"EAGLE AND SWASTIKA: CIA + NAZI WAR CRIMINALS AND COLLABORATORS" CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05657205
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: October 23, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2023
• Case Number: F-2011-00655

Approved for Release 2023/09/28 C05657205
SE\RET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Chapter Twenty-One
An Enduring Legacy (U)
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked the biggest
development in the Nazi war criminal investigations Since the Nuremberg trials.. For the
�41'
first tiniesinCe the eht(*World.War II/tensions between East andllifeat tib longer
complicated the pursuit of justice. As a result, the scope of the investigations
dramatically increased. Neal M. Sher, who succeeded Allan A. Ryan, Jr., as the director
of the Office of Special Investigations in 1983, declared ten years later, "people expected
this office would have been out of work years ago, but we're busier now than we've ever
been."I (U)
As the former Warsaw Pact countries experienced the first taste of democracy, US
investigators gained entree into many of the Russian and other Eastern European archives
that had never been accessible. The records provided bountiful new leads on Eastern
European collaborators, who had committed atrocities and later had immigrated to the
United States.2 By 1999, OSI's investigations had resulted in the denaturalization of 63
individuals, and the deportation of 52 war criminals from the United States. The
IMichael Isikoff, "Nazi-Hunting Office is Busier than Ever," Washington Post, 3 May 1993, p.
A17. (U)
2Janc Mayer, "With Cold War Over, More Escaped Nazis Face US Deportation," Wall Street
Journal, 16 April 1991, pp. Al and A4. The opening of the STASI files in East Germany is also a
bonanza for war criminal investigators. See Michael Shields, Reuters, "East German Files Cast
Light on Nazi War Criminals," 1 May 1996. (U)
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Department of Justice's "watch list" had also prevented the entry of 150 suspected Nazis
at American ports. (U)
Public interest in the Nazi war criminal investigations experienced a worldwide
rejuvenation with the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of World War II. In the
United States, the opening of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993 told the
horrors of the Third Reich to a new generation, and the museum quickly became one of
_ -
Washington's most popular tourist sites.3 The prospects of "ethnic cleansing" in the
- .
Balkans and elsewhere raised painful memories of how the world had failed to stop the
Nazis before the outbreak of world war. As the 20th century came to a close, students of
the Holocaust as well as the surviving victims themselves grew concerned that the
lessons of mass murder were being lost. As the Holocaust survivors died in increasing
numbers, the Jewish community grappled with the need to obtain a final accounting of
the material losses while fighting to preserve the memory of the Holocaust.4 (U)
Confronting Painful Pasts: France (U)
3In addition, the Holocaust Museum offered scholars a first-rate library and research institution
with records collected from countries throughout the world. The museum promised to spark
renewed historical interest in the World War II period. See Sybil Milton, "Re-Examining
Scholarship on the Holocaust," The Chronicle of Higher Education, 21 April 1993, p. A52.
4Marc Fisher, "Fragments of Memory," Washington Post, 7 April 1998, pp. DI and D2. (U)
2
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Klaus Barbie's trial resurrected the controversial subject of collaboration between
the Nazi occupiers and their Vichy sympathizers:8 In 1993, the murder of Rene Bousquet
clearly highlighted the difficulty that France had in facing its own past,,clespite its
longstanding efforts to emphasize France's resistance activities.6 In early 1994, the
French Government finally charged Paul Touvier with crimes against humanity for the
execution of seven Jews in 1944. A year later, Jacques Chirac, France's president,
openly discusscd how France had facilitated the deportation of the Jews to Nazi
_
. -
concentration camps.7 In 1996, France launched a highly public trial of Maurice Papon,
a senior French Government official in the 1970s and the former chief of police in Paris.
Papon faced charges of deporting nearly 2,000 French Jews, including children, to
Germany where the Nazis killed them. The case, in its twists and turns, attracted
international attention as late as 2003.8 (U)
5The French finally took steps to have Barbie extradited after years of efforts by Serge and Beate
Klarsfeld. See Charles Truehart, "A Nation's Nagging Conscience," Washington Post, 17 April
1997, pp. Cl and C4. Marcel Ophuls's 1970s documentary, "The Sorrow and the Pity," also
highlighted the underside of France during World War II. (U)
6The French president in the early 1990s, Francois Mitterand, had also worked in the Vichy
regime following his release from a German prisoner of war camp. See Alan Riding, "Vichy Aide
Accused of War Crimes is Slain in France," New York Times, 9 June 1993, p. A3. (U)
7A1an Riding, "France Confronts its Past in a Collaborator's Trial," New York Times, 16 March
1994, p. A3. Marlise Simons, "Chirac Affirms France's Guilt in Fate of Jews," New York Times,
17 July 1995, pp. Al, 3(U)
8Anne Swardson, "French Ex-Official Faces War Crimes Trial," Washington Post, 19 September
1996, p. A23. In 1997, Archbishop Olivier de Berranger apologized for the Roman Catholic
Church's silence on the deportation of French Jews. See Charles Truehart, "A Wartime Scar
Heals; Another is Reopened," Washington Post, I October 1997, p. A19. The Papon case took a
new turn in 1999 when Papon fled from France in an effort to avoid his ten-year prison sentence
after being found guilty in 1998 of helping to transport Jews to Nazi death camps. Suzanne
Daley, "Facing Jail, Vichy Aide Says He'll Go into Exile," New York Times, 21 October 1999, p.
Al 1. Papon later returned to France and was jailed, only to be released because of poor health.
3
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Confronting Painful Pasts: The Baltic Countries (U)
Other countries throughout the world also confronted their own Nazi legacies
with some surprising results.9 For the new nations in Eastern and Southern Europe, the
war's memory was indeed entangled as the Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, have all learned since the 1990s. Scores of individuals from:these countries
. � -
had collaborated with the Nazis during the war and later fled to the West; in some cases,
Western intelligence recruited former Nazi collaborators to work against the Soviets. In
the spring of 1991, the Office of Special Investigations examined records pertaining to
Bronislovas Ausrotas, a Lithuanian,
Ausrotas, it turned out, had served in the Lithuanian
army before that country's invasion by the Soviets. Fleeing to Germany, he worked as an
interpreter and then in the German military.10 OSI did not file suit against Ausrotas
because he had died, and it closed the case in December 1993. (S)
In September 1994, OSI filed suit against Aleksandras Lileikas for commanding
the Vilnius province element of the Lithuanian Security Police, known as the Saugumas,
See Alan Riding, "European Court Says Nazi Ally was Denied Fair Trial by France," New York
Times, 26 July 2002, p. AS; Elaine Sciolino, "French Free Top Civilian Official Jailed for War
Crimes," New York Times, 19 September 2002, p. A3; and "France: Vichy Official Will Stay
Free," New York Times, 14 February 2003, p: A8. (U)
90ver the years, reports had pinpointed Alois Brunner as living in Syria. Brunner, an SS captain
and aide to Eichmann, remains the most notorious war criminal still at large. Elliot Welles,
"Where is Brunner?," Washington Times, 20 September 1995, p. A21. (U)
10, MS/Litigation Support Staff to OGC, "Nazi War Crimes Investigation�
Bronislovas Ausrotas," 10 June 1991, XAN-2147, (S), in OGC, Nazi war criminal files. (S)
4
SECRET
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SLCREF
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
which had participated in the roundup and murder of thousands of Jews. While 051
initially reviewed Lileikas's DO file in 1983, it took 11 years for the Department of
Justice to take the case to court until it located corroborating evidence in newly opened
files in Eastern Europe. Lileikas, while still in Germany, had worked briefly for CIA
during the 1950s. A Federal court stripped him of his American citizenship in 1996, but
he fled to his native land before immigration authorities could deport him.I1 (U)
The Lithuanian Government proved to be slow in taking any action against
Lileikas. Even before he had escaped from the United States, the Lithuanian Government
declined to take any action against Lileikas.12 He was greeted with a hero's welcome,
and the Lithuanian state prosecutor's interrogations were friendly despite his well-
documented background. The Lithuanian S still took no action against Lileikas and, in
fact, reversed Soviet-era court convictions of other Lithuanians charged with
collaboration with the Nazis as "frame-ups."I3 It was, as the head of the Boston Anti-
Defamation League stated, 'The glorification of the war criminal as the victim. There's
strong forces for denial in Lithuania," Leonard Zakim told the American press.I4 (U)
11Pierre Thomas, "US Seeks to Deport Immigrant, 87, For Role in Deaths of Lithuanian Jews,"
Washington Post, 22 September 1994, p. A3; Kevin C. Ruffner, CIA History Staff to J. Kenneth
McDonald, "Aleksandras Lileilcis," 26 September 1994, (S), in DCVHS Records, Nazi war
criminal files. "Accused of Aiding Nazis, Man Returns to Lithuania," New York Times, 20 June
1996, p. A7; Judy Rakowsky, "Alleged Collaborator is Called Hero in Lithuania," Boston Globe,
12 November 1996, p. B3. (S)
12Associated Press, "No Prosecution of Alleged War Criminal," Washington Post, 10 February
1995, p. A16. (U)
13Daniel Williams, "Lithuania Vows to Speed Up Nazi-era Prosecutions," Washington Post, 27
January 1998. (U)
14Judy Rakowslcy, "Alleged Collaborator is Called Hero in Lithuania," Boston Globe, 12
November 1996, p. B3. (U)
5
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Efraim Zuroff at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Israel charged in 1998 that
"Lithuania continues to live in denial" while refitsing to take responsibility for its role in
the murder of over 200,000 Jews. Valda Adamkus, the new president of Lithuania and an
American emigre who had returned after a 50-year absence, proclaimed, "the crimes were
individual acts. The Lithuanian nation did not commit them." While Adamlcus promised
to take steps against Lithuanian war criminals, the Lithuanian Government, in reality,
took few steps.15 In-1999, Eli M. Rosenbaum, the director of OSI, accused the ,
Lithuanians of lacking the political will to tackle prosecutions for wartime crimes. When
Rosenbaum learned that a Lithuanian court had declared that Liliekas was medically unfit
to stand trial, the OSI director exclaimed, "this is an outrage. The US Government has
specific, verified information that Lileikas has been feigning illness. He is fit to stand
trial."16 (U)
Facing the threat that the United States would move to block Lithuania's entry in
NATO over its dearth of Nazi investigations, the country's parliament changed its trial
code to allow for prosecutions to continue even if the defendants were too sick to be
physically present in court.17 By this time, the US Government had deported four .
members of the Saugumas, to Lithuania: Aleksandras Lileikis in 1996, Kazys
Gimzaukskas in 1996, Adolph Milius in 1997, and Aloyzas Balsys in 1999.18 As it
(u)
16"US Blasts Lithuania for Delay in WWII Trial," Washington Times, 1 February. 1999, p. A6.
