RESEARCH STUDY -- INDONESIA-1965: THE COUP THAT BACKFIRED

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00186624
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 357
• Document Creation Date: September 12, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2023
• Case Number: F-2021-01370
• Publication Date: December 1, 1968

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Research Study
LVDO1VESI4-1965
The Coup That Backfired
4
December 1968 -
1
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INDONESIA 1965
The Coup That Backfired
December 1968
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BURMA
LAOS
THAILAAID
CAMBODIA
SOUTH
WIETHAM PHILIPPINES
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MALAYSIA
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BORNEO
INDONESIA
JAVA
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100 15014144r,
130 Irlionwura
JAVA
AUSTRALIA
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Foreword
What is commonly referred to as the Indonesian
coup is more properly called "The 30 September Movement,"
the name the conspirators themselves gave their movement.
In this paper, the term "Indonesian coup" is used inter-
changeably with "The 30 September Movement," mainly for
the sake of variety. It is technically correct to refer
to the events in Indonesia as a "coup" in the literal
sense of the word, meaning "a sudden, forceful stroke in
politics." To the extent that the word has been accepted
in common usage to mean "the sudden and forcible overthrow
of the government," however, it may be misleading. For
it now seems clear that the Indonesian coup was not a move
to overthrow Sukarno and/or the established government of
Indonesia. Essentially, it was a purge of the Army lead-
ership, which was intended to bring about certain changes
in the composition-of the cabinet. In this sense, it is
more correct to refer to the 30 September Movement as a
purge, rather than a coup.
A word should also be said about the organization
of the paper. It is divided into four main sections.
The first one treats the actual events of the coup ondl
October; the second one traces the movements of the key
figures in the coup up to the time of their capture or,
in the case of Sukarno, up to March 1966, when he lost
de facto control of the government to Gen. Suharto, who
assumed full responsibility for restoring law and order;
the third one discusses the planning for the coup that
vos done in the one month of September 1965; and the last
one, perhaps the most important one, reviews the events
leading up to the coup, including the decision to stage
the coup.
This organization was chosen for several reasons.
First of all, there was the consideration of the evidence
itself. For the most part, the matters that are discussed
in the first two sections are matters of established fact;
in other words, they are part of the record against which
we must examine the words and testimony of the various
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-individuals who were involved in the coup. Our knowledge
of the conspiracy behind the events, which is the subject
of the third section of the paper, comes entirely from
�the interrogation of the people involved in the conspiracy.
Naturally, this kind of evidence must be considered in a
slightly different light than the evidence that is pre-
sented in the first two sections. The reader is in a
better position to make his own judgment, based on the
evidence, if he has a clear understanding of the kind of
evidence that is involved.
The matters that are discussed in the fourth section
are much more matters of judgment. The coup can only be
understood, of course, against the background of Indonesian
politics in 1965. Many of the events that form that back-
ground are open to varying interpretation, however. Again,
the reader is in a better position to evaluate those events
if he can view them from the vantage point of hindsight,
as it were, with the events of the coup clearly drawn in
his mind. The one difficulty with the arrangement of the
paper, with the events of the coup at the beginning, is
the possibility of its creating the false impression that
the coup was a distinct occurrence, which can be treated
apart from the rest of the Indonesian political scene. 4
Of course, it can not. It should be viewed as the culmina-
tion of many events over the.years.
There has been a deliberate effort in telling the
story of the coup to present the evidence in as straight-
forward a manner as possible, to let the facts speak for
themselves. The purpose of this has been to allow the
reader to make his own conclusions as he goes along. A
final section at the end of the paper summarizes the con-
clusions of the author.
All the events that are discussed in the paper,
including the events of the coup itself and the major
events leading up to the coup, are presented in chrono-
logical order in the Chronology of Events. Also included
in the Appendix is a brief-discussion of the validity of
the Army interrogation reports as evidence.
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INDONESIA - 1965
The Coup that Backfired
Contents
Page
Preface
The Coup 1
The Kidnapping of the Generals 1
Suharto Takes Command of the Army_ 7
The Show of Force in Djakarta 10
The Central Command in Djakarta 11
Sukarno Hears the News 16
The Murder of the Generals 118
The Coup is Proclaimed 21
The Central Command Moves to Halim 22
The New Order is Announced 25
President Sukarno at Halim 30
Dani Seals His Fate 41
Suharto: The Making of a Hero
The Collapse of the Coup 53
Reflections of the Coup Throughout Indonesia 60
The Coup de Grace for the PKI 66
The Postlude 70
The Central Command in Hiding 71
Aidit's Last Days 77
Dani Under Sukarno's Protection 84
Sukarno is a Losing Cause 87
The Conspiracy 97
The Role of the PKI Special Bureau 100
PKI Recruitment of the Military Officers 107
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Page
The Planning of the Coup 110
The First Meeting: The Participants Meet 112
The Second Meeting: Sjam Takes Charge 117
The Third Meeting: The Question of Troops
and the Role of Sukarno 120
The Fourth Meeting. The Question of the
Generals and the Choice of a Leader 122
The Fifth Meeting: The Question of Arms and
an Important Newcomer to the Group 130
The Sixth Meeting. The Training of the
Volunteers and a Promise from the Cavalry 136
The Seventh Meeting: The Decision on D Day 143
The Eighth Meeting: The Order to Go 152
The Last-Minute PKI Preparations - 157
The Last-Minute Military Preparations 161
The Prelude I, 169
PKI Domestic Policy 169
The PKI's Armed Capability 173
The PKI's Covert Apparatus 175
PKI Policy Toward Sukarno 182
Background to a Coup. September 1964
March 1965 186
The Gilchrist Letter f93
The Generals' Council 198
The PKI's 45th Anniversary 209
Aidit's Last Trip Abroad 211
In Moscow 213
In Peking 216
Sukarno's Illness 220
An Urgent Summons to Aidit 223
The PKI in a State of Panic 225
Decision in the Politburo 227
Sukarno Recovered...and with Aidit 235
Sukarno Against the Generals' Council 237
The Month of September- A Flurry of Speeches.. 240
The Evidence Against Sukarno 250
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Conclusions 266
Appendix I: Chronology of Events 290
Some Comments on the Interrogation
Reports 311
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Preface
On 14 September 1965 Indonesian Army Intelligence,
of which General Parman was the chief, presented a detailed
report on the internal security situation to the Army Chief
of Staff, General Yani. The report summarized all informa-
tion known about the activities of the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI) as of that date. In particular, it mentioned a
report of a plan to assassinate the army's top leadership,
giving a list of the Army generals who were to be killed.
