MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS) FROM (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001700180050-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 50
• Content Type: MF

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TOP ICCRE'i'
it January 1963
r)e)euty Director
Deputy Director (1mtelliger-ce)
MU FOR: Deputy rhr*cter (PI
1. Pursuant to the suggea#ion cc
of A:tiott
is transrnitted herewith a
therein.
2
1963, there
2. It should be nesters that the c tert of this paper,
few exceptions, was lifted verso fry the Director's report
to the PAD en intell.igente cc=pity activities relating to
the Cuban arms build-up, e i no new thoughts have been intro-
duced.
3. It is requested that az.y coxrrn~nent.a y may have
ed to xme not later than COS 14 January 1963.
25Xf 1
Inspector Genera]
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cc: ,' DCI
#'xecutire Director
Mr. Elder
.UGC
_S~ IQ 11
10 ks IS '00
rThis documant may be
downgraded to.t
w?'_n enclosure is detached.
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Between mi.dsumm+er ax.d fall of 2962 the Soviets attempted,
within a very short period of time, tic, convert Cuba into a powerful
strategic base.
Theses events were occurring in the environment of Caetro's
police-state controls, reinforced by the Soviets' own security
precautions, n g their detection axed reporting difficult.
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H. CCILI CTICT4 REt u:CRE TENTS
In late 1961, in order to provide a so ad basis for future
U. S. policy toward Cuba, the intelligence community was instructed
to increase its intelligence and actinn capabilities. Resulting Intel-
ligence community actiore included increasing U-2. overflights from
ore to two flights per month, creati. g a
I for the intelligence exraloitaticni of Cuban refugees, and stepping
u;p substantially the world-wide irate: I.igenc? collection effort on Cuba.
IN hile these actions he., beer initiated prior to the start of the
Soviet build-up, it was this series of actions which placed the con- rnuri
July
The broad. framework of requirements on Cuba, w hich was in
the corn-iunity`s possession 1: eefore the build-up, was comprehensive
enough to include guidance fox the gathering. of information on the scope
and pace of the Soviet arms biAld-w.3 Including missiles.
in a position of readinesti when the icxviest build-up began in
and early August.
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IV. REPQPTMG ON Tom`. BU MD
During 1961 and early 1962. there were numerous reports from
ground observers about missile aettirtty in Cuba. Until August 1962.,
overhead photography disproved almost all such reports. The few
that could not be disproved. could not be confirmed.
The reporting of all types of information on Cuba was massive,
and it grow as collection facilities were increasingly focussed on the
arms build-up. The reports irtdica4 to the community that the
speed and magnitude of the influx of Bloc pe rso p of and equipment into
a non-BiDe country was unprecedented in Soviet military aid activities.
From mid-April to mica-C'cts eo~r there were over a thousand
ports on the arnes build-up.
in retrospect, reveals ore7.y a handful that can be related to offensive
missile activity. These few, which 'vegan to reach the c
ty
after mid-September, were suggestive enough to arouse the suspicions
of the analysts, but did not provide hard evidence.
Our limited intelligence: assets
the Soviet Union did not
detect the detailed planning and [ extensive assembly of a erials destined
for Cuba. However, once the weapons were on their way, the Intelli-
gence community succeeded, in e. very short period of time, in discover.
ing and reporting the facts.
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V. DISSEMINATION OF THE REPORTS
Raw information roport;3 on the Cuban arms build-up, like
all such reports, were widely disse,nni tted throughout the intelligence
community.
From early September there was a restriction on publishing
intelligence on offensive weapons in Cuba. This restriction, however,
did not affect the flow of raw infornuLtion to analyst*.
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V1 .
Ci SSING AND ANALYSI
The composite of information reaching the analysts on the Cuban
arms build-up was unique in peacetime intelligence operations. By
the end of August the total volume of reporting reaching the analysts
had become a virtual deluge.
The intelligence community was understandably cautious in
raising any alarm over the possibility of MRBM' a in Cuba. The time
span was very short and the evidence was inconclusive. The MRBM
probably did not arrive in Cuba before 3 September. Because of the
difficulty in getting cornrnurai,cations out of Cuba, the first reporting
suggesting the presence of MR 81+ 's in tuba did not reach Washington
until after mid-September.
By 3 October, the analytical protons had funneled these reports
into the targeting mechanism, resulting in the 14 October U- flight,
originally approved to test the opsratio
eadiness of a SAM site,
being flown over an area where MliDM' a might be found.
