NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05903576
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: May 30, 2024
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2024
• Case Number: F-2012-01748
• Publication Date: September 17, 1980

Approved for Release: 2024/03/18 C05903576
. Director of
Central
Inteffigence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
17 September 1980
Co min RIL7101Y
17 September 1980
Copy
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
TURKEY: Outlook for the Military Regime
Turkey's new military rulers face major risks, but in the
short term, at least, they are likely to bring a measure of order
and economic revival to Turkey while keeping it on a pro-Western
path. Far more difficult to achieve will be their announced goal
of laying the groundwork for long-term social, political, and eco-
nomic health within the context of a democratic state. The complex-
ity of these tasks seems to ensure that the military will be in
power for some time.
To restore order, the generals must control the
many armed terrorist groups on the left and right that
are tightly knit, well disciplined, and highly committed
to disrupting Turkish society. The economy, too, is
fragile, and much will depend on how well the regime is
able to follow through on the stabilization program
begun by the ousted civilian government. The commanders
must also be responsive to external economic advice--
even when it runs counter to Ataturkist state-capitalist
principles--if Turkey is to receive the foreign aid
necessary for economic recovery.
Although the military is now united in a common
purpose and morale is high, the choices and decisions
that lie ahead may place severe strains on military unity.
The commanders, moreover, will need to consider the sen-
sitivities of many allies concerning human rights vio-
lations.
In view of the difficulties of putting the country
in the kind of shape Turkey's new military rulers think
necessary before returning it to civilian government, the
generals risk getting bogged down in managing Turkey for
such an extended period that institutional democracy,
military professionalism and relations with allies will
be severely damaged.
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Short-Term Prospects Encouraging
Some important assets offset the risks of governing.
In a society wracked by the breakdown of authority, the
commanders now have a monopoly of power and the will to
control terrorism and to impose the sacrifices necessary
for economic recovery. In place of the recent opportunism
of the political leadership, they bring a moderation that
could help substantially to restore law and order and
develop a sounder economy. The military leaders' strong
domestic position, moreover, will make it easier for them
to compromise with the Greeks on such troublesome is
as Greek NATO membership, Aegean rights, and Cyprus.
Although they cannot completely eradicate political
violence, the country's military leaders should be able
to bring it under control. If, as seems likely, the ter-
rorists seek to provoke harsh reprisals to discredit the
commanders abroad, the military initially may try to avoid
excesses. The military's first priority, however, will
be to establish order and in the end it will use whatever
force it believes necessary. Many terrorist groups will
be broken up, while the hard core will go deeper under-
ground, but the root causes ofetremim are not likely
to be significantly affected.
The new military government shows every intention of
adhering to the austerity program and free enterprise
orientation its predecessor instituted on the advice of
external aid donors. The commanders are in a better posi-
tion than their civilian predecessors to see the economic
reforms through. The new regime can and probably will
resist future inflationary wage increases and make the
inefficient state economic enterprises more self-
sufficient.
Reorganizing Turkey's political institutions also
is likely to prove manageable. A consensus has developed
among most military leaders and some members of the civil-
ian elite in recent years on the need for a less free-
wheeling democracy. These groups envision a presidential
form of government, abandoning the proportional system
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of representation in favor of the majority system, and
renewing emphasis in the constitutononhe rights of
the community over the individual.
International reactions to the commanders' takeover
so far suggest that Turkey's foreign ties will not be
severely disrupted. Most governments have shown sympathy
for the military's goals--even while publicly lamenting
the necessity of the takeover and calling for a speedy
return to democratic rule. Some governments and many
left-of-center political parties within NATO and the
European Community may not be responsive to further re-
conomic aid from the nondemocratic regime.
Barring widespread abuse of power, however, and as-
suming clear, although gradual, moves toward restoring
democracy, most of the NATO allies will support the new
regime. Even Greek officials seem optimistic that they
will be able to establish a productive dialogue with the
commanders over longstanding bilateral differences. Pre-
liminary statements by the commanders and their need to
show good will toward the Western alliance suggest that
the Greeks may be right.
Longer Term Outlook Less Promising
If the military can reduce violence substantially,
reactivate the economy, and devise a more effective cen-
tralized political system, it will have gone far toward
helping the Republic get past one of its darkest periods.
But this would by no means ensure that Turkey will hence-
joy stable government and economic prosperity.
771
The causes of violence in Turkey derive from social
cleavages, the dislocations and inequities accompanying
modernization, and Turkish political culture. The mili-
tary will not be able to make much headway against these
problems, and extremists will reappear after full democ-
racy is restored.
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Unless Turkish leaders in the future can forgo
grossly overvalued exchange rates, huge budget deficits,
and price and interest rate controls, Turkey could again
et itself into the same economic bind it is in today.
Opposition from those whose political interests are
adversely affected--such as the extreme right and left,
the Islamic fundamentalists, the universities, and the
trade unions--could make it difficult for the military to
extricate itself from politics gracefully.
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