BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR 29 OCTOBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010028-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: October 29, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Department review completed
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I. Castro, faced with a serious setback to his pres-
tige, is evidently attempting to pressure the Soviet Union
into supporting his demands for major US concessions prior
to the implementation of the Soviet pledge to remove the
offensive military equipment from Cuba. Surveillance on
(the most recent) indicates that construction
and camouflage activity were continuing at the MRBM and
II. Eight Soviet ships--four tankers and four dry
cargo ships--are presently en route to Cuba. One of the
tankers, the GROZNY, is Just inside the quarantine zone--
apparently dead in the water or proceeding at an extremely
slow speed.
III. Moscow this morning published the text of the
President's reply to Khrushchev's announcement on the with-
drawal of Soviet missiles. The bloc public is being told
that Khrushchev has earned "personal credit" for his stroke
for peace. The emphasis being given throughout the bloc
to a US pledge not to invade Cuba reflects Moscow's urge to
salvage prestige within its sphere. Peiping, however, is
backing Castro's demands for further US concessions, and is
evidently sticking to its aim of making Moscow look bad.
IV. Four installations of the US-owned Creole Corpor-
ation in the Venezuelan oil fields were sabotaged yesterday
mornin
Fur-
ther attempts at sabotage elsewhere in Latin erica can be
expected.
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U Thant, who intends to depart for Cuba on Tuesday with
between six and ten neutral militaryibfficers, has asked
for an indication from the President of what "assurances"
the US is prepared to offer Cuba.
Little reaction has come in yet from Latin America
on Khrushchev's dismantling announcement. Elsewhere in the
free world the news is being greeted with jubilation, relief,
and an occasional note of caution. The British Foreign Of-
fice has expressed official pleasure. The press in Western
Europe is using such phrases as "unbelievably happy" and
"enormously satisfying." The French are showing cautious
optimism. In West Germany a note of apprehension about Ber-
lin is still being sounded, but in West Berlin itself there
are some signs of quiet relief.
Canada's Lester Pearson is quoted as saying that if the
settlement can lead to progress on disarmament, "then we can
be even more grateful to President. Kennedy for his firm
stand."
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Castro, faced with a serious setback to his prestige,
is evidently attempting to pressure the Soviet Union into
supporting his demands for major US concessions prior to
the implementation of the Soviet pledge to remove the of-
fensive military equipment from Cuba.
Castro's 28 October statement, issued shortly after
publication-,.of Khrushchev's letter of the same day to Presi-
dent Kennedy, listed five conditions which he said the US
must meet before "guarantees against US aggression" can ex-
ist. These conditions are (1) cessation of all commercial
and economic pressure against Cuba; (2) and end to all "sub-
versive activities: carried out against the Castro regime
from the territory of the US and other "accomplice countries:"
(3) cessation of "pirate attacks" on Cuba; (4) an end to
violations of our air and naval space" by US aircraft and
ships; (5) evacuation of the US Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay.
Except for the reference in the body of Castro's state-
ment, there has been no mention in domestic Cuban media of
Khrushchev's 28 October letter to President Kennedy. Castro's
statement, on the other haild, has been given heavy coverage.
Special editions of Havana's two leading newspapers, includ-
ing the Communist Ham, were issued to cover Castro's state-
ment, which was also given heavy play by Cuban radio stations,
and in a speech later in the day by Raul Castro.
Raul ridiculed the idea that the US could be trusted
to abide by any "non-aggression guarantee" unless Fidel.'s
terms are met. He concluded: "Whatever happened, whatever
President Kennedy says, Cuba will remain mobilized until its
commander in chief orders the contrary." In this speech,
Raul Castro also spelled out his brother's reference to the
US Naval Base in terms which suggest that no immediate Cuban
action is invisaged. He said: "Sooner or later, this
(evacuation of the Base by the US) has to happen--and it
has to happen, we reiterate once more, through peaceful
means."
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ion and improvement activity were continuing
at the MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba
.amour age, including cover ng with canvas an a emp oy-
meet of natural concealment, was Also continuing at the MRBM
sites and was becoming more effective.
Activity at the IRBM sites was proceeding at a high
rate. The number of vehicles noted at Guanajay site 1 in-
creased from at least 44 to at least 61 on
Additional m s e support equipment had also
been move o this site. At site 2 a significant amount
of construction was completed
Work was also continuing at the Remedios IRBM site F-- I
The photography lso provides addittona
evidence that all MRB ana sites were intended to have
nuclear warhead bunkers.
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29 October 1962
II. SOVIET SHIPPING TO CUBA
Eight Soviet ships--four tankers and four dry cargo
ships--are presently en route to Cuba. One of the tankers.
the GROZNY, is just inside the quarantine zone--apparently
dead in the water or proceeding at an extremely slow speed.
One of the dry cargo ships, the BELOVODSK, is about a clay
away from entering the zone. In addition to the Soviet
ships, one Czech freighter also is headed Cuba I
none is believed to be carrying m_1 1-
tary equipment.
