CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, CONTACTS AND DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO THE SAIGON STATION COUP D'ETAT ACTIVITIES OF AUGUST 1963

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06265874
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: October 29, 2024
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2024
• Case Number: F-2020-00663
• Publication Date: September 28, 1963

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28 September 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT
REFERENCE
Chronology of Events, .Contacts and-Discussions
Relating to the Saigon Station Coup d'Etat
Activities of August 1963.
(a) Memorandum for the Director,. '!Sequence
of Contacts with Vietnamese Generals,
August 1963".
(b) DIR 70474
1. The following is a.chronological listing of the events,
contacts and discussions relating to the Saigon Station coup
d'etat activities between.21.August and 2 September 1963. This
record has been prepared from a review, of pertinent operational
correspondence with correlative commentary from those officers
directly involved and therefore, represents an accura'Le recon-
struction of the-events, contacts and discussions. All dates
are Saigon time.
21 August Declaration of Martial Law
23 August
Coneit/General Tran Van Don, Acting Chief of Staff,
Vietnamese Armed Forces meeting -with following
significant points: (a).troops not under General
Don (General Ton That Dinh, Military Governor of
Saigon, has control of III Corps troops and Colonel
Le Quang Tung, Chief ARVN Special Forces High Command,
is responsible only to the Presidency); (b) Don
stated did not want President Diem replaced by an
exile; admitted no one within the military was
capable of replacing Diem; (c) stated this was the
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first step 7 could not reveal what next step would
be; (d), stated that after first phase, things can-
not revert back to what they were before -
specifically referred to the government; (e). if
Don had to choose between Diem and Counsellor Nhu,
he would choose Diem; repeated that if had to make
choice between the President and Nhu, Nhu was
going; (g) wanted assurances of support from the
USG.
. 25 August Spera/General Nguyen Khanh, Commanding General
11 Corps, held meeting morning 25 August at
latter's request: .(a). stated some of general'.
officers determined to stop taking orders from Ngo
family the Very minute SVN anti-Communist stand .
comes into question; fears accommodation with the
DRV; (b) asked if USG mould support army takeover
of the country - stated regardless of USG decision,
they would go it alone should it become clear there
was a softening on the anti-Communist position;
Cc) 'cited he has four divisions of troops; (d) does
not trust General Don; (e) stated General Tran
mien Khiem, Chief of Staff, Joint General Staff,
was completely, on his side; (f) stated they were
only generals and it would be up to USG to take care
of political organization after the coup.
25 August During afternoon 25 August, Ambassador Lodge called
Richardson to his (the Ambassador's) office; present
were Lodge, 'General Harkins, DCM-Trueheart, General
Weede, DepTel 243 of 25 August had already been in
part discussed before RiChardson's arrival. Lodge
and rest of the group accepted this cable as a
command decision.; the' tenor of the meeting was
simply that of proceeding with instructions; Lodge
did not ask for comments or general discussion
relating to the advisability or inadvisability of
the action contemplated; Lodge's approach appeared
to be that we should do everything possible to .
implement these instructions immediately and' with
maximum speed; the only discussion at this time
related, as reported in SAIG 0296, to the question
of whether Diem should be given an option of
removing Nhu; General Harkins was strongly in favor
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of giving Diem an option; Lodge, Trueheart and
Richardson believed that Diem Would not accept
such an option and that providing him with the
option would further alert him to' the possibilities.
of a coup effort against him; consequently, Lodge
originated a message to State recommending against
providing Diem with the option. of removing Nhu;
Trueheart took the lead in the formulation of this
recommendation during the discussion; in view of
the fact that this message was' going forward and
because the Ambassador was to present his
credentials to President Diem on the morning of
26 August, no other action vis-a-vis Vietnamese
personalities was contemplated prior to receipt.
of Washington's response and the completion of
Lodge's presentation of credentials; Lodge and
Harkins proposed that the Station convey guidances
contained. in DepTel 243 .to Generals Khanh, Khiem,
Don and perhaps Dinh. As stated in this .
communication, Harkins said that, if necessary,
he would be willing to convey these guidances .
directly to the Vietnamese Generals.
26 AugUSt VOA broadcast stating ARVN not responsible for
pagoda raids but blaming it on' ARVN Special Forces
and secret police headed by Counsellor Nhu;
. Ambassador Lodge presented credentials to President
Diem.
