STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. COLBY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND G

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 07101929
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2024
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2024
• Case Number: F-2021-02293
• Publication Date: August 1, 1974

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Statement of
WILLIAM E. COLBY
Director of Central Intelligence
before
HOUSE FOREIGN OPERATIONS
AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE
1 August 1974
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on H.R. 12004,
introduced by you and others, to replace with a statutory classification system.
the existing system established by Executive Order 11652, and to discuss the
operations of this Executive Order within the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want you to know that while we in the
intelligence profession do have some special security needs, we fully recognize that
the bedrock of our system of government is an open society and an informed
public.
, In a report issued last year your committee stated that "...there is an
unquestioned need for Federal agencies to avoid the release or dissemination to
the public of certain sensitive types of information, the safeguarding of which is
truly vital to protecting the national defense and to maintain necessary
confidentiality of dealings between our country and foreign nations." The necessity
to safeguard certain truly vital foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by
the Congress in its direction to the Director of Central Intelligence in the National
Security Act of 1947 to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure.
There are special problems involved in protecting intelligence sources and
methods which I believe bear directly upon H.R. 12004 and Executive
Order 11652. These problems flow from the very nature of intelligence
information � its substance and the means by which it is obtained.
The flight characteristics of a foreign fighter plane, the accuracy and numbers
of a foreign ballistic missile, or the plans and capabilities of a foreign country
in the economic or political fields are examples of substantive intelligence
information. Very often such intelligence information can be a benefit to this nation
only if our potential adversary is unaware that we have such knowledge. On this
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basis such substantive intelligence information is deserving of protection as affecting
our nation's vital interests.
But inherent in the substantive information itself are clues to the means
through which it was obtained � intelligence sources and methods. Unless these
means are protected, countermeasures can be mounted to nullify or impair
collection efforts. It was this concern, I believe, which led to the statutory directive
that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
� Clearly a secret agent operating abroad in a hostile climate must be
protected � not only to enable him to continue to supply intelligence,
but also because the freedom and lives of individuals may be at stake.
The exposure of an agent obviously ends his immediate usefulness. It
may or may not expose his sub-agents and any networks for collecting
information he may have established. Finally it may affect our ability
to obtain assistance from others. Credibility in protecting our sources
is the sine quo non of the intelligence profession.
� Foreign intelligence services and security agencies are also positive
contributors to our intelligence and counterintelligence programs abroad
and continued cooperation often depends upon confidence that the
existence of the relationship will be protected.
� Revelation of methods of technical intelligence collection may result in
countermeasures to mislead or obstruct methods of collection and render
ineffective costly programs.
� While a particular piece of intelligence information, by itself may not
be revealing of sensitive sources and methods, accumulation of bits of
intelligence information may well eventually lead back to the sources
or methods relied upon for its collection.
In view of these considerations, I believe Congress acted wisely when in the
1947 National Security Act it identified a focal point to assume the responsibility
to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive intelligence sources and
methods.
Recently I testified before the Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee on H.R. 15845, which amends the charter of the Central
Intelligence Agency in the National Security Act of 1947. One amendment in that
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bill would reinforce the charge in the original Act by requiring the Director to
develop appropriate plans, policies, and regulations for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. In that testimony I pointed out that I do not believe the
present statutes provide sufficient measures to enforce this responsibility, and that
proposals are under consideration in the Executive Branch to remedy this weakness.
The Central Intelligence Agency is not a public information agency, but was
established to provide our government with information and assessments to assist
policy decisions about developments abroad affecting the United States. Much of
this material is necessarily classified as it comes from sensitive intelligence sources.
It is thus made available in classified form to the members of the Executive Branch
concerned with these questions. Such material is also made available to the Congress,
in executive session, to endeavor to assist the Congress in its role in decision-making
under the American Constitution. To the extent feasible, moreover, the Agency's
information is made available to the public, directly or indirectly, in a number
of ways.
� Where possible the Agency identifies for public release information
resulting from its efforts. A recent example was the China Atlas published
in 1972 and an atlas on the Middle East published in 1973.
� The Agency briefs appropriate committees of the Congress � the Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Armed Services
Committees, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy � in executive
session in order to provide the fruits of our nation's intelligence
investment. To the extent possible, such information is later cleared for
publication. A recent example of this procedure was the detailed
testimony on the economies of the Soviet Union and China provided
to the Joint Economic Committee and published on 19 July after
appropriate screening. We also fully brief the CIA oversight
subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees
on budget and operational matters.
