UNACCREDITED DEGREE: TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628010
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 17, 2024
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2024
• Case Number: F-2013-02114
• Publication Date: May 3, 2011

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3 May 2011
DISPOSITION MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: (U) Unaccredited Degree: Technical Intelligence Officer
CASE: 2011-10167-IG
ISSUES UNDER INVESTIGATION:
1. (U/ /./Otierj Based on a 2008 United States Secret Service
investigation that identified an Agency contractor as possessing a degree
from a known diploma mill, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated
a proactive investigation on 5 August 2008 into Agency Staff claiming
degrees from non-accredited institutions. OIG matched a list of known,
unaccredited institutions against Agency BIO information to identify any
individuals who had provided degree evidence to Human Resources.1'2
One of the individuals
"degree" from
identified,
claimed a master's (b)(3) CIAAct
on her (b)(6)
Agency BIO.
(b)(7)(c)
with
a known, unaccredited institution,
is not affiliated
the accredited
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
I (U/ La:44er The term unaccredited refers to the recognition and acceptability of a degree for use in
federal employment as recognized by the Office of Personnel Management. Unaccredited degrees cannot
be used to meet the qualifications for federal positions that require a degree. The complete definitions of
accreditation are included in the Appendix.
2 (U/ LED4rFer The Agency biographical profile (Agency BIO) is the mechanism for tracking information
on individuals who officially declare their education to the Agency by providing proof of attendance.
The Agency BIO is made available to hiring managers and used directly in staffing decisions. Only staff
employees and former employees were covered by this review because there is no central database on
contractor educational records.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
2. (U/ LEA:JO) OIG reviewed the claims made by regarding
her degree and the associated education to determine if there were false
statements or improper use of an unaccredited degree, and if there was an
improper reimbursement for the degree by the Agency.
INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS:
3. (U/ 4E01401
claims.
file for any degree
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
OIG reviewed security
(b)(7)(c)
4. (U/LECA401-
and online Agency
OIG reviewed Official
Personnel Folder
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
BIO.
(b)(7)(c)
5. (U/L.F.Oldefr OIG interviewed
regarding her unaccredited degree.
on 11 August 2008,
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
6. (lin...WI:J.01
OIG reviewed Department
of Justice (DOD records
(b)(7)(c)
related tc
for evidence of reimbursement to
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
7. (U/ JD-140Y OIG reviewed Agency regulations and relevant laws
(b)(7)(c)
related to the allegations.
RESULTS:
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
8. (U/LEOT40)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
is a
Staff officer within the
has been an Agency employee since
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
l(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
holds a bachelor of arts degree from
fully-accredited institution) and a master of science "degree" in
During her 11 August 2008
interview with CMG, stated that she took classes at other schools,
but confirmed that her only degrees were from and
stated she started at
ended in
between $5,000 and $7,000.
in approximately
estimated that the total degree
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
2
and
cc(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6110)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(6)
(b) (b)(7)(c)
11. (U) Former students identified by were informed by DOJ
that they had been defrauded and that their � e rees were not valid.
The students were informed in a letter that stated in
part:
12. (U) advertised its degrees in mainstream publications.
Students would receive extensive credit for transferred courses as well as
extensive "life experience" credit. Students would register for a small
number of classes and were asked to purchase and read textbooks for the
classes. Students would then submit a paper based on the class topic for
3
(b
)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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grading. For classes taken at the university, students would pay an
enrollment fee for each class, and then a separate grading fee for each
paper submitted. Since there were no faculty behind the classes, student
submissions varied greatly in quality. There was no valid check of the
academic work performed.
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
14. (U/L.F..0446) presented her direct supervisor with
details of her master's program in several performance appraisal reports
(PARs) reporting periods. For her
PARS,
studies as part of her evaluations.
had completed her master's program for the
period. Her then-supervisor,
provided details of her progressing
advised her supervisor that she
PAR
noted the completion of
her master's degree as an accomplishment in her PAR.
15. (U/LECA:f)9 According to records in security file,
during a interview for her background investigation
update, stated that she received her master of science degree in
from
generated an education check during subse
investigation. Her graduation was confirmed
adjudication for that update.
included in her Agency BIO from
This statement
uent background
favorable
master's degree information was
(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c) (b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
(b7)(c
16. In an interview with OIG, stated that s)(he d)id not (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
realize was unaccredited until she was told during the interview. She (b)(7)(c)
claimed that she enrolled with because it offered the
major she wanted, and because she needed to pursue
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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distance learning
stated that her program took about three
years to complete and required work that was of a level-of-difficulty
consistent with her undergraduate degree work. stated that she
completed a significant amount of work, to include a 200-page thesis for
one of her courses. In light of all this, she said, she had believed the
program to be legitimate until informed otherwise by OIG.
b)(3) CIAAct
b)(6) 17. (U/LEGI40) advised that she sought and received
b)( 7)(c)
authorization for Agency tuition reimbursement of her courses, and
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
that the Agency paid all tuition costs. She noted that the Agency did not
reimburse fees other than tuition, such as application and graduation fees.
estimated the amount of her tuition for the program as between
$5,000 and $7,000.
18. (U/LEQUe)- stated that she was never contacted
regarding a tuition refund in conjunction with the DOJ investigation, nor
did she apply for or receive any refund. This was confirmed through a
review of the DOJ reimbursement records related to
19. (U/LE.01443)- It is unclear whether may have received
favorable consideration in promotion or assignment processes due to her
having a master's degree, which exceeded the minimum requirement for
the positions she has held. When asked during the OIG interview if she
had benefited from her degree, responded that if she did, it
would have been only in a general way, that is, by having an advanced
degree.
b)(3) CIAAct
20. (U/ /...a31:ferl Although stated that she was unaware of
b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) her master's de ree's non-accreditation prior to the OIG interview, once
informed, expressed her concern and asked what steps she should
take to rectify the problem. While stressing her surprise and the amount of
work she had done, accepted the situation and was fully
cooperative. She voluntarily provided a quantity of documents from her
personal file for OIG's use.
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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I(b)(3) CIAAct
DISPOSITION: (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
21. (U) was widely recognized as a fraudulent institution.
Though it had "classes" and "coursework," the efforts of students were not
evaluated by actual faculty./
(b)(6) 22. (U/L.F-01:107 Likely because of
(b)(7)(c) she was not notified by DOJ of being defrauded by
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
assignments,
Additionally,
provided evidence that she did work toward her master's degree
that, while not graded, may have led her to believe it was legitimate.
did receive Agency reimbursement for the degree. After being
(b)(3) iAAdotified by OIG that her degree was not legitimate, agreed to
(b)(6) provide all documents requested and volunteered to take any steps
(b)(7)(c) requested to rectify the problem.
23. (U) There is no evidence of criminal or regulatory violation on
the part of Based on the currently available information, no
disciplinary action or further investigation is recommended.
Special Agent
Supervisory Special Agent
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SEGRF4,-T�
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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