WARSAW PACT MILITARY PERCEPTIONS OF NATO NUCLEAR INITIATION

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06568476
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• Document Creation Date: November 22, 2024
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2024
• Case Number: F-2021-00333
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986

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lre-Secrut-
Warsaw Pact Military Perceptions
of NATO Nuclear Initiation (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
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C
� Top Secret
SOV 86-10029JX
June 1960
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Intelligence
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Warsaw Pact Military Perceptions
of NATO Nuclear Initiation (u)
An Intelligence Assessment
t
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This paper was prepared by Office
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
1
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SOYA,
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June 1986
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Key *judgments
Information available
as oil April 1986
was used in this report.
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Warsaw Pact Military Perceptions
of NATO Nuclear Initiation (u)
The key tenet of Soviet doctrine for nuclear war holds that delivery of the
first massed strike provides a decisive, potentially war-winning advantage.
Consequently, Soviet military doctrine is preeminently concerned with first
use and has a strong bias for preemption on a massive scale. A decision by
the Soviets to preempt in a European war would depend upon their
perceptions and observations of NATO activities and their predictions of
the circumstances under which NATO would use nuclear weapons. Our
analysis of all sources suggests that the Soviets lack confidence in their
ability to detect preparations for NATO's imminent Use of nuclear
weapons. Hence, we judge that the Soviets' perceptions of the catalysts and
conditions for NATO first use would be critical to their decision to
preempt. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Analysis of authoritative writings leads us to
conclude that the Warsaw Pact assesses the conventional "correlation of
forces" as being in its favor, especially in ground forces. The Pact believes
that, barring the unforeseen, victory in a war is possible without first use of
nuclear weapons. We judge that Soviet leaders would approve the first use
of nuclear weapons for only two reasons: to preempt NATO's large-scale
use or to prevent general defeat. Only the first reason receives serious
attention from Pact theorists because the second is seen only as a remote
possibility. (b)(3) NatSecAct
The Soviet General Staff's perception of why NATO might initiate nuclear
warfare, as echoed throughout the Warsaw Pact military, varies signifi-
cantly in some ways from Western plans and intentions. Our analysis of
Pact writings persuades us that at least some
misperceptions arise because the Soviets project their own doctrine,
command arrangements, and intentions onto NATO. For example, the
Soviets, as well as their allies, do not distinguish the US national nuclear
forces from those of France and the United Kingdom, but rather assume
they are controlled by a unitary NATO decisionmaldng structure dominat-
ed by the United States. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Drawing upon their analyses of NATO's doctrine, exercises, nuclear
decisionmaking, and defense plans, Pact strategists have refined their
estimates of the cause and timing of NATO nuclear initiation into four
major cases:
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� NATO strikes early and massively. Such a strike typically would occur
on the first day of the war, followed by NATO thrusts into Eastern
Europe. This is seen by the Pact as an attempt to initiate a decisive
surprise attack and is described by Pact sources as the worst case.
� NATO strikes to support its first main defense line. Such an attack
typically would occur when Pact forces threaten to breach NATO
defense lines along the Weser River.
� NATO strikes to hold its final defense line along the Rhine River. Pact
planners assume that nuclear use is virtually certain as their forces
reach and attempt to cross the Rhine.
� No nuclear strikes. In recent years, Pact writings have begun to give
more attention to the possibility of a protracted conventional war.
Although the Pact devotes considerable effort to prepare against the worst
case scenario, it expects to avert it and may see a chance to escape nuclear
attack at NATO's first main defense line as well. No major Pact theater
exercise has simulated the worst case scenario for seven years, although it
was regularly featured for nearly two decades. A number of recent major
exercises have portrayed Pact forces penetrating NATO's first main
defense line without a NATO nuclear response. (b)(3)
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Sensitive Pact writings stress how critical the Rhine would be in support of
a last-ditch defense of West Germany by NATO. No major Pact exercise
has simulated an advance beyond the Rhine without nuclear initiation.