In conclusion, it stated the Army Intelligence judgment that
"something was going to happen."
At first, General Parman had been reluctant to
accept the judgment of his staff. He was more conserva-
tive on the question; in the end, however, he agreed to
take the case to General Yani. Yani, in turn, pretented
the report to President Sukarno, laying particular stress
on the "assassination list," which included the names
of three generals--Suharto, Mursjid, and Sukenulo--in
addition to the seven generals who were later t be the
target of the Indonesian coup of 30 September.
The report mentioned September 18 as the date4of
the planned attack, and, on that evening, the army took
special security precautions; but nothing happened. After
that, Yani apparently did not take the report seriously.
and no special precautions were observed.
Late in September the former military attache in
Peking, Brig. Gen. Sudono, told Maj. Gen. M.T. Harjono,
a subsequent victim of the coup, that he had learned that
a number of Army generals would be abducted within a few
days. Although General Harjono did not believe the in-
formation, he decided to call a staff meeting at Army
headquarters on 30 September since General Sudono was so
obviously in earnest. Apparently, PKI intelligence learned
about this meeting but drew the wrong conclusions as to
the subject under such high-level discussion. At the meet-
ing, General Sudono reportedly became "the butt of laughter"
of everyone present.
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Yet, within a matter of hours of the staff meeting
at Army headquarters, exactly what General Sudono said
he had heard would happen "within a few days" happened
that very night. That the Army was totally unprepared
for an attack from its political enemies was the most
obvious feature of the Indonesian coup. In one night
alone, the army was to suffer the staggering loss of
six of its most senior generals. Never before, in any
of the great wars, have six generals been lost in a single
night.
1.
..t
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The Coup
At approximately 0400 hours on the morning of 1
October 1965 the leaders of the 30 September Movement
launched their surprise attack on the Army leadership in
the form of simultaneous raids on the homes of seven gen-
erals. In a matter of hours, the military action in-
volved in the coup was over; besides the raids, it in-
volved only the securing of a few vital objectives--the
Presidential Palace in Djakarta, the radio station of
Radio Indonesia, the central telecommunications build-
ing, and an airbase just outside Djakarta. These purely
military aspects of the coup are by now fairly clear. Thus,
in beginning with a reconstruction-of the military opera-
tion of the coup itself, we can establish certain neces-
sary facts about the coup before discussing what we do
and do not know for sure about the planning of thek,coup.
The Kidnapping of the Generals
The staging ground for the attack was an abandoned
rubber plantation that was within the confines of Lubang
Buaja, a small village or hamlet on the outskirts of Halim
Air Force Base, about seven miles from the Presidential
Palace in Djakarta. Reached by another road than the main
approach to the airbase, Lubang Buaja was a remote area
that could easily be sealed off for purposes of security.*
*In the tightly structured organization of local govern-
ment in Indonesia, Lubang Buaja is properly referred to
as a Kompung or "hamlet," which is smaller than a "village"
or "town" or "city." It is the lowest level of local gov-
ernment in Indonesia. Usually, a Kompung is set apart
by a fence that encloses the whole area of the Kompung.
In the case of Lubang Buaja, the only road into the Kom-
pung runs parallel to the road into Halim Air Force Base
from the main Bogor-Djakarta Highway. A security guard
on this road can guarantee the security of the whole area.
(See map of "Djakarta and Vicinity.") The literal meaning
of the name "Lubang Buaja" is "Crocodile's Hole," which
suggests that the area was once a swamp land.
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Early on the morning of 1 October, at about 0400
hours while it was still dark, some 10-15 trucks and
buses left Lubang Buaja and began a 30-minute drive into
Djakarta. The assortment of vehicles--all of which be-
longed to the Air Force--carried 4 fully-armed companies
of troops: one company from the special Tjakrabirawa
Palace Guard that guarded President Sukarno, one company
from the 454th battalion of Central Java, one company
from the 530th battalion of East Java, and one company
of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the 5th Territorial Command.
In view of the persistent belief that some civilians,
namely Communist party members and sympathizers, particip-
ated in the kidnapping raids on the generals' homes, it
1-iou1d be 'emphasized that only regular military officers
and men wearing army uniforms, were actually involved.
The troops were under the command of Marine Lt. Dul Arief,
a direct subordinate of Col. Untung, one of the three
battalion Commanders of the Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard
and the chosen leader for the coup.
As it neared the residential area in which the top
Army leaders lived, the caravan of trucks broke up into
seven separate raiding parties destined for seven differ-
ent targets, the homes of seven of the Army's senior gen-
erals.* A force of one fully-armed platoon was assigned'
to handle each of the following five generals: General
Suprapto, General Harjono, General Parman, General Pand-
jaitan, and General Sutojo. Special forces of one fully-
armed company each were assigned to the homes of Minister/
Coordinator of Defense Nasution and Army Minister/Commander
Yani, respectively. Contrary to widespread belief, the
*All of the generals except Gen. Pandjaitan lived in
an elite residential section of Djakarta called Menteng.
Before the caravan of trucks reached this section of town,
one or two of the trucks must have turned off in the
direction of Kebajoran, where Gen. Pandjaitan lived. As
they approached the Menteng area, the others broke up
into six separate raiding parties destined for the homes
of the six other Army generals.
