INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DURING CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800060005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 86
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 1, 1962
• Content Type: STUDY

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NSA, DIA reviews completed
JCS review(s) completed.
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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF
HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
DURING THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP
August to mid-October 1962
DIA, JCS and NSA review(s) completed.
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20 November 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Handling of Intelligence Information
During the Cuban Arms Build-up
1. On 5 November 1962, you asked me to investigate the input
of raw information during the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba with
particular reference to reporting that suggested installation of
weapons of offensive capability. My report of investigation was
submitted on 12 November 1962.
2. You asked that certain points be clarified or expanded
and that certain additional information be included. A copy of
the report of investigation (revised) is attached.
3. Also attached is a list of the questions you asked and
the comments you made regarding the original report of invest'-
gation. These questions and comments are numbered consecutively
on the list. The numbered tags that are clipped to various of
the pages of the revised report correspond to the numbered
questions and comments on the list.
Instctor General
cc: DDCI
Executive Director
I
Copy 1 of k
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Director's Comments
Regarding the IG Report of 12 November
1. The original report listed a ban on publication of intell_genev
on offensive weapons in Cuba without express permission o the
President.
DCI COMMENT: What ban?
2. This section of the original report dealt with an order by the
Director in mid-August to make sure that reports were checked
with NPIC.
DCI COMMENT: This sounds like an excuse. What DCI order
actual, probable, or possible MRBM's f.:'om
c. Did CIA have anything in hand which might
have caused us to go to the President with an
oral statement that we thought MRBM mi;sile::
were there?
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5. The last sentence in our original report read: 25X1
I Ichief of the Current Support staff Of ulun, no-es
a was most effectively blocked in attempts to impu-,e
some significance to the arms deliveries.
DCI COMMENT: By whom? What is CI procedure of coo.?dina-,Aa A
6. These paragraphs of our original report concerned the res-rict'-:)n;
on the September overflights.
DCI COMMENT: a. Why was the original flight plan of
September proposed?
b. Did NRO participate?
7. Our original report listed the missions flown
d. I think our right to publish in the
pretty well extinguishes th:s
point. not believe we were seriou:;ly
hurt nor any conviction re MRBM's sup.-Dress(-3
because of this.
c. Was any consideration given to flying
over known SAM sites to find out wha-_ the,,
were protecting?
d. Was any consideration given to DC_
September 7 request for "frequent coverage"?
DCI COMMENT: But say what kind of missiles.
8. Our original report said:
series of Clandestine Services reports, in addition to a
selected DD/P distribution, went to standard addressees o-itsid
of the Clandestine Services."
DCI COMMENT: How many?
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9. This paragraph of our original report read in part: "The
distribution of is typical of that made of
reports in the series. That message distributed on
2 October, reported the observation on f MA, S 25X1
being unloaded at the port of Mariel."
DCI COMt?NT: "SSM's" underlined. Marginal note: This
not clear.
10. Our original paragraph begins: "Taking as an example the
message whose distribution is discussed above,
this is the sequence of processing between date of observation
and date of receipt by the user."
DCI COMMENT: What did this contain?
11. This paragraph in our original report concerned the
I
DCI COMMENT: Question mark in the margin alongside the
paragraph.
12. Our original paragraph read in part: "But at the time ME E
85-3-62 was under discussion there were as yet no valid report:.
of an offensive build-up."
DCI COMMENT: ". . no valid reports of an offensive
build-up" is underlined. Question ma:?k
in the margin.
13. The first sentence of our paragraph read: "Mr. Sheldon sw_ressed
the lack of credibility in Clandestine Services reporting."
DCI COMMENT: "Clandestine" is underlined. Marginal
note: "or refugee?"
14. Our original paragraph read: "However, we do think that -he
publishing ban had the effect of prolonging this skepticio;m
until the eleventh hour. If the ban had not existed an i71em
on the possible presence of MRBM's in Cuba could have appeared
in the CIB in the last days of September, providing it could
have survived the coordination process, and it might have
changed some people's minds."
