DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 16386047
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: July 31, 2024
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2024
• Case Number: F-2014-01314
• Publication Date: June 18, 1962

Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06271220
NOFORN
k.F1(t.
11,;,3ircai
18 June 1962
PalORANDUN 1DR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Director's Meeting with the Secretary of Defense
1. At 11:30, 18 June, the Director met with Secretary McNamara
and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric. to report on his trip to Southeast Asia.
The meeting lasted until 12:40. .The Deputy Director (Plans) also was
present.
2. The Director described in detail his long talks in Taipei
with Chiang KaiL-3Shek. He indicated that Chiang seemed to be in good
health at the time, although his hands shook when he drank tea toward
the end of each meeting.
3. After considerable discussion of Chiang's plan for a return
to the Mainland, it became clear that there was some misunderstanding
on the part of Messrs. McNamara and Gilpatric as to whether the United
States had decided to withhold logistic support from any military ef-
fort Which Chiang was planning to make. It also became clear that .
there was no consensus. in the United States Government on what it
conceives Chiangls,role to be: a) whether it is solely to protect
FOR
Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06271220
Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06271220
OLUniC NUFORN
-2-
Taiwan, or b) whether it is to attempt the liberation of China from
the Communists at an appropriate time.
4. The Director advocated the equipping of. five C-123 aircraft
and the positioning of amphibious gear for use by the ChiNats with
the understanding that it would all remain in United States hands
pending a policy decision about its use. Secretary McNamara did not
seem to feel that amphibious equipment should be stockpiled until it
became clear that ChiNat intelligence-gathering missions. demonstrated
that an attack on the Mainland had some chance of success.
5. The Director then discussed the places he had visited in
South Viet-Nam and described in some detail the training installations
which the Agency is running. He spoke of our depAre. to ,increase the.
nuMber of training bases and to secure the services of sixteen Special
Forces teams which would have three CIA personnel attached to each.
Secretary McNamara indicated that he was favorable to this additional
training effort and would ..ort we require.
It was agreed that our proposal should be taken up through the Special
..�
_
Groun. The Director concluded this part of the meeting by saying thaC
although he did not want to depreciate the efforts being made in South 1
Viet-Nam, he was not optimistic about the success of the whole United [
States program.
.6LCRET NOFUHN
Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 006271220
Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06271220
SECRET NOFORN
-3
6. After describing the places he visited in Thailand, the
Director explained the training of Border Police and Royal Thai Army
units by United States forces in Northeast Thailand. He underlined
his belief that United States Military Forces in Thailand should have.
training as their basic mission, and touched on the problan the United
States may have in maintaining them there if pressure is applied by
the Communists for their withdrawal in the context of the Laotian
'settlement. He then discussed Prime Minister Sarit's concern about
Burma's current political orientation and pointed out that the United
States position in Laos was regarded by Sarit as being the prime
factor in causing Burma's slide to the left. He stated that he feared
Thailand would move toward neutralism and seek accommodation with the
Communist camp if the United States position in the area showed ad-
ditional signs of weakness..
7. The Director concluded the meeting by saying that he thought
United States programs in Southeast Asia were essentially holding
actions which would buy time, He said he did not think that they
would succeed over the long run, pointing out that we were merely
chipping away at the toe of a glacier from the North. He read the
"General Conclusions', from the paper prepared at the end of our trip.
Secretary McNamara commented that he did not feel it had yet been
proved that United States actions were not capable of rolling back
SECRET NOFORN
Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06271220
Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06271220
SECRET NOFORN
- -
the Communist push. It was agreed that the United States should
continue to support programs and projects which would buy time.
Pir
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
Distribution4
� Original Ucc DCI
2 - DDP
t.
ET kilt;
N
Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06271220