(U)
17"Nazi Trials to Resume in Lithuania," Washington Post, 16 February 2000, p. A18. (U)
18Reuters, "Alleged Nazi Ally Departs US in Deal," Washington Post, 31 May 1999, p. A10. (U)
6
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
turned out, a Lithuanian judge indefinitely suspended charges against Lileikis because of
his health in 2000.19 A year later, a Lithuanian court also lifted the sentencing of
Lileikis's deputy, Kazys Gimzaukskas, because he suffered from Alzheimer's disease.20
(U)
Despite appeals from the Jewish community to speed up indictments of war
criminals in Lithuania, indictments were slow in coming. The war crimes trials appeared
to have,gotten nowhere in post=Soviet Lithuania.21 (U)
The same proved true for Latvia, which found itself involved in an acrimonious
dispute over the veterans of World War II. Latvians had fought on both sides during the
war, with large numbers serving in the Red Army or as partisans. A substantial number
of Latvians, however, supported the Nazis, including a large contingent of members of
the Latvian SS Legion. During the Cold War, the Soviets branded the Latvian
Legionnaires as fascists and repressed those who remained in the country. With Latvia's
freedom, however, the pro-German, anticommunist Latvians turned the books against the
pro-Russian Latvians. (Latvia has a large ethnic Russian population.) In March 2000, a
�Associated Press, "Judge Halts Lithuanian War Crime Trial," Washington Post, 4 July 2000, p.
A16. (U)
20Michael Wines, "Lithuania: Conviction in Death of Jews," New York Times, 15 December
2001, p. A6. See also FBIS translation, "US Hunter Praises Lithuania for 'Historic Victory' in
War Crimes Trials," Vilnius Lietuvos Rytas, 19 February 2001. (U)
2IFBIS translation, "Lithuania's Jews Urge Prosecutors to Investigate Early WWII Mass Murder
Case," Vilnius Lietuvos Zinios, 11 September 2002. (U)
7
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Latvian court convicted a Soviet Latvian partisan of war crimes in the deaths of six
villagers in 1944.22 (U)
The case quickly became a test of how Latvia viewed its wartime role. Veterans
of the Latvian Legion took to the streets to proclaim their vindication for fighting the
Soviets. Images of former Nazi veterans marching in Riga, the Latvian capital, became a
public relations nightmare as Latvia wanted to join NATO and the European Union.
4'The West," a reporter wrote, "is uncomfortable with the rehabilitation of.men who
fought with the Nazis." The Latvian undersecretary of state assured Western reporters .
that Latvia planned to take on cases against Nazi war criminals. Armands Gutmanis
announced, "we have no trouble dealing with the Holocaust . . .. What worried Latvians
is that our friends pay little attention to Soviet crimes."23 (U)
Estonia, like its neighbors Latvia and Lithuania, also had trouble in coming to
terms with its divided past. In 1995, the Estonian government ended its investigation of
Haiti Marmil, an Estonian emigre and wealthy businessman in Venezuela, suspected of
22Daniel Williams, "In Latvia, World War H Isn't Quite Over," Washington Post, 20 March
2000, p. Al 3; Michael Wines, "Latvians Can't Escape Cold War's Divisive Legacy," New York
Times, 20 May 2001, p. 3. (U)
23Ibid. At the time, the Latvian Government had one pending Nazi war criminal case. KonrDC
Kelejs, an alleged member of the wartime Latvian Arajs militia that murdered Jews, had fled
from Great Britain to Australia to avoid investigators in 2000. A Latvian prosecutor claimed that
the government was investigating charges against Kelejs before pressing for his extradition. The
Latvian Government, however, expected that DCditional trials of Nazi collaborators in Latvia
were unlikely due to the number of cases prosecuted by the Soviets in the aftermath of the war.
For background information on the Kelejs case, see FBIS translation, "UK: Witness Reports on
War Crimes Suspect," 3 January 2000. A bounty program sponsored by the Simon Wiesenthal
Center to identify Nazi war criminals in Latvia brought only one response. See FBIS translation,
"Only One Latvian Replies to Invitation to Inform on Nazi War Criminals," Riga Leta, 11
September 2002. (U)
8
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
participating in war crimes while he was a member of the Estonian Political Police during
World War II. A year earlier, the Office of Special Investigations had placed Mannil's
name on the "watch list" to prevent him from entering the United States. In 2001, the
Estonians reopened its investigation of Mannil after an Estonian commission examining
wartime activities in that country declared that as a general policy, it was reasonable to
hold members of the Estonian Security Police responsible for war crimes. Shortly later,
Eftaimiuroff, the director of the, Simon Wiesenthal Center in Israel, visited Estonia,
claiming to have new evidence in the Mannil case.24 (C)
Consequently, the Estonians reopened its investigation of Mannil, but expressed
concern that it lacked sufficient evidence to press for his extradition from South America.
In 2002, the Estonians turned to the United States for assistance in pursuing the Marmil
case and requested that two investigators join OSI in interviewing witnesses in the United
States. The Estonians claimed that it "attaches great importance to investigating all
crimes against humanity, and the Holocaust in particular." The Simon Wiesenthal
Center, on the other hand, noted in its 2002 report that Estonia had yet to prosecute
anyone for war crimes. The Estonian police claimed that its investigations were
handicapped because the Soviets had already prosecuted Nazi collaborators. "Thus," the
State Department reported in 2002, "there was little likelihood that persons who
committed war crimes were still alive in Estonia."25 (C)
24Cable, Tallinn to State, "Suspected Nazi Persecutor Harri Mannil�GOE Request for
Participation in US-Based Investigation," 2 May 2002, Tallinn 00513. (C)
25Ibid. In 2002, the State Department's Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Randolph Bell,
spent one day in Tallinn where he met with the Estonian officials to discuss the country's efforts
9
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Confronting Painful Pasts: Croatia (U)
Even more so than the Baltic countries, the new nations of the Balkans were hard-
pressed to deal with the horrors of World War II. Born out of the violence that
accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia, Croatia played a notorious role in World War II
,.�as.art,Axis partner. After its independence in 1991, the Croatian,Govertunent,.under
President Franjo Tudjman, had celebrated the wartime Croatian fascist regime known as
�the Ustashe. Tudjman vehemently denied that the Ustashe had committed atrocities
during the war, and he appointed surviving Ustashe to high-level government posts. The
Croatian fascists, under Ante Pavelic, murdered thousands of Jews and even greater
numbers of Serbs. After the war, many of the Ustashe escaped from Croatia and settled
in Argent na.26 (U)
In April 1998, the Argentine Government deported Dinko Sakic to Croatia to
stand trial as the commander of the infamous Jasenovac and Stara GrDCiska
concentration camps. From 1942 until 1944, Sakic earned a bloody reputation for his
ruthless murder of Jews, Serbs, and others who opposed the Ustashe regime. Sakic, who
had escaped after the war to Argentina and headed up Ustashe emigre activities in the
Latin American country, remained defiant about his role as did his wife, Nada Luburis
to broDCen awareness of the Holocaust. See Cable, Tallinn to State, "Holocaust Special Envoy
Visit to Estonia," 4 September 2002, Tallinn 01009. (C)
26Andrew Borowiec, "Croatian-run Death Site Remains Dark Secret," Washington Times, 5 July
1994, p. A10. (U)
10
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
(she later changed her first name to Esperanza), who reportedly headed the women's
section of the camps. In June 1998, Sakic arrived in Zagreb and was taken to prison, but
outside observers feared that the Tudjman government would take no action against .
him.27 Later in November, the Argentines also expelled Sakic's wife, and the Croats
placed her under arrest. (U)
The trials of Nada Sakic and Dinko Sakic attracted attention as one of the last .
