SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05903548
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• Document Creation Date: May 30, 2024
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2024
• Case Number: F-2012-01748

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Summary �
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uriceyrerAi5s, . eV bi PolitiCa' I, economic, '.0 internal secni!pi Pi:Ob!er :
� ,
-` Witli4#146*. , j..,,f14:4.i,!.?5Ipii,;i:iii. irso,.,vii....atymitnlezimo meli7:2707g-,:i::,..,': -
bie'ed;;e6.0-6.-r.SPitalingeoljt'PaA' violence --iick'dfOrtign.
exchange has ca - �
. unchecked,'rCegu'iif id itigii:i.*ijii.'#F,r1Pct,ion or civil ; !arn.. ., . � , ����� .
-v-- ;.'..-.-��.�,...,s,,.,�,,,,A.,,,,, ... ,...;.:
-Y to -grind it:i i'liati,floweitlieli4the - �
� ' political violence
: - ir. . - . ����-it
,.
Together with *41iiigit jockeying an partisanship bYLTUrkeY's:poliOca
��
leaders; these developments have impelled military leaders to become More
involved In the politieaj,pro*Cess:Theiideinand in early January. that the.
sqUabbling**Ofiis:040,'..i*a,T,Urkey's problems nudged the ,, ,�,'�: ,
government into taking stronger on both Violence andtheecOnoMy .
and hai7eviiked'SOMegrOiing'ecioperation from other political Paittes, But .
interpartii:felidingihiSCOMinned;and the onrush of events leaves the '
. iniiitessiOn:Of*goient still lacking control. In a follOwup Statement, :
Ttirkey'sionide.iiiii44.6-ipider*Tarned that time is running out for a_ ,:�,
deirreatie solution to TnikeY7iPrOblems, and there are other indications
that ,the milifirY's patience is Wearing thin.
' ' � ''..,g,,:! ,,,- -'' ' � , . '''..- .
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Aliont.tke*O.,...bri:iht:spotfoe,Tu.ikeir. and for Western interests in this
bleakiiiettireaietheioVerninent's economic stabilization prograin, which '
contains. the kind of medicine that the economy needs, and Demirers pro-'
Weitern, orientatiCip;,**Ii:has made Turkey more sensitive to the concerns
of che-weg:-:,'TOrkeys friends andallies have reacted favorably to the 1
governMent'S';rinVes and are following up their 1979 rescue effort with an�
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even bigger aid 'package this year
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This memorandum was prepared by of the Western Europe Division, Office al (b)(6)
Political Analysis. It has been,coor nate wit the Directorate of Operations. the Office af
Economic Research, and the National Intelligence Officer/or Western Europe. Information '
available through 9 March. 1980 was used in the preparation of this memorandum..
Comments and questions are welcome and may be addressed to Chief, Western Europe
OPA.
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An Activist Government ,When conservative Prime Minister Suleyitlan Demirel returned to power
:hundred days ago, he did so reluctantly Fed Witlideei3eningeeOriomiCid
internal security crises and dependent tiOT-?k�
, working majority on the
uncertain support of two �reme rightist parties, Demirel was not eager to
risk more government yp, by ao 1,1
nrnhlenis that brought down his previous
i 5
Many of '4.xorstlearkitaye been reahzed:! He has received only
grudging a'ad interaiiiient support from the government's informal 'Partners;
the economy's slide14cOntinifed unabated; political violeaCe haS.moved,'�2
toward chil iegularliattaCked hit'adminiStra--
tion. Moreciver, .Deiniiel has had to endure the humiliation Of Yet another;
military ifronsinneedient:MideMbre'bearable only because it was directed
as Much at the oriiOtitionitnt him:A similar intervention in .1971 led to the
resignation din earlier beiiiirel'idininiitration
,
The pronounc&ncnjandte continued.behind4he-scenes pout cal involVe-
Ment of thilifaii.leadel*paradoXicallkhave 'strengthened the feeble .
