CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800020033-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: November 9, 1962
• Content Type: NIE

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MUT sNit 85-4-62
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9 Norembor 1962
SPECIAL
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85-4-62
7 Castro 's Subversive Capabilities
in Latin America
Svbrfutropei by five
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Ceitorrrod in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As iftelksted everloat
9 NOVEMBER 1962
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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 85-4-62
Castres Subversive Capabilities
in Latin America
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CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE
CAPABILITIES IN LATIN
AMERICA ?
THE PROBLEM
To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet help,
for carrying out subversion and sab?ge in Latin Amerti
SUMMARY
A. .The dangerously unstable etuation that wevails through-
out much of Latin America is the product of fundamental in-
equities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of
Castro and the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to
exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have
t produced signifIcant results.
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There are many gets n
einisnitere vulnerable to astro-Communist subversion and sab-
?tar. and the Soviets are likely to assist Caatro in reaching them
by contribuUng both his securit at home and to his capability
for action overseas.
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THE ESTIMATE
Aims
1:. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought 10
gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of
himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America.
He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American
States,. Moreover. Castro has generally had the support of the Sino
-
Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims.
iAsons
2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin
America in 1252 with landings of small rebel forms n NiCaraftIa. Pan-
ama, the Dominican Republic. and Haiti. None of these were successful
and he turned to other means.
3. From the berinning. propaganda has been one of the principal in-
struments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main trans-
missions of Radio Havana for external listeners. which have had a great
deal of revolutionary content. he luis beamed special programs devised .
to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen si!ected
countries A major effort has been made through-Prenso Latina. the
Cuban . news service, to disseminate Castro-Corrununist propaganda.
Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into most other
Latin American States. and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel
have actively disseminated R. Students returning from indoctrination
In Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among
Peoples which have functioned as propaganda outleta
4. Thousarids of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuban.
Many hundreds
hT'becn traLne in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla warfare.
Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel between Latin
America and the Bloc.
5. Financial support his been provided by Cuba to revolutionary
jp ups in a number of cot 'Aries
Arms shipments have
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We believe that
there Is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana-
6 Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups
throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist.
? but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliarnen-
i tary line he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups.
e.g.. in Snail. and non-Communist revolutiunaries. e.g., In Guatemala
and El Salvador. In some eases he has sponsored new revolutionary
organizations. e.g.. In Panama, Colombia, and Peru. In Chile he has
endorsed a popular front coalition made tip of Communist and moderate
leftists.
Evolvation ?
7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba to revolt's
tionaries In other countrip which haw me to our attention are
rolnbly only a part of the total effort.
Yet along with the political
and psychological stimulus which Castro s influence has provided. Cuban
subversive activities have perrept'bly strengthened activist revolutionary
groups, Dangerous situations subject to exploitsUan by Castro and
the Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries?
These ds.ngers arise from political and social tensions whic
cxLsted long before Castro came to power. They might lie dormant
for some time; but with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more
Likely to blow up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Cas-
troism survives, whatever may happen to Castro personally.
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Waft-
Support Which Castro Con Exped in tit* Fitful-to
11. The range of Castro's support has been. we believe, considerably
narrowed by events since Castro declr.red himself a Communist. Rev-
elation of the fact that he had allimed the Soviets to establish offensive
ba.ses under exclusive Soviet control its alienated many non-Communist
nationalists. genuine neutral ts. nines seeking social
and economic bettcrment.
12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the oniy impIrtant force
en which Castro can now count. but even the.r support has apparently
been rendered less effzctise by differences un the question of Soviet rela-
tions with Castro and with Latin. American Communist parties. -
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Castro's Risoorcas lac Continuad Subversive Activity
13. Arms. Castro has substantial stocks of AIMS.
In addition vitt Blo Fateriel there are stores of arms inherited
from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available
for distribution outside Cuba. In the put he has apparently been ham-
pered in his efforts to we arms for subversive purposes by problems
of transport and 4elivery. He has at his disposal. however. 11 1L-14
transports belonging to Cubans airlines which could be used to deliver.
arms under certain circumstances. The I1,-23's flOW in Cuba are In-
appropriato. for subversive purposes. However they could be used for
air drops. ba has man small craft suitable for inflitration of men
and arm
14. Propaganda apparatus. Castro's propaganda machine remains
Intact. For the time being. however, his diplomatic missions are likely
to And it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both be-
cause of new precautions by local governments and because of a reduc-
tion in the numbers of cooperative volunteers outside the organised
Communist groups.
15. Mone and ?utpment.
we believe that the
Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equip-
ment for subversive activity. The Soviets have certainly supplied Castro
with sophisticated instruments of intelligence collection. sabotage. and
clandestine communications.
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Sten?
?So
Ofhtr Fadors on Wb;ch Costres Subversive Capability Will Depend
18. Situation in Cuba. Castro's ability to engage In subversive activ-
ities will be intlionceci significantly by the strength and stability cd his
position at home. Heightened politkal and economic difficulties in'
Cuba would restrict Castro's subversive effort. while the more sure
he b at home, the more freedom and strength he is likely to have for
subverting other governments and re4stablishing his prestige and in-
timate. Castro'uposition tn Luba will dep:nd in part on his own
policies. but Ls likely to depend even more upon those of the Soviets.
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Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage
23. The extent of Castro's capabilities for sabotage arid other clan-
destine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated
factors noted above. Whatever his capabtlities are, he will not be at
a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more obvious
targets are:
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WALL
ANNEX A
HIGHLIGHTS OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO DATE
I. Cuban subversive activities of one sort or another have been
directed toward virtually every other Latin American State. Cuban
Embassies have been without exception centers for propaganda and
efforts to cultivate receptive local groups. whether they be Castrotte.
' regular Coinmunist. leftist. or simply disgruntled with the esistLig
regimeaThe Cuban Embassy is commonly a disburser of funds for
subversive purposes. Radio propaganda from Havar.a has been and
La being beamed at each of the Latin American States, sometimes tailored
to have particular local impact. Sympathetic nationals from the other
Latin American States havf been encournytt-and givereadnancial sup-
port to come to Cuba for varying lengths of time for trtining, goodwill
visits, or for purposes of instruction and coordination of subversive
programs.
2. The above represents a general pattern. There are, of coarse.
significant variations and different degrees of effort, depending on how
Castro's regime views the importance and vulnerability of the target
country. The following represents ii summary. country by country.
of th most t ? teal re rts of Cuban u versive activity r.ailable to
us
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DissumNAIION. Nome
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