EVIDENCE OF A SOVIET MILITARY COMMITMENT TO DEFEND CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001700140007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 19, 1962
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 2428/62
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Cur-rent Intelligence
19 October 1962
SUBJECT: Evidence of a Soviet Military Commitment
to Defend Cuba
1. Although Cuban leaders may have requested
admission into the Warsaw Pact and probably have
sought an unrestricted Soviet commitment to come to
Cuba's defense militarily in the event of a US attack,
there is no evidence that any such requests have been
granted.
2. Raul Castro arrived in Moscow on 2 July and
left on 17 July. Even before he left Soviet terri-
tory, the first Soviet vessels had left Black Sea
ports for Cuba with the initial cargoes of equipment
for the SAM and coastal defense missile installations.
The decision to send this equipment to Cuba must
have been taken at the latest by mid-June and prob-
ably earlier.
3. When Che Guevara and his mission arrived
in Moscow on 26 August, the buildup of Soviet equip-
ment in Cuba was already well under way. The Cuban-
Soviet communique issued on Guevara's departure on
2 September publicly acknowledged Soviet military
assistance to Cuba for the first time. This was
followed on 11 September by the Soviet government's
statement accusing the US of aggressive intentions
against Cuba and renewing general promises of Soviet
support for. the Castro regime. In these
statements, as in earlier ones, the Soviet Govern-
ment avoided committing itself to a specific re-
sponse in support of Cuba should that country be
attacked.
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4. There is evidence that the Cuban leaders
were very fearful of a US attack during the summer
months. There were numerous "invasion scares" which
reached a peak toward the end of August and then
began to level off. As early as last June Cuban
officers were reported to
be fearful of an attack by the US and pessimistic
as to the outcome unless the invasion took place
after September when "the danger will be over."
There are other indications that the Cubans re-
garded the period of late August and early Septem-
ber as the time of maximum danger. This timing
strongly suggests that Raul Castro did not obtain
a hard-and-fast Soviet commitment to Cuba's de-
fense during his trip to Moscow in July. It does
suggest that the Cuban estimate of the period of
maximum danger was pegged to a stage in the instal-
lation of Soviet military equipment in Cuba, and
that the Cubans felt progressively more secure as
the work advanced.
5. The state of military alert in Cuba was
relaxed on 5 September, Che Guevara had talked with
Khrushchev on 30 August, and a joint communique
was issued on 2 September. There could have been
a connection, but there is no evidence to support
such a relation. Guevara, who stopped over in
Prague after leaving Moscow, did not return to
Havana until 6 September.
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officials could as well have been pegged to the
then existing stage in the installation of the So-
viet equipment. It would also seem logical that
Moscow would make known to the US any Soviet mili-
tary guarantee to Castro as a means of deterring
US action that might involve the USSR and the US
in conflict on terms unfavorable to the USSR.
7. There is no evidence that the Castro re-
gime has been admitted to the Warsaw Pact. There
was a report that Raul Castro had requested Cuban
admission in July but that the request was denied.
It was also reported that sometime in early Septem-
ber the Cubans had informed leaders of the Panama-
nian Communist party that Cuba had secretly con-
cluded a bilateral defense pact with the USSR which
was tantamount to bringing Cuba into the Warsaw
Pact. This appears to be an exaggerated reference
to the 11 September Soviet statement. A Soviet
commentary on Cuban developments broadcast on 3
September specifically denied that Cuba was a War-
saw Pact member. In April 1961, Khrushchev denied
that the Soviet Union had any military base in Cuba
or intended to establish one there; this denial
was repeated in the 11 September 1962 Soviet pro-
nouncement.
of Soviet policy is to prevent the US from "liqui-
dating" the Castro regime. He characterized Cuba
as an "ideological beachhead for the USSR in Latin
America" and as a means of destroying US hegemony
in this area. He said the Cuban example stands as
proof to the rest of Latin America that the USSR
will support and defend any country which takes
"the socialist road." He observed that Cuba has
become a matter of prestige for both the US and the
USSR and that this has produced an "extremely ser-
ious" situation in which Moscow cannot afford to
retreat from its declarations of support in the
event of US aggression. The source indicated that
it is difficult to predict what form Soviet support
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would take, but he speculated that the USSR would
provide "material" for attacking bases used by US
forces for offensive operations against Cuba.
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