� � � - . � . .
minority goVernmerkPeMirelfias.secured-parliamentary pasage. of a part,:
, of his internal SeMiritYiiaCkagen:n4Moied even thore boldly on the::
economic front witfrhit;Wide4angingitabilizatiOn program. Moreover,
Demirel. haithown newflcxibility in Turkey's relations With the United ��
States; the EC,'nnit_the'
-
All of this ha earned Peatirel,a Certain respett'frOm segrnenti of the
,
Turkish elite and populace, btitit has alsO fueled resentment and left the.
government open to criticism from the and frOm One of its
informal iiiOnere:The'StieiitlienediiderilarteCuritYineatiffet have failed
to reduce the growing political violince;and the stabilization program has�
led to a steel; rite in prices Many goods'
DeMirel survived fits_ first, ftirrrial parliamentary test�the budget vote late :-
last month�and his:OpPcinenti and informal supporter's may refrain from
pressing him hard in the coming months for fear of a military coup. Events'
outside parliament, however, could still force the military's hand. In that
CaSe,. Demirel would have two options. He could remain in power and risk
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, man meaitire,!;),m,:,, 'could
ii#,#:7'.001ietkli6iiiiiliii'inilitaiY;bike
above-parties government ofiLln't ce'',i4iiicase�direct military 'rule
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'At ;.the end Of Tifi'keY1'Woritwititer, in years.; theiiirkish'econom
y is
staggering.1,he;#0041.,rate;of;i0j4i0o:4,noW,OVer,:100Percent4-up
some 20 percent iii jUitld.feW4TiOnthk4anclstill soaring. Unemployment has
surpassed 20 0-pieolf,*-0 ikrliiiiiiteSpite:suliStantial padding in,the large,
and inefficient State eatiOnfc-,SeC,P).:::,Mosi lasic commodities are in .short
� supply, and "..ratini ?iack rind transportation bottlenecks
conimon.:IndtiisttialpiOdgetronilikr".OPPed!,4'5 011.0 oeiteeni. of capacity
for lack of MiterialkThercis.no, foreign exchange to pureh'ise.them:
This aggravates limits
. Political Violence � . ,
Turkey'sworsenine,06nOrnic,'Plight,has,contributed,tO t e. new an
.. -Deepens 2,500
paliticalliMbitA9*illingI4.446.4,'PisirtWO'y'iiiit-' been the
. ,
, . . , J1,4oick4montr.hr.,41i.ufb,:a.:11.,:gang,i.'..MiiiOiiitiiei 'o-
,-,-.:-. ,,...�, .,.... ,�.�,..., ,... ,..plos: have .:...�,
result of hit-and-run a
violence haVc.beeit lithited'fo'ilie!iitnOt4:e'asIe,i*ProvinCes'AVIi-ieli`hai
- : lessened tiiiii:j4,441.tatiWmiiiti'iitiiieiiiSi feetiiinitheir'effOitii
� M"aj,ei uiban. '',.'iteksliieIZMIr;:ind:tilnbtil;'",a)cd In. eon' traSetio'tlieir'ealier.P'':--
. . t f � j�,-�
htheV. Seeiri'iii`en'aie' 'to. 'Strike; reir6tiii; itOd COnfron t �
..,,,,,..
hit-and
security forces
.. . ,
More ominously, Turkey's difficulties are Providing militants With a'laige, s .
base of converts and sympathizers among Workers, salaried' employees; and
� . ... , ,
other hard-pressedgroUps.;SeCtiCitYforcei had�great.diffictilty ending
- � , - - - - , . . , ,
,Izmir. last,monthonclUdinkafiVo-:'We
disorders in ' '' ' '''' ' ' � ek-lOrig:wOrkers!,.Oconiii
...ition,of factoridi:tefilitliiiiiiintilichanb 1 succeeded .:.
,.., commerce teMPOrarifYialiiikliV in'stiM'Ai'F7.'.4'1'Fb;'illnioii�cg;.g :
,. down their, sibies. some ' ' ...--n;.:'-psah't�oPAPne. provinces,:on.the '
other hand, ei,ttierne:iiiiiiiiesWii3iii"I'
. power, and peighbOrliOOdirloitiiiidelit. if:'7�.44'.F.9:1:(:),!):41:,,Itil'Iiidn'iniiirnaistik;ine:-'�
with the worsenini[i I ! are ea ng fear, privation, and loss
, economicniiiiiii ii., 7; ?:;f#,.c17:ie.. ,i,
administra-
tion These probleMitavieliO lokvi escalating violence and, ii164,-.
of faith in TurkeiYiriiiiiiiiiiiiiiitiie heretofore stolid TurkiPUbliC-;'
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Military Prods Civilian The pelitics4austial approach that civilian leaders have taken toward the .