trials of those who:ran�concentration camps during the war-.28 A Croatian court
dismissed charges against Nada Sakic in February 1999, because no witnesses Could
confirm that she participated in the torture, terror, and intimidation of female prisoners at
Jasenovac.29 In a surprise ruling, the Croatian court found Dinko Sakic guilty of carrying
out and condoning the torture at Jasenovac, the worst of some 20 camps run by the
Ustashe. Sentencing Sakic to the maximum term of 20 years in prison, Chief Judge
Drazen Tripalo said, "we hope that the sentence�mDCe 55 years after the events � will be
a warning that all those who committed crimes in the near or distant past will not escape
justice. We also hope," the court stated," that the verdict will be a warning for the
future." Foreign observers hailed Sakic's conviction as a landmark development for
postwar Croatia. "Today should be a proud day for Croatia," said Tommy Baer, former
27Chris Hedges, "War Crimes Horrors Revive as Croat Faces Possible Trial," New York Times, 2
May 1998, pp. Al and A4; Anthony Faiola, "Extradition�to a Hero's Welcome?" Washington
Post, 6 May 1998, pp. A21 and A26. (U)
28 Guy Dinmore, "Croatia Confronts Its Past as War Crimes Suspect Returns," Washington Post,
19 June 1998, p. A35. (U)
29Associated Press, "Croatian Suspect in World War II Torture is Freed," New York Times, 2
February 1999, p. A3. (U)
11
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
president of the Jewish group B'nai B'rith. "Croatia has shown that it does not fear
facing its past and learning a lesson from the painful chapter of its history."30 (U)
Confronting Painful Pasts: Argentina (U)
Perhaps even more surprising than Croatia or the Baltic States, Argentina in the
1.990s took several major steps-to exorcise the ghosts of its Nazi past. In 19917Argentina,
announced that it planned to open its files to determine how many Nazi war criminals and
collaborators had sought refuge in that South American country. Two years later,
researchers concluded that they had accumulated some 1,000 names, including dozens of
Ustashe supporters of Ante Pavelic, the leader of the pro-Nazi regime in Croatia.31 In
1998, Argentinean researchers reported that they had discovered that most Nazis who had
fled to Argentina after the war had arrived in Argentina with passports issued by the
International Red Cross in their real names. This information contradicted previous
reports stating that the Peron regime had given passports to the former Nazis using false
names.32 (U)
Yet, some still regarded Argentina's steps as insufficient. Elan Steinberg, the
executive director of the World Jewish Congress, called for the release of all Argentine
30Snjezana Vulcic, Associated Press, "Croat, 78, Gets 20 Years for Crimes at Death Camp,"
Washington Times, 5 October 1999, p. A16. (U)
3INathaniel C. Nash, "Argentina Files Show Huge Effort to Harbor Nazis," New York Times, 14
December 1993, p. A10. (U)
32"Nazis Entered Argentina Under Own Names," Washington Post, 10 March 1998, p. Al2. (U)
12
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
bank records to follow the Nazi money trail. "We're asking for both moral and material
restitution," Steinberg declared.33 Some Jewish groups, on the other hand, praised the
Argentine Government for its efforts to release information on the Nazis and their
collaborators in that country. President Carlos Saul Menem's establishment of a "truth
commission" in 1997 was hailed as a step forward.34 (U)
Argentina continued to make progress as it reexamined its past. In December �
1998, Argentina's-Minister of the Interior said that Pres:Menem planned to proposc,that-, , -
other South American countries, including Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile, establish their own
Nazi investigating commissions. The Simon Wiesenthal Center wanted to take Menem's
idea one step further to create a regional commission with members from various
countries.35 Just before Menem's call, the Commission for the Clarification of Nazi
Activities in Argentina (known by its Spanish abbreviation as CEANA), issued the first
report of its findings in November 1998. Perhaps the most controversial finding was the
Commission claim that only 150 war criminals entered Argentina, a figure immediately
disputed by Jewish organizations.36 (U)
In June 2000, Argentina's new president, Fernando de la Rua, came to
Washington to meet with President Bill Clinton. At a ceremony at the Holocaust
33Ann Louise Bardach, "Argentina Evades Its Nazi Past," New York Times, 22 March 1997, p.
25(U)
34Calvin Sims, "Argentina, Once Nazi Haven, Now Hailed by Jews," New York Times, 19 April
1997, p. 6. (U)
35David Haskel, Reuters, "Wider Campaign of Nazi Hunting in Latin America Sought," Seattle
Times, 4 December 1998. (U)
36Uki Goni, "Argentina Confronts Links with Nazis," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 29
November 1998. (U)
13
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205 �
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Museum, de La Rua apologized for Argentina's role in the 1-Iolocaust.37 Later that
summer, the Argentine Foreign Minister asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for
US assistance in tracking down documents about the immigration of Nazis to Argentina
after the war. The Argentine-Foreign Minister hoped to coordinate American efforts with
CEANA. The American press hailed these moves as a means of solidifying the Jewish
community's support in Argentina, the largest Jewish population in Latin America.38 (U)
The outlook-changoldramatically by 2003 .when�a new government clamped
down on openness. "It's an embarrassment," said Sergio Widder, the Latin America
representative of the Simon Wiesenthal Center. Argentina refused to declassify its
records relating to Nazis who came to Latin America and how they were aided by the
government and the Roman Catholic Church.39 (U)
Confronting Painful Pasts: Italy (U)
Measures taken by Argentina to expel war criminals from its shores in the 1990s
reopened old cases throughout Europe. In 1994, four years before Argentina deported
Dinko Sakic and his wife, Nada Sakic, to Croatia, the Argentine Government arrested
Erich Priebke, a German SS officer accused of murdering 335 Italians in 1944 in
37Hugh Bronstein, Reuters, "Argentine to Apologize for its Role in Hiding Nazis," Seattle Times,
13 June 2000, p. A9. (U)
38Gilbert Le Gras, Reuters, "Argentina Asks US for Help in Search for Nazis," Washington
Times, 18 August 2000. (U)
39Larry Rohter, "Argentina, a Haven for Nazis, Balks at Opening Its Files," New York Times,
9 March 2003. (U)
14
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
retribution for partisan actions. Priebke claimed that he escaped from Italy in 1948 and
moved to South America through the assistance of the Catholic Chureh.40 After some
debate, Argentina deported Priebke to Italy where a military judge ordered the 82-year
old man to stand trial in April 1996, the first such trials in that country since 1948.41 -
This trial brought new surprises, including the reemergence of Karl Hass, the former SD
major who had worked for the Counter Intelligence Corps in Italy after the war. When
-the,CIA.rejected using-himin the 1950srHass:had dropped-out of sight. His,extradition---.47-7
from Switzerland to testify at Priebke's trial in Rome raised new questions and harkened
shades of Klaus Barbie.42 (C)
At the end of July, a military appeals court rejected a motion by lawyers of the
relatives of the victims to dismiss the three-judge panel for alleged judicial bias in favor
of Priebke.43 A day later, the military appeals court found Priebke guilty of the charges,
but released him on the grounds that the statue of limitations on wartime murder had
expired. That decision shocked the Italian people and protesters quickly seized the
40Paul Holmes, "Captured Nazi Says Vatican Helped Him Escape from Italy," Washington
Times, 11 May 1994, p. A10, and Reuters, "Italy Asks Argentina to Extradite Ex-Nazi," New
York Times, 8 June 1994, p. A15. For earlier discussion of the Vatican's role, see Ralph
Blumenthal, "Vatican is Reported to have Furnished Aid to Fleeing Nazis," New York Times, 26
January 1984, pp. Al and A14. For a discussion of the execution of Italian civilians in 1944, see
Robert Katz, Death in Rome (New York: MacMillan Company, 1967). (U)
4IGeorg Bonisch, "His Name is Priebke," Der Spiegel, 3 September 1995, pp. 98-101; Calvin
Sims, "In Nazi's Hiding Place, the Stain Won't Wash Away," New York Times, 30 October 1995,
p. A4; Daniel Williams, "Nazi Horror Still Haunts Eternal City," Washington Post, 22 November
1995, pp. A19, 23; John Tagliabue, "Ex-Nazi Faces Trial in Italy in Cave Killings," New York
Times, 5 April 1996, p. A9; and Daniel Williams, "Ex-Nazi's Trial, Book on Gassing Brings
Facism Back into Focus," Washington Post, 7 May 1996, p. A14. (U)
42"The Nazi and the Protection Racket," The Independent, 13 June 1996. (U) .
43Reuters, "Court Denies Dismissal Motion," Washington Post, 31 July 1996, p. A28. (U)
15
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
courthouse and blocked Priebke from leaving.44 International reaction to the verdict was
also swift. Germany demanded Priebke's extradition, and Argentina refused to allow him
to return to that country.45 (U)
A few hours after his release, the Italian justice minister rearrested Priebke on
charges that he had killed 14 other political prisoners in June 1944.46 At the same time,
the Italians also arrested Hass, who had.been confined to an Italian military hospital after
he had-attempted-to escape in June 1996 and,sufferedm.broken-pelvis: The Italians-felt' -
that Hass had not been as forthright about his role in the Ardeatine caves massacre.47
Using the Priebke case as a justification, the Italians also reopened a long-forgotten case
against two other German SS officers, Karl Titho and Hans Haage, for executing Italian
military personnel and civilians at a concentration camp near Fossoli di Carpi near the
northern Italian city of Modena.48 (U)
In the meantime, Priebke remained in a cell at the Regina Coeli jail�the same
prison where he had collected his hostages in 1944. He bemoaned his fate and told an
Italian legislator that he recognized his mistake. "Do you know what my mistake was?,"
44The New York Times, for example, discussed the Priebke case in an editorial. See "A Nazi's
Flawed Trial," New York Times, 8 August 1996, p. A26. (U)
45Vera Haller, Reuters, "Rome Atrocity Panel Frees Ex-Nazi Officer," Washington Post, 2
August 1996, p. A16; Celestine Bohlen, "Italian Court Throws Out Case in 1944 Rome
Massacre," New York Times, 2 August 1996, p. A3; Reuters, "Germany Seeks Extradition of Ex-
Nazi," Washington Post, 14 August 1996, p. A22 (U)
46Associated Press, "Ex-Nazi Faces Inquiry in Hero's Killing," Washington Post, 8 August 1996,
p. A24. (U)
47Hass testified on Priebke's behalf and said that Priebke would have been killed if he had not
obeyed the order to kill the Italians in retribution for the partisan attack on the German troops.
See "Ex-Nazi Backs Up Comrade," Hartford Courant, 13 June 1996. (U)
48John Tagliabue, "Italy Reopens Old Inquiry into 2 Ex-Nazis in Killing of Prisoners," New York
Times, 11 August 1986, p. 6. (U)
16
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
he asked. "To be the last." In October 1996, Italy's highest court overturned the verdict
of the military tribunal and ordered the German to be held for a new trial. Observers
worried that the Italians, however, lacked the impetus to convict Priebke for his,role in
the murder of Italian civilians, despite the flood of new evidence against the German SS
officer. "All of this information is coming out at a point when it is too late for the war
crimes trials,.too late. for the families of the victims," commented Shimon Samuels, a
member oftheSimon,WiFannthal center. "Thc,firiebke case is the-last,pustb-which is, �
why I am worried that it could get bogged down."49 (U)
In April 1997, the Italians opened a new trial against Erich Priebke and Karl Hass.