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coup leaders had not included General Suharto, a former
commander of the Central Java Territorial Division (the
Diponegoro Division) and the then chief of the army's
strategic reserve force (KOSTRAD), with headquarters in
Djakarta, in the list of generals to be eliminated as
the top leadership of the army. The error of not seizing
Suharto, known as a strong and capable officer but ob-
viously underestimated and not foreseen to be the man
who would quickly and effectively take command of the
situation in the crisis hours of the coup was certainly
a major error of the coup planners. It was an e:ror in
the planning of the coup, not in its execution. Euharto
did not escape from would-be kidnappers, as did Nasution.
No effort was ever made to capture him.
At the various target homes, the attacking parties
followed the same general tactics. One-third of the
force stood guard on the streets around the house, tone-
third surrounded the house itself, and one-third entered
the house to bring out the victim. A member of the Tjak-
rabirawa Palace Guard told each general that he was
wanted by Sukarno at the Palace immediately. It is clear
from the reports of the kidnapping oi Harjono and Pandjai7an,
that they. at least, suspected that they were being ar-
rested on orders of the Palace. Harjono even went soi
far as to cry out that he was about to be. murdered. When
he resisted further, he was, in fact, the first general
shot that morning. A little later, General Pandjaitan
was also shot and killed resisting capture. Generals
Suprapto, Sutojo, and Parman, quickly overpowered, blind-
folded, with their hands tied behind their barks, were
forcibly pushed into the waiting trucks and rushed back
to Lubang Buaja.*
Meanwhile, the larger raiding parties were hand-
ling what was expected to be a more difficult assignment
--the capture of Generals Yani and Nasution--whose homes
.*For a more detailed account of the actual capture of
- the generals in their homes, see Indonesian Upheaval by
John Hughes, Davis McKay Company, Inc., 1967, pp:�T6-42.
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were normally more heavily guarded. At Yani's house, the
attacking troops managed to engage the guards in conver-
sation, telling them that they had an urgent message for
Yani from the President. Seeing their Tjakrabirawa uni-
forms, the guards apparently suspected nothing until the
invading group was near enough to overpower and disarm
them. Yani himself does not seem to have doubted the
story that Sukarno wanted to see him at once. He merely
asked for time to bathe and dress. However, when he was
told that there was not time for that, he apparently be-
came angry and struck one of the men. Thereupon, they
opened fire on him. Like the others, his body was car-
ried out of the house, put aboard a truck, and taken back
to Lubang Buaja.
The attack on General Nasution's house was on the
largest scale of all, altogether, about one hundred men
were involved. That General Nasution--who was in tile
house at the time--could have escaped from such an ambush,
with 60-70 soldiers surrounding his home and another 20-
30 searching the house, seems almost unbelievable. It
was one of those twists of fate that all but re-shape
history. The one and only failure in the execution of
the coup, it was to prove nothing less than a major
disaster for the coup leaders. 4
In part, it was due to mistaken identity. Awakened
by the commotion outside, the Nasutions had quickly de-
termined that someone was trying to kidnap General Nasu-
tion. They locked the door to their first-floor bedroom
and, while the troops outside were still struggling with
the door, Mrs. Nasution quickly led her husband through
the next room, down a corridor and out a side entrance
near the wall adjoining the residence of the Iraqi Ambas-
sador. In Nasution's own words:
I climbed the wall and from the top of the wall
I first saw that my daughter Irma had been shot
in the back. I was going to come back to face
the soldiers that had done it, but my wife
prevented me, imploring me to save myself.
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The road from Halim to Djakarta, the route travelled by the
raiding parties on their mission to kidnap the generals
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"...they shall not have died in vain."
General Yarn
-
General Harjono
General Suprapto
General Sutojo
General Erman
General Pandjaitan
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It later was determined that my house was
closely surrounded. The person guarding the
wall was only a few meters away, but I was
protected from his view by a dense growth
of vegetation near the wall. At the moment
I jumped from the wall I was fired at by the
Tjakrabirawa troops who were guarding the
side of the house, but...none of their bul-
lets struck me. I heard the men who were
shooting say something like, 'Someone
escaped at this side. He wasn't hit.'
After jumping from the wall I hid behind a
water barrel in the yard of the Iraqi ambas-
sador's house.* While hiding there I thought
to myself, 'Why is the Tjakrabirawa staging
this raid and trying to kill me? The Tjak-
rabirawa is the palace honor guard of the
President. ...Perhaps the President has listened
to slander and ordered the Tjakrabirawa troops
*In jumping the wall between his house and that of
the Iraqi ambassador next door, Nasution broke his ankle.
To some degree, his broken ankle was probably responsible
for his removal from the scene in the days immediately
after the coup. Of course, the tragic death of his
daughter as a result of the wounds she received during
the raid on Nasution's home on the morning of 1 October
was the main thing that preoccupied Nasution for weeks
after the coup. The picture of Nasution hobbling around
on crutches at the funeral of the slain generals on 5
October and the funeral of his own daughter several days
later will probably never be forgotten by most Indonesians.
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to shoot me in my own house without a hear-
ing!' I knew that I repeatedly had been
slandered in untrue reports received by the
President.
I thought of trying to get to the house of
Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, which was
nearby (across the street from the house
where I was hiding). I believed that he
would not betray me if I asked for help in
contacting the President and asking why �
the Palace had ordered the Tjakrabirawa
troops to shoot me in my own house. I gave
up this idea after considering that I would
have to go out on Teuku Umar Street to
reach Pak Leimena's house. I knew that the
street certainly would be controlled by the
Tjakrabirawa. I decided to remain hidden
and wait for morning and the chance that
help would come from my own troops.
...Prior to the 1 October 1965 incident I
had not received at my house, in either an
official or unofficial capacity, reports
or information that an incident of this
type would occur...My escape was not due to
any foreknowledge I had of the (coup) plans.
It was due solely to the assistance and pro-
tection of Almighty God and the help of my
wife that I escaped abduction and murder.
t.