Several major nonnuclear exercises have ended with a suggestion of
imminent nuclear initiation as Pact forces reach and attempt to breach
NATO's defenses along the Rhine River. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Soviet theorists recognize the paradox in their expectation that the very
success of Pact conventional forces would be likely to trigger NATO
nuclear strikes to stave off defeat. They further believe that initial limited
nuclear strikes by NATO would be ineffective, motivating it to launch
larger nuclear strikes. Because Soviet doctrine calls for launching a
preemptive, massed nuclear strike once NATO's intention to use nuclear
weapons on a large scale is detected, Pact theater successes could lead
directly to a general nuclear war. (b)(3)
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To resolve this paradox, the Soviets have undertaken peacetime and
wartime initiatives to weaken NATO's will and capability to use nuclear
weapons in a war. They seek to make it difficult for NATO to use nuclear
weapons effectively, to demonstrate the futility of their use, and to
highlight the risks of preemptive or retaliatory Pact nuclear strikes.
The Soviets' responses to their perception- of the probability of NATO
nuclear use and the requirement to launch a- preemptive massed strike
when ordered could, ironically, provide another motivation for Pact first
use in a war. Soviet planners and commanders explicitly trade off resources
required for the conventional campaign to support the transition to nuclear
war. The withholding of additional forces for possible nuclear strikes would
reduce the availability of conventional fire support from air and missile
units at times when they would be needed to support the Pact assault on
NATO defense lines. This is precisely the same time when NATO first use
is seen as increasingly likely
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We believe that the Soviet threshold for nuclear preemption would be
lowered significantly at NATO's first main line of defense and especially
at the Rhine. Confusion and the Soviets' lack of confidence in their ability
to correctly interpret NATO defensive measures heighten the risks of
miscalculation. The Soviets believe that NATO plans and prepares for
nuclear initiation at these times. The General Staff's recommendations to
the Supreme High Command would be made in the context of the staff's
own sense of vulnerability to a massive NATO nuclear strike. Regardless
of the Supreme High Command's decision, Pact forces would be at
maximum readiness to carry out a nuclear strike at these times.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments iii
Introduction 1
Misperceptions of NATO Nuclear Policies 4
Perceptions of NATO Nuclear Decisionmaking 4
Perceptions of NATO Defense Plans 5
NATO's Cover Zone and Forward Defense Zone 5
NATO's Main Defense Lines 5
Perceptions of NATO's Nuclear Doctrine 11
Perceptions of Specific Circumstances for NATO First Use 13
Implications for Soviet Planning and Doctrine 16
Appendixes
A.
Soviet Definitions of Nuclear Use 19
B.
NATO's INF and Pact Military Perceptions 21
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Warsaw Pact Military Perceptions
of NATO Nuclear Initiation (u)
Introduction
Warsaw Pact analyses of NATO's nuclear doctrine,
plans, and exercises help shape Soviet military percep-
tions of why, when, and how NATO would initiate the
use of nuclear weapons in Europe. These perceptions
provide a context for monitoring indications of and
over time,2 we are aware that such material must be
used judiciousb(b)(1)
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Finally, extrap-
olation of scenarios rand events recovered from exer-
cises is complicated
predicting the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO. (b)(1)
Because Pact reconnaissance and intelligence systems (b)(3) NatSecAct
would be under severe stress in a crisis and unable to
produce conclusive evidence of NATO nuclear prepa-
rations,' Soviet perceptions of the catalysts and condi-
tions for NATO first use are likely to play a key role
in advising the Supreme High Command whether to
order a preemptive Pact strike (b)(3) NatSecAct
Our evidence indicates that the Soviets have made a
concerted effort to understand and predict NATO's
behavior. For Soviet theorists and planners, war is a
problem amenable to study using the "scientific"
principles of Marxism-Leninism. War and human
behavior are believed to be predictable when subject-
ed to rigorous, systematic study. Consequently, Soviet
military leaders can be expected to give more cre-
dence to "scientific forecasts" of enemy behavior than
would be the case in Western armies]
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This paper addresses Pact military perceptions of
NATO nuclear initiation as a reflection of less acces-
sible Soviet military perceptions. Our analysis relies
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non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP).
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military writings.
Although we believe that major trends and decisions
are reflected in these writings and in exercise data
' These issues are addressed in DI Research PaDe SOV 85-
10107CX (Top Secret June 1985,
Warsaw Pact Tactica Forces: Capabilities and Ieadiness for
Nuclear War,
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indicative of
Our evidentiary base is
Warsaw Pact peacetime military perceptions. Of
course, these may not survive the stress of war.