Priebke attended the first day of court at the Rebibbia prison, but claiming that he was in
poor health, the Italians allowed him to remain in house arrest at a Franciscan monastery
outside of Rome. Hass, whom the Italians also charged with shooting two Italians, did
not appear in court as he was still recovering from his injury the previous summer.50 By
July, the three member civilian court found both Priebke and Hass guilty of the charges
that they had killed civilians. Priebke was sentenced to 15 years in prison with 10 years
suspended under an amnesty law. Hass, in turn, received a suspended 10-year, eight
month sentence. Rome's mayor proclaimed that "after the terrible and painful events
which followed the first trial, the fact that the court affirmed there is no statue of�
49Celestine BoWen, "Nazi's Case Forces Italy to Revisit Sore Subject," New York Times, 20
October 1996, p. 4; Reuters, "Rome Court Orders Retrial of Ex-Nazi in WWII Atrocity,"
Washington Post, 16 October 1996, p. A17. See also Robert Katz, "The Last Nazi Trial," MHQ:
The Quarterly Journal of Military History 8 (Summer 1996), pp. 74-79. (U)
5� Candice Hughes, Associated Press, "Nazi's Second Trial Sparked by Ire over Results in First,"
Washington Times, 15 April 1997, p. A15; Vera Haller, "Retrial of Ex-SS Officer Opens with 2"
Defendant," Washington Post, 15 April 1997, p. A20. (U)
17
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
limitations for war crimes in Italy is very important for civil justice in the world, because
it applies to all war criminals like those in the former Yugoslavia and the Great Lakes
region of Africa."51 (U)
Following the second trial, the Italian Government placed Priebke in a military --
hospital to serve his sentence, while Hass would be confined to the Castel Gandolfo
clinic.52 In early 1998; an Italian militar3:, appeals coUrt upheld the convictions of both
Priebke and Hass and.upgraded their-sentences to life imprisonment. Priebkes.lawyers----
. announced that they would take his case to the European Court of Human Rights to fight
the new prison term.53 The Italian Court of Cassation, the highest court in the land,
upheld the tougher terms for both men later in November 1998.54 In the meantime, the
Italians relented, and said they would allow Priebke to serve the remainder of his
sentence under house arrest.55 Hass was also released from a military prison hospital and
permitted him to stay in a private clinic in Rome.56 (U)
As late as 2002, the Italians continued to fight with Priebke. In April, the Court
of Cassat on rejected Priebke's request for a pardon following a similar move in July
5IVera Haller, "2 Ex-Nazis Convicted of War Crimes," Washington Post, 23 July 1997, p. A18.
(U)
52Reuters, "Court Moves War Criminal," Washington Post, 7 August 1997, p. A29; see also
Xinhua News Agency, "Italy Transfers Convicted Ex-Nazi Officer to Military Jail," 19
November 1998. (U)
53Associated Press, "Former Nazi to Appeal a Life Sentence in Italy," New York Times, 9 March
1998, p. AS. (U)
54Xinhua News Agency, "Italy Maintains Life Sentences for Ex-Nazi Officers," 19 November
1998. (U)
55"Nazi Under House Arrest," Stars & Stripes, 10 February 1999. (U)
56Reuters, "Aus Gesundheitlichen Gruenden Ex-SS-Officier Hass aus Haft Entlassen,"
Suddeutsche Zeitung, 22 February 1999. (U)
18
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
2001 by the military court of appeals. Priebke's lawyers had hoped that the Italian
Government would release the now 88-year old German officer under the provisions of a
1966 amnesty for Italians who.had supported the fascist regime during the war. The
court rejected the appeal because the terms of the amnesty applied only to Italians and not
to members of the German military.57 (U)
Confronting Painful-Pasts: Germany- (U)
While the the pursuit of Nazi war criminals in the United States became an issue of
public interest in the 1980s and the subject of intense media and political attention,
investigators in West Germany found themselves increasingly isolated. The unification
of the two Germanies raised hopes that the Nazi war criminal investigations would be
infused with new resources and information. While the East German Ministry of
Interior's files proved to be a bonanza of information on Nazis, the German Government
took few steps to mine this new information. The Stasi's Nazi files, reportedly if put
together would stack some five miles high, provided leads to only 30 suspects. By 1995,
the Federal Republic of Germany had failed to prosecute anyone for war crimes from
information derived from the Stasi files.58 (U)
57Rome ANSA, "Italian Court Rejects Pardon for Nazi War Criminal," 25 April 2002. (U)
58Rick Atkinson, "Nazi Hunters are Still at War, Fighting a Losing Battle," Washington Post, 27
August 1995, pp. Al and A22. (U)
19
SECR,ET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
At the same time, the German Government reduced its efforts to hunt Nazis. The
Central Office for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Ludwigsburg had dropped to 28
people from a peak strength of some 140 staff members, including attorneys, in the
1970s. Alfred Streim;-the director of the Central Office, blamed the individual German
states for being unwilling to support the Nazi war criminal investigations and
prosecutions. In Streim's opinion, Germany had given a "backdoor amnesty" to war
criminals who:were now weIl advanced in age.�One prosecutor-on.the,Central Staff was
appalled at Germany's negligence. "I believe no culprit should be allowed to climb into
his grave without being unmasked." Ursula Solf added, "he should be at least told: You
were the one, you were the pig who did this."59 (U)
The publicity surrounding the Priebke case brought to light Nazis that had lived in
Germany for decades. In 1995, Hans Schwerte, an authority on German literature and a
highly acclaimed professor at the Aachen Technical University, was exposed as Hans-
Ernst Schneider, a SS officer. Schneider joined the SS in 1938 and the Nazi party a year
later. As a SS captain, Schneider served in the East, and it was believed that he may have
played a role in obtaining medical equipment in the Netherlands that was later used to
conduct horrible experiments at Dachau. At the end of the war, Schneider mysteriously
disappeared and his widow remarried Hans Schwerte. Only in the 1990s did an
American researcher reveal Schwerte's true identity. Although he admitted to having
served in the SS, the German professor denied any role in the medical experiments. The
59Ibid. See also Michael Shields, Reuters, "East German Files Cast Light on Nazi War
Criminals," 1 May 1996. (U)
20
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
� Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
German Government subsequently stripped him of his high honors, and he died in
2000,60 (U)
The Italians pursued another major case in the aftermath of the Priebke/Hass
trials. Friedrich Engel, who as an SS officer in Italy became known as the "Butchefof
Genoa," was convicted in absentia in 1999 by the Italian Government for the wartime
murder of 246 Italian civilians. Two years later, German television reporters uncovered
Engel in Hamburg where he-had-lived,since the war: Piero Fassinortheltalianminister,
of justice, pressed for Engel's arrest despite the fact that German law prevented him from
being extradited. Fassino continued to ask his German counterpart to charge Engel for
his war crimes on Italian soiI.61 (U)
According to the Italian justice minister, the pursuit of Engel was "achieved
thanks to the determination of the victims' relatives, who had never resigned themselves
and have always pressed for the culprits to be punished."62 In early 2002, the Hamburg
prosecutor's office announced that Engel, now 93, had been arrested to face charges of
60A1an Cowell, "German Scholar Unmasked as Former SS Officer," New York Times,1 June
1995; Eric Pace, "Hans Schwerte, 90, Ex-SS Man Who Hid Identity," New York Times, 10
January 2000, p. A17. (U)
61FBIS translation, "Italian Justice Minister Calls on Germany to Arrest, Try World War II
Criminal," Milan Corriere Della Sera," 15 April 2001, p. 6; FBIS translation, "Minister Says SS
Man Found in Hamburg Must Not Go Unpunished," Rome RAT radio interview, 17 April 2001;
FBIS translated report, "Justice Minister Fassino Appeals to German Opposite Number in Engel
Case," Milan Corriere Della Serra, 20 April 2001, p. 15; Georg Bonisch, Carsten Holm, and
Hans-Jurgen Schlamp, "Schrank der Schande,"Der Spiegel, 23 April 2001, pp. 56-57. (U)
62FBIS tianslated report, "Italian Jugtice Minister Calls on Germany to Arrest, Try World War II
Criminal," Milan Corriere Della Sera," 15 April 2001, p.6. (U)
21
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
the murder of 59 prison inmates in retaliation for a partisan attack on German troops.63
Engel was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. He
told the judge, "I have two wars behind me, and in my youth I learned that toughness is
good for you. I have learned my whole life to react with toughness."64 (U)
Confronting Painful Pasts: Canada, Great Britain, and the United States (U)
2 -. =It c-
The pursuit of Nazi war criminals and collaborators in the West had been an on
and off process since the 1980s. In Canada, two undercover reporters from the Jerusalem
Post posed as researchers and interviewed suspected war criminals in 1996. The paper's
articles led to a television special in Canada the following year discussing what Bernie
M. Farber called Canada's "dirty little secret." According to the Simon Wiesenthal
Center, Canada had become the home of as many as 3,000 war criminals, half of whom
were still alive in the late 1990s. The Canadian Government had a poor record in terms
of investigating and prosecuting these individuals, many of whom had Eastern European
backgrounds. By 1997, the Canadians had only brought charges against one man for
killing more than 8,000 Jews; the case dissolved when the suspect died just as deportation
63Rome ANSA, "Germany to Prosecute Ex-Nazi Convicted In Italy," 12 February 2002; "Former
SS Officer Faces Massacre Trial," Washington Times, 31 March 2002, p. A9. (U)
64Steven Erlanger, "Former Nazi Convicted of Ordering Executions," New York Times, 6 July
2002, p. A5. (U)
22
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
hearings commenced in British Columbia. Only two other men had been deported from
CanDCa for war crimes in 1982 and 1993.65 (U)
In the early 1980s, The Canadian Government had launched a major effort to
identify war criminals in the country. -Delays in the legal procedures doomed that effort
and not until the mid-1990s did Canada embark upon a reinvigorated strategy, including
toll-free telephone numbers, to pinpoint war criminals.66 Budget cuts in the Canadian.