The an. lytic effort identified each of the major weapons systems
introduced into Cuba before the system reached operational capability.
It should be noted, however, that the intelligence community would
have been hard pressed to devote a sivailar effort to a similar problem
occurring in some other part of the world at the same time.
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VII. THE Il TELLY NCL PUBLICATIONS
The most immediate reflection of the intelligence analysts' work
appears first in current intelligence ,put licationet and later in estimative
papers.
Because of restrictions on 9ublishing information concerning
offensive weapons in Cuba, there were delays and gape in the published
information, but not in the Low of raw information. The purpose of
the restraint on publishing was to restrict the information to those
who needed to know it for purposes of analysis and action. The effect
was to concentrate the information at the decision-making levels of
the Government.
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VIII. THE ESTIMATES ON CUBA
Before the discovery of strategic missiles in Cuba on 14 October
the community had, in 1962, produced two National Intelligence, Estimates
and one Special National Intelligence Nstirnato. Each of these estimates
discussed the possibility of Soviet use of Cuba as a strategic base, and
each, including that of 19 September, concluded that the Soviets would
sider the risk of U. S. retaliation too great.
Through long experience in estimating Soviet policy, the estimators
had developed some sense of the limits within which the Soviets might
operate. Until 14 October the evidence on the military build-up did
not clearly indicate to the eaetimators that the Soviets would accept
the risks involved in deploying offensive weapons systems to Cuba.
The size and speed of the build-up and the obvious military advantage
the Soviets would gain from a strategic bases in Cuba caused them to
examine this contingency in detail in preparing the 19 September estimate.
They concluded, however, that such an action would involve an unacceptable
degree of risk and would therefore be unlikely.
On 19 -Dctober, the U. S. Intelligence Board estimated that in reaction
to certain U.S. courses of action the Soviet leaders would not deliberately
initiate general war or take military measures, which in their calculation,
would run the gravest risk of general war. This estimate was correct.
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IX. CHRONOLOGY OF CUBAN U-2
Overheead reconnaissance of Cam with U-2 aircraft began on
26 October 1960. Between that date and 12 October 1962, CIA flew
a total of 54 missions.
As of mid-April i962,, authority for U-2 n'xissions was increased
from one to two per month.
The 29 August naission, which c nnplotod the two authorized
missions for August, covered the length of the island and found eight
SAM sites in western Cuba and what was later learned to be a cruise
missile site at Banes.
A mission flown on 5 Septerrsb r over the eastern and central
portions of the island found three addhfca
ites in central
At a meeting on 10 September, the Secretary of State expressed
concern over CIA's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive
peripheral coverage as well as two leas directly over Cuban air space,
all in one flight. As a result, CIA split the proposed coverage into
four parts, involving four separate flights. because of bad weather
the four flights, covering portions of the island which had not been
photographed sines 5 August, were not completed until 7 October.
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From 18 September thxougta 2 October, agent and refuges reports
dovetailed sufficiently to create the hypothesis that there was something
of unusual irportance going an in a definite area west of Havana and
flights over Cuba. SAC flew 1.4 rairaionr between 14 and 22 October,
the date of the President's statena.ent to the ration.
discover the presence of MR.BM' s.
On 16 October approval was gives for an unlimited num
one U-2 mission in the westo.ra part of the island. If this flight did not
activate ground-to-air fire, as number of similar sorties would be
mounted.
On lg October operational control of U-Z overflights of Cuba was
transferred to the Strategic Air Corner d.
A mission was flown by SAC on 14 'October over an area west
of Havana to test the operational readiness of SAM sites and to look
for suspected offensive inievile activity. The flight was the first to
uction there needed
On 9 October it was agreed that first priority should be gig
that ground observer reports of missile site
to be confirmed or denied by photography.
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The intelligence coxrxnunity operated extensively and well
in connection with Cuba. Every major weapons system introduced
into Cuba by the Soviets was detected, identi
before any one of these systems attained an oiler
reported
capability.
Aerial photography ways very effective and our best
of establishing hard intelligence. The procedures adopted in
September delayed photographic intelligence, but photography prior
to about 17 October would not have been sufficient to warrant action
of a type which would require support from Western Hemisphere or
NATO allies.
The 19 September eatirnatet while indicating lack of probability
that MRBM'ss would be placed in Cuba, did state that this contingency
must be examined carefully. " Ths estimators in preparing the
19 September estimate gave great weight to the philosophical argument
concerning Soviet intentions said thus did not fully weigh the indicators
which would have led to a contrary conclusion.
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