26 August After Ambassador's presentation of credentials on
the morning of 26 August, Lodge called a meeting
at his residence attended by Lodge, Harkins, Trueheart,
and Richardson. Mecklin.(USIS Director) was inadvert-
ently present and Ambassador allowed him to remain.
Lodge decided that Harkins was to take no initiative
with Vietnamese generals and that the American
official hands should not show; in terms of American.
official hands, he asked Richardson also nbt to �
participate in discussions with Vietnamese on coup
questions; during this meeting of 26 August,
Richardson asked Lodge whether he (Lodge) interpreted
DepTel 243 as an instruction to act and Lodge stated
he did; again there was no- discussion on the overall
advisability or inadvisability of proceeding with
the action; as stated SAIG 0300, the decision was
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taken during this.meeting at Lodge's home that CAS
would make contact immediately. with Generals Khanh
and .Khiem. It cannot be recalled whether much, if
any, discussion was devoted to whether we should�
fan out and make contact, .with a variety of Viet--
namese military personalities; we were not sure of
Don and Dinh, and Richardson's.calculation was that �
.we would be able.to get the �word to the generals
as securely and effectively.throughEhanh and Khiemy
the latter being in a reasonably.strong.and central
position and according to Khanh, enjoying Khanh's
full confidence; (as it turned out, during the
process of these few days, the guidances reached,
to our knowledge, Generals Duong Van Minh, Tram
Van.Minh, and Le Van Kim.-- the latter through the
intermediary of Mr. Rufus Phillips who provided
Kim with Ambassador Lodge's personal assurances .of
support and of backing for the CAS demarche.
26 August Conein/General-Khiem meeting: (a) Nine points
explained to' Khiem (see reference (a) for listing
of nine points). (These nine points' had been
. cleared in written form by Trueheart who partici-
pated in drafting prior to their submission to �
either Khanh or Khiem); (b) Khiem asked that the
nine points not be raised with General Don;
(c) Conein to be taken to' General Minh; (d) Khiem.
Concurred in Spera contact with Khanh.
26 August Spera/General Khanh ,meeting in Pleiku (a) Khanh,
not ready to move-now; (b) wait until Counsellor
Nhu moves in the direction of accommodation with
the DRY; (c) disturbed because contact had been made
with General Khiem without. prior approval from him,
(Khanh); (d) Khlem asked that contact not be made
with General Dinh; (e) asked if USG 'would give.
asylum and support to families of the coup
principals.
27 August National Assembly elections postponed.
27 August Conein/General Khiem meeting: (a) Khiem -asked for
the meeting; (b) Khiem stated that at a meeting of
the Generals at the JGS, it was agreed that a coup
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d'etat was to take place within one week; (c) the
coup group was to be headed by General.Duong Van Minh
(see SAIG 0346 for additional names); (d) Generals
Dinh and Cao to be neutralized; (e) Colonel Tung is
the primary, target; (f) Vice President Tho is aware
of the plan and supports it; (g) the new government
would not be a military .junta but a mixture of
civilian and military; (h)" General Minh does not
want direct contact; (i) General Khiem does not
want direct contact except through Major Nhon with
Spera; (j) there should be no more discussion of
cutting off aid since it was confusing the various'
elements; (k) Khiem was assured of fact USG would
attempt support the families in the event attempted
coup was a failure.
28 August Spera/General Khiem meeting: (a) made arrangements
for a meeting between SperalConein and Khiem/Minh;
(b) Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao saw Khiem the previous
day' (27 August). stating he and Huynh Van Lang were
planning a coup - asked for Khiems participation;
(c) Khiem'stated Colonel Vien, Airborne Commander,
was Counsellor Nhu's man; .(d) cites forces available
to the generals and states can also count on Marine
Commander Lt. Colonel Nguyen Khang.
29 August At 0745 hours, Richardson, Spera and Conein.latter
two of whom were scheduled to contact Generals Minh
and Khiem at 0815 same morning, were shown a message
from General Maxwell Taylor to General Paul Harkins
stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed.
at White House and commenting that second thoughts
were beginning in Washington; faced with this
information and given strictly limited time factors,
' Richardson decided that the meeting with. Generals
Minh and Khiem should not be postponed but that
contacting officers would make this meeting :a, fact-
finding mission without encouraging or discouraging
General Minh,
29 August Conein/Spera meeting with Generals Minh and Khiem:
0815 hours: (a) Minh and Khiem reviewed reasons
for caution; (b) Generals stated that the USG had
built ARVN Special Forces into Can Lao Army;
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(c) Generals want firm evidence that USG will back
them; (d) feeling is that the Generals have a plan
.but will not discuss it - mentioned that Dinh would
have to be neutralized; (e) General Minh said that
,USG. Should stop economic aid to force Nhu's hand.-
..this would give the Generals a moral reason for
revolt since could then claim that without aid VC
would win; (f) Minh paid lip-service to loyalty.
