THE INSPECTOR GENERAL S SURVEY OF THE CUBAN OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001900160008-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 15, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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15 February 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: The Inspector General's Survey of the
Cuban Operation
1. Upon receipt of the Inspector General's report of October 1961,
on the Cuban Operation, which reached my desk prior to my resigna-
tion as Director of Central Intelligence, I immediately transmitted a
copy to the Deputy Director (Plans) for his comment. This was in line
with the practice I had consistently followed in dealing with the reports
of the Inspector General: namely, the Office which is the subject of
the inspection is given an opportunity to comment on the I. G. report
before the Director determines the action to be taken thereon. The
reply of the Deputy Director (Plans), dated 18 January 1962, of which
I have received a copy, was submitted to you following my resignation.
2. Meanwhile, I have also received and considered the comments
of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cabell.
3. I remain at your disposal for any comments you may wish me
to submit on any phases of this matter relating to C.I.A. responsibili-
ties. Hence I will not submit detailed written comment on the Inspector
General's report.
4. At this time, however, I wish to make certain general comments:
a. As a member of the Taylor Committee appointed by the
President, I participated fully in the work of his Committee and
joined in his Memorandum and oral reports to the President on
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this subject. While I do not now have a copy of these documents,
I made only one or two reservations to the general conclusions
and recommendations of these reports. I consider them to be
sound and believe they should be accepted as the best available
Survey of this particular operation.
b. The Inspector General's report suffers from the fact that
his investigation was limited to the activities of one segment of
one agency, namely, the C. 1. A.. Opinions based on such a partial
review fail to give the true story or to provide a sound basis for
the sweeping conclusions reached by him.
c. Judgments could not properly be rendered in this matter
without a full analysis, as was made by the Taylor Committee, of
actions of all of the participating elements in the operation and
the influences brought to bear outside of the Agency which affected
the operation. This applies particularly to the participation of
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and to certain elements of the Executive Department
of the Government.
d. At no time during the preparation of his report did the
Inspector General request any information from me and he makes
certain serious errors in areas where my direct responsibility
was clearly involved.
5. Two major areas of criticism in the I. G. report cover (1) the
operational arrangements for the organization, training, transportation
and deployment of the Brigade and, (2) the relations of Agency personnel
to the Cuban emigration and their political organization. As to these
points, I submit the following:
a. First, while certain organizational matters, in the light
of developments, may be open to some criticism, the Brigade
with its entire complement of men and equipment reached the
landing area on schedule and under circumstances which achieved
complete surprise. The situation in the landing area was substan-
tially as predicted. The enemy battle order intelligence was
essentially correct. The failure to get the ammunition and supplies
ashore was due to circumstances beyond the control of the Brigade
commander or its personnel.
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b. Second, with respect to the organization of a Cuban emigre
political committee in support of the operations, I would point out
that prior to engaging in the operation a broad coalition of Cuban
leaders, and one acceptable to our State Department, was realized.
These two important achievements covered major areas of C. I. A. res-
ponsibility.
6. As Director, I deemed it desirable and necessary in view of my
other duties to delegate certain responsibilities within the Agency for
the day-by-day management of the operation, and on military matters
and judgments I relied heavily on military personnel assigned to C.I.A.
and on Department of Defense personnel and the Joint ChieSof Staff.
However, I assumed throughout full responsibility for the Agency's
participation and actions and kept currently advised of all important
developments. During the concluding days of the operation, I was par-
ticularly influenced by the judgments in Col. Hawkins dispatch, dated
April 13, 1961, relating to the high state of readiness of the Brigade
(Annex A to Chapter IV of DDP report).
7. Whether or not the operation would have succeeded if the Brigade
had landed with its entire personnel and equipment is a matter which can
be debated and on which even today military experts differ. Certainly,
the responsibility for failure does not lie primarily in the main areas of
criticism stressed in the Inspector General's report.
8. Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed out in the
Taylor Reports. These keports, I believe, should be taken as the main
basis for any review of the Agency's actions in ort,,,of the operation.
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