COMINFORM ACTIVITY AND PROPAGANDA AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008300510018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 10, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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?Iilat"1 CLASSIFICATION -rich
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COUNTRY Yugoslavia
SUBJECT Cominforra Activity and Propaganda Against
IN FO R NI AT 1 0 Ncolv:IIEDENPTOIARL T
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PLACE
ACQUIRE
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DATE OF
INFO.
Yugoslavia
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CI3C,ULNIE
DATE DISTR. 10 August 1951
NO. OF PAGES 2
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(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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the nature of current Cominform
activity against Yugoslavia and the nature of the propaganda line being
employed in the country and peripheral areas as it has been received by him
from various informants. While much of the reply received contains overt
information, it is believed the following retains some interest because of
the informants' accessibility to the opinions and feelings of Yugoslav
Party and Government officials.
a, Propaganda and limited sabotage activities are being conducted into Zone B
of the Free Territory of Trieste and Yugoslavia itself from Zane A and the
Austrian border area. Currently, the Coninformists are attempting to
coordinate, small individual Uea1 groups into a eingle compact and
directed organization. there have been reports
of contacts being made with members of the conservative opposition within
the count,- ration in anti-Tito activity. Concerning
sabotage limited sabotage is currently being raged
on a wide-scale basis. This consists of ruining nachines by "accidental"
means in heavy industry plante, absenteeism in factories, quitting jobs,
and producing only the absolute minimum required in work output.
b. Recently there has been an increase in intelligence activity by Cominformist
groups. It is alleged that activists are being 'infiltrated at all levels
to collect intelligence data and to organize nets among satellite embassy
and consulate employees throughout Yugoslavia.
c. The Cominform propaganda line within the country continues to play upon
the fears of the population that another war iv imminent. In substantiating
this allegation the propaganda maintains that the Tito regime in collabora-
tion with Anglo-Americans is rearming for aggressive purposes and the
governnentins assumed secret treaty obligations with the Western powers.
The aid being given to the regime is in response to these obligations and,.
the governnent has lost military, political and economic independence.
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WFICIAL
CIIITRAL INTELLIGTIICE MEM!
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Oa the positive side it is stated that the struggle for liberation from
the Tito regime is continuing and victory is certain. Yugeelavie Shortly
min return to the family of nation e composed of the People's Democracies
headed by the Soviet Union, The Cominformists allege to be organised
and ready to-selse power at the appropriate time.
do. Concerning methods of distribution of illegal CaminDemn propaganda within
Yugoslavia source reiterated that the known proeedures are still being
used. These would include the releasing of pealed cans and bottles
containing propaganda material into rivers flaming into the country,
placing propaganda in mail boxes and under doors painting slogans on
wells and placing pamphlets in train coadhes runhag from satellite
areat into Yucoslavia. He added that Yugoslav cargo Ships now calling
at Trieste are used to secrete propaganda material for dissemination
upon return'. Couriers from Trieste and Gorizia are also in contact with
resistance grams who distribute propaganda material in the mails.
!!!!!!!!!!!tedmenanofficers,b111111111,11111111'e morale and intentions of the Twoslav troops,
so The Yugoslav Ar r and Party leaders do not believe a satellite or Soviet
attack is presently imainento This feeling is based on the failure of the
-
Korean adventure and the increasiag rapprochement between the Yugoslav
Government and the United States and Great Britain. The Military Aid
a factor that is deterring an aggression0
the opinion that the ltgodlav Amp particularly
, its Serb elements, is antUkuselan.
be, The officers' morale le reported to be relatively good. The officer corps
was.largeler selected bz' PrunistParty officials and source reports that
a ienswof indebtedness exists? The people as well as the Arm also
believe that United Nations farces mill actively assist Yisgoslavia in
repelling aersegressioa. This U.N. assistance is an important factor in
Arpy as mell as civilian morale.
00 The morale of the enlisted pereonnel is reported to be very bad, homeema%
Host come from average peasant fanilies which are hostile to the govern-
mento The detachment from Noscou and the change in Yugoslav foreiga policy
has allegedly hod little effect on enlisted morale.
do the Army's ability to resist is doubtful. First,
because pro-Comb/fame officers, though small in nunber, could partially
.paralyse the officer corps and their influence mould increase in the
event of an aggression. Top Army officials are reported to be deeply
fearful of the Soviets and possible reprisml &triad the Cominformitts
gain eontrol. M nieefeeifieAnt Dert of the officer corps" Will figIVP
detarmimegr because they are closely linked mith the Tito regime and
policies and feel themselves compromised with respect to the Caminftmen
and Yugoslav Nationalist groups, Should the Soviets invite Communtat
officials in the Yugoslav Army to revolt and fleat the regime, promising
complete reinstatement and good standing, it is reported that only e
fest/would refuse.
60 The troops mill avoid ccubat anddssert as soon as it is clear that the
present regime is no longer in a position to take action against them.
They. hate the regime and source alleges that the arrival of Soviets
will alWernean a Change of dictatorthip as far as the troops are con-
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the Army as 'thole leeks any basic ideo-
logical tie with the regime and is not prepared ideo1ogigL14 for a severe
struggle. Flarthermore? the people would not support the Army WhiCh mewed
severely cripple its ability to fight evea Should it so desire?
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