
controls the surfaces of the aircraft by a matter of clutches. Sometimes
these clutches will slip just a little bit and you can feel this as it
slips and gives just a little bit to make way for a change in attitude.
This is normal. You can feel it. I believe a man that flies a lot, once
he gets in the aircraft, you can feel everything that that airplane does.
You might call it flying by the seat of your pants. Even though you are
not flying by the seat of your pants you still have the feel.
MR. HOUSTON: Is that particularly so of this plane because
you had direct controls.
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I always, as a matter of course - now this is my own
technique - I suppose possibly a lot of other people used it too - when
the aircraft was on autopilot I still flew with one hand on the control
column. I just rested it on the yoke. That way?I could feel. If I
were busy now I might not have my hand on the yoke. I might have it back
on the throttle vernier, which is a knob that moves the throttle back and
forth and makes very minute adjustments.
COL. GEARY: The incident that occurred to you, did this
particular incident occur while you were in the turn?
Nov, as I understand, Mr. Powers was straight and level then. He would very
definitely be. in a fine position to maintain airspeed.
COL. GEARY: If you were flying manually and making a turn, is
it likely that you would be making any notes at that particular time?
GENERAL BULL: Would you consider there should have been a
minor concern on the part of the U-2 pilot after having completed the
turn with the obligation to fly manually, since the autopilot was off,
and at the same time record his flight data, which I assume would require
him to divert his attention elsewhere, which I think you had been involved
in the same thing on your turn. Would that introduce a serious element of
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I
danger to the plane due to the fact that your other task would divert
you from this constant observation of speed? Is it that delicate?
Sir, I believe I can say that if one were
making notations on a card and hand-flying the airplane in this manner,
as you bring out, you might write down some figures on the card and come back
to flying the aircraft, then, as it was squared away, maybe make two figures
more until you finally completed the task at hand at that particular time.
You never get away from this airplane, especially so hand-flying it.
GENERAL BULL: That is a compelling requirement on the pilot
to keep his eye on the airspeed.
Yes, that along with engine instruments, but
I believe I was checking the airspeed three times to any of the other
instruments.
One question,
In your technique
of flying, as you are approaching a target -- and Mr. Powers was in this
case; he had made a turn; he was lining up on a target which was designated
a priorit'.- target on his flight map -- would you, under any circumstances
at that time, be making any notations on your map?
No, I would have either made them previously or
shoot down the drain this notation until either I could take care of it
later, or I would have made it previously and concentrated on my priority
target.
JUDGE PRETP!MAN: Thank you,
II
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