DCI COMMENT: Did this item appear in the
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15. Our original paragraph read in part: ". . there was little
excuse for demeaning the validity of CIA. reporting indicating
a shift to offensive weapons."
DCI COMMENT: What such CIA reporting?
16. This section of the original report dealt with the preparing o
SNIE 85-3-62.
DCI COMMENT: Marginal note between paragraphs dealing
with the situation as of 19 September when
the USIB approved SNTE 85-3-62 and the first
reports suggesting offensive missile activity:
"DCI views on 85-3-62."
17. This section of the original report dealt with the views ,)f
the Director of Central Intelligence.
DCI COMMENT: Did you find any analytical effort as
contrasted with philosophical conclusions?
18. You asked whether, once the SAM sites had been establishe.t, anvo-n
sat down and asked why; for what purpose; were they given to tle
Cubans just to keep the U-21s away?
19. This paragraph of the original report listed the Current
Intelligence publications.
DCI COMMENT:
20. This section of our original report dealt with "Restrictitns o._
Overflights."
DCI COMMENT: Why and under what circumstances were CIA
September flights--two over eastern ca,astat
area--changed to four covering about the
same area?
21. Our original Annex B listed abstracts from the CIB.
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22. This section of our original report dealt with the 22 Aug_Lst
Current Intelligence Memorandum summarizing recent Soviet
military assistance to Cuba.
DCI COMMENT: Suggest full wording of the report be incladei.
23. Our original paragraph dealt with a CIB draft concerning arrivi
of MIG-21's. We said: "DIA refused either to coordinate it or
to insert a footnote."
DCI COMMENT: Why?
24-. Our original paragraph said: "But until 10 October CIA a -id DI,4
were in disagreement over interpretations of specific pie-yes of"
information."
DCI COMMENT: Examples. Chronology of differing reports.
25. You asked for the names of the ships in Mariel on 19 and
23 September. Were they missile carrying ships in light f
information we now have?
26. You asked if there was any evidence that our analysts ran a
computation on what the Soviet ships could have been carrying
other than SAM equipment, and whether any thought or analysis
was given to what other cargo the ships might have been carrying.
I realize that this annex does not fully answer your quesL-ion,
but it makes clear that our information on Soviet shipping was
incomplete and that no precise analysis was possible.
27. You asked whether any thought was given to a quantitative
estimate during the critical period based on the mass of ~?hipping
which had been reported. This annex, again, reveals more than
anything else the incompleteness of information available to
us. Navy simply has been unable thus far to provide inforrma-
tion on all Soviet shipping.
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HANDLING OF RAW INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
DURING CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP
Page
The NPIC Caution . . . . . . 2
The Publication Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Coordination Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Restrictions on Overflights . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The 22 August Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Increase in Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The Missile Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
How the Reports Were Selected . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Distribution of Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Speed of Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Mistrust of Clandestine Services Reporting. . 28
Analyses and Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Action Taken on the Views of the Director
of Central Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Publishing the Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
The Mechanics of Putting Together the CIB . . . . .
38
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Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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Handling of Raw Intelligence Information
During Cuban Arms Build-up
1. This paper will discuss the movement and use of raw
intelligence information during the intensive Soviet arms build-u))
in Cuba from mid-July to mid-October 1962, with particular emphasis
on the period beginning in late August. Except during a few days
at the end of the period when the I Iwas in force, the
flow of intelligence reports was normal. They were delivered to
all officers at all levels who needed them, both in CIA and else-
where in the intelligence community.
2. However, there were certain limitations on the formal
publication of this material in community-coordinated publications
which may have diluted the impact of this information upon the
community at large. These limitations were:
a. A caution on publishing information about Soviet
military preparations in Cuba before determining whether
or not it was contrary to photographic evidence in the
possession of NPIC.
b. A ban beginning on 6 September on publication, ether
than in the
of intelligence on o:t ensi'
nt
id
P
th
weapons
in Cu Da w
.
e
res
e
ou e ission of
c. Difficulties in inter-agency coordination.
d. Restrictions on reconnaissance overflights, as veil
as delays caused by weather, which hindered verification: of
information and delayed acquisition of additional informations
3. In a recent memorandum to the DCI, Mr. Richard Lehman ha,
discussed in detail the broader aspects of CIA action during thi.;
period.
