PROSPECTS OF THE KOREAN CEASE-FIRE TALKS AND OF CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008600500001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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ifFELLOF/1 4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
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China/USSR/Korea
Prospects of the Korean Cease-Fire Talke and
of Chinese Communist Stra4gy in Asia
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there may be some reference value in observations
and conclusions based mainly on news items and views in Chinese Communist
publications as to why the Chine Communists would like to have a Korean
cease-fire? to whether the Kaesong cease-fire mill produce say results,
and to what will be the future movements of the Chinese Communist's.
2. At the present stage of the Korean war, there are the following reasons to
explain the willingness of the Chinese Communist for a cease-fire:
a. The Chinese Communists have Buffered considerable losees in the Korean
war. The Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong, boasted that the American troops and
troops of other nations had had over 500,000 losses, and that the ratio
of United Nations (UN) losses to those of the Chinese Communists and
the North Koreans was one to two. Chinese Communist authorities
admitted losses of over a million. Before the Kaesong conference, a
Ta Kung Pao editorial stated that the Korean mer mould not be advan-
tageous to both parties, but would merely add to the loss of lives and
property of the North Koreans.
b. The -ainese Communists have lost their hope of driving UN troops to the
sea. This was hinted by Chinese Communist papers soon after the UN
resolution branding Comunist China as an aggressor.
c. Bien if the Chinese Communists could drive UN troops out of Korea, that
would not mean the end of the Korean war, but the expansion of the war.
this was also expressed in Chinese Communist per three or four months
ago.
d. The Korean war has caused grave troubles in Chinese Communist reconstruc-
tion, especially in the economic sphere where numerous difficulties have
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already appeared, such as the shortage of materials, the lack of
a proper flow of native goods, financial difficulties, etc.
e. Chinese Communist auth.-ities are very much worried aver the
Japanese Peace Treaty and the rearmaxent aid revival of Japan.
Japan is expanding, while the Chinese Communists have been
wasting themselves in the Korean war, which has made the Chinese
Communist very uneaeyf. ,
The USSR and the Chinese Communists do not dare to provoke
another world ear yet, and therefore the so-called International
Volunteer Army and the Chinese Communist Air Force have not yet
appeared in the ear to any degree.
g. The fight for admission into the UN aid the conquest of Taiwan
cannot be achieved with the continuation of the Korean war, On
the contrary, the continuation of the Korean ear would deprive the
Chinese Communists of an opportunity to make themselves heard in
the international circles.
h. Chinese Communist authorities may have found that a Korean ear
ceasefire at the 38th Parallel is for them *possible and profitable
solution at the present time. And the withdrawal of foreign troops
from Korea, if obtained, would mean a real victory for the Chinese
Communists.
3. After the UN passed the resolution branding Communist China as an
aggressor, and after the Chinese Communist forces had sustained heavy
casualties, Chinese Communist papers at once cut down boastful comments
on the progress of the Korean war. The argument that the Chinese Commu-
nists mast win sad that the UN troops must be driven from Korea
disappeared almost entirely,. Instead, they began to view the Korean war
as a long and difficult war with no promise of a profitable future, and
admitted also the superiority of UN fire-power. The Anti-America Aid
Korea campaign stressed the importance of building up the Chinese
Communist strength in various aspects such as national defense recons-
truction, production reconstruction, land reform, "suppression of anti-
revolutionist*** etc., and no argument was advanced that these measures
were to bring direct and speedy-victory in the Korean mar.
4. According to news from people from the China mainland, it is often
reported that there have been differences in opinion within the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in regard to the Korean ear. Proofs of this can
also be gathered from Chinese Communist papers. The people even say that
the Chinese Communists have craved a cease-fire, and are thus quite dis-
satisfied with tile USSR. The fact that the United Stated adopt,td a
speedy and firm policy of resisting aggression from the start of the
Korean ear, and that the UN ham been unanimous in opposing aggression,
furnishes proof, on the contrary, of the mistaken Soviet policy of pro-
voking the Korean war and its defeat. The Korean war has proved to be
an adventure based on mistaken calculation. It was equally erroneous to
have rejected UN cease-fire proposals.
There are, however, other factors. For example, the Korean war might
have made Communist Caine and North Korea more dependent on the USSR, and
more hostile toward the United Statea and Great Britain. Further, if a
Korean cease-fire could be realized, this woeld be away out of a very
dangerous situation and it would not deepen the lit between the USSR and
Communist China. T4 split
The Chinese Communist Government could also pacify its
people by showing that it can start a ear and can also end a war. There-
fore we cannot aver-emphasise the growth of a split within the CCP as a
result of the Korean esr, It might have been a factor in the desire for
a Korean cease-fire. This is because the USSR, after having driven her
satellites into trouble must see to it that she does not allow the Korean
war to develop into a third world war, and that the losses are still
bearable for the satellites.
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6. As the continuation of the Korean war is --,ry dangerous for Communist
China, it would be more serious if the Kaeaong conference proved a failure.