office responsible for war crimes investigation also undermined that effort.67 In 1997,
the Canadian Government announced that it had employed Neal M. Sher, OSI's former
director, to beef up Canada's War Crimes Unit.68 Five years later, in May 2002,
Canadian authorities arrested Michael Seifert, who had been convicted by an Italian court
in 2000 for his participation at a German concentration camp near Bolzano, Italy. Justice
officials, however, warned that extradition proceedings could be quite lengthy.69 (U)
65Anthony DePalma, "Canada Called Haven for Nazi Criminals," New York Times, 3 February
1997, p. A6. (U)
66Howard Schneider, "Canadians Asked to Dial 'N' for Nazi," Washington Post, 22 March 1997,
p. A28. (U)
67Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Canada Plans Bid to Punish War Crimes," New York Times, 9 April
1995, p. 9. (U) �
68Reuters, "Ottawa Says it Hired a Nazi-Hunter," New York Times, 12 December 1997. In
September 2002, Denis Coderre, the Immigration Minister, asked for a review of Canada's policy
of deporting elderly Nazi war criminals. A subsequent review stated, "despite the increasing
difficulty of pursuing World War II cases, there is no strong rationale at this point in time for
either eliminating or formally reducing the priority of the World War II component of the
program." See Robert Fife, "Ottawa May End Effort to Expel Nazis; Policy Has Never Led to
Actual Deportation; Jewish Groups Fear Creation of 'Sympathy," Toronto National Post, 20
September 2002, and Stewart Bell, "Don't Ease Up On Nazi War Criminals, Review Says,"
Toronton National Post, 11 October 2002. (U)
69Rome ANSA, "Canada Extraditing Nazi War Criminal to Italy," 8 May 2002. (U)
23
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Efforts to track down war criminals and collaborators in the United Kingdom
have also met with mixed results. Until the passage of a controversial War Crimes Act in
1991, the British Government could not prosecute individuals who were not British-
subjects if they had committed crimes outside of Great Britain. Consequentlyywar -
criminals lived peacefully in the United Kingdom until the first case in 1995.70 By that
time, the Simon Wiesenthal Center had identified some 17 war criminals, but Scotland
Yard claimed only 13 individuals.7,11n 1999, a British court convictedrAnthony -
Sawoniuk, a 78-year old retired railroad ticket collector, of killing 18 Jews in a Polish
town in 1942. Sawoniuk was the first, and perhaps only, Briton to be convicted of war
crimes during World War 11.72 (U)
In the United States, the Nazi war criminal investigations took some unusual
twists in the early 1990s. The past now came back to haunt the children of the DP
generation that came to America in the 1940s and 1950s. Pres. Bill Clinton discovered
this in the summer of 1993 when he nominated Army Gen. John Shalikashvili for the
position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shortly after Clinton hailed
Shalikashvili's rise to the nation's highest military rank from his humble immigrant
background, the Simon Wiesenthal Center announced that the general's father had
actually been an officer in a Georgian Waffen SS unit. Captured by the British at the end
701n 1995, British authorities charged a Belorussian living near London with wartime murder.
Fred Barbash, "Britain Launches Its First Nazi War-Crime Case," Washington Post, 15 July
1995, p. A-24. (U)
71Fred Barbash, "Britain Launches its First Nazi War-Crimes Case," Washington Post, 15 July
1995, p. A24. (U)
72Sarah Lyall, "Nazi Crimes Bring Man 2 Life Terms in Briton," New York Times, 2 April 199,
p. AS. (U)
24
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
� of the war, the Shalikashvili family moved to the United States in the early 1950s.73 The
appointment, one columnist wrote, made it appear that "the Clinton administration or the
Pentagon�or both�have combined the smug arrogance of the ignorant with an attempt to
repackage a Nazi into a political refugee:" Columnist Richard Cohen protested, "the
apparently purposeful recasting of the elder Shalikashvili from a Nazi soldier to a war
rePagee just to make a better Rose Garden ceremony is an insult to the victims of Nazism
and.shows contempt for the American-people:74 (U)- -
The Demjanjuk Debacle (U)
No case has besmirched the prestige of the Office of Special Investigations more
than its prosecution of John Demjanjuk. While OSI filed its largest number of suits in
1992, the Demjanjuk case cast a dark shadow over the entire Nazi war criminal
investigations. Eleven years earlier, OS! stripped John Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian-born
autoworker in Cleveland, of his citizenship for lying on his immigration application and
his petition for naturalization. In one of its most important cases involving a Nazi war
criminal, the Federal government claimed that Demjanjuk was the infamous "Ivan the
Terrible" at the Treblinka concentration camp. In 1986, the United States extradited
Demjanjuk to Israel to stand trial for these crimes. An Israeli court, indeed, determined
73Thomas VV. Lippman, "Pentagon Nominee's Father Served as Nazi SS Officer," Washington
Post, 28 August 1993, pp. Al and A14. (U)
74Richard Cohen, "Gen. Shalikashvili's Father," Washington Post, 31 August 1993, p. A19;
Andrew Borowiec, "Elder Shalikashvili's Situation Not Unique," Washington Times, 31 August
1993, pp. Al and A8. (U)
25
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
that Demjanjuk had participated in war crimes and sentenced him to death. The Israeli
Supreme Court, however, felt that there was reasonable doubt whether Demjanjuk was
"Ivan the Terrible," although it agreed that he had served as a guard at another
concentration�camp. After much debate, Israel released Demjanjuk in September 1993
and returned him to the United States.75 In 1998, Demjanjuk regained his American
citizenship. (U)
Public pressure.forced the United States Government to.review-the-Demjanjuk
case. Im1992, the 6th US Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati launched an
investigation into the handling of the case to determine whether there had been any
misconduct on the part of OSI in its prosecution of the Ukrainian immigrant. The court
questioned several former OSI attorneys, exposing differing opinions about the evidence
used to convict Demjanjuk.76 In June 1993, Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., declared
that OSI's behavior had been "reckless" in not providing evidence that appeared to
contradict the Govenunent's case. But Judge Wiseman found the evidence did not
disprove the case as the Office of Special Investigations had presented it. Thus, Wiseman
held that OSI had not engaged in any prosecutorial misconduct. A second panel of
judges from the same circuit court, however, then took up the case and reached a
different conclusion. Chaired by Senior Judge Pierce Lively, the three�judge panel
75Numerous articles and books have been written on the Demjanjuk case. For some
contemporary accounts, see Edward Walsh, "Protests Greet Demjanjuk's Return After Seven
Years," Washington Post, 23 September 1993, p. A3. (U)
76See Sharon LaFraniere, "Ex-Prosecutor: Demjanjuk was Not 'Ivan the Terrible,' Washington
Post, 13 November 1992, pp. Al and A22; Ronald Smothers, "Lawyer Recalls No Doubt on Nazi
Guard," New York Times, 15 January 1993, p. All; and David Johnston, "Doubt Cast on
Identification of Nazi Guard 'Ivan,' New York Times,1 July 1993, pp. Al and A14. (U)
26
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
declared that the Office of Special Investigators, in particular its former director, Allan A.
Ryan, Jr., and Norman Moscowitz, had suppressed contravening evidence about
Demjanjuk and bowed to pressure from Jewish interest groups anxious for a successful
case.77 (U)
The decision badly damaged the reputation of the Office of Special Investigations
and prompted Attorney General Janet Reno to review the ethical standards of the Office's
attorneys.78.. In February-4 994Neal-M. Sher, director of OSP, announced'his resignation
to accept the executive directorship of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.79
After a lengthy interim period, Eli M. Rosenbaum, the WJC's lead investigator during the
Waldheim affair and a former OSI attorney, assumed the helm at OSI in 1995. (U)
Despite the setbacks, OSI pressed with a new case against Demjanjuk. In May
1994, OSI asked the Supreme Court to throw out the appeals court ruling. In a brief
signed by Solicitor General Drew S. Days III, the Justice Department sought to vindicate
the OSI prosecutors and their efforts to strip Demjanjuk of his American citizenship. The
Office of Special Investigations contended that its lawyers had acted in good faith to
deport Demjanjuk. Their lapses in providing certain documents pertinent to the case did
not constitute "egregious and deliberate misconduct, such as bribery of a judge or
77Stephen Labaton, "Judges Assail US Handling of Demjanjuk," New York Times, 18 November
1993, pp. Al and B20. (U)
78Michael Hedges, "Nazi-Hunting OSI Criticized Before, Reno Admits as Probe Continues,"
Washington Times, 7 February 1994, p. AS. (U)
795tephen Labaton, "At the Bar: A Successful Prosecutor of War Criminals May Be
Remembered for the Case that Fell Apart," New York Times, 27 August 1993, p. A21, and
Michael Weisskopf, "Justice Official Named to HeDC Pro-Israel PAC," Washington Post, 11
February 1994, p. A23. (U)
27
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
fabrication of evidence" that is normally cited as fraudulent behavior before the courts.�
(U)
In 1999, OSI reopened the case when-it filed suit against Demjanjuk whom it
alleged had served as a guard at several concentration camps.81 The Demjanjuk trial
opened in Cleveland in May 2001 as both the prosecution and the defense grappled over
the use of decades-old documents in what the defense attorney called a "trial by � ��
� -Iarchive."82"In February 2002, Judge-Paula-. Matia ruled thattheltiSticetDepartrnefit nr-'a
proven that Demjanjuk had knowingly misrepresented his past.when he arrived in the -
United States in 1952 with "clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence." Demjanjuk,
in Matia's opinion, had "not given the court any credible evidence of where he was
during most of World War II." 83 (U)
The Search for Restitution (U)
The plight of Holocaust victims in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe
attracted the attention of Jewish groups in the West, who mounted a vigorous campaign
�Joan Bislcupic, "US Challenges Fraud Ruling in Demjanjuk Case," Washington Post, 25 May
1994, p. M5. (U)
81David Johnston, "Nazi Death Camp Case Reopened by US," New York Times, 20 May 1999, p.
A20. (U)
82Jerry Seper, "Justice Targets Man, 81, Again," Washington Times, 29 May 2001, p. A6;
Associated Press, "Government Tries Demjanjuk Again," Washington Times, 30 May 2001, p.
A7; Francis X. Clines, "US Again Prosecutes Man Cleared of Being Reviled Nazi," New York
Times, 30 May 2001, p. A15; and Associated Press, "Witness Deems Documents about
Demjanjuk Authentic," Washington Times, 31 May 2001, p. A7. (U)
83David Johnston, "Demjanjuk Loses Citizenship Again; Judge Cites Lies," New York Times, 22
February 2002, p. A16. (U)
28
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
to aid these forgotten victims. Since the 1950s, West Germany had paid compensation to
Jewish victims of the Holocaust, but survivors behind the Iron Curtain had received none
of this money. By the.1990s, most of these men and women were now old and helpless.