Inside Nasution's house, confusion reigned. Clutch-
ing her bleeding child in her arms, Mrs. Nasution hurried
to the telephone to call a doctor. A few moments later,
she was not prevented from driving away from the house
with her wounded daughter and a servant to the Army Hospi-
tal. Meanwhile, the soldiers continued to search the
large house. By this time, Nasntion's adjutant, Lt.
Pierre Tendean, a man of the same general build and ap-
pearance as Nasution, though much younger, had had time
to put on his chief's uniform-jacket and cap. He went
out to the front pavilion to meet the attackers. The
detail commander said: "General Nasution?" Tendean
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l.
General Nasution
General Nasution and Mrs. Nasution with their daughter Irma (far left),
who was fatally wounded during the raid on Nasution's home
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replied with a curt "Yes. What is it?" He was immedi-
ately overpowered and bundled into a truck, and the con-
voy set off for Lubang Buaja. It was just 5:00 a.m.
There is one final detail about the kidnapping
raids that should be clarified because of the persistent
confusion on the point. It concerns the supposed attack
on Deputy Prime Minister Leimena's house. When the raid-
ing party arrived at General Nasution's home, the troops
first moved to disarm any armed guards (assigned to the
homes of certain government officials) on the street.
It so happened that Leimena's house, two doors down and
across the street from Nasution's home, had a three-man
guard in recognition of his status of Second Deputy Prime
Minister. One of the guards came down the street and
was shot by mistake. His was the only death other than
those of the generals and Lt. Tendean to result from the
coup action in Djakarta that day. No attempt was made
to enter Leimena's-house or to trouble him further. The
only objective was to prevent the guards at his house
from coming to the rescue of Nasution. No doubt, because
of the death of the policeman guarding Leimena's house
the incident received immediate and perhaps greater at-
tention than some of the other raids on the generals'
homes. It was assumed that Leimena had been a major
target of the coup. In fact, the targets were the seven
army generals; no one else. The killing of Leimena's
guard was purely accidental.
Suharto Takes Command of the Army
Besides the heroism of Lt. Tendean in posing as
General Nasution, thereby helping to save the life of
his chief at the loss of his own, and the calm presence
of mind of Mrs. Nasution in a crisis situation, it was
the quick thinking of another member of the Nasution
household that frustrated the coup plans for a fait
accompli--the elimination of the top army leadership--
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before the.army could react to the first staggering blow.
Namdan, an aide of Nasution, contacted the Djakarta gar-
rison commander Major General Umar Wirahadikusumah, on
the special KOTI communication system, sometime around
0515 hours. General Umar went directly to Nasution's house,
arriving there about 0530 hours; shortly thereafter, five
tanks he had ordered also arrived. As the vehicles of
the raiding party had been seen to at off in the direction
of Bogor, General Umar ordered a pursuit by the tanks in
tbat direction. The effort was not successful, however,
as the tanks were unable to catch sight of any of the
fleeing trucks or buses.
Nasution, still in hiding next door in the yard
of the Iraqi Ambassador's house, heard the commotion of
the arrival of the men and tanks under General Umar, but
uncertain as to who it was, he dared not come out of hid-
ing. Not until about 0630 hours when he saw Col, Hidajat
Wirasondjaja, the commander of the headquarters detach-
ment of the Armed Forces Staff, near the wall did he ven-
ture to reveal himself to anyone. The colonel, one of
Nasution's adjutants, and his brother-in-law accompanied
Nasution, concealed on the floor of the car, to a safe
place not far from KOSTRAD headquarters.
.4
General Suharto has given a detailed account of
how he first learned about the raids that morning and
what actions he took as the senior surviving general of
the army (except for Nasution, whose whereabouts were
still unknown). About 0530 hours, a neighbor of Suharto
arrived at the General's home to inform him that shoot-
ing had been heard down the street. (Suharto was head
of the neighborhood association that was concerned with
law and order in the neighborhood; members were respon-
sible for reporting anything unusual that they saw or
heard to the head of the association.) Shortly there-
after, Suharto received a message from General Umar that
a number of Army generals had been abducted by unknown
parties. There was no information of the fate of the
generals, and it was incorrectly reported that Deputy
Prime Minister Leimena had also been taken.
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Suharto did not hesitate. In his own words:
I concluded that the leadership (of the Army)
was paralyzed. I knew that without leader-
ship things would become even more confused.
I was the senior officer in the Army after the
Commander'.of the Army (Yani) and was ordinarily
designated to represent him when he went
abroad...I decided without hesitation that
I would take over the leadership of the Army
until something was learned of the fate of its
commander.
As my driver had not yet arrived, I drove a
jeep to KOSTRAD headquarters myself, arriving
there between 0630 and 0700 hours....Soon
General Umar arrived and was able to provide
clearer information as to what had happened...
He said that he had gone to several of the
generals' homes ' and then to the Palace but
was unable to meet with the President. He
did see General Supardjo at the Palace, how-
ever, which surprised me, since I dia not
know he was in Djakarta.*
I told General Umar that I was taking over
the leadership of the Army; he agreed. I
issued my first order to him, which was that
all troops be placed on stand-by but Lhat
they not be allowed to go out except on my
orders. This was done because we did not
know who was friend and foe...and we wanted
to avoid shooting until we knew.
*As Commander of the 4th Combat Command of KOSRAD in
West Borneo, General Supardjo should have been at his
post near Manggaian in West Borneo. Suharto would have
known that he was in Djakarta if he had been there for
proper reasons--either official or personal. His presen,!,'!
in the capital, unknown to Suharto, was thus immediately
suspicious.
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Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624
The Show of Force in Djakarta
Simultaneously with the raids on the homes of the
generals, the coup forces had fanned out in the center
of Djakarta, seizing control of the most important instal-
lations, above all the Palace and the radio station.* The
troops used in this phase of the coup were those of the
454th Battalion and the 530th Battalion minus the one
company from each that had been sent on the raiding mis-
sions. The two battalions mustered about 1,000 men each.
