BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR 25 OCTOBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001800010017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Department review completed
NGA Review Compl6iwdloved For Release 2005/06/14: CIA-RDP80BO1676R001800010017-6
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Fin, ,,l Draft
nar.io for Air3t:-1k,1against offensive
l.- bases and bombers in Cuba.
.. i-ries out Pr e , .d?nt-' S pledge to -' liminar = o f -gin` ive
at tr. . and Hemi:;phi-re from Cuba and avoid:, are ern
: ,oTt
.
oi '
_.S. mom-1ntum and position. The pledge carried our ,-'how--.
th:i: U.S. h,i will to fight and to protect vital intere>'t
o treat .T,?I;orta.nc vise-a-vi> Berlin) .
2. nc dirac t d , a t a if ins ive weapons , keeps focused on Soviet nuclear,--mr(-ence in Cuba in defianc's o Ov, S
an r! majority of Sccurity,coi cil.
'err-,, 2, o:I.;ible one time action, may carry ::mal. i er
o ,.irther ^calatidn th.-in a series of confront.zt~.ons
'-a of time. Soviet decision to risk major war
_kelr; to be nIeci_,ivel a ff:cted
y by this, action in rn area
? k--vital. to th- _'oviots.,
_ P, S ; CRET -- SJNSITIVE
4. act_on will avotc danger of a growth of hands-
o_:s' Cuh{,' _' Y >.;t t.:.roughout Latin America which might make Ct
inc:-ea s r , J' C: i 1 '.Clll_t to s tr T e at offensive weapon' 31 P r--!'nt
~ngr of Latin n Ainericar. to support strong action probably
c ',,,ot T -:t maintained fnd fini_t 2ly.
5. . i,sna1., clearly tl-_at U.S. not prepared to b main bases
Cuba dos no,,i_tion.^a i.n Ea lin, NA and els where.
6. :' :?-mnnstrato to Cubans, Castro and cther : th,
wsakness of position 1.n Cuba. In the absence of an strong
~{7viet rear i_c'r :. ?f 'nse of Cuba, C,'e would tint the TV ' C-.,. }
of disenchantment r n,,,' s t o 'to and
Ca -;trona.nd Cuba .n r- I ':inc lon the Sov'. +r- Union. 'j:.
woul~
,w,saken any t:,. ndanc'" - rely on Soviet; el_sewher- in wort
7. Remove;
t-:iry thr.cat to
from Crib. n t r~rr; t-r,r..?.
8. Don . _ '.hch^v a ?oc'; i _ble heap victor-. t-'
17'071h
SUCcCssful m?inf ni'- n FfcnsiV,. W a' o Cu
apon,; in JU!~a .
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Final Draft
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
DISADVANTAGES
1. This action,may force Khrushchev to react st-ongly
and could result in some type. of war. ir;hchev will n.at
order launch of a missile from Cuba unless he ,.s ready for
war essentially on other grounds. There is greater likelihood
of a riposte in kind. However, it is unlikely that the risks
of major war are greater than through escalati_n of blockade.
.2. There is remote possibility that some local Soviet
commander in Cuba may order firing of a missile.
3. Adv -.rse effect on U. S. image of initiation of use
,of force against a small country. This can be minimized by
making attack selective and focused on Soviet offensive
weapons. At same tine there would be positive increments
to our image from, demonstration of clear willingness to
take on the Soviets in protection of our vital interests.
4. Unless carefully handled could damage long-range
U.S.-Cuban relations
. 5'. May not totally eliminate offensive weapons thus
calling for follow up at-vacks and/or invasion, unless full
aid unlimited international inspection is agreed to.
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.Final Draft
ECRET -- S NSITIVE
,7EQUISIT_; FOR D :CI ~IOZ1
1. `Tto of U.3, rcsolut 7_on in Security Council-
2. Evidence that Soviet:; hav^ continued build-1. p of
n;~ ;tang offcn ivc capabili'--y in Cuba in defiance of Presidontial
warning and OAS resolution.