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ii. Beginning in May 1962, the analysts began the practice of
checking out with NPIC any report that was susceptible to photo-
graphic verification. The following, which we have confirmed,
appears in Mr. Lehman's memorandum:
"In May 1962, NPIC began publishing a series of formal
reports (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba) in
which the reports referred to NPIC were evaluated in the light,
of photographic coverage. In the seven issues of this
publication, published between 31 May and 5 October, NPI"
examined 138 reports referred to it for comment. Of this
total, only three cited missile activity which could not be
directly linked to the SAM and cruise missile deployments.
NPIC's evidence negated these three."
5. According to Mr. Walter Elder, in mid-August the Director
briefed the President on the increasing volume of refugee and
agent reports on the Soviet build-up in Cuba. The President
directed that every effort be made to check out these continuing
reports. The Director instructed the DD/I to check every available
source, particularly including NPIC. This instruction from the
Director was passed onward orally.
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America Division, OCI, is the "chief OCI analyst" on Cuba. E(31
was one of the ultimate recipients of the instruction and one of
the persons required to take it into account. 0 received
the instruction orally. He says that, however the instruction to
use NPIC to check informant reporting was intended, he received it.,
or at least interpreted it, as an outright ban on publishing
anything that could not be verified by NPIC--and that, in fact,
nothing susceptible to photographic verification was published wh_,ah
had not been verified. Although we can offer no written evidence
in proof, we believe that this "instruction to check" became a
"ban" through a combination of the following:
a. Distortion of the Director's instruction as it passedi
from mouth to mouth.
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b. The weight the Director's word carries within th_I Agency
is such that the ultimate recipient of it "leans over ba:kwar:!."
to comply. In this case, if the ultimate recipients received
the instruction as it was originally worded, they read into it
a meaning that was not intended at all.
c. A procedure for checking reports with NPIC had been in
effect since May. When the Director's instruction of mid-August
reached the analysts, it is reasonable to assume that they
concluded that the existing procedures were inadequate and tht.t
a more positive and all-inclusive check was desired.
7. There is other evidence that the Director's instruction
came to be considered a restriction. Mr. Lehman is a senior officer
in OCI. His memorandum of 7 November on the arms build-up we we11.
researched. A quotation from his memorandum is illustrative of the
views he found in OCI at the time he conducted his research.
"At some point, probably just after 27 September, a-. item
on the subject (the arrival of SSM's) might have been witter
for CIA current intelligence publications. It could not be
written because the analytic level was under the injunction
not to publish anything on missile sites without NPIC
corroboration."
It should be noted that an item could have been written for the
but none was. Further, when we first
discussed this subject with Mr. Sheldon, he said that there had
been an outright ban issued in mid-August on publishing anything
that could not be verified by photography and that this ban had come
from the President. Mr. Sheldon later came to realize that his
earlier recollection was wrong, but it is probable that his first
impression was a fairly accurate reflection of views widely held
within the DD/I complex.
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The Publication Ban
8. The ban on publication of intelligence on offensive
weapons has the following history.
9. On 0 a U-2 flight confirmed establishment of a
missile defense of western Cuba and found a missile site at Banes
in Oriente Province. On 31 August the President ordered General
Carter not to allow publication of this information pending
clarification of U.S. policy. General Carter relayed this ord_er
to the USIB. The information on the SAM, sites was released for
publication on 5 September. In a memorandum to the DD/I, dated
6 September, the AD/SI reported that:
"A preliminary analysis of the technical parameters of
the facility indicate that the missile system present is a
surface-to-surface cruise type system. . . . P.I. analyE;es
of the additional photographic coverage should be available
on 7 September. . . ."