,
Leaders � mounting political arid eennOrnie turmoil has impelled the military to
broaden it political rOlesfinificantly. The Demirel government's extreme
partisanship'i� making its initial appointments and the Ecevit-led opposi-
tion's
on,jfiterilal security legislation prompted '
military leaders-tperhapsln,Colltision with in mxasperated president
,Koraturkto issuen stern warning Demirel and Ecevit on 2 January.: .
.� 1 This deritarche,.;rerniniscent of the1971 "coup by memorandum," Urged the
. , � ,
politicians,t0:)rnite to solv�he country's problems and imnred that �
otheriVise-the:inilitaiiiYOUld intervene
The demareheserit*s ocy/a4.thrOugh the Turkish political World.
Grudgingly and haltingly;i:sarliarnent enacted part of the government's,
internal security inekiiit; strengthening pollee authority and stiffening''
criminal statutes. It aliciaPProYed the extension of Martial law te_violence-
plagued Izmir province' and to Hatay in the southeast, while lifting it in
Sivas, eaving 20 of.TnrkeY's.07:proYinees under martial law. Demirel,
moreover, has giVen.theinilitatY a freer hand in administering and ;
; implementing martial law. Parliament has yet to enact a state-of-emergency.
statute, giving security forces Wider powers to apprehend lawbreakers or
reestablishing State security courts to aid in their prosecution
.;
, � � ;�� ,
'Parallelingtheie.moYeinn internal security, Demirel announced a far-,
reaching economie:reforth Package on 24 January. Described as Courageous
by Dernirel's supporters,' and even by some detractors, the measures
represent a sharp break with past economic policy and are a major step
toward returning Turkey to payments equilibrim. The centerpiece of the
Program is a 50-percent devaluation of the lira in the case of petroleum
imports and agricultural exports, the main items in Turkey's foreign trade,
and a 33-percent devaluation fOrninstother goods and services. Other
measures include a sharp tut in subsidies for state economic enterprises,
: removal of most private sector Price controls, a reduction in import duties,
and steps to boost exports.' �
� ; ; .c 4, ; , ; �
In foreign policy, the Demirel government has reemphasized Turkey's ties to
the West while seeking to preserve the cordial relations its predecessor
established with the Soviet Union ant: nonaligned�particularly Muslim�
countries. It has avoidedihe frequent�anti-Western rhetoric of Ecevit and
his colleagues and, instead has pointed out the common interests Turkey
� shares :with its NATO.Alliesin.more.concrete terms, the government has
� initiale:d a new defenie,CoOperation agreement with the United States. It has
revived the EC-Turkish 'Association Cduncil forum and announced its
intention to seek full membership in the European Community. Although
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, erplrel has continued , Trecoi,egoe;t5g;tt iipir.).4!nst,i.6 ,'" withdrawn,NAT o �, under
'.anything pther:.:04ii'l Turkishi:e'rgi,%
� :- military proddini;Tuikeiliiiie4e:kYi,*!m,to,eohtrol of the airspace over
' the eastern half or�:the'Aeieih':'This Could,:give new momentum to the
Alliance'effortIo�Seetife0aki*A6.' into its and help solve
remaining Greek-Turkish aiffeAnakietnIiel:ilSO seems receptive to 'i;:;'''
' resumption of thi',itilledikt#004i,g4l0Vh*.CYPrui'settleMeht.::On
. the o,ther hand;!#fi-OV,einthent'sVeiti.X),6fiell'fiWci relations With'.
nonaligned states and with 04:Nirlo,fii-..,'.:;ii,lidentilliti circumspection
. toward the Iranian ' .-clution and 11%41, Moscow's:inyaSion of:Afghani:
Stan':
..
Mat t'i3;4,4i
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4.