^CTTO"ITS PRIOR OR SIT_ULM-NEOUS TO STRIKE
1. I:'hi.te. Hou: e statement . that. offensive build-zfp
cont:L_nuing, a. dangerous and provocative act, which incraa ;e
Urav .ty of s'ituation. Repeats warning for those engaged' '_n
thl- work.
2. Delivery of. copy of I.,hite House statement to Cuban
rcpr.3sentative at UN., Evacuation warning (as long as militarily fear } b1 i= to
personnel in ll~strike areas by leafl:it drop. A strike plan dies igned
to,accomplish mission with.minimum damage to non-military trrgets.
4. Inform OAS .(Chairman) shortly in advance of str~l.I" .
5. Arrange for hnbassadors to notify Latin American heads
of state at zero hour,
6. Inform NATO Allies and others at appropriate tine.
7. Letter to X, delivered at zero hour, describing ac'.:ion
and indicating regret 'that continuation of work at offcns i_v 2
sites had forced action, limi_teci.nature of operation, our i Efort
to limit personnel losses, and calling for immediate consultations
.to reduce world-wide tensions.
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PAP SECRET - SENSITIVE
FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
1. Continuation of close air surveillance.
2. Be prepared to hit SAM sites and airfields if
.reconnaissance planes attacked.
3. Immediate report to Organ of Consultation (OAS)
and adoption of resolution requesting Soviets to evacuate
offensive forces from Cuba under international inspection.
4. Report to UN Security Council explaining limited
nature of operation and requesting immediate despatch of
.UN observer team to Cuba.
5. Maintenance of blockade extended to include POL
until clear evidence is available that offensive bases
have been eliminated. .
6. Major Presidential address including special
massage to Cuban people.
7. Appropriate leaflet drops over Cuba.
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-P- SECRET
October 25, 1962
POLITICAL PATH
?
This path has several branches, both as to the forum in
which negotiations are carried out, and with regard to the steps
to be taken.
With respect to the forum, we are already in the UN and
this could be combined with private approaches on the side.
We could follow up the U Thant proposals in order to get into
prompt discussion with the Soviets. This is almost essential
since the Soviets will almost certainly not put forward or in-
dicate agreement to proposals publicly made.
Another method would be to propose or have someone
such as U Thant propose a direct meeting with Khrushchev.
He has publicly indicated his readiness for such a meeting ire.--
his letter to Bertrand Russelland could not have been expected,
at this stage, to have made proposals directly to the President
for fear of a rebuff. It would be difficult, however, for him to
refuse an invitation from the President. A direct meeting
would have to mean the continuance of the quarantine and would
be difficult for us unless there was progress on proposals to
ensure a standstill under UN control. It would probably involve
discussions over Berlin or, as a minimum, our missile base
Turkey. A prompt proposal for an agreement to a meeting
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Q'SECRET
with Khrushchev might defer or avoid strong Soviet reaction to
our stopping one of their ships.
As a background for political action that would have any
hope of success, it would be important to minimize, so far as
possible, any forceful action against Soviet vessels in carrying
out the quarantine.
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ET
_XQP-SECR
Theloilowing political actions might be considered:
1. Aproposal in some forum to withdraw our missiles
from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal of
their missiles from Cuba. This might be expressed
in generalized form, such as withdrawal of missiles
from territory contiguous or in proximity of the
territory of the other.
.2. An alternative approach might be to have a proposal
for the UN to send teams to Cuba and Turkey to take
control over the missiles there pending the outcome
of negotiations. U Thant might be put up to advancing
such proposals.
SECRET
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TOP SECRET
Approach to Castro
?
An approach would be made to Castro through a Latin
American representative in Cuba, probably the Brazilian Am-
bassador, pointing out that Cuba was merely being exploited in
the interests of the Soviet Union and that any of the possible paths
by which the Cuban crisis can be expected to develop will result
in the overthrow of his regime, if not its physical destruction.
It could be pointed out that President Kennedy has stated that
only two subjects were not negotiable between the United States
and Castro: military ties to the USSR and aggressive actions
of any kind in Latin America.
If the Castro Government considers it has no free-
dom to act because of the presence of Soviet technicians, we
would be prepared to undertake to deal with this problem. We
would have to give some assurances, regardless of whether we
intended to carry them out, that we would not ourselves under-
take to overthrow the regime or support others trying to do so.
