ADDITIONAL TALKING POINTS ON GRENADA (PROVIDED BY THE OPSCTR)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05831151
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: May 30, 2024
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2024
• Case Number: F-2011-01198
• Publication Date: October 20, 1983

�Approved for Release: 2024/04/30 C05831151
(b)(3)
20 October 1983
0500 hours
Additional Talking Points on Grenada (Provided by the OPSCTR)
Prime Minister Bishop and three of his cabinet ministers
reportedly are dead.
-- Radio Free Grenada last night announced that Bishop
and ministers Whitman, Bain, and Creft had died
during firing at Fort Rupert.
-- Embassy Bridgetown reports it is not clear if Bishop
was even taken to the hospital.
A Revolutionary Military Council has been formed.
Radio Free Grenada last night carried an
announcement by Armed Forces Commander Austin
stating the formation of a 16-man Revolutionary
Military Council, chaired by Austin.
-- The Council has full legislative and executive
powers, and has dissolved the People's Revolutionary
Government and dismissed all members of the present
cabinet.
MII�fas
Austin said all private and foreign property "will
be guaranteed," and warned foreign governments not
to interfere.
Curfew is in effect.
Four-day, 24-hour curfew declared by the Council
will last until 1800 on 24 October.
-- Curfew violators will be shot on sight.
-- Essential service workers will receive special
passes and transportation to and from work.
Cuban connection is alleged, but unconfirmed.
001,11111.
arms shipments
for Coard's f��are e ng un oaded from boats at
night and are believed to have Cuban sponsorship.
SEPT
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/04/30 C05831151
�Approved for Release: 2024/04/30 C05831151
(b)(3)
on Saturday night
shipments of arms--amount and type unknown�were.
being loaded off a Cuban vessel in St. Georges
Harbor onto a small boat and transported into
Grenada.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2024/04/30 C05831151
(b)(3)
Dtc
Approved for Release: 2024/04/30 C05831 151
3C.L.tcr. I
20 October 1983
Situation in Grenada
1. We are dealing with two different situations in Grenada, the first is
the safety of US citizens, and the second a political question of whether we
can take steps to improve the government of Grenada or whether, on the other
hand, the Cubans themselves might take their steps to keep in power a
government inimical to us.
2. Direct intervention by US military forces--aside from the temptation
to use it as a "signal" to the Soviets, the Cubans, the Nicaraguans, and so
on--is undesireable in itself and should only be started if we are sure US
citizens are in danger and it is clear that no other means of saving them is
possible. Before we consider intervening directly, we should try
simultaneously
To continue to try to get a US party in with reliable
communication under the UK High Commissioner's protection, to
make representations on behalf of US citizens with the Grenadian
authorities, to get in touch with the St. George's Medical School
and other concentrations of US citizens.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2024/04/30 C05831151
1
Approved for Release: 2024/04/30 C05831151
SECRET
-- Encourage the dispatch of
Caribbean nations.
token military forces from
3. Our main discomfort so far is our lack of information on either the
state of our citizens or what is happening politically. It would be rash to
move US forces without having a clear idea of what could be gained politically
or that our citizens are in such peril that this is our only choice.
4. We have no idea of what the Cubans are doing, which so far has
encouraged loose hypothesizing, but we cannot ignore the possibility that they
might move to guarantee that the situation can be turned to their advantage.
Putting in a friendly foreign presence other than our own--the British which
has a legal leg to stand on--would keep the Cubans from intervening.
5. These steps are designed to safeguard our interests until we can
learn what is happening. Then we can see what further steps may be necessary
in a clear emergency threatening to either our citizens or our interests, or
what is possible to achieve politically.
SECRET
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2024/04/30 C05831151