CONVERSATION WITH WILLARD MATTHIAS ON VIETNAM ISSUES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06887350
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 31, 2024
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2024
• Case Number: F-2014-01314
• Publication Date: February 12, 1990

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Conversation with Willard Matthias
by Dr. Harold P. Ford
12 February 1990
NO TAPES
OFFIC i E ONLY
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12 February 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Conversation with Willard Matthias on Vietnam
Issues, 12 February 1990
1. At my initiative, Ken and I lunched with Willard Matthias today,
and later talked with him in the History Staff. Williard, an old 0/NE
colleague of mine, was in Army G-2 in Washington during WWII (in
charge of sigint analysis re SEAsia). He later went to State when his
unit was transferred there, thence to the nascent CIA. He was one of
the first of 0/NE's original staffers (having come there from CIA's
ORE); then an 0/NE Board
member; then special senior-level analytic duty (W(1)
then 0/NE Board again. He retired from CIA when 0/NE was (b)(3)
wrapped up in 1973.
2. Of chief importance for our Staff's Vietnam undertakings, Willard
was the 0/NE Board Member in charge of the ill-fated NIE 53-63 (the
one McCone remanded in February 1963). Then, a little over a year
later, Matthias wrote an Estimate of the World Situation that was
later semi-declassified--and leaked to the press, where it raised
quite a rumpus because it was so pessimistic about Vietnam (at a time,
mid-1964, of great rhetorical (only) optimism on the part of the LBJ
administration) that Willard received a lot of flak for having taken
such a view.
3. CIA-NSC liaison on Vietnam events prior to 1962-1963. It is
Matthias's recollection that in the 1950's Allen Dulles himself was
the principal go-between, CIA-NSC, on Indochina and other matters.
Later that duty was delegated to Bill Bundy of 0/NE. Thence to Bob
Komer of 0/NE, beginning about 1962, who physically moved into the
DDI's office to perform that chore. Then, ditto, in 1963 to Chet
Cooper of 0/NE. Willard says that on a few occasions he filled in for
Bundy, Komer, or Cooper.
4. The sad fate of NIE 53-63.
-- George Carver was the staff drafter of this estimate
(initiated by his immediate boss, CFE/ONE Hal Ford, in the fall of
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1962). This was about the first Estimate Carver had drafted, having
just joined 0/NE at the time. (Ford was out of commission much of the
time until about February 1963 -- with ear trouble and a mastoid
operation). Matthias says that he redrafted Carver's whole paper
because "it was just a lot of facts about Vietnam, not an estimate."
-- In any event, even though Willard's draft NIE then got
through the coordination process OK at the working level, it hit the
fan when it got to Ray Cline, then the DDI, who at the time had an
overseeing responsibility for Estimates. According to Matthias, Ray
felt that the draft was much too pessimistic -- in part because his
daughter's boyfriend was then on duty in Vietnam, and the three of
them were, in Willard's terms, "gung ho to kick the Communists out of
Vietnam." Willard assumes that Ray conveyed his dislike of the draft
to McCone.
-- Willard then met with McCone, who told him that the
pessimistic tone of the paper did not square with what he had been
hearing from senior USG officers (Krulak, Walt Rostow, etc).
-- Then the paper went to the USIB in February 1963. (I was
present on that occasion, HPF). There McCone remanded the paper,
directing Sherm Kent to contact Rostow and the others, learn their
views, and work them into a revised draft. Williard's recollection
and mine differ on this matter: his view is that on that occasion
McCone was not as steamed up on the matter as Cline had been. I am
unaware of what position Cline had taken, but McCone was extremely
frosty to Sherm and the 0/NE contingent at USIB, raked Kent over the
coals in front of big roomful of Generals and Colonels, and directed
us to check "with the people who know Vietnam best." Guess who.
-- After hearing from Rostow and the other drum beaters, the
0/NE Board watered the paper way down (over the objections of Ford and
Carver). Willard's recollection is that the draft wasn't changed that
much (I definitely disagree; the two texts, side-by-side, create an en-
tirely different impression/tone). Will defends his action, stating
that he didn't want to provoke a State dissent. Matthias: "maybe I
made a mistake."