.to President Diem; (g) stated Vice President Tho �
had-lost much prestige lately;. (h) military.govern-
ment was inevitable for initial period.
29 August Rufus Phillips meeting with Bui Diem (Dal Viet
politician and oppositionist).and General Le Van �
Kim: (a) informed Phillips of the Spera/Conein/
Minh/Khiem.meeting (see above) 7 Kim confused Spera
for Richardson - asked if Spera/Conein meeting had.
blessing of Ambassador Lodge; (b) at subsequent
meeting same night, Phillips confirmed that Ambassador
� had given full blessing; (c) Kim stated Conein should
contact Khiem on morning of 30 August; (d) Minh needs
American assistance on the actual specifics of a plan
- how it should be carried out and what support the
USG would render; (e) �Ambassador aUthorized the
contact with Khiem and stated we can volunteer
assist in tactical planning. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
30 August
report received to effect that GVN would arrest
tne generals within 24 hours; warning was to have -
been passed through Major Nhieu by Colonel Newman.
Nhieu could not be reached; Newman called Kim
residence, but feels phone tapped and person imitating
Kim answered; 'Newman finally talked with Madame Kim;.
Kim's aide was sent to escort Newman and Colonel
Strickler to Kim,s residence.
30 August Ingram/Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao meeting: .(a) Thao,
who claims be associated with Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen and
� Huynh Van Lang, met with generals evening of 29 Aug-
ust; (b). Thao claimed generals Khiam, Minh and
� Khanh would support coup if someone else starts
.(c) military would support Vice President Tho;
(d) Generals have too much to .ose to start coup - -
prestige, position, fine living, etc.; (e) Thao
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indicated his opposition to Nhu; (f) claims will
execute coup within one month; (g) listed pro-
posed members new government (see SAIG 0483). .
. 30 August Station sought meeting with General Khiem who
passed word through .Major Nhon that he was too
busy; Khiem was called to the Palace; Lodge
decided that General Harkins would seek meeting
with Khiem. Station suspended contacts until
results of the Harkins/Khiem meeting were known;
ordnance list of Colonel Tung's Long Thanh Camp
was turned over as bonaf ides of USG intentions.
31 August General Harkins meeting with General Khiem:
General Harkins was authorized to meet with
General Khiem to give Khiem assurances :of USG
backing; Khiem showed a reluctance to talk and
suggested that Harkins meet with General Minh;
.Khiem commented that Minh had called off the
planning and was working on other methods which
Khiem would not describe; Khiem further states the
Generals were not ready as they did not have
enough forces under their control; Harkins decides
not to give General Khiem assurances which he had
been authorized to impart; Ambassador Lodge approved
Harkins decision on 31 August after Harkins reported;
subsequently, approval. of Harkins' decision was also
received from the State Department,.
31 August Rufus Phillips. meeting with General Kim: (a) Kim
stated Nhu clearly knows of coup plotting but that
planning was to continue but tightly compartmented;
� (b) Kim did not know that Khiem had seen Harkins .on
the morning of 31 August and was sure that Minh did
not either; (c) Phillips informed .1am that Khiem
� had told Harkins that the Generals -could do nothing
�� and planning. had ceased - perhaps best solution was'
for Nhu to become Prime Minister with military
support; (d) Kim reacted violently, stated Zhiem
did not speak for rest of generals - Nhu unacceptable;
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(e) Xhiem possibly turned, against coup group and
playing lone hand; (f) Elm suggests a meeting
between Ambassador Lodge and General Minh.
Second meeting between Rufus Phillips and General.