As in the case of the army units assigned to kidnap the
generals, these troops were dressed in regular army uni-
form and armed. There were no civilians, armed or unarmed,
among them, as far as we know.
By 0600 hours component units of these two batta-
lions were stationed at different points around Merdeka
Square, in front of the Presidential Palace, and around
the radio station. General Umar had seen the troops on
his drive to KOSTRAD headquarters to report to General
Suharto. He was able to identify them as elements of
the 454th and 530th battalions, which had arrived in
Djakarta only two days previously to take part in the
Armed Forces Day parade on 5 October. Since Suharto kne*
that these troops were to have taken part in a rehearsal
for the parade that very morning and thus should not
have been where they were, he could calculate that he
*The location of the Palace, the radio station, the
telecommunications building, and the railroad station
around one large square, Merdeka Square, in the center
of Djakarta made it a relatively easy military operation
to seize control of these vital objectives of any coup
attempt. In this sense, Djakarta was the ideal city for
a coup. All of the coup forces, except those involved
in the raids on the generals' homes, were concentrated
aibund Merdeka Square. (See the insert of Merdeka Square
on the map of Djakarta and vicinity.)
-10-
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LERA)71
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Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624
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Approved for Release: 2023/01/23 C00186624
was dealing with an enemy that had control of at least
two main battalions of the Indonesian Army and at least
part of the inter-service Tjakrabirawa unit that was
Sukarno's special guard. What was unclear was just who
was giving the orders to these units.
The Central Command in Djakarta
Although Suharto did not know it, the Central Com-
mand of the coup had established itself in the Aerial
Survey Office building, next to the PENAS film studio,
on the main road from Djakarta to Bogor. Situated near
the juncture of the Djakarta-Bogor Highway and the road
into Halim, the Aerial Survey office was only a few miles
from Suharto's KOSTRAD headquarters. The five men who
comprised the Command had been there most of the night,
having moved there-from Lubang Buaja where the3 had in-
spected the troops sometime around midnight.* Of these
five men Suharto would have been personally acquainted
with three of them--the three who were in the military.
He would never have heard of the other two--the two
civilians in the group.
1. Lt. Col. Untung, aged 40, was a battalion com-
mander of the special Tjakrabirawa Honor Guard that guarcEd
President Sukarno. Newly appointed to the .job, he had
commanded the 454th Battalion of the Diponegoro
(the Central Java Territorial Division) until a few montl-!..
before the coup. Although limited in some respects and
politically naive, he was well-thought of as a military
officer and was considered to be on his way up in the
Army.
*One of the men who composed the Central Command, Air
Force Major Sujono, had not arrived at the Aerial Survey
Office until 0630 hours; the others had come several
hours earlier, as soon as they had completed their re-
view of the troops at Lubang Buaja.
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2. Air Force Yajor Sujono, aged 45, was Regimental
Commander, Air Base Defense Troops (PPP) in command of
the troops that were assigned to guard Halim Air Force
.Base, a major air base some seven miles distant from
Djakarta.
3. Col. Latief was Commander of the 1st Infantry
Brigade of the 5th Territorial Command, a post which in-
volved control of a number of the mobile battalions in
Djakarta.
4. Sjam, aged 42, was a man whose true identity
-was known to only a very few people. The military of-
ficers involved in the coup knew him only as Sjam--one
of his several aliases. They all accepted the fact that
he spoke for the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), with-
out asking too many questions. Actually, they seem to
have had some idea (whether they knew for sure or notL
that he represented Aidit, the Chairman of the PKI per-
sonally.*
Sjam's true identity and function in the PKI or-
ganization have now been clearly established. (It must
be remembered that we now know more about the secret
party organization of the PKI before the coup than we 4
have ever known about most other Communist parties. Be-
fore the coup, only a few of the most trusted members
of the PKI itself would have known of the secret organi-
zation Sjam headed, and even fewer would have known the
identity of the man who ran the organization.) Sjam's
real namewas Kamarusaman Bin Achmad Mubaidah, and he was
*At his trial, Untung testified: "It is true that Sjam
stated that he was a friend of Aidit; on one occasion,
he said he was a messenger from Aidit, who had ordered
him to attend the meetings in order to be in on the plan-
ning of the 30 September Movement. Whether this happened
to be true or not, I did not know. My understanding was
That he was simply from the PKI." Apparently, Sujono and
Latief and the others had the same vague understanding
of who Sjam really was.
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the Chief of the Special Bureau of the PKI--the clandestine
arm of the PKI. Established as a special apparatus for
handling those matters that could not be accomplished
through the overt PKI organization, the Special Bureau
was primarily concerned with military matters, in par-
ticular PKI penetration of the Indonesian military organi-
zation. Among those in the military whom the Special
Bureau -managed" were Air Force Chief of Staff Omar Dani,
Brig. General Supardjo, Col. Untung, Col. Latief, and
Air Force Major Sujono.* (Apparently, Sjam personally
"managed" Brig. Gen. Supardjo, while the others were
"managed" by subordinates of his in the Special Bureau.)
In its operations, the Bureau was apparently entirely free
of the control of the politburo and maintained direct
contact only with Aidit.
5. Pono, whose real name was Marsudidjojo, was
a subordinate of Sjam as the second-ranking membert,of the
PKI's Special Bureau. His job was to "manage" PKI con-
tacts in the 1st Infantry Brigade of the 5th Territorial
Command (Latief's brigade), the PPP units guarding Air
Force installations (Maj. Sujono's regiment), the Tjak-
rabirawa Palace Guard, and the Djakarta Military Police.
*These men were not necessarily Communist (in the sense
of being Communist party members) because they had regular
contacts with important PKI persons connected with the
Special Bureau. They all deny being Communists and that
may well be true, although it is also possible that one
or two--like Dani or Supardjo or Untung--were "sleepers."