Communist China would Suffer greater losses, and war would have to be
extended to the Yalu River and to within Chinese boundaries. According to
nem received by informant, there would, in general, be agreement reached
on the agenda of the Kaesong talks. After agreement on the agenda, there
does not appear to be any serious reason for the talks to break up.
Judging from known facts, we may Bey that the talks may end in some kind
of agreement. However, that does not mean that the talks will fares no
difficulties and delays.
7. Atter the cease-fire, the solution of the Korean problem would be very
difficult. The implementation of the cease-fire agreement would un-
avoidably incur many disputes sed confusions, because the CCP lacks
sincerity and a spirit of abiding by leen and because the division of North
and South Korea presents further complications in the implementation of the
cease-fire agreement. The speedy- withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea
would be a major CCP propaganda offensive. North Korea and the Communist
bloc, once compelled to accept a temporary cease-fire near the 38th Parallel,
would at the same time seize opportunities to get a political solution to
the Korean problem that would be profitable to North Korea, They 'would not
easily assume the spirit to accommodate the working out of the UN Korean
unification program.
8. One view is that the Communist Party would renew the Korean war shortly
after the cease-fire. However, we have no sufficient reason to think that
the Communist Party would soon make new aggressive moves -while they still
remember the losses sustained in the Korean ear.
9. There are indications that the Chinese Communists are revamping their poli-
ciee. In the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Japan is taken as their
hypothetical enemy. In their props/sande, they have been picturing the
United States as their most dangerous enemy, as having replaced Japan in
its position and influence in the Far East, and as having designs to follow
the Japanese path of military aggression in China. At the beginning,
Communist China took as the cardinal policy of its national defense recon-
struction to defend the Far East for the USSR against Japan in the event of
a third world war. With its entry into the Korean war, Communist China
publicly reiterated that national defense reconstruction was the main task.
The Korean ear meant but a kind of practical exercise in modern wsrfare to
the Chinese Communists. In implication, the Korean war must have made the
Chinese Communists understand more thoroughly how efficient the human sea
tactics could be in modern warfare, its national defense weaknesses, the
shortcomings of its national defense reconstruction, and the great length
of time required for national defense reconstruction. The defense planning
aims merely at fighting huge Japanerse armies in China., The flimsy naval and
air strength they possess makes it imposeble for them nee to harbor any
design to launch attacks of a certain kir-.
10. For the present, the Chinese Communist national defense program may contain
the following points:
a. To keep the best naval, land and air forces in the Northeast to coordi-
nate with the Soviet, Mongol :an and Korean forces to prepare for war
against Japan in the future.
b. To prepare to fight major delaying campaigns against Japan in North
China.
e. To build up military industriee and strategic bases in the Northwest to
supply Southwest, Central and South China, and East China.
d. To launch obstructive campaigns in Central and South China and East Chine.
e. To start in Southwest China ndiaruptiven areas of *disturbance" against
Southeast Asia,
f. To launch surprise attacks Oh the high seas.
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11. The completion of this plan would require three to five yeers at least.
It would also require much time and ereat effort instabilizingpolitical
payer, in completing land reform, in economic betterment, and in other
work. :deny ills would arise frOm this over'-burdening. The completion
of full-scale national defense preparations in the China mainland and
construction of aggressive paver mould require still more time. Apart
from preserving Chinas military dependence on her, the USSR also realizes
that China is an important safety factor on her eastern front. then the
Chinese Communistsjoied the Korean war, they put forth the elogan nft
must crush aggression first before es engage in reconstruction", but,
such a slogan is no longer hoard; in its place is the slogan to "Speed
up reconstruction in order to crush aggression."
12. following a cease-fire, a 13%inese Communist political offensive would be
concurrent with their :eational defense program and other internal recon-
struction elms. The Chinese Communists see that there i3 no unity in
the Far Eastern policy of the United States and of Great Britain. The
rise of Japan once again would possibly lead to competition between the
western countries and to the fear of Japan of Asiatic coentries. By this
the democratic countriee could be weakened and Japanese rearmament delved,
which would cover the progress that Communist China made in rearmament.
The Japanese pee treaty would be the first major subject for the launch-
ing of a political offensive. Ccalmunist China must immediately secure
Taiwan, but it mould not dare at this time to launch any military attacks
on the island. At this time, the Chinese Communists mould not dare to
send a volunteer army to help Ho Chi Minh, because this would mean a repeti-
tion of the Korean war which would help the solidarity between the United
States and Great Britain. This political offensive mill be complicated and
eany-sided. To attack the United States, Great Britain and other nations
would not lead to any understanding with those nations. For the Chinese
Communists, there is merely retreat under military and political pressure,
but not well-meaning understanding.
13 Lith the bitter lesson of the Korean war, the Chinese Communists have
subdued considerably their over-confidence in their ability "to crush
egression" and "to liberate Asia." Armed egression will be changed to the
supply of arms and secret aid to revolting forces so as to bring about
the realization of their infiltration policy in all Asiatic countries.
14. In summary, the ear-adventure policy of Communist China possibly will stop
for the time being; and China will devote itself to internal recon-
struction, preparations for ear, political aggression., and infiltration
policy toward Asia. However, Communist China would change its policy
whenever the USSR changes hers.
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