(EST PUB DATE) CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OF GROUND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES AT THE STAFF LEVEL OCTOBER 1949 - SEPTEMBER 1955

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01410809
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 17, 2024
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2024
• Case Number: F-2018-01028
• Publication Date: November 1, 1968

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CS Historical Paper
No. 163
CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HISTORY
(TITLE OF -PAPER)
THE EVOLUTION OF 'GROUND
PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
AT THE STAFF LEVEL
WIRMW
OCTOBER 1949 - SEPTEMBER 1955
DO NOT DESTROY
Date published: December
Copy No.. 2 of 2
Controlled by
Date prepared
Written b
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of the paper continued to be NSC 10/5, which has been
described previously. On 15 March 1954, it was re-
67/
placed by NSC 5412,� the first of several NSC actions
referred to as the 5412 series.
NSC 5412 reaffirmed the responsibility of the DCI
for ensuring that covert operations were consistent
with U.S. policies and that direct action such as
support to resistance, GW, sabotage and countersabotage
and E&E was included in the overall definition of covert
operations. The DCI was made responsible for consult-
ing with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) and
other departments and agencies as appropriate.
Ground PM Accomplishments, August 1952 - June 1954
It was rather bitterly ironic, at least to PM Staff
personnel, that this period at the outset saw PM activ-
ity achieve its highest announced status and recognition
as a principal staff function, then decline to its
Atm,,
lowest depth of acceptance (in 1954) as a major Agency
responsibility and effort, because of a series of
failures, compromises and disappointments. It is un-
fortunately true that to a certain extent these unhappy
results were the product of a lack of professional
expertise in the planning, implementation and security
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The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Soviet Russia: The operational difficulties
in establishing long-range PM assets in the USSR were
practically insurmountable, particularly in view of the
more pressing requirements for intelligence collection.
The practicality, and advisability of recruiting and
training PM assets, to be held externally until required
for operational employment, was taken under advisement.
It was recognized that such an undeLtaking would present
very large administrative and security problems.
Czechoslovakia and Poland: Within a few
months after the disastrous BDJ exposure in Germany, PM
projects which had successfully infiltrated trained
agents into Czechoslovakia and Poland were badly
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compromised by Communist penetrations of the sponsoring
political groups. A number of valued agents were round-
ed up and executed. The projects were considered as
compromised beyond salvage.
Bulgaria: A PM project for the introduction
of trained agents into Bulgaria was also compromised,
with resultant loss of agents.
East Germany: A PM project, based in Berlin,
for the infiltration of trained PM agents into East
Germany was initiated and appeared to give some promise
of fruitful results.
The Near East
Iran: By late 1952 it became apparent that
Iran was in danger of indirect takeover by the Soviets.
The government of Iranian Premier Mossadeq, sorely
beset by economic problems, was falling increasingly
under the influence of extreme nationalists and Tudeh
(Iranian Communist) Party.
have the will to act.
At the suggestion o
The Shah did not seem to
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