Further, Soviet political leaders may hold views dif-
ferent from those of their military subordinates. We
judge this latter possibility unlikely because of the
salient importance of the nuclear war issue and the
relatively deep and ongoing involvement of Soviet
political leaders in national defense planning. We
believe any major disagreement between political and
military leaders would have been observable and
reflected in our evidentiary base. (s NF)
This paper focuses upon Pact perceptions of NATO
nuclear initiation. NATO nuclear responses to initial
Pact use and the interplay between limited NATO
and Pact nuclear strikes also evoke discussion and
analysis in Pact military writings. But the key tenet of
Soviet nuclear doctrine holds that the side that deliv-
ers the first massed strike gains a decisive, potentially
war-winning advantage. Thus we observe a preemi-
nent Soviet, and hence Pact-wide, concern over first
use, as well as a strong bias toward preemption on a
massive scale
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'For the role played by exercises in the formulation of Soviet
military doctrine, see DI Research Paper SOV 86-10014JX (Top
Secret April 1986, The Soviet General
Stat Managing Change in Military Doctrine.
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The Influence of NATO Exercises on the Warsaw Pact (b)(3) NatSecAct
Sensitive Pact military writings and the efforts of
NATO ;how that the Pact devotes
considerable effort to monitoring NATO exercises
and is influenced by its observations. a The Pact
writes specifically that large, multinational exercises
are a primary vehicle for NATO to work out its
contingencies and plans for a future war in Europe.
The influence of NATO exercises on Pact perceptions
and thus indirectly on doctrine can be seen in the
following examples:
� NATO and the Pact both foresee longer periods of
conventional combat before nuclear employment.
On the basis of NATO exercises, the Pact perceives
that NATO sees a trend toward longer periods of
conventional combat before nuclear weapons are
employed. Whereas NATO exercises in the early
1960s went only one or a few days before nuclear
weapons were introduced, by the mid-1970s the
conventional period lasted four or five days, and by
the late 1970s it stretched to about a week. As
shown in figure 1, a nearly identical trend can be
observed in Pact exercises.
� NATO is more likely to initiate nuclear use than the
Warsaw Pact. NATO exercises analyzed by the
Soviets and their allies show NATO initiating
nuclear use in every case since the mid-1960s.
Evidence from more than 100 Pact military exer-
cises between 1970 and 1985 that featured nuclear
use in the European theater indicates that the
initial use a nuclear weapons by NATO was simu-
lated in about 55 percent of the exercises. Addition-
al cases of intended NATO initial use are also
present within the 10 percent of the exercises we
classify as "simultaneous initial use," and in an-
other 10 percent where we cannot determine the
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Percent
Simultaneous
initial use
10
Unambiguous
Warsaw Pact
first use
25
Undetermined
initiator
10
Unambiguous
NATO first use
55
Nuclear First Use in Warsaw Pact Exercises
in the European Theater, 1970-85
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initiator. Of the remaining 25 percent�cases in
which the Pact initiated nuclear use�a substantial
portion reflected Pact nuclear initiation motivated by
its perceptions that NATO nuclear use was imminent
or unavoidable. Pact nuclear initiation in such cases
is, in the Soviet view, doctrinally mandated and does
not constitute true "first use." Even these figures may
understate the dominance of NATO first use in Pact
exercises. In recent years, Pact exercises depicting
NATO first use are even more common. The depic-
tion in Pact exercises of NATO as bearing the onus
for initiating nuclear use fulfills both training and
propaganda purposes. Nevertheless, the reason for
NATO's initial use of nuclear weapons conforms to
the Soviets' assessments and appears to reflect their
perceptions of NATO nuclear planning and intent.
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Figure 1
Timing of Nuclear First Use in Warsaw Pact and NATO
Exercises in the European Theater
Day of initial nuclear use
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Finally, the language of the discussion helps deter- the early stages of nuclear use. These sources state
mine the intellectual framework of Soviet and NSWP that the final authorization for nuclear use must be
writings about. war in general and nuclear war in given by the President of the United States.
particular. Appendix A provides a lexienn nf mainr (b)(3) NatSecAct
Soviet terms concerning nuclear war. (b)(3) NatSecAct
The Soviets, as well as the NSWP, do not distinguish
Misperceptions of NATO Nuclear Policies among the different national nuclear forces' political
control or reasons for initial independent use (see inset
In describing NATO nuclear policies, Warsaw Pact
military writers reveal perceptions that sometimes
vary significantly from NATO's actual plans and
intentions (see inset on pages 2 and 3). These misper-
ceptions cannot be explained simply by a lack of
information. To the contrary, we have overwhelming
evidence that the Soviets, and to a lesser degree the
NSWP countries, have gathered extensive informa-
tion about NATO's nuclear capabilities, doctrine, and
plans. They expend considerable resources monitoring
NATO exercises and incorporate the
into their own exercises and doctrine
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We believe most Warsaw Pact misperceptions result
from projecting Soviet doctrine, command arrange-
ments, and intentions onto NATO. This mirror imag-
ing is most apparent in Pact descriptions of NATO
decisionmaking and the military reasons for NATO
nuclear initiation. On the other hand, Pact writers
discuss NATO defense plans and the most likely form
of NATO first use without major distortions.