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GONFIDENTIAL
DENUCLEARIZATION TRACK
1. It may take as much as 24 hours to persuade the
Brazilian Government to sponsor our resolution in place of
theirs in the Organ of Consultation and the United Nation;.
A telegram to Ambassador Gordon and conversations with the
two Brazilian Ambassadors here would initiate action.
2. With Brazilian sponsorship it should be possible ir.
24 hours to secure action close to unanimity by the Organ of
Consultation on the resolution. Telegrams to our Ambassadors
in each of the Orgarof Consultation countries, as well as
Ambassadors here, would be utilized to secure support.
3. Immediately the Organ of Consultation has acted
the Brazilians should submit a similar proposal to the United
Nations for approval. '
There is attached a draft resolution which we would ask
the Brazilians to sponsor.
It is possible that the above 48 hour schedule could be
cut, and, if approval is given tonight, the Organ of Consultation
might act Saturday morning.
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WHEREAS:
CONFIDENTIAL
The Council of the Organization of American States Actin,;
provisioially.as Organ of Consultation in its Resolution of
October 23, 1962, recognizing that "Incontrovertible ev _dentle
has appeared that the Government of Cuba, despite repeat;ed
warnings, has secretly endangered the peace of the Cont:vnent:
by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate a rd
middle-range missiles on its territory capable of carrying flue e
ar
warheads" called for "the immediate dismantling and withdrawal
fro
C
m
uba of all missiles and other weapons with any
offensive capability; the e
The establishment of nuclear missile capability on the
territory of an American Republic which did not possess such
capability at the date on which the Inter_
American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance came into effect creates a situation
which would endangerkthe peace and security of the continent
and is thus inconsistent with the purposes and principles set
forth
in the Charter of the OAS;
THE COAS/OC
to Decides that no American Republic referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall establish or permit the
within its territory of n7aclear he
missiles
or missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads;
CONFIDENTIAL
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D R A P 1 'i' r e : E, E s: R 11 RR
f/ei Yor ,ls = h 6..
relieve acki11- m nr@nnga7 offers nnggibi-..'it i hp l nf, i
Cuban si aati.on., Tt Appears to ? aartment that of -waricrarr PI rt., -, w.,_~
n-pen for disposal problem c2reatef b,* build-un Covi } nf-T'r n i
Cuba, this perhaps most attractive and feasible fa,A 'nll ri ncr -, t-, ,r::.
(a) Assuininp, Communists will be wil l in??! absrdnrm n' r*,r
nuclear base i_n face our n ruress without reauiri-no nuiii i r'n ,
which is our present nPaoti.&tir_P nosition. nroposa
one would o f'wr s:,itr.artiv'r, facersavi"-a v out f'o,? ,,,,,: ..~
particularly trine 41,nee rrnserFt nrnno~-a]. Is bona f'-',OF TA 4,.i:-4 4
Cuba cOu
_G aceQIlt; on arnnivr`.ra t.hcztr r31wf~r_ -i f7 to qa T, 1
_ ake entire $'"nn roiC t:!?I` 't'fmn "o-z- t'! Whje&, thew .r! siI- nrert- h. stirQ :
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_a piospeea: it .davana and Moscow did not find a way ~_o
arArE)ve the offensive installations.
7. s persuasive sit of movement towar ,9.001001x7
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 TOP SECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
`~Q~KOY'Q~~Ull4'L~
THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA
Information as of 0600
25 October 1962
PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
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 Approved For Release 266 66/1 -:'I _DP 800010017-6
No change has been noted in the pace of construction
activities at the identified MRBM and IRBM sites. The es-
timated dates of operational readiness for these sites re-
main as previously reported. (Two MRBM sites are believed
already operational, three others will probably become
operational today, and the sixth on 28 October. Of the
three IRBM sites, one may become operational by 1 December
and the other two by 15 December.)
Photography I Irevealed no new missile sites,
and no additional m , missile transporters or erectors
at already identified sites.
There is increasing evidence of camouflage at several
sites
Among the Soviet ships formerly en route to Cuba whi