Kim after Phillips,had sought to see-Ambassador
Lodge; Phillips saw Lt. Colonel Dunn, Assistant to
the Ambassador, who made the decision without .
reference to- the Ambassador that meeting between
Ambassador Lodge and General Minh would be undesir-
able, Significant points of Phillips/General Kim
meeting: (a) Khiem had not informed Minh.of his
previous meeting with Harkins; (b) Nhu was aware
of the plot; (c) a Colonel Cuong was reportedly
contacted by unspecified.Americans. Kim trans-
mitted following from General Minh: (a) ARVN �
Special Forces were on full alert - coup attempt'
would result in certain failure;.(b) planning had
not been discontinued; (c) Nhu not acceptable
under any conditions; � (d) Generals did not lack
the will - they lacked the means; (e) since no
overt action had been taken by the USG against
Nhu, people were not aware the USG was not still,
supporting Nhu; (f) Kim questions Khiem's,
reliability.
2 September. Times of Vietnam headlines �story entitled "CIA
Financing Planned. Coup d'Etat".
2. Correlative .Commentary: Although .various preliminary
meetings had been held as outlined in the chronology above prior
to 26 August, the Station began its action plan upon receipt of
instructions from Ambassador Lodge after his ,credentials
presentation on the morning of 26 August. Both General Khiem
and General Ehanh were contacted that day and the "nine points"
were explained which, in our judgment, constituted a clear call
for action. Both Spera and Conein state-that during their
meeting with General Minh on 29 August, General Minh confirmed
that he. wars aware of the "nine points". Our assumption is that
General Thiem acquainted Minh with these points and the approaches
made by Conein. Spera was informed by General Khanh on 26 August
that Khanh was proceeding immediately to Saigon to discuss the
situation with.Minh and Khiem - in the latter's case, Khanh had
indicated that he regretted that Khiem had been cut in prior to
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receiving his (Khanh's) consent. To our direct knowledge, then,
the three principal generals were promptly informed of the
guidance contained in DepTel 243 and of the need for action.
Both Conein and Spera were advised by Khiem and Khanh, respec-
tively, not to see General Don. They considered General Dinh
unreliable and a target to be neutralized.
3, Throughout, Lodge and Trueheart .followed these
developments closely and in detail, We reported to Trueheart
on an item-by-item basis and also reported on a number of
occasions directly, to the Ambassador. The Ambassador's emphasis'
throughout was on the earliest possible action by the generals.'
Trueheart, together with Smith, Conein and Richardson, explored
the developments and possibilities exhaustively on a day-to-day
basis and on a 24-hour basis. Trueheart's emphasis was consist-
ently on the need to get a coup started. Richardson encouraged
launching a coup as soon as possible consistent with the
probability of success. This position was in response to Agency
communications and in response to President Kennedy's correspon-
dence.to Ambassador Lodge.
4. The passage of the "nine points" constituted a call to
action. Conein told General Khiem we were 100% behind the
effort whereas Spera-did not discuss timing with General. Khanh.
Ambassador Lodge passed his personal assurances through Phillips
to General Kim. Assurances were given of the USG's agreement.
to assist the families of the coup principals in the event ol
failure. On .26 August, General .Khiem had given assurance of
action within one week. The Station elected to approach this
action with the General.officers rather than with the officers
below General officer Tank since we felt we were in contact with
the most powerfully placed senior officers where the best chance
lay a$ well as protection of the USG and Vietnimese security, �
thereby avoiding starting various Movements.which would not be
coordinated at a central point and thus counter-productive.
There was a clear distinction between our full encouragement and
actually being in a position to put together the ingredients for
'a successful coup. The actual .composition and the launching of
this action clearly lay with the generals and the Station was
not in a position to engineer the actual coup. The Ambassador,
who 'after all had not been in Saigon even a week, was notable
understandably to provide specific guidance- in terms of tactics
or weighing the possibilities involved. Trueheart entered
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deeply into the operational picture, and came up with a
considerable number of suggestions" as' the effort developed.
A significant factor was that at no time did. we have
sufficient details allowing .for a definitive and reasonable'
assessment of the feasibility of success or failure of a coup
action permitting 4 review of the data by General Harkins or
Washington.
5. The developments of 29 August relate to the Maxwell
Taylor cable to General Harkins as reported in SAIG 0520,
When Spera and Conein returned from their meeting with Khiem
and Minh we proceeded to Trueheart's office to make our
report.. The Ambassador came in and Richardson'4dyised him of
our meeting with General Weede, of Taylor's cable, and of the
decisions which Richardson had made as a result of the Taylor
cable. Lodge. was angry and expressed the 'view that
Richardson's decision had destroyed the possibilities of .
carrying out a coup. Richardson expressed a firm dissenting
opinion. Conein stated during this meeting that he thought
the decision bad adversely affected the meeting with General
Minh. Spera stated he felt the Generals were not ready .
regardless of what we could have said. Richardson's review'
of the record leads him to conclude now, as he did on 29
August, that the Taylor cable incident had no actual effect,
on the development of coup possibilities.