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Distorted Pact perceptions do not skew its threat
assessments in a single direction. Some appear to
diminish NATO's nuclear threat, but most enhance
it. It is ironic that the Pact could hardly face a more
obstinate and challenging foe in the nuclear arena
than its own mirror image. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Perceptions of NATO Nuclear Decisionmaking
In its military writings, the Pact generally portrays
NATO's nuclear decisionmaking structure as mono-
lithic and highly responsive, although individual
national pressures could argue for use at different
times. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
(SACEUR)�always an American in practice if not
by treaty provision�is generally depicted as the
individual who would request permission for specific
nuclear employment from the NATO Council. The
NATO Council, according to Pact writers, would
grant permission on a case-by-case basis, at least in
"Tou-Secr.ei
on paves 6 and 71.
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The formal NATO nuclear
decisionmaking structure, including consultative ar-
rangements, is a primary collection
and analysis target. (b)(1)
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Similarly, the Pact either dismisses or misunderstands
uniquely French and British national nuclear doc-
trines even though the technical characteristics of
their systems are regularly and accurately described.
An NSWP source in the mid-1960s described
France's rejection of limited nuclear war and its belief
that general nuclear war was the only conceivable
form for a major European war. However, this theme
has not reappeared in either sensitive Soviet or
NSWP military writings. More typically, recent Pact
writings portray French and British nuclear systems
incorrectly and simplistically as integrated compo-
nents of a coordinated NATO nuclear array. French
and British strategic systems are described as longer
range versions of the US Pershing II surface-to-
surface missile (SSM), with the same types of targets.
Similarly, the French Pluton SSM is considered a
replacement, along with the American-made Lance,
for the obsolescent Honest John. An exception in
recent years to this view of NATO has been a Soviet
proposal to deal separately with France and the
United Kingdom on intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) (see appendix B). Most recently, General
Secretary Gorbachev called in January 1986 for the
elimination of French and British systems over a five-
to 10-year period beginning no later than 1990.
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Perceptions of NATO Defense Plans
Warsaw Pact perceptions of NATO's defense plans
are for the most part realistic and accurate appraisals
derived from Pact analyses of NATO exercises, open-
(b)(3) NatSecAct source as well as classified writings and
statements, peacetime deployment of NATO forces,
and geography The appraisals show a strong bias
toward the Central European Theater of Military
Operations (TMO) and toward the northern half of
West Germany in particular. This probably reflects
the dominant role of that region in Pact plans and
presumes NATO interest there, although this bias
may in part be artificially induced by the nature of
our sources (b)(3) NatSecAct
A substantial number of NSWP sources, some Soviet
writings, and virtually all exercise scenarios describe
NATO as planning to conduct offensive operations
against the Pact NATO is depicted as intending to
advance toward Szczecin, Berlin, Leipzig, Dresden,
and Prague. We believe such intentions are imputed
to NATO not just for propaganda purposes but also to
motivate the soldiers and leaders of the Pact.
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Still, we should not totally discount Pact concerns
about a NATO offensive. Soviet Marxist-Leninist
theory holds that one of the major missions of the
armed forces is to deter, and if necessary punish, those
capitalist states that resist "the inevitable triumph of
socialism" Resistance is commonly portrayed in the
future when the dying capitalist oligarchy lashes out
against the "triumphant, progressive forces of socia-
lism" Pact military strategists analyze potential con-
flict in Europe within this context and their doctrinal
requirement to examine all military-technical possi-
bilities. It is not the role of the military strategists to
judge whether NATO political leaders would order an
offensive, but they are charged with investigating
NATO's capabilities for offensive action and taking
measures to counter identified threats
Soviet military doctrine also emphasizes readiness to
defeat a NATO offensive and to seize the initiative
with a vigorous Pact counteroffensive. Unsurprisingly,
Pact sources state that NATO would undertake de-
fensive operations if it were clear that even a surprise
5
attack would not offset numerically superior Pact
forces In any case, Pact leaders clearly expect to
force NATO onto the defensive, whatever NATO's
initial intentions (b)(3) NatSecAct
The basic features of NATO document MC 14/3,
NATO's flexible-response doctrine (see inset), as well
as NATO's command structure and layout of corps
sectors, have been portrayed in Pact writings for
nearly two decades Unclassified official NATO docu-
ments and statements, which the Pact would have
access to, do not indicate clearly what geographic
features its covering force area and main battle area
would rest upon, nor what rear defense lines might be
occupied as necessary Pact estimates of these fea-
tures and lines are revealing, both for what they
indicate about Pact intelligence and analysis and
because of the role Pact planners believe these defense
lines are likely to play in triggering NATO nuclear
use and shaping Pact operations
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NATO's Cover Zone and Forward Defense Zone.