"The-war has almost been consigned to ancient history," said Rabbi Andrew Baker, the
director of European affairs for the American Jewish Committee. "So it's somewhat of a
shock that you have not only living witnesses but people who have suffered and have yet
tgureceivetany, kind .of compensation.""(U) -
In early 1996, Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato of New York took up the issue of Jewish
accounts in Switzerland. On 23 February, D'Amato wrote DCI John M. Deutch
requesting the CIA's help to "achieve an authoritative, accurate and final accounting of
all assets that numerous Swiss banks continue to hold from this time period and to which
the survivors and rightful heirs are entitled." D'Amato also sought the Agency's help in
locating the "reportedly great amounts of Nazi loot, including gold, art, and other
treasures, that might have made their way to Switzerland, and perhaps into Swiss
banks."85 (U)
The allegations of Swiss complicity in hiding confiscaied Jewish assets captured
the world's imagination. In less than two years, as the New York Times wrote in 1997,
Europe was "awash in information that nations which considered themselves neutral or
even victims of the Nazis actually profited from the Holocaust. They trafficked in gold,
"Rick Atkinson, "Slow to Redress," Washington Post, 26 May 1995, pp. A29 and A33. (U)
85D'Amato to Deutch, 23 February 1996, ER 96-1509, in CIA History Staff files. (U)
29
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
strategic minerals, art and real estate. Newly opened archives reveal that others knew of
the slaughter of Jews and stayed silent."86 (U)
A World Jewish Congress report in 1998, for example, estimated that Nazi
Germany had seized between $9 and 14 billion from the 20 different conntries or regions -
that it had occupied between 1933 and 1945.87 In 1996, Pres. Clinton ordered the
Federal government to search its unclassified and classified holdings for information oil
, the role of neutral-countriestduring the war years. The two-yam-investigation, headed by.,-
Under Secretary of Commerce (later Under Secretary of State) Stuart E. Eizenstat,
brought together 11 different Federal departments and agencies that reviewed some 15
million documents.88 (U)
Eizenstat's investigations resulted in two reports, US and Allied Efforts to recover
and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II,
Preliminary Study, and US and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations
with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German
External Assets and US-Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Ustasha Treasury,
published by the State Department in May 1997 and Rine 1998, respectively. The reports
marked the pinnacle of official American efforts to understand what happened during the
war and aftenvard. Both studies discussed Project SAFEHAVEN, a wartime interagency
86Tina Rosenberg, "Nazi Entanglements: Judging the Acts of Another Era," New York Times, 3
March 1997, p. A24. (U)
87U5 Congress, House. Committee on International Relations. Heirless Property Issues of the
Holocaust (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), pp. 71-101. (U)
88See Stuart E. Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished
Business of World War II (New York: Public Affairs, 2003). (U)
30
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205.
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
� US project to identify Nazi Germany's sources of wealth and to neutralize its commercial
and industrial strength. The Office of Strategic Services played a leading role in
obtaining intelligence on Germany's activities and providing assessments. Decades later,
the CIA's History Staff located-primary sources in both OSS and CIA files and provided
historical analysis for both Eizenstat reports.89 (U)
In April 2000, Under Secretary Eizenstat briefed the Senate's Committee on
Foreign Relations on Americairefforts,to-right-the wrongs,of1her1940s. His testimonyct.-
demonstrated the wide-ranging steps that the Federal government undertook during-the
Clinton administration, resulting in a $1.25 billion Swiss bank settlement; a $5.1 billion
German agreement to assist those men and women forced to work for German companies
during the war; the restitution of stolen and looted art; the creation of the International
Commission for Holocaust Era Insurance Claims; the declassification of US records on
World War II; the return of religious and communal effects in Eastern Europe; the
sponsorship of international efforts to spur Holocaust education; and the negotiations
with Austria on slave labor. Eizenstat told the senators why the US Government had
taken these unprecedented steps. "Our policy on Holocaust issues," he noted, "serves
important US foreign policy interests, as well as helping individual American
89See William Z. Slany, US Department of State, US and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore
Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II, Preliminary Study
(Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 1997) and William Z. Slany, US Department of State,
US and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argentina, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German External Assets and US Concerns about the
Fate of the Wartime Ustasha Treasury (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian, 1998). See also
Donald P. Stettry, "Tracking Nazi `Gold:' The OSS and Project SAFEHAVEN," Studies in
Intelligence (Summer 2000, No. 9, Unclassified ed.). (U)
31
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
citizens . . . . and helps in the removal of impediments to greater cooperation in
Europe."90 (U)
CIA's Ongoing Participation in the Investigations (U)
The Central Intelligence Agency supported the�Nazi war criminal investigations
4.-,irnthe-1990s; mostly through-routine name traces-in-the files of the-Directorate of
Operations and the Office of Security. The Office of General Counsel served as the
conduit between the Agency and OSI, coordinating OSI reviews of CIA documents. The
relationship between the two agencies proceeded smoothly with only minor disruptions.
(U)
For the most part, OGC staff paralegals initiated name traces after receiving OSI
requests. When the Agency's components located documents pertaining to an individual,
OGC then provided OSI with a summary of the Agency's information. If OSI wanted to
look at the records, the Department of Justice attorneys would then visit the Agency's
Headquarters to examine a sanitized file of the documents pertaining to the individual's
wartime activities. If the case actually proceeded to the litigation stage, OSI would then
again meet with the Office of General Counsel to review the Agency's entire holdings.
90U5 Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The Legacies of the Holocaust
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), pp. 13-49. The US Government's efforts
had great impact. For example, the Vatican declared in February 2002 that it would open its
secret archives related to Pope Pius XII as well as documents pertaining to the Church's
relationship with Nazi Germany. See Daniel Williams, "Vatican to Open Nazi-Era Archives,"
Washington Post, 16 February 2002, p. B9, and Melinda Henneberger, "Vatican to Hold Off
Releasing Pope Pius XII War Documents," New York Times, 16 February 2002, p. AS. (U)
32
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
This meeting was held to ensure that neither 051 nor CIA encountered any later
difficulties or surprises. Representatives from the two agencies occasionally met to
discuss the name trace procedures and improvements for.overall operations. These
meetings, held in 1989 and 1993, clarified general issues and introduced new
personne1.91 (U)
Between 1980 and 1995, the Central Intelligence Agency had conducted over
,,,.."1000,name traces-for the_Office of-Special-Investigations
The Agency did the bulk of these name traces during the first five years
of OSI's existence and it slowed after the first rush. During the 1990s, CIA handled an
average of 30 name traces for OSI annually. The Agency's records systems provided a
bonanza of information about numerous individuals of interest to OSI because they
contained documents from the State Department, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Displaced Persons Commission, the FBI, the Army, and the Air Force, in
addition to CIA's own components. The DO's records systems, in particular, have been
of value to the OSI investigations, although the system was not designed as a research or
investigative tool. The Agency also retained control of an extensive collection of records
from the Office of Strategic Services, the Strategic Services Unit, and the Central
Intelligence Group that occasionally assisted OSI investigators. (U)
91 telephonic interview by Kevin C. Ruffner, Arlington, VA, 18 October 1996. See
also Jr., Assistant General Counsel to John K. Russell, OSI, "Name Trace
Requests," 23 June 1993, OGC 93-52098, enclosing draft 15 June 1993, "Letter of
Understanding�OSI Name Trace Requests," in OGC Nazi War Criminal Working Files. These
letters were never sent to OSI because the points of interest were discussed in a meeting between
CIA and 051 at CIA Headquarters in August 1993. (S)
33
SECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
The Office of Special Investigations turned to CIA as one of its first avenues for
research to determine if allegations of war crimes had any merit. While the Agency's
records do not normally provide conclusive evidence that an individual participated.in a
war crime, the records can offer extensive information about an individual's background
or whereabouts. For a successful prosecution, OSI has to demonstrate that an individual
provided false information to the US Government about his wartime activities whew:, -
-"7"�'"..t � immigrating to thisccountryfor, obtaining_citizenship. The -Agency:s records, because,they
are readily retrievable and incorporate documents from a variety of sources, often contain
valuable clues. In fact, OSI often preferred to examine the CIA's records as opposed to
using files from the Immigration and Naturalization Service because the Agency's
records were better organized and preserved. Lastly, the Agency's files indicate whether
the CIA or another Federal agency, including the Army or the FBI, had an operational
interest in a particular individual. Over the years, information of this nature had a
bearing on a number of cases. (U)
While most of the name traces done by CIA over the years have located "no
record," the CIA has occasionally found its old agents now sought by the Office of
Special Investigations. The Agency has always informed OSI when it possessed records
on individuals who had worked for CIA, and the two agencies coordinated the
presentation of this information in court. For the most part, the Agency prefers not to go
to court with OSI unless absolutely necessary and then only to protect Agency "sources
and methods." The Agency, to date, has never taken a stand in defense of a former agent
34
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
seeking to avoid prosecution for misleDCing Federal officials regarding wartime
activities. (U)
Ring Around the Records (U)
Kurt Waldheim remained a persona non grata in the United States as the 20th
:.,centuryccame to a close,ln-the-afterglow following the.collapse,of communistn,little-clidr
the Central Intelligence Agency realize that it would soon confront a highly publicized
and a politically well-connected drive to open the Agency's historical files related to Nazi
war criminals. As events proved, Kurt Waldheim was the key that unlocked the
classified cabinets at Langley. (U)
The first volley of this new campaign appeared in the form of a letter from
Elizabeth Holtzman, comptroller of the City of New York, a former Congresswoman, and
a candidate for the US Senate, to DCI Robert Gates in March 1992. Holtzman, who had
also written to Pres. George Bush, requested that.the CIA release its files on Nazi war .
criminals. Citing specifically Klaus Barbie, Otto von Bolschwing, Mykola Lebed, and
Arthur Rudolph, Holtzman complained that the United States Government had protected
Nazi war criminals and, in some cases, arranged their immigration to the United States.