-- (The NIE hit the streets in final form in mid-April; it
was only three weeks later that the riots in Hue began the months of
extreme turmoil in South Vietnam that culminated in the fall and
murder of Diem in November 1963). Some time soon after the Hue riots,
McCone apologized to Kent for having remanded the draft: "You guys
had it right the first time."
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5. Willard's Estimate of the World Situation (in 1964, completed just
shortly after (b)(1)
(b)(3)
-- At McCone' o request, 0/NE declassified this paper so that
McCone could take it up to Gettysburg and show it to ex-President
Eisenhower. Thereafter the paper was "classified" "US Government
Only." It then was leaked somehow to the press (Willard says he
thinks he knows how, but won't say), where the Chicago Trib was the
first to run the story. The NYT and other papers then took up the
story. The point was, the sftction on Vietnam was exceedingly candid
and gloomy, it included a suggestion for a possible negotiated settle-
ment that would neutralize South Vietnam (heresy!), and it named Will
as the author..
-- This caused willatd some flak
(b)(1)
b 3 -
(because of the notoriety surrounding the press releases about
Willard's Estimate). In the end DCI McCone went to bat for Matthias,
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
cc: Ken
Tom
File
OFFICLkUSE ONLY
Hal Ford
(b)(3)
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Interview with Willard Matthias
by Dr. Harold P. Ford
20 April 1990
NO TAPE
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20 April 1990
Memorandum for the Record
Subject: Conversation with Willard Matthias re Vietnam
1. This conversation today centered on his role in a
public flap that occurred in 1964 regarding the views of 0/NE
concerning Vietnam. At the time Matthias had been a member of
0/NE's Board of National Estimates for some time, and had been
the chairman of the ill-fated NIE 53-63 (the one DCI remanded
and rosied up)
2. Subsequent to the NIE 53-63 affair, Mr. McCone changed
his mind in 1964 about events in Vietnam, and began to share
more or the concerned tone 0/NE had been voicing since early
1963. McCone's change of mind had been brought about by the
domestic turmoil in SVN following the HUE riots of May 1963,
the overthrow and murder of Diem in November, and the advent of
feckless post - Diem leadership in Saigon.
3. In the spring of 1964 McCone asked 0/NE for a estimate
on the world situation that he could use in briefing
Congressional figures. Matthias wrote that piece, which McCone
liked very much. The DCI then asked 0/NE if the paper could be
declassified because it talked in such general terms. 0/NE
agreed, but after deleting a very few items gave the revised
version to McCone marking the paper "Government Use Only."
McCone then circulated a number of copies around to various
senior consumers.
4. Meanwhile, CIA had for months been arranging a special
tour of duty for Matthias
in
August 1964, when the Chicago Tribune made a big thing about
the above (leaked) paper he had written. The particular point
concerned Vietnam, where Matthias had written (correctly and
courageously) that the situation was bleak, and that one avenue
the US might possibly examine would be that of negotiating a
settlement on Vietnam. Given the times - the Gulf of Tonkin
episode et al - this suggestion was anathema. A lot of media
people and government officers raised a hue and cry about
whether CIA was clandestinely trying to make national policy on
Vietnam.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
6. According to Matthias, who heard the account from a
participant (Sherman Kent) in McCone's Morning Meeting the next (W(1)
day,/ (b)(3)
hereupon McCone got very frosty,
pointed his finger at and said, "I don't want that boy
hurt. Matthias is going to stay Kent told Matthias
7. Matthias saw McCone a few times thereafter, and on
every occasion the DCI went out of his way to signal his regard
for Matthias. Willard attributes this in part to (a) the
change of heart the Director had had concerning the situation
in Vietnam, (b) McCone's belated realization that he, the DCI,
had erred a year earlier in remanding NIE 53-63; and (c) the
fact that McCone had admitted to Kent and Matthias that he had
so erred.
8. Willard says he thinks he knows who leaked the paper to
the Trib, and why and how, but he prefers to remain mum on that
question for now.
cc: Ken
Tom
File
OFFICI ONLY
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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