BUNKER'S 19 JUNE MESSAGE TO RUSK (SAIGON 8185, IN 92906)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05009770
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: October 29, 2024
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2024
• Case Number: F-2020-00664
• Publication Date: June 20, 1967

Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C05009770
20 June 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
SUBJECT: Bunker's 19 June Message to Rusk
(Saigon 8185, IN 92906)
1. Precis: This message is of such importance that you should
read it in its entirety. Its principal points are:
a. Bunker is concerned at the deteriorating political
situation which, he says, results from several causes
"one of these ... is General Thieu's announcement of his
candidacy for President..." Of much greater seriousness,
however, are the rather blatant election-rigging tactics of
General Loan.
b. Ky is virtually sure to win the election, by hook or
crook, and on balance is the best available candidate.
However, to preserve his Image and overall credence in
the elections, Loan must be removed from his positions
and sent out of the country.
c. Bunker is "actively investigating" ways to pressure
Thieu to withdraw.
d. Bunker recommends that, through CAS, a special
relationship be established with Ky to advise and guide him.
zes the pros and cons of this and outlines
the CAS assets which could be brought to bear.
2. Comment
a. Bunker is right in saying the problem is serious but
has his priorities wrong. Loan's activities are a symptom
rather than a cause and, at best, a tertiary rather than the
primary issue.
b. The most serious danger is a split in the unity of the
military establishment and the principal cause of this imme-
diate danger is Thieu's insistence on running -- or, rather,
his and Ky's inability and unwillingness to live up to their
joint commitment to the President that there would only be
one military candidate.
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c. It is unrealistic to be irritated at Ey for exploiting
the full advantages of his office in seeking election (as do
incumbent office seekers everywhere else in the world).
d. One of the great risks of a dual military candidacy
is that Ky will run scared and allow his subordinates to
transcend the rather fuzzy bounds of propriety in an attempt
to ensure his victory. This, in fact, is what is now
happening.
e. U ng, or forcing. Ky to get rid of Loan will not
get at the riot problem (dual military candidacy) and raises
many risks. Loan is Ky's right arm and protector. He will
be most loath to part with Loan, could flatly refuse, and
would certainly be resentful even if he acquiesced. Further-
more, if Ky sacked Loanunder U.S. pressure, he would be
viewed by his restless military colleagues (Yhang, Tri, et al)
as an American puppet.
f. Rather than trying to get Ky to sack Loan, we should
urge him to keep Loan in bounds. (This tack worked well
during the struggle movement last year and, in my opinion,
would work again.)
g. We should also,
time to persuade Thieu t
Bunker recommends, try more
ithdraw.
h. We should also establish a working relationship and
covert channel through which we can give Ky continuing
political advice.
i. One final point, with Bill Colby I am concerned at the
extent to which what purports to be Bunker's message to
Rusk may reflect little besides Hart's personal distaste for
and dislike of Loan.
George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Approved for Release: 2024/08/05 C05009770