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6, When Richardson saw Trueheart that afternoon and
told him that.he-felt it obligatory to report this development
to his headquarters, Tkueheart said he felt the Ambassador
had already forgotten the matter; he went on to expres8 the
reservations incorporated in SAIG 0520, Paragraph 1. Since
that time, there has been no further discussion of this matter.
between Lodge and Richardson .or between Trueheart and
Richardson, On Sunday 4fternoon, 21 September, Richardson
informed Trueheart that he had sent in a cable for internal
Agency records a few days before. Trueheart made no comment
other than to express his understanding of Richardson's
position that the professional record had to be kept.
Richardson exPects no repercussions from Trueheart's knowledge
that Richardson had reported this development. Trueheart
clearly understanda that the report was made reasonably well
after this particular coup operation had apparently come to
an end.
7, As reported in SAIG 0485, Lodge held A meeting on.
30 August with Harkins? Trueheart and Conein and he instructed
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Harkins to continue coup discussions with General .Khiem as
contained in the Station's cable. 'Before these instructions
were issued, Richardson had advised the participants that he
did not believe the generals had a specific plan or felt
themselves ready to act. Richardson did this because Lodge
had previously stated during the course of these develop-
ments' that once General Harkins was thrown into a.posture of
active coup plotting directly with Vietnamese generals, the
USG might well have reached a point of no return in its
relations with Vietnam. Consequently, Richardson Wished to
enter his assessment and reservation on the record during-
this meeting even though this assessment was no more than
impressionistic.
. S. With these same considerations in mind, Richardson
.insured that General Harkins receive the report on the Ingram/
Lt. Colonel Thao meeting on the evening of 31 AuguSt. At the
time, RichardSon knew that General Harkins was Scheduled to
meet with GeneYal Khiem the following morning and wished him
to be alertedito the substance of Colonel Thao's report, which
Richardson wa�inclined to accept as accurate. However,
Richardson did not send Harkins a personal evaluation of this
report.
-9. On 31 August, we reported in SAIG 0499 the results
of General Harkins' meeting with General Khiem. Harkins had �
reported this'Meeting personally to Lodge,sTrueheart and �
Richardson that morning. Harkins' conclusion., from which
none of the participants dissented, was that the generals'
coup, as far as this phase was concerned, had come to an end.
We received no instructions to continue efforts with the -
_generals toward the objective of achieving a coup. Subse-
quently, the Ambassador's instructions were, and continue to
be, that when the subject of launching a-coup is brought up
.in conversation with us, we are neither to encourage nor
' discourage coup plotters but listen to their comments- with �
. an open-minded or sympathetic interest. Approximately one week .
ago, Trueheart informed Richardson that Washington wanted to
be assured that we .did not find ourselves inadvertently
involved in sparking or cranking up a- coup. In this connection,
Iit should be pointed out that we have not informed the generals
. of any change in USG posture as represented by the "nine points",
In other words, the USG call, for coup action remains operative .
in the generals' minds. Richardson made this point to Trueheart
and Colby separately on 28 September.
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10.. As late as two or three days ago, Ambassador Lodge, in.
response to Richardson's question, confirmed again his previous
guidance that we are neither to discourage nor encourage coup �
plotting bUt.tb receive information with open minded or
sympathetic interest.
11. !In:preparation for Colby's visit to Saigon with
Secretary of Defense McNamara, Richardson raised the possibility
with Lodge and Trueheart of Colbyls visiting Generals Khanh,
andperhaps General Duong Van Minh. These visits would .
be made Within the framework of Colby's membership in a high-
ranking official USG visitors team. Richardson thought that
McNamara's HgrOup might constitute a natural .context for Colby to� �
see one or the. other-of-these officers. It seemed possible that,
if any of these officers wished to open up a subject privately
with Colby,' they might have the opportunity to do so. Lodge
and Trteheart expressed strong reservations about Colby's
visiting the. generals in question.
7
Richardson
hief.of Station, Saigon
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