"In the process of employing these people and bringing them to safe haven in the United
States and elsewhere," Holtzman added, "laws were broken, lies were told, and the
President, Congress, other government agencies and the public were deceived. But we
35
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
still don't know the whole story," she exclaimed. "Forty seven years after the end of
World War II, it is time for the American people to find out the truth."92 (U)
Holtzman's letter landed on the desk of J. Kenneth McDonald, the Agency's chief
historian, who prepared the response for Adm. William 0. Studeman, theActing DCI, in
the summer of 1992. After discussing Holtzman's request with the Office of General
� Counsel and the�Informatiom Privacy and Classification Review Division to see what
-trecords theAgencychad on these individuals, McD6naldtreported1hat�the,CIA had
previously released material on Barbie and that the Agency's overall collection of Nazi
material was "dispersed but not large." McDonald commented, "the rime has come for us
to attempt to unburden ourselves of all records we hold related to Nazis and war
criminals."93 (U)
On 10 August 1992, DDCI William Studeman told Holtzman that he had directed
the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence to search for and review records relating to
Nazi war criminals. The DDCI also informed her that no records had been found in
CIA's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) files that mentioned either Lebed or Rudolph,
although it had released documents through FOIA on Barbie and Bolschwing. The letter
unfortunately gave Holtzman the impression that the Agency had no records at all on
Mykola Lebed.94 (U)
92Elizabeth Holtzman to DCI George Bush, 26 March 1992, copy of the letter in CIA History
Staff files. (U)
93J. Kenneth McDonald to DCI, 20 July 1992, in CIA History Staff files. (U)
94W.O. Studeman to Holtzman, 10 August 1992, ER 92-1861/2, in CIA History Staff files. (U)
36
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Studeman's letter quickly mDCe its way to the New York Times. "In a change of
policy that could provide new information about American recruitment of Nazi war
criminals after World War II, the Central Intelligence Agency says it has begun to
systematically search its records-with the aim of opening long-secret files to historians'
scrutiny," the paper reported.95 (U)
This optimistic announcement soon became mired in controversy. Holtman
,t--immediately retort ed-that;tebedthad�a-lengthy relationshirvith the CIA7-,"It.therefore. � -
seems highly unlikely that the agency would have no records on Mr. Lebed,", the former
congresswoman noted.96 (U)
John Loftus, the former OSI attorney who had embarked upon an independent
career as a Nazi hunter, soon contacted the Agency with his own theories about Lebed
and DCvice on how to find the "missing" files.97 In his press release, Loftus announced,
"I suspect that, in a few weeks, a red-faced Admiral Studeman will tell Liz Holtzman that
the CIA has found several filing cabinets full of Lebed's files. Of course," Loftus went
on to say, "if Lebed's files do not tiim up, then the CIA would have a major scandal. It
would mean that someone put a large portion of their intelligence files into a CIA shedder
without proper authorization. If Admiral Studeman is right and the old Nazi records are
95Ralph Blumenthal, "CIA is Planning to Unlock Many Long-Secret Nazi Files," New York
Times, 10 September 1992, p. B8. (U)
96Holtzman to Studeman, 27 August 1992, ER 92-1861/3, in CIA History Staff files. (U)
97 Executive Assistant, DDCI, Memorandum for the Record, "Telephone Call
from John Loftus re Mykola Lebed," 11 September 1992, (S), in CIA History Staff files. (S)
37
SECRET
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
gone, then it is a major historical loss, as well as a flagrant violation of the CIA's
statutory obligation to the National Archives."98 (U)
The Agency continued to feel the heat from this incident as a result of Adm.
� �--Studeman's Angus. t 1992 letter. Both Holtzman's and Los's correspondence received
� further publicity in the New. York Times, while reporters sought out interviews with Lebed
in his Yonkers, New York residence.99 The aging Ulcrainidn resistance leader-expressed
-7surprise-at,the Ageney.'-seactions, and refusedgo talkswith the'media,� "I am tired-Of
this," he declared. "I can't understand why they do this. I was looking for
understanding, for help, and the answer is so vulgar. I can't understand this."100 (U)
After Holtzman's electoral defeat in the fall of 1992, the Agency quietly let the
subject drop altogether.101 But the issue of the Agency's records management
procedures did not disappear. The National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA) was also drawn into the controversy over Lebed's files because of its legal
98Loftus, press release, 15 September 1992, in CIA History Staff files. (U)
99Ralph Bluinenthal, "Nazi Hunter Says CIA Has Files on Man Accused of War Crimes," New
York Times, 17 September 1992, p. B10. (U)
100Laurel Babcock, "Yonkers Man, 82, Denies War Crimes," Yonkers Herald Statesman, 18
September 1992. By this time, Lebed had been the subject of extensive speculation in the press
following the 1985 GAO Report, which noted his case anonymously as "Subject D." In early
1986, both the Village Voice and the New York Times ran lengthy pieces about Lebed while the
Office of Special Investigations questioned him extensively. As late as 1991, OSI continued its
investigation about Lebed although it has never filed any charges. The Central Intelligence
Agency monitored these activities closely as seen by numerous memos in Lebed's 201 file. (S)
101For various correspondence on how to answer Holtzman, see McDonald to DDCI, "Reply to
Elizabeth Holtzman's Letters concerning Nazi War Criminal Records," 15 December 1992, CSI
92-0223, (S), enclosing draft letter for DDCI to Holtzman; Assistant General
Counsel to McDonald, "Letter to Elizabeth Holtzman on Nazi Records," 23 February 1993, OGC
93-50500; and McDonald to DDCI, "Reply to Elizabeth Holtzman's Letters concerning Nazi War
Criminal Records," 23 July 1993, CSI 0227/93, (S), enclosing draft letter for DDCI to Holtzman.
All correspondence located in CIA History Staff files. (S)
38
SECRET
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 202/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
mandate to protect historically important Federal records. Trudy H. Peterson, the Acting
Archivisit of the United States, wrote R. James Woolsey, the new DCI, in the summer of
1993. She demanded to know if the Agency still possessed "highly significant Federal
reports." In response to her office's first inquiry after the NeW-York Times broke the-
story about the missing Lebed file, the Agency had told the National Archives that "it
would be inappropriate for the CIA to discuss particular records or files based upon
accusations reported in news articles.�102 Over the.course of,the nextcouple of months;
_
the CIA tried to reassure the Archivist that no records marked for permanent retention
had been destroyed.103 (S)
The Agency Is the Obstacle (U)
In May 1994, New York Times editorialist A.M. Rosenthal again took up his pen
as he mused about "the Waldheim file." Rosenthal continued to ask about Waldheim and
how he had escaped his past for so many years. Rosenthal again drew upon Prof.
Herzstein's research to highlight the gaps in the public's knowledge of the Austrian �
politician, (Waldheim had by this time completed his tciizi as president and retired from
102For background material, see James J. Hastings, Director of Records Appraisal and
Disposition Division, NARA to CIA Information Management Officer, 19 October
1992; to Hastings, 14 April 1993; and Trudy H. Peterson, Acting Archivist, NARA to R.
James Woolsey, DCI, 7 June 1993, ER 93-3464, all in CIA History Staff files. (U)
103See Frank J. Ruocco, Deputy Director for administration, to DCI, "Letter from NARA
Regarding Alleged Destruction of Files on Nazi War Crimes," 23 July 1993, OTT 0502-93, OGC
93-05046, (S), enclosing Woolsey to Peterson, 7 August 1993, ER 93-3464/1, (S), in CIA History
Staff files. (S)
39
SECRET
AN)
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
all official duties.)104 Herzstein maintained that Waldheim "was protected by the US
Government, provided information in return for that protection, and profited from the
Governinent's willingness to obliterate his wartime service."' 05 (U) �
Frustrated-with the Agency's refiisal to declassify its holdings on Waldheim,
. Rosenthal urged the US Congress to pass legislation "preventing Government agencies
from denying information about World War II war crimes."106 CongressWainan Carolyn� -
B.. Maloney efilibkly:toble7ipi Rosenthal's and Herzstein's platfonpirral2JJuly=1-9944etter
to her colleagues on Capitol Hill to push for a "War Crimes Disclosure Act." Forwarding
a copy of Rosenthal's editorial, Maloney expressed shock that "the CIA withheld critical
information about Kurt Waldheim's Nazi past from the public." She sought a cosponsor
to close the loopholes in the Freedom of Information Act that allowed the Agency to
withhold information about war criminals.107 (U)
104After his 1988 book, Herzstein continued to research Waldheim's service in World War II
and to speeulate on his postwar activities. See Robert E. Herzstein, "The Life of Dr. Kurt
Waldheim, 1938-1948: Sources in the National Archives," in George 0. Kent, ed., Historians and
Archivists: Essays in Modern German History and Archival Policy (Fairfax: George Mason
University, 1991), pp. 287-297, and Herzstein, "The Present State of the Waldheim Affair:
Second Thoughts and New Direction," in Bischof and Pelinka, eds., Austrian Historical Memory
and National Identity, pp. 116-134. (U)
105A.M. Rosenthal, "The Waldheim File," New York Times, 24 May 1994, p. A19. (U)
1061bid. Rosenthal's editorial evoked an immediate reaction in the CIA and a search for
information pertaining to the Austrian. See Office of the Director. Executive
Secretariat, to SA/DDO, "Commentary on Newspaper," 25 May 1994, (S), and
Chief, External Inquiries Branch, 1MS, to Office of the Director, Executive
Secretariat, "Your Request dated 25 May 1994," 26 May 1994, DOR-03886, (S), both in
Waldheim, File 201-0896881, DO Records. (S)
107Carolyn B. Maloney, letter to colleagues, 12 July 1994, copy of the letter in CIA History Staff
files. (U)
40
SECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
Maloney introduced her bill on 12 August 1994, and it was referred to three
committees in the House of Representatives, but she lacked a companion bill in the
Senate. The hill, cosponsored by six other congressmen, would amend the Freedom of
Information Act and eliminate the Agency's ability to claim any FOIA exemptions for-
Nazi war criminal information. The bill called for a minimum of exceptions to full
disclosure of the identities of war-criminals-in the United States.108 (I) -
- Withinta,-week-, A.M. Rosenthal-informed the readers of the NewfYork-Times;thp.-----
_
Rep. Maloney had introduced a bill, drawing upon Rosenthal's coverage of Herzstein's
research on Waldheim. "It is an overdue piece of legislation," Rosenthal wrote,
"important to justice and history. The key to the Waldheim file is right there on the table,
waiting for Congress to pick it up and use it."109 (U)
The Congressional legislation quickly ran into a wall of opposition from the CIA.