S6 fir ,thegovernmentXict#ishl,has doie.httlito check political
#nc.14it oroi=0, .,1411.4.had,:i.006fo#:lo:00.14,eiii.,,Pi.10:063014,ipa
cooperation thernAlt4rY,'*plan is still
.General Staff Chief Evren last month to issue a second warning that
politicians should unite t laee-A,,.00:0:015,9cmy4ary Intervention Thoug
nedesiarkfor.Tnikei*Ionieti,e0-;.CAitornjC:he*h; thenibi,irnMent's:
ecor:!Orhic refoinikhave.been*efichrglii,ti**�0,term: Prices Of basic
coniinOclitiei'he)Weifinci*reirfr:O00.PerCent.;fOr gasoline to. 350
percent for newsprint and iiii:einisiciy*ty4ak*F-if, as the governMen�
tried to reduce the size Of the inefficient state sector. Shortages of liiiic!f;:
goods are likely to continue and will n011ie.allei:iated until there is in inflO,
of foreign aid on which the program has been predicated.
The additional internal security measures, air,eproddied even fewetho
term gains, and both tensioil, ind'-violen#,haveincreased! Despite the
roundup of large numbers Of tettoriitkand;theaii-est of several key leaders,: �
particularly on the left; Political jihide0iive elimbed.t6ieccird highs, and
extremists are becoming bolder. Thislt4PeeiailyrtNe Of the extreme left;
which has reacted to the goernineni'ino:Mil4ary,clairipdown by taking the ;
� offensive, as in its spearheading of the Izmir andIstanbul disturbances. In
what seems to he n'OadgerOOS,!04'.yioii3j:o.iie pattern; Moreover, extremists :
are beginning to target Turkish servicenienditioh to piominent Turkish:-
r
civilians and US siOridemetr.
Although sporadic cooperation between��ment and opposition has
fostered by the inkhtaWs-demarhe;44,ihforpatcoalitionniong pemkers
moderately conservative IiiitieefTtlirihYtiOeiffeirie 'tight minor parties
continues to be shaky: OPpOsiticilivfedcle0c*iliaS attacked the &rein-
ment's efforts to cope with violet* and the economy, likening them to a .�
"South American dictatorship." Most reCeritly,. his party voted against the
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Outlook
,
gd*OMent'S, tidgetifOri9,40:;Qd. the governMent side; the neefaseis
�NatiOnaliitAetiok,Nitx(NAPhakremained�fii.m,ia its supportof
eifilief4i1;isiticiii4tidErhaccateiaslaMickiriented and anti-,WeiteitiNational Salvation Party (NSP) has been reliable only on make-or-brea
issue!:,,,_suchp,,,p,1;$414et'?,Voie,":94,*her issues it has often Wit
Ecey4',s !t0004ji.:40N:Sfii,:i."6.'iiipleai. the iovernthent, Moreover;
ErbagaU has � ..ide aa,Mitiide parliament,
and Demirel � � v- ,
�A;tespon � .4kodi
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Despite its few54hiei,tmentS;...theiDeinirel government has nonetheless
�
� ..eaine4'.'reiPa4linii moral support for its boldaciS,'Demirel's eeonornie.::
reforms, his greater,responiii;eneSs', toNesteen�cencerns, and Turkey's
increased strategic importance in light Of the Iranian revolution have
prompted Turkcy;s;fri0.0*441fiei-to,ipee4!iip the delivet7i, of aid, already.- :
riroiriiied'.04'i,4Jti*A0iii0i*.,;,Ottb.71.ed 'rescue, effort this year; Since,:.
the i-0006,40,4pf;Deniitel,,S;ifaiiiliiition program, Turkey has received
total of nearly $300 in loans from the United States, the
International MonctaryFund,and private hanks. The IMFis'eOnsidefing
ancitfieiikaiviiii Of $79 million ari'diatends'to begin talks With the Turks this
spring fora',fieilt:We;�'O'i.:4tkieeYeat.'itrandby lain agreement in excess of $500_
million The United Slai'aoid:Wiii;GernianY;. meanwhile, hope that the
OECD session on 26 March will lAegie a' figure at leait equal to the 1979.'