Sensitive Pact writings claim that NATO will deploy
60 to 70 percent of its forces in its cover zone and
forward defense lines. These sources usually describe
the depth of NATO's cover zone as 15 to 50 kilome-
ters (km) and depict its forward defense zone begin-
ning just beyond (to the west of) its cover zone (see
figure 3) These and other Pact writings consistently
locate the leading (eastern) edge of NATO's forward
defense zone as running through West Germany from
Lubeck, Luneberg, and Uelzen, to Braunschweig
South of Braunschweig, this forward defense line is
less clear but appears to link the cities of Munden and
Passau in a gentle arc around the inner German
border (b)(3)
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NATO's Main Defense Lines. Pact writers claim that
if NATO forces were pushed from their forward
defense zone, they would fall back on a series of main
defense lines that stretch the length of West Ger-
many, ceding each in turn to occupy that to its rear
These lines are approximately 40 to 60 km apart
Because the battle for Germany may proceed at
different rates in the north and south, NATO could
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The French Nuclear Forces: An Unrecognized Wildcard?
We have no convincing evidence that the Soviets view
French nuclear forces as separate from or likely to be
engaged under different conditions than other NATO
nuclear systems. The creation of the French Rapid
Action Force, the growing French theater and strate-
gic nuclear capabilities, and the convergence of Paris
and Bonn on many security issues may, however,
focus Soviet attention n French nuclear capabilities
and nuclear doctrine in the future. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Currently, French main forces are located within
French borders or relatively deep in NATO's rear
areas (the II Corps in Baden-Baden), although there
is one brigade stationed in West Berlin. The Soviets
might therefore expect the French to feel no pressing
need to employ theater nuclear weapons to rescue
major French forces early in a war (see figure 2).
French Army nuclear systems�some 30 Pluton sur-
face-to-surface missile launchers�are positioned too
deep to be used very near or beyond the eastern FRG
border (given their 120-km range) without consider-
able forward deployment. On the other hand, French
tactical nuclear-capable aircraft could reach East
lEuropean territory rapidly with relative certainty.
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We expect the Soviets to reconsider the French
nuclear threat as France increases its theater and
strategic nuclear capabilities by acquisitions of the
350-km-range Hades missile, additional nuclear-
capable strike aircraft, new air-to-surface nuclear
missiles, additional and more capable nuclear sub-
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capabilities must be seen in light of:
These
� Increasing French Army capabilities to intervene
quickly with significant forces in the battle for West
Germany, both with the formation of the Rapid
Action Force and the reorientation of the III Corps
of the First Army.
French Pluton SSMs
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� Planned organizational changes to subordinate all
French theater nuclear forces to a command con-
trolled directly by the Joint Staff Command. The
French nuclear release procedure is arguably al-
ready highly responsive and will most likely be
further streamlined with this organizational
change.
� The deliberate effort to link the theater nuclear
force to the more threatening and rapidly growing
French strategic forces.
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The French view their theater nuclear force in war as
a means to serve as a 'final warning" to the Soviets
that they must cease aggression or suffer a French
strategic nuclear strike against cities in the USSR.
To reinforce the linkage, the French have none too
subtly renamed their theater nuclear forces "prestra-
tegic" nuclear forces. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Soviet failure to recognize independent French first �
use or escalation in a war could draw the Soviets and
non-French NATO countries into a nuclear exchange.
The same possibility could result from independent
British nuclear strikes, although the British decision-
making system is relatively more integrated into the
formal NATO structure (b)(3) NatSecAct
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Figure 2
A Soviet View of France's Ground Forces
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