There are some reports that Untung and Dani were secret
party members, but there is no convincing evidence that
this was true. Certainly, they were pro-Communist, and,
being sympathetic to the party and its aims, they were
able to be used by the PKI for ,its own purposes. The PKI
"managed" them in the sense' of directing their thinking
and their actions along certain lines. In carrying out
� the coup under PKI direction, they were in fact agents
of the PKI, whether they chose to look at it that way or
not.
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Pono personally "managed" both Latief and Sujono.*
In addition to the five men of the Central Command
whom we know were at the Aerial Survey Office Building
from the early morning hours, General Supardjo arrived
there abodt 0400 hours while it was still dark; he, too,
had visited Lubang Buaja earlier in the night. As com-
mander of the 4th Combat Command of KOSTRAD in West
Borneo, General Supardjo should have been at his post
near Manggaion in West Borneo. He had no official reason
to be in Djakarta, and he had not reported his presence
there to Army Commander Yani or KOSTRAD Commander Suharto.
As we shall see later, only a few persons--int.luding
President Sukarno and Chief of the Air Force Dani--knew
that he had arrived in Djakarta on 28 September, osten-
sibly to visit his sick daughter. In connection with
events on the morning of 1 October, he had been given
the assignment of contacting the President, with the
purpose of informing him of the action that had been
carried out against the generals and/or taking him to
Halim Air Force Base, where a safe place had been prepared
4
*The third-ranking member of the Special Bureau--Walujo
(whose real name is Subono) had the assignment of "manag-
ing" pici contacts in the Air Force (excluding the Air
Force PPP troops that guarded Air Force installations)
and the Palace Guard. Thus, he was the PKI contact man
for Omar Dani, Untung, General Pranoto, and others. He
was not a member of the five-man Central Command of the
coup, however; in fact, he is not known to have played
any role in the coup or in the planning for it; his only
known involvement was his presence at the 29 September
meeting of the Central Command that was concerned with
last-minute preparations for the coup.
Since Walujo had been Untung's contact man from the
Special Bureau, Untung had not met either Sjam or Pono
before September 1965, when the planning for the coup got
underway. He seems to have appreciated the fact that
these men were all close associates of Aidit, however.
At his trial, he stated that Pono was ''also a buddy of
Aidit, just as Sjam was."
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Supardjo
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The Central Command
fral
s
old 11r11,
Sjam
Untung
I.
Sujono
Not pictured: Pono and Latief
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for him. There is reason to think that Supardjo actually
intended to accompany Sukarno to Halim, although the coup
leaders have preferred to explain Supardjo's mission as
simply that of informing the President of the coup action
that morning.
Originally, Police Commissioner Anwas and Air Force
Col. Heru were to accompany Supardjo in the party to in-
form Sukarno, and they were to await word from Lubang
Buaja that all the generals had been taken captive. How-
ever, Anwas did not arrive at the Aerial Survey Office
and, for some reason, Supardjo left before the Central
Command had received a report from Lubang Buaja.* The
commanders of the 454th and 530th battalions--Major Su-
kirno of the 454th and Major Bambang Supeno of the 530th--
had just arrived at the Aerial Survey Office to report
on the successful securing of the Palace and the radio
station, and it was decided that they would go wit!? Gen-
eral Supardjo and Col. Heru to see Sukarno. The delega-
tion arrived at the Palace around 0630 hours.
It is important to an understanding of Sukarno's
actions that day, as well as to an understanding of the
source of the conflicting reports that all of the generals
had or had not been captured, that one keep in mind Uhat
Supardjo left on his mission to the Palace under the im-
pression that the kidnapping raids had indeed been a suc-
cess. He was not to learn otherwise until some hours
later, when he finally arrived back at Halim Air Force
Base and after he had seen Sukarno.
*In commenting on the change of plans, Supardjo has
said simply: "It was decided to bring the President after
the report that General Parman had been secured was re-
ceived"--without explaining why it was decided not to
wait for word about the other generals. Obviously, the
coup group was confident of success. And it may be that
time was pressing, and they were anxious to have Sukarno
safely in their custody.
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Sukarno Hears the News
The exact whereabouts of President Sukarno and his
-actions on the day of the coup have been fairly well estab-
lished by a variety of sources. On the evening of 30
September, Sukarno had addressed the National Conference
of Technicians at the Senajan Sports Stadium in Djakarta.
Apparently, he returned to the palace sometime around
2300 hours. Shortly after that, he suddenly left again
to spend the night at his wife Dewi's home, accompanied
011y b} his personal bodyguard. According to Dewi, Sukarno
',leas furious upon arriving at her house to find that she
had not yet returned home from a party at the Hotel Indo-
nesia. He sent a message for her to return home immedi-
ately.
Sukarno spent the night at Devi's house, arisiqg
early in the morning as was his custom. It seems quite
clear that he fully expected to be back at the Palace be-
fore anyone might want to see him that morning. At 0600
hours, he was enroute to the Palace when he received a
report on the car radio (on the Tjakrabirawa radio com-
munication system) that shooting had occurred at the homes
of General Nasution, Dr. Leimena, and General Pandjaitaa.
Apparently, only the one personal bodyguard who had ac-
companied Sukarno to Devi's house the night before knew
where he was. Neither Col. Saelan, deputy commander of
the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard, nor Capt. Suwarno,
company commander of Battalion I of the Tjakrabirawa, who
were on duty at the Palace that morning had been able to
locate him earlier, around 0530 hours, when they first
received a report from Chief of Police Sumirat about the
kidnappings. It might seem that Sukarno had deliberately
put himself out of touch with the rest of the government
machinery in order to protect his options as events de-
veloped--assuming that he knew beforehand of the coup
plans. At other times of crisis in the past, it had been
characteristic of him to disappear from the scene and
remain incommunicado at some unknown hiding place until
the situation cleared. In this case, however, he defi-
nitely seems to have been on his way to the Palace and
would have been there in time to receive Supardjo if
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everything had gone according to plan. Certainly, Supardjo
and the other coup leaders expected to find him there.