On 7 September the Director of NPIC and the Chief of the Offensive
Systems Division of OSI jointly addressed a memorandum to the DD/I,
It read, in part:
"The Banes installation is assessed as a surface-to--
surface tactical missile site most likely for cruise-type
missiles. The purpose of the system and the effective range
of the missile cannot be conclusively determined from the
available data. . . . It must be emphasized that, while we
cannot definitely exclude the possibility of this missile
installation being for offensive purposes, i.e., attack cu
Guantanamo Naval Base or possibly the Florida mainland, we
believe the evidence is much stronger for the coastal
defense role."
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The President was informed that the precise nature of the Banes
installation had not been conclusively determined. He ordered
General Carter to put a complete freeze on publication of informa-
tion on the Banes site. A Current Intelligence Memorandum of
14 September, based on a full readout of the photography, 25X1
says: "We conclude that there is no longer any reason to doubt: that,
the Banes site has a coastal defense mission." The information was
released for publication.
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10. Following his conversation with the President, General
Carter received approval from Mr. McGeorge Bundy to allow anaLysta
access to such information and provide the results of their
analysis to policy-makers on a need-to-know basis.
11. The minutes of an executive session of USIB on 7 September
imply a publication ban on all types of intelligence pertaining to
offensive weapons in Cuba. There is, however, no explicit written
record of the ban's imposition. The DD/I gave the AD/CI order's to
this effect, on or about 6 September. The ban was further di.;cussed
at an executive session of USIB on 13 September.
12. On 14 September the AD/CI issued the following instruction
to certain members of his staff:
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"This is to remind everyone that we are under a White
House injunction not to print in any publication which goes
outside CIA any intelligence bearing on Cuban offensive
military weapons.. At the same time we are enjoined by the
DD/I to insure that normal distribution is made of all
material bearing on Cuban military capabilities so that
analysis of this intelligence may continue, This -nra ~_tion
need not apply to the but 25X1
it does apply to all other publications. Any material which
might ordinarily be thought to be publishable on this for-
bidden subject should be brought to the attention of the AD/CI
or the DAD/CI."
13. This restriction, as was intended, resulted in a virtual
blackout from intelligence publications of information on offEn-isive
weapons. The only exception was publication of information or. the
arrival of IL-28 bombers in Cuba. General Carter asked Mr. McGeorpf,
Bundy for permission to publish. The request was refused. General
Carter then referred the matter to the Director, pointing out that
the information had already appeared in Department of Navy puhiiea-
tions. The Director himself then called Mr. Bundy and got approval
for publication. The information appeared in the CIB and in the
Cuban Daily Summary on 11 October.
14. Certain observations are in order as to the probable
effect of this publication ban.
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15. No CIA reports on offensive weapons were withheld from
dissemination. All received full dissemination within CIA and to
all other components of the intelligence community. In the cave
of Clandestine Services reports, this runs to some 200 copies.
None of the reports found their way into intelligence publications
because of the ban on publishing reports on offensive weapons.
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16. This ban, of course, did not apply to 25X1
I but none appeared there either. We have compared items
appearing in the with those appearing in the CIB and the
Cuban Daily S ry . Nothing of any significance appears in the
that does not appear in the other publications. None of
them makes mention of the offensive build-up.
17. CIA did have reports in hand which might have caused us
to go to the President with an oral statement that we thought MRB1
missiles were being installed. There are eight reports that are
quoted in the section on "The Missile Reporting." Four were
disseminated between 20 and 23 September, inclusive. The other
four were disseminated between 1 and 8 October, inclusive.
Mr. Lehman noted in his memorandum that an item could have been
written in late September had it not been for the publications
ban. We asked Mr. Cline if an oral report had been given to the
President. He told us that none had.
18. It can be argued that there were no restrictions on
publishing in the Regardless of the original intent
of the I we found substantial agreement within the M ,,/I
complex that the as been used primarily to call to the
attention of the President those particularly significant, solid
items of intelligence appearing in the various intelligence
publications for the day. The concept of it being a vehicle for
passing to the President and a few other senior officials informa-
tion not included in formal intelligence publications has larp:ely
been lost. The evidence strongly suggests that the practice of
orienting the II to solid information did hurt us in this
situation. There were reports on the introduction of offensive
weapons that were not suitable for use in normal Current Intelli-
gence publications. This information pould have been included in
the but it was not because the was too
closely tied to other publications.