total of $900-iiiilliOn'AAnd that'll Will 'provide better termsThe ability of the .
emireft0eitinient to bring yiplence under control is
questionableiri:addi0OU;1*,ipUilin4s,Ot the 'recently implemented
� econpiilic.rUeaicireSi4akprovOkad:Widespread.ttareit, which could trow To
be'sure,:�Delairel'S,e0Ondipieifopii4tiori program contains Appropriate
prescriptions But will be wrenching and the � ,
bureaucrack=�rehictant.tolOsesoMe of its preiogativecould'still
plac�
roadblocks in the path Of;ttie:koverninent. Anticipated foreign aid will
mitigate the program's SPecificallyforeign:eiehange'
will permit resiMPti*pflta4Poiistof oil and other materials needed to get
idle factories bid( late, operation. Even if the amount of assistance is more
generous than that Offeted,liat year, however; it not be sufficient to buy ,
off unrest
The belt-tighteriiiii is.parti6ulaily unpopular with labor, and problems seem
likely to escalate ii.,wOikeritiy to keep ahead of inflation. Strikes and
lockouts are already in,progress in several key economic sectors, and other
areas could experience clashes between' workers and security forces similar
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to those in limir.;Politieal 'extrithista are nnlikely to be deterred from
fomenting unrest by growing gOveriimeiit:-and Military clampdown. .
Despite the inifkisbninent'of 'Many troublenmakers; moreover, Turkey's
,.stress-racked socioeconomic structure will continue to produce replacements
who are equaIlyterninitte �to'deitioyinge*isting institutioni.
;Ind ire. l's g,ovsliearnitmiieetnit�onviil.hdifia,11.firiait:',6*Igb,t;Of snclf Problems, u
bath his tacit : tepponehtigiaitesome hesitancy ..-
is om of OilitinibiniEtbiilUnelirieT;ibeinciel'i alliance with; the NAP and
. the NSP his efiiiiira despite his o ' ` f Erbakan on such key issues as
relations with the We...' f'.44-d iecl'ilaidic:Ofilie.'itie economic sector.:Part'of:�''
the reason is �E�rbas ki,..,n'a:''eale'riiiitiatiilt�-p,e�in,l,r(1,;baca*eliedaiire4ided '
.� over Turkey's cri�es'i_IllsgiffeiliAlb'enexegeneial election ididdiiled for
..-: iiiid-1981. Eibikanikobably also fears thatjtheseenlainiinded military will
step in if Pciilkplfalliancl;iitocribi:iliS`partyls'4'did in 1971 E6ev4's ?. ,
- Republican People's Party, which itself suffered 'during the '1971-7) perk)
: of indirect mayMilitarkfulei .also choose not to press Demirel so far as to
topple the go , . ,
vernment , , , , ,
, '
'
The next tests for the government and for interparty relations will be the
parliamentary election of a new president beginning on 22 March ani fate o
Dernirel's tax reform package shikilY.iliereafter".-If the government survives
those events intact; it'inaYbe'il*lb`fend off Parliamentary threats for the;
remainder of this spring and
. The military, for its part; can be expected to grow increasingly frustrated by
Turkey's economic and internal security problems. These threaten both
military and national interests; and military leaders will be inclined to -
expand their political role to cope with the problems. So long as the Demirel
government remains responsive to'their."suggestions," military leaders will
probably continue to operate behind the scenes, because they are reluctant to ,
, �
become directly involved in governing and because they fear tha
I I
democratic image�and supply of aid�will suffer
� � � � � �
If Demirel begins to resist military demands, or if violence and unrest
threaten to get worse, the.Military*uig probably weigh in more forcefully,
either by establishing, a"Military=0:0ked,g4yernMent that would be above
parties or, in the extreme, by 419ik,Oier:cliii,cili..In any ease, the Military is
unlikely to give liolitieaf leaders merely iiiO4ewirning. In order to retain
its credibility, the military leadership will feel obliged to take firmer action: �
.In sum, the extraparliamentarY:f.hi!eat to the Demirel government in the
next few months may become even greater than the threat of losing
�
parliamentary support
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