LONG TERM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80B01676R001800020030-0
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 11, 2004
Sequence Number:
30
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 8, 1962
Content Type:
REQ
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP80B01676R001800020030-0.pdf | 77.07 KB |
Body:
TOOP For Release 2004/03/18: CIA-RDP80B01'i 8AOMMIC ~M30-0
November 8, 1962
Long Term Surveillance Requirements
PROBLEM: What kind of continuing surveillance is required for
our protection if offensive weapons are withdrawn with
and without some inspection on the ground?
1. In general, it can be stated that our continuing aerial surveillance
requirement is to obtain complete huh level coverage of Cuba and of
the Isle of Pines each thirty days, plus a sufficient nurnber. of low-level
fli hts or on site ground inspections to check out specific locations
hich
ar, _ TM
w
may appe , from high-level photography or from other intelligence,
-
to be suspicious.
2. It is estimated that a schedule providing complete higher level
coverage of Cuba once every third days would allow elasticity in the
scheduling of overflights. This should permit selecting days for flight
when the weather was relatively good and therefore should lead to a
requirement for no more than approximately six flights'per month to
produce complete coverage of the island. In perfect weather conditions.
complete coverage of the island could be obtained in one day by four
U-2 aircraft.
3. We do not yet have the capability to provide search coverage of
Cuba by oblique photography. There is a shortage of` cameras for
this purpose, and for the foreseeable future the oblique technique
will not provide adequate coverage of interior locations.
4. The number of flights required for low-level photography would
depend almost entirely on the extent to which suspicions about specific
locations arise as a result of high level surveillance or other intelligence
and the adequacy of on site ground inspection. In the absence of reliable
ground inspection, low-level surveillance would be required as needed
to check suspicious locations. The minimum requirement would seem
to be to schedule a sufficient number of such low-level flights to protect
the "right" to them even if no suspicious locations.were indicated by
U-2 photography of other intelligence. This political consideration
would indicate a requirement for perhaps two such overflights a month.
5. In addition to aerial, and such on site inspection as may be
available, we would plan to continue all other avenues of intelligence
including continuing surveillance at sea of shipping bound for Cuba.
Any unexplained increase in such shipping would be a ground for
increased.suspicion.
OSD REVIEW COMPLETED