Col. Saelan and Capt. Suwarno had first looked for
Sukarno at the home of Harjati, another of his wives.
Not finding him there, they had finally succeeded in con-
tacting the President on the car radio. Having learned
from Chief of Police Sumirat that the Palace was surrounded
by unidentified troops, Saelan ordered the presidential
party not to enter the Palace but to proceed to Harjati's
home in Grogol. By the time Sukarno arrived there, Saelan
had received a later report that General Nasution had
escaped his abductors, that the general's aide had been
abducted, and that his daughter had been wounded. Saelan
reported the news to the President as soon as he came
inside Harjati's house.
That Sukarno first learned the true story of the
raid on Nasution's.home--before Supardjo (who was then
at the Palace) heard the news and before Untung and the
rest of the Central Command at the Aerial Survey learned
the true facts and, apparently, even before those at
Lubang Buaja recognized the mistaken identity of Lt.
Tendean, certainly before those at Halim Air Force Base
were informed--is a crucial fact about the coup that.thas
never been mentioned in any account of the coup. It
gave Sukarno an advantage of time that the leaders of
the coup did not have in considering their course of
action in the light of the unexpected escape of Nasution.
After Sukarno received Saelan's report, he is re-
ported to have said that it came as an "absolute surprise"
to him. It is unclear whether he meant the news of the
action taken against the generals or the news of Nasution's
escape. He then asked Saelan: "What will you do with
me?"
On the grounds that Devi's house, Harjati's house
and the Palace were not safe, Sukarno made the decision
himself to go to Halim Air Force Base, where he would be
near an airfield in case of an emergency. Preceded by
an escort, the President and his entourage were driven
to Halim, arriving there about 0930 hours. He was welcomed
at the air base's Operations Command Center by the Ministel/
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Commander of the Air Force, Omar Dani, who seemed to be
expecting him.
There is an unaccounted-for period of almost three
hours from the time that Sukarno arrived at Harjati's
house to the time that he must have left for Halim to
arrive there at approximately 0930 hours. Apparently,
he was at Harjati's house the whole time. He may have
been awaiting word on the fate of Nasution. Sometime
after 0630 hours, Lt Col. Ebram, the head of the Tjak-
rabirawa intelligence section, and several of his men
arrived at Nasution's house on the orders of the Presi-
dent, they said, to ask about the whereabouts and safety
of General Nasution. No doubt. Sukarno did order such
an independent check on the report that Nasution had
escaped. Col. Ebram was the head escort of the Presi-
dential party on the trip to Halim, so he was clearly
acting on behalf of Sukarno that morning. He was unaOle
to establish the truth regarding Nasution's whereabouts.
The Murder of the Generals
As already suggested, the Central Command at the'
Aerial Survey Office had not heard the news of Nasution's
escape. As a matter of fact, they did not learn about
the unexpected turn of events until they had disbanded
the Command Center at the Aerial Survey office and moved
back to Halim Air Force Base.
Around 0800 hours, Lt. Dul Arief, who had been in
command of the troops on the raids to the generals' homes,
arrived at the Aerial Survey Office to report to Untung
and Latief in person on the success of his mission. He
had just come from Lubang Buaja where he had discharged
his final duty in turning over the generals to lir Force
Major Gatot Sukrisno, who had been designated to receive
them there. As of that moment, it is clear that Arief
did not realize the error of the mistaken identity of Lt.
Tendean. He reported that four generals (supposing one
to be General Nasution) had been captured alive and three
had been killed in the process of capturing them.
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The well at Lubang Buaja in which the bodies of the generals were found
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As to the fate of the generals at Lubang Buaja,
they were taken inside a tent as each arrived on separate
trucks at slightly different times. A reliable witness
to the scene has described events as follows:
When I entered the tent I saw 7 men treated as
prisoners (he must not have realized that three
were already dead) who were in a sad condition.
Some lay on their backs, soiled and bloody,
and two sat down, their hands bound and eyes
covered with a red cloth. I heard a member
of the Tjakrabirawa say: 'Yani has already
been killed.' An officer of the Tjakrabirawa
with the name Dul Ariel on his uniform was
(issuing orders).
The tent was near a small house with an old
well close to the kitchen of the house. Att.
about half past six in the morning I saw some
civilians crowd around the old well scream-
ing 'Crush the unbelievers.' I saw then how
the persons who had been lying on their backs
were carried out of the tent and thrown into
the well. This was followed by a burst of
fire from an automatic weapon aimed into the
well by a member of the Air Force who had two
white stripes on his shoulders. Then a hand-
cuffed prisoner was taken to the wel:. His
eyes were covered before he was thrown head-
first into the well, followed by a burst of
rifle fire.
I was afraid. Then a soldier of the Tjakra-
birawa came over to me and said 'You need not
be afraid. This killing takes place on the
orders of the President because these people
are members of the Council of Generals and
wanted to kill the President on Armed Forces
Day. We are killing them therefore before
they can kill the President. You know that
it is the task of the Tjakrabirawa to protect
the President.'
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I saw how the last prisoner was dragged to the
edge of the well, but I could not see his face
clearly, as it was scratched and soiled with
blood. He was thrown into the well like the
others. The civilians piled litter and leaves
in the well. and I saw how a helicopter hovered
above us, apparently to watch the people work-
ing around the well. I could not see who was
in the helicopter.
