NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05903571
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: May 30, 2024
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2024
• Case Number: F-2012-01748
• Publication Date: July 29, 1980

Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C05903571
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
29 July 1980
Top
CO NID 80-177JX
29 July 1980
Copy 220
(b)(3)
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
TURKEY: The Prospects for Military Intervention
CIA
Speculation about military intervention is increasing as
Turkey is rocked by high-level political assassinations, endemic
left-right violence with sectarian overtones, and an impasse between
the government and opposition leaders over practically every impor-
tant issue. The military's constitutional role is confined princi-
pally to advising the government through the National Security
Council, which is composed of the President, the Prime Minister,
and top commanders. Any moves outside of that framework would
constitute extralegal intervention. The military took over the
government in 1960 and 1971, but its dismal performance on those
occasions and its commitment to democratic principles make it re-
luctant to try again. If the level of disorder becomes any greater,
however, senior military officers may decide that their disruption
of the democratic process is necessary to preserve it.
There are no signs that a "colonels' coup" similar to
the one in 1960 is in the making. A more likely event
would be a "coup by memorandum" patterned on the one that
occurred in 1971, when senior officers persuaded the
politicians to step aside and impose a nonpartisan gov-
ernment. The military might undertake such a move if
political leaders seemed incapable of cooperation, al-
though similar military-backed governments of 1971-73
were ineffective and discredited.
At this stage, senior commanders probably would
prefer to exert behind-the-scenes pressure on Prime Min-
ister Demirel, opposition leader Ecevit, and the parlia-
ment. Such pressure could be direct, where the officers
impose their will on political leaders, or indirect,
where the officers issue progressively more specific
warnings.
The military also could choose to ignore the poli-
ticians and enforce rigorously existing martial law
powers. The commanders have long pleaded for expanded
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ret
powers; lacking a parliamentary response, they could pur-
sue their own interpretation of martial law authority
but would not act on it under current legislation.
Implications
A military government probably could curtail violence--
after quelling the initial protest against the military
takeover--but would not redress the basic causes of polar-
ization or of economic malaise. Moreover, this approach
would probably force extremists underground as in the
aftermath of the coup in 1971.
Turkey's foreign policy most likely would not change
so long as the existing Demirel government, even though
controlled by the military, remained in power. Most of
the officer corps is pro-Western, and would advocate
keeping Turkey in NATO and maintaining close ties with
the US. If the junta were shunned by West European gov-
ernments, however, it might become more neutral in its
foreign policy than the current government.
If the military replaced the current government with
a nonpartisan government, it would find it difficult to
address underlying causes. Lacking a political base, an
above-parties government would tend toward neutrality.
It would be more acceptable to Western Europe, however,
and the military's influence probably would ensure that
it remained cautiously pro-Western.
The Turkish General Staff probably has applied direct
behind-the-scenes pressure because the indirect approach
has been unsuccesSful until recently. A letter of warning
on 2 January, supplemented by increasingly stern public
and private statements, has had little effect. Direct
military pressure might eventually produce legislation
to combat violence and establish state security courts,
but the lasting effects of such measures would be ques-
tionable.
If the commanders decided on a strict and unilateral
enforcement of martial law, they first would seek immunity
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from future prosecution. They would be reluctant to pro-
the politicians refused to provide such guarantees.
In any event, harsher martial law enforcement prob-
ably would not dissuade extremists, although it might con-
tain the expansion of violence for a short while. The
government would come under intense fire for acquiescing,
and its tarnished public image would be further marred.
If the military commanders failed to take any action
even as the country drifted toward anarchy, Turkey could
be consumed in civil war. Senior officers would see this
course as shirking their duty to protect the nation, and
almost certainly would act before the situation deterio-
rated to that point. Nevertheless, they do not seem
eager to become fully responsible for initiating what
would be a last ditch effort to resolve Turkey's problems.
Outlook
The rapidly deteriorating situation is likely to
lead the military to increase pressure on the politicians
to bury their differences. The commanders, however, will
be reluctant to go beyond backstage arm twisting because
they know that they also lack the answers to critical
issues. They probably would demand the quick election
of a permanent president, expanded powers for combating
violence, state security courts to expedite prosecution,
and a prolongd nriod of political truce between Demirel
and Ecevit.
Any form of intervention would not come easy to the
General Staff, which apparently believes that involvement
in politics would distract the military from its primary
duty of national defense. Moreover, there are generals--
evidently including General Staff Chief Evren--who are
committed to democratic principles and want to give the
elected government, every chance.
The politicians, probably reacting to military
pressure, recently have shown some signs of cooperating
to enact security legislation. At the same time, however,
the level of violence and economic dislocation is reaching
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a point where the institutional base of the government is
being undermined. The generals thus may soon see no
alternative to taking a stronger role if the politicians
do not satisfactorily fulfill their commitment
responsively on stronger security legislation.
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Top Secret
Z9 July 1923t.
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