� We are completing a review of nearly 1,000 cubic feet of classified OSS
records in the custody of the Archivist and over 90% of them are being
declassified. Moreover, we have reviewed and declassified nearly 250 OSS
films.
* The Agency responds affirmatively whenever possible to requests for
information under the Freedom of Information Act and Executive
Order 11652. Of requests received and acted on in 1973, affirmative
action was taken in 80% of the cases.
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In our efforts to screen our information to decide what can be made available
to the public, we must depend upon the training, background, and experience of
professional intelligence officers to identify those matters which might appear
innocuous but which could reveal to a foreign intelligence service our intelligence
sources or methods.
With this background, I would now like to address myself to the provisions
of H.R. 12004.
Very simply, H.R. 12004 would conflict severely with the responsibilities of
the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods.
Under the bill all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information must be declassified
in two and one years, respectively. A great deal of our intelligence product, even
of our sources and methods, would not meet the standard under the language
of the bill to be classified as TOP SECRET. All such information thus would be
declassified in no more than two years. I would find it very difficult, in good
conscience and in terms of practicality, to urge a foreign intelligence service or
a strategically placed individual in a foreign government or a foreign country to
cooperate with this Agency and to provide information in confidence if the law
of this country required that such information be made available to the public
two years later.
All TOP SECRET information would be declassified under the bill in three
years, unless it falls within one of several categories, one of which is information
which would disclose intelligence sources and methods. But even this information
could be declassified by the Classification Review Commission which the bill would
establish. Moreover, the Commission could do so in the face of and notwithstanding
a written detailed justification by the President himself "for the continued
safeguarding of such information based upon national defense interests of the
United States of the highest importance." This would seem to raise constitutional
questions and it surely would impair my ability to protect intelligence sources
and methods.
Under the bill information may be classified only in the interest of "national
defense," as contrasted with "national defense or foreign relations of the United
States" as now provided by the Executive Order. I believe it important that the
bill be in terms which make it clear that the information which may be protected
is not limited to strictly defense information.
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The bill requires that the names and addresses of all persons authorized to
classify must be furnished quarterly to the Classification Review Commission and,
upon request, to any member of Congress or the Comptroller General. This feature
would hamper severely the operation of the intelligence-gathering function of this
Agency, since it would serve to identify many employees whose duties and
prospective duties require that their status as employees of CIA not be revealed.
It would also be in conflict with the provision of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 which exempts the Agency from the provisions of any law which
require publication or disclosure of certain information concerning Agency
personnel.
The requirements for downgrading and declassifying existing information in
the first and succeeding years after enactment would pose tremendous
administrative burdens. The requirement to transfer to the Classification Review
Commission information downgraded from TOP SECRET likewise would be
administratively burdensome. Further, it would impinge on my responsibility to
protect intelligence sources and methods.
My final point with respect to H.R. 12004 concerns the impact its enactment
would have on the authority departments would retain to withold information
based on one of the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act. Exemption 1
of that Act permits withholding of information classified pursuant to executive
order. Exemption 3 permits withholding of information which is "specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute." If enactment of H.R. 12004 resulted in
the rescission of Executive Order 11652, as I assume it would, the protection of
Exemption 1 would be gone. And it might be contended that classification actions
made under H.R. 12004 and the regulations of the Classification Review
Commission are made "pursuant to" rather than "by" statute and therefore are
not to be withheld under Exemption 3. If this contention is sound it would mean
that classified information requested under the Freedom of Information Act could
not be withheld. Clarification by appropriate revision would be highly desirable.
I turn now to Executive Order 11652. That Order, and H.R. 12004 as well,
obviously represent an effort to overcome the problem of too much classification
and for too long. I believe responsible opinion is in agreement that there are
problems in this area. Executive Order 11652, the first major change in
classification practices in nearly 20 years, was an attempt to make a turn-around
in the government's classification practices which date back to World War II, and
to deal with the untold volumes of documents which remain classified. This is
a major undertaking. It will require time and much work.
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The Order of course has impacted on CIA operations in a number of ways,
some of which I mentioned earlier. I propose now to summarize certain others,
Mr. Chairman, and, with your permission, I will submit for the record a
supplementary statement which provides certain statistics and details.
To meet the requirements of the Executive Order, we have made minor
modifications in our data index system, which we had developed through the years
as an aid in locating and retrieving information. We have made significant reductions
in the numbers of persons authorized to classify information.
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