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19. This is the evidence on which we base our conclusicans
as to the effect of the publications ban:
a. With respect to possible in-house CIA reports
being withheld, we can report that we found nothing worts
disseminating that was not disseminated.
b. With respect to our conclusion that the
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carried nothing on the offensive build-up, we have attached
as annexes to this report extracts from the EI the
CIB and the Cuban Daily We have chec e e three
publications. Nothing on offensive weapons appears in arty
of them.
c. With respect to CIA having reports in hand upon
which to base oral briefing of the President, we have ci.ed
the specific reports and have quoted from them in the section
on "The Missile Reporting." Copies of the actual report::. arcs
in our hands.
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Mr. Ray Cline, DD/I
Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Assistant DD/I
Assistant to the DD/I (Planning)
Mr. E. J. m , AD7CI
Mr. Richard Lehman, Special Assistant to the AD/CI
Chief, Latin America Division, OC1
Chief, Middle America Branch, Latir.
America Division
Officer in Charge of getting out
the u an Daily
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Coordination Problems
20. On 3 August CIA made its first attempt to place an item or
4-
the buildu
-
p
the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), noting an
unusual number of suspected arms carriers enroute to Cuba. Both
NSA and DLA nh ier+te t
th
e
o
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finally coordinated '1ne item, as
., appeared on August, but it was watered do~,nn
in the
s
-
significance to the arms deliveries. It should besnoted that, over
the years the concept of the CIB being a fully coordinated ar.,d a ?E,e(
upon publication has developed. In the past, higher authority wouLC_
not tolerate "split" items presenting differing views. The pcocer,ur(-
for coordinating items for the CIB is outlined in the sectior
entitled "The Mechanics of Putting Together the CIB."
vciW7 1.u tuguu
u. I
CIA chief of the Current Support Staff of ORR, notes that
was most effectively blocked by DIA in att t t
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It 21. The stated 25X1
many Soviet ships are involved i au n m ary gear (to Cuba)."
The CIA officer who delivered the to the White House on 25X1
that date reported that General Maxwe ay or challenged the
statement. According to this officer, he cited this statement, froit
the DIA Intelligence Summary of the same date: "The high voL_tme
of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade betw.=,en
the USSR and Cuba."
22. General Taylor was further quoted as saying that he had
seen no hard evidence of armaments going into Cuba, that equipment
like trucks and tractors could be used for military purposes but t}1: ,~,
he did not think this was the case in Cuba, and that in his opinion
the Soviet aid to Cuba was purely economic.
23. This was the day of the U-2 mission which confirmed 3AM
sites in western Cuba. According to E: I he was ir_Porn d
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on or about this time by Mr. Joseph Neubert of Mr. Roger Hilsmar`s
office in the State Department that General Taylor had requested
Staters INR to withdraw a memorandum which noted an upsurge in Bloc
vessels traveling to Cuba under conditions suggesting increasing
deliveries of arms. The same source said General Taylor had mrtde
this request after consultation with Admiral Dennison.
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24. These incidents illustrate the disagreement which oreva_E16-d
throughout August between CIA and the Defense establishment over
interpretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to Cuba.
We have reviewed DIA intelligence publications for August and
September and can confirm that DIA did indeed insist throughout
August that the increased shipping reflected an increased flow ct
economic aid.
25. The USIB Watch Committee placed Cuba on its agenda in
late August. This action followed submission to Watch Committee
members of an urgently worded 22 August Current Intelligence
Memorandum (OCI No. 30+7/62) from CIA. Distribution of this paper
was as follows: DD/I, 1; A/DCI, 1; OCI, 7; Watch Committee, 25.)
Items on the Cuban build-up began to appear in the Combined Watch
Report with the 29 August issue.
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26. After the U-2 missions 25X1
coordination of material relating to the speed-up of arms deliveries
to Cuba became less difficult. But until 10 October CIA and DIA
were in disagreement over interpretations of specific pieces of
information. Attached as Annex H is a copy of a memorandum