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29 October 1962
III. THE SITUATION IN THE BLOC
A. REACTION TO KHRUSHCHEV DISMANTLING ANNOUNCEMENT
Moscow has moved quickly to dramatize Khrushchev's 28
October offer to dismantle the Soviet bases in Cuba under
UN supervision as a major step in guaranteeing world peace,
Khrushchev's reference to US assurances against an invasion
of Cuba is being highlighted in Soviet domestic propaganda
in an apparent effort to convince the Soviet audience that
unilateral US action was averted by the Soviet Premier's
move.
Khrushchev's indication that the USSR wishes to lake
up negotiations with the US on broader international is-
sues was reiterated by Soviet First Deputy Foreign M:is-
ter Kuznetsov on his arrival last night in New York. Nei-
ther Kuznetsov nor Khrushchev mentioned Berlin, suggesting
that for the time being at least Moscow intends to p1E...y this
issue in low key. The Soviets also avoided any suggestior:
of a link between Cuba and the Berlin situation in tht-ir
26 October overtures to the West Germans to use their in-
fluence toward a peaceful settlement of the Cuban crisis.
The Communist bloc's initial treatment of the US--So-
viet exchange reflects the impact the Soviet backdown is
bound to have on the USSR's position as leader of the
bloc. East European press and radio comment attributes tte
Soviet decision to President Kennedy's assurances not to 5a -
vade Cuba, but also reiterates Moscow's theme that Khsu-
shchev deserves "personal credit" for preserving the; Vea:E .
In a brief dispatch, Radio Warsaw hinted at a po.-si
ble settlement on other;,pressing international issues by
stating that in this "new atmosphere" it may finally be-
come possible to conduct negotiations on questions of gre..t
international significance. Belgrade, which was caut"ous
in its comment earlier in the crisis, is now emphasizng
the "statesmanlike" role played by Khrushchev Y' easi"g
tensions.
The USSR apparently did not coordinate its move { ith
the Castro regime. Aside from Castro's brief referen-e,
Havana has not commented publicly on Khrushchevts mesti,age
Similarly, Moscow has only briefly reported Castro's
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statement but has not commented on his demands. While-
the Soviet Union has declared its willingness to with-
draw its missile bases from Cuba, it has indicated it wi
continue to support Castro and provide economic aid tc; hEe_p
him maintain his regime.
Immediately prior to Khrushchev's 27 October letter
calling for a reciprocal Soviet-US withdrawal of offensive
weapons from Cuba and Turkey, the USSR reportedly attempted
to bring pressure to bear on' the'?'Tuikish government to fore-
swear unilaterally the!use of mjq5i1e5.r_
The US Embassy in Moscow reports that there doeE not:
seem to be any restrictions on tourist or business trve-_
within the Soviet Union. According to one unconfirmel re-
port, measures which were taken by the USSR to limit the
movement of certain foreigners at the beginning of th,~-,
Cuban crisis have now been lifted.
A terse Radio Peiping newscast reported the late t Si,-
Viet move without comment. But the bulk of Chinese r ypor--:-
ing on Cuba continues to emphasize US military prepar_ctions
and repeated pledges of Chinese support for Cuba. Tea
thousand Chinese were paraded in the streets of Peiping on
28 October to hear regime spokesmen reiterate these pledges
Thus far, Peiping has been the only bloc capital to broad
cast the text of Castro's statement demanding evacuation >f
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Guantanamo.
Khrushchev's Cuban retreat will be
in their efforts to undermine confidence
used
in
by the
Soviet
Ctiine:;e
leader-
ship of Communist world affairs.r
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Peiping undoubtedly will portray Khrushchev's move t:-
ward a Cuban solution as weakness in the face of the 'im-
perialist enemy." Albania, Peiping's European ally, alre
has reported that the Western press is regarding Khrushchev s
letter as a "victory for American diplomacy."
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U Thant said last evening that he intends to take be
tween six and ten neutral military officers with him to
Havana on Tuesday to begin inspection of Soviet missile
and bomber sites. The officers will be supervised by In-
dian Brigadier Rikhye, U Thant's military adviser, who
said that on arrival his men will be sent to the locations=,
cited in US information and have them report on dismantling
and removal. U Thant told US representatives at the Unit-d
Nations that it would be helpful to him in his discussion~4
with Cuban officials if the US could suspend reconnaissance
flights and the shipping quarantine during his stay. He
has also asked for an indication from the President of tb,_
"assurances" the US is prepared to offer Cuba.
Word on the official and public reaction in Latin
America has not yet begun to come in. However, Venezuela?s
delegate to the UN, possibly representative of one line o
thought, yesterday expressed his concern to our delegatio?,
lest the US get trapped into commitments in Cuba beyond rr.e
guarantee against "invasion."
The sabotage of four electrical substations of ttie U.S-
owned Creole Corporation in the Lake Maracaibo oil fi=-.ids
early on 28 October probably was carried out by Venezuelan
Communists
Initial estimates of Creole officials were that ::.boui
one sixth of Venezuela's daily production of 3 millio_, bar-
rels would be temporarily lost. These officials said it
will be several days before it is known when production c.