a member of the Agency's Office of Congressional Affairs, warned that the
War Crimes Disclosure Act would strip the Agency of its ability to protect information
under the National Security Act of 1947, and there would be no protection for the
identities of CIA officers.110 Although Maloney's bill failed to move in the House in the
108For further details on the impact of the act and its wording, see Office of
Congressional Affairs, to Director of Information Management, Information and Privacy
Coordinator, Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, and Litigation Division, Office
of General Counsel, "War Crimes Disclosure Act (H.R. 4955)," 23 August 1994, OCA 94-2161,
(no classification listed), copy in CIA History Staff files. (U)
I�9A.M. Rosenthal, "The Waldheim Bill," New York Times, 19 August 1994, p. A27. (U)
119�Office of Congressional Affairs, to Director of Information Management, Information
and Privacy Coordinator, Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, and Litigation
Division, Office of General Counsel, "War Crimes Disclosure Act (H.R. 4955)," 23 August 1994,
OCA 94-2161, [no classification listed], copy in CIA History Staff files. (U)
41
SECRET
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
waning hours of the 103'd Congress, she reintroduced it when the new Congress
convened in March 1995, this time with 17 cosponsors, and it began to make its way
through hearings. In the summer. of 1996, A.M. Rosenthal took up the charge and
proclaimed, "for a full half-century, with determination and skill, and with the help of the
law, US intelligence agencies have kept secret the record of how they used Nazis for so
many years,. what the agencies got from these services�and what they gave as
payback-"11.14i)
Once again, Rosenthal advocated that Congress demand the release of the Federal
government's holdings on Waldheim, whom he now described as a possible "big power
groupie who worked for all sides during the Cold War. Adding to Maloney's efforts in
the House, Daniel P. Moynihan, the powerful New York senator, also took up the drive in
the US Senate. In late September 1996, the House voted to approve the Maloney bill,
although ParDCe Magazine, a widely distributed national insert to most Sunday
newspapers, commented in December of that year that "there are thousands of Nazis still
being pursued for war crimes they committed more than 50 years ago. The CIA,"
ParDCe Magazine claimed, "is one of the obstacles to finding those alive today. The
agency," according to the article, "intervened in October to weaken the War Crimes
Disclosureiket, which would have opened US intelligence files on Nazi war criminals to
111A.M. Rosenthal, "Ms. Maloney and Mr. Waldheim," New York Times, 25 June 1996, p. A21.
(U)
42
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
those engaged in hunting them. Why? National embarrassment. The US helped some
Nazis after the war if they were useful in fighting the Communists.>>112 (tr)
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (U)
, Congresswoman Maloney's efforts culminated in success when-Presiderit Bill
Clinton,signed the Nnzi-War Crimes Disclosure-Act; Public Law -105-246;---on 8 October
1998.113 Earlier that summer, the House ratified the Senate bill calling for the disclosure
of records related to Nazi war crimes and criminals. In addition, the Senate language,
adopted into law, called for an interagency working group, or WIG, to facilitate the
review and release of government records. The new law required all Federal agencies to
locate bodies of records that can reasonably be believed to contain information
that: (1) pertains to any individuals who the US Government has grounds to
believe ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion, during
the period of Nazi rule in Germany (1933-45); or (2) involvesnssets taken,
whether or not under the color of law, during that period from persons persecuted
by the nazi regime or governments associated with it. (U)
112 "House Votes to Release Data on Nazis," Washington Times, 25 September 1996, and "CIA
is Obstacle in Hunt for Nazis," Parade Magazine, 22 December 1996, p. 7. (U)
113Public Law 105-246, "An Act to Amend Section 522 of Title 5, United States Code, and the
National Security Act of 1947 to Require Disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act
regarding Certain Persons, Disclose Nazi War Criminal Records without Impairing Any
Investigation or Prosecution Conducted by the Department of Justice or Certain Intelligence
Matters, and for Other Purposes." Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, to Secretary of State et al, "Implementation of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure
Act," 22 February 1999. Copies of both documents are located in CIA History Staff files. In
2000, Congress amended the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act and its implementing directive to
DCd records pertaining to the Imperial Japanese Government between 1931 and 1945. (U)
43
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
The Implementation Directive issued by the White House furthermore stated that
."agencies should take an expansive view of the act in making this survey and in the -
subsequent identification of records and declassification review. Special.efforts-should -
be mDCe to locate records that may shed light on US government knowledge about,
policies toward, and treatment of Nazi -war criminals, especially during-the Cold War
-years."114 For the first time inghe-Agency's history,-Congress mandated-thatitheiCIA-
. had to review all of its classified holdings on Nazi war crimes and criminalsior
declassification. (U)
In January 1999, President Clinton appointed the three nongovernmental members
of the IWG; Thomas H. Baer, a lawyer and motion picture and television producer;
Richard Ben-Veniste, a former assistant US attorney and Watergate prosecutor; and most
importantly, Elizabeth Holtzman, who had struggled for 25 years to get the Federal
government to open its records on Nazi war criminals) 15 (U)
Past is Prologue (U)
While the Agency has provided extensive assistance to the Office of Special
Investigations, the General Accounting Office, and various Congressional offices in their
1'Office of Information Management, Employee Bulletin, "Implementation of the Nazi War
Crimes Disclosure Act," 31 March 1999, EB No. 0002-99, in DCUHS files. (S)
115The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Clinton Names Thomas Baer,
Elizabeth Holtzman, and Richard Ben-Veniste as Members of the Nazi War Crimes Records
Interagency Working Group," 11 January 1999. Copy located in CIA History Staff file. (U)
44
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
inquiries about Nazi war criminals and collaborators, many feared that the CIA still
protected some deep, dark secrets. The Agency had itself to blame for the persistence of
these suspicious. With its responses in the Waldheim investigation and its gaffes with
Elizabeth Holtzman, the CIA created even more problems. (U)
The pattern of using German intelligence figures and their collaborators had been
� well established by the time of the CIA,s formation in 1947. In fact, the Office of �
u.�-Strategic!Services had embarked on,this-course�even.during the war. For-a:yariety-of
reasons, other American intelligence agencies, including the Strategic Services Unit and
the Central Intelligence Group, continued to exploit these individuals for information as
the Cold War spread over Europe. Headquarters personnel in Washington had a less than
favorable impression of using these sources than had their counterparts in the field, who
felt pressed to obtain current intelligence. While the CIA's sponsorship of the Gehlen
Organization, the nascent German intelligence service, is one of its most controversial
actions, the Agency and its predecessors actually took a dim view. of Gehlen's
effectiveness. Until forced to take on this service from the US Army, the CIA had
expressed its distaste for Gehlen's organization and had advocated a radical trimming, if
not a complete disbandment of the outfit. CIA's initial reluctance to use the West
Germans and the various emigre groups would later prove to have been justified. (U)
The Army's Counter Intelligence Corps, the larger and more powerful American
intelligence service in Europe immediately after the war, demonstrated an amateurish
approach to intelligence recruitment and operational employment. Two of the most
serious Nazi war criminal investigations of the 1980s, the Barbie and the Verbelen cases,
45
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
highlighted the CIC's poor evaluation of its agents and how the Army facilitated their
escape from justice. The Central Intelligence Agency, once it achieved a measure of
� status in Europe,.attempted to undo the damage caused by the CIC in the.early 1950s, but
the Army had already-wreaked considerable havoc by that point. (U)
As the Cold War heated up, both the Office of Special Operations and later the
Office of Policy Coordination embarked on missions behind the Iron Curtain. OSO's
ill-fated-missjons to,dro.pragents into thelIkraine-and Eastern-Europe,linked theiCIA to -
suspect Eastern Europe groups and individuals tainted by collaboration with the
Germans. Until late 1948, the CIA had avoided these groups because of questions about
their reliability. The need for intelligence and growing tensions between the East and
West, however, overrode caution on the part of the Americans. The establishment of the
Office of Policy Coordination in 1948 spurred CIA's movement into covert operations.
At the same time, OPC tried to exploit internal fissures within the Soviet Union. This
effort also involved growing reliance on anticommunists from Central, Southern, and
Eastern Europe�the same regions of the world marked by widespread support of the
Nazis. While OPC had a short life as a bureaucratic entity, it deeply influenced the CIA's
development and established the Agency's future psychological and paramilitary
operations. (U)
By the early 1950s, World War II seemed a long way from the problems faced by
the United States in its struggle against world communism. Americans, never known for
long memories or a sense of history, concentrated on the new problems at hand. This
national amnesia allowed the CIA to not only employ individuals who had supported the
46
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
nation's enemies only a few years earlier but also to allow them to immigrate to the
United States. (U)
After the experience of the 1960s and 1970s, a new generation questioned the
- honesty of the United States Government and forced a serious examination of-the -
presence of Nazi war criminals and collaborators in America. The Agency, reeling from
. other scandals, soon faced demands from Congress and the media,for'information about
Nazi wqr criminals. The.Agency didrnot welcome these calls witItopeitarrnscand:,-
released its information only with hesitation. After a series of mishaps within the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and concerns that the CIA had sponsored the
immigration of Nazis to the United States, Congress passed new legislation to strengthen
the laws to prosecute Nazi war criminals and collaborators in 1979. The Agency and the
new Office of Special Investigations experienced some rocky cases in the beginning, but
by the early 1980s, the two organizations had established a steady working relationship�
one that survives to this day. The Agency remains one of the best sources of information
for OSI in what is now the longest-running investigation in the Agency's history. There
are no signs that public interest in the topic of Nazi war criminals has abated; if anything,
it has become a growth industry for archivists, historians, and journalists. (U)
The Agency cannot escape from its past because the public is enthralled by tales
of escaped Nazis. The CIA's own mystique lends itself to the image that it directed Super
secret operations that allowed these individuals to escape from justice. The media and
self-proclaimed "Nazi hunters" quickly link the Agency with the latest rumors of one
Nazi fugitive or another. The Nazi war criminal issue is likely to outlive its participants,
47
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205
SECRET
DRAFT WORKING PAPER
the accused war criminals and collaborators as well as their American case officers. The
wartime generation is rapidly disappearing, but the controversies live on and take on new
dimensions. While the_bulk,of the Agency's early records have now been declassified
. and transferred to the National Archives, thorough histories of these agencies and their
operations have yet to be written. Likewise, the declassification of CIA's own records
under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act offers the best insight as to the extent of the.
Agcncy's role.and operations during-theRold- War. (U,) The Central Intelligence Agency inherited a thorny problem in 1947. This
birthmark is an unfortunate blemish that cannot be erased. The only solution for the
Agency is to bring these Nazi cases to light and to share as much inforniation with the
public as possible. It is a half-answer, but it is the CIA's only available option that best
serves the interests of the American people. (U)
48
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C05657205