The initial Army accounts of the killing of the
generals placed great emphasis on the alleged torture
and mutilation of the generals by the civilians mentioned
above, who were Communist youth and women in military
training at Lubang Buaja. This theme found lurid elabora-
tion in many instances. Without doubt, these stories
suffered from severe inflation. All of the victims
except possibly Lt. Tendean were shot without any hint
of torture or mutilation. Lt. Tendean may have received
several blows from rifle butts before he was shot. There
was none of the ghastly mutilation of the bodies that
was recounted in the press, however. For the death of
the generals and the actual circumstances of the deaths,
the military officers at Lubang Buaja--and they alone--
must bear the responsibility, it would seem. There is
no convincing evidence that the PKI civilians who were
at Lubang Buaja for military training (and who were armed
by the Air Force later that morning to serve as "reserve
troops" for the coup) played any significant role in the
murders--except as witnesses to the scene.*
*The "confessions" of the members of the PKI youth
and women's organizations that were implicated in the as-
sassinations leave the impression that they were little
aware of what was happening and that they might have been
used unwittingly. Their accounts of the murder scene
differ markedly, so that it is difficult to put much
faith, in any of their stories. No doubt many of the "con-
fessions" were contrived by the army. In other cases,
some of the people interrogated may have been in shock
at seeing the murders and, later, they were unable to
recall precisely what they had witnessed.
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The Coup is Proclaimed
At precisely the moment that the generals were
meeting death at Lubang Baaja, an impatient Captain Suradi
was waving a pistol at the announcer of Radio Indonesia
who was reading the morning news broadcast. With some
20 of his men standing guard outside the building, the
captain, who -was acting as commander of the troops dis-
patched to secure the Palace, the radio station, and the
telecommunications building, had forced his way into the
broadcasting room and threatened the station manager and
the announcer if they refused to read a statement over
the radio that he wanted broadcast. They agreed to read
it at the end of the first news report of the day. And
so at 0710 hours the official announcement of the coup
was broadcast to the nation.
In announcing the fact that a movement "directed
against the generals who are members of the Council of
Generals" had taken place that morning, the statement
repeatedly stressed that the action was purely and simply
an internal Army affair. Untung, as commander of the
movement, assumed full responsibility for what he called
"preventive action against a plot by the Generals' Coun-
cil, a CIA-sponsored subversive movement...which planned
to stage a coup on 5 October." The generals involved
were said to have been arrested, and President Sukarno
and "a number of other public figures who would have
been targets of the Council of Generals" were said to be
"safely under the protection of the 30 September Move-
ment."*
*It is to be remembered that at 0710 hours, when this
announcement was made that Sukarno was under "the safe
protection of the 30 September Movement," the President
was still at Harjati's house, and the coup group had not
yet made contact with him. Under these circumstances,
it was a remarkably confident assertion to make unless
the coup leaders had some prearranged understanding with
Sukarno that he would be taken to some agreed upon place
at a certain time that morning.
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The announcement was notable for the absence of
the usual perfunctory praise of Sukarno; his name was
scarcely mentioned except for the fact that he had been
taken to a safe place. It was almost inconceivable that
'anyone staging a coup in Indonesia in 1965 would not have
tried to make use of Sukarno's authority to swing public
support behind their movement. Regardless of the facts,
one would have expected the coup leaders to make a public
statement claiming that they were acting on orders from
Sukarno, to protect Sukarno from his enemies, to safe-
guard the Indonesian revolution. The fact that Sukarno
was mentioned only as being "under the protection of the
30 September Movement" created a vague impression that
the coup might be anti-Sukarno. The only other credible
explanation, if this was not the case, ..was that the con-
spirators felt that it would look better if Sukarno were
not directly associated with the removal of the Generals
but were to emerge later to give his blessing to the qpup.
In this case, one could hypothesize that Sukarno must
have held out the promise of making a subsequent broad-
cast announcing his endorsement of the coup; either that,
or the coup group must have felt absolutely confident
that Sukarno would endorse their movement after the fact,
even if he had not given his approval beforehand.
The Central Command Moves to Halim
The radio announcement was made at a time when the
leaders of the 30 September Movement thought their move-
ment had succeeded. Shortly afterwards, around 0900 hours,
the Central Command moved from the Aerial Survey Office
in Djakarta to Halim Air Force Base. This was not a re-
treat; it was a move planned in advance as the coup moved
into the political stage after the initial military action.
Sukarno, Commander of the Air Force Dani and a yet unmen-
tioned but important figure in the coup--D.N. Aidit, chair-
man of the PKI--were already there or on the way.
The principals were not together in one location
at Halim; they were at three different places, all within
a distance of less than one mile of each other. Couriers
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were sent back and forth with important communications;
for instance, General Supardjo served as the main liaison
between the President and the Central Command of Untung,
Latief, Sujono, Sjam, and Pono. As far as we know, Sukarno
never had any direct contact with any of these five men
in connection with the coup, either before the coup, the
day of the coup, or after the coup. He was in the company
of Dani and Supardjo, mainly, while he was at Halim.
Similarly, Aidit remained apart from the men actually
directing the coup. He communicated with the Central
Command only by courier and apparently with Sukarno and
Dani not at all. Still, he was near enough to be in
close touch with events as they developed, should his
lieutenants Sjam and Pono need his advice
Major Sujono had personally brought Aidit to
Halim, picking him up at his home around 0200 hours that
morning. He had made the arrangements himself for the
use of the home of one of the enlisted men on the iyase;
Aidit and his two bodyguards spent the day there. Dani
appears to have spent the night at Halim's Command Opera-
tions office, which included sleeping accommodations for
the senior Air Force Command Staff. It probably would
not have seemed extraordinary for Dani to sleep there.
He, too, stayed in the one place the whole day of th(2;
coup. Sukarno came directly there when he arrived at the
base.
The Central Command of the coup was installed in
the home of Air Force Sergeant Sujatno, an aide of Major
Sujono. Sergeant Sujatno had spent the whole day of the
30th as well as that night at the Aerial Survey Office,
on a "stand by" order from Major Sujono. � *On the
Morning of the 1st Sujono reportedly asked him
if he could use his house at Halim Air Force Base for a
while as his office. Sujatno drove ahead to get things
ready for Sujono. Soon, Latief, Untung, Sjam, Pono and
Sujono arrived. Sujatno's description of the five men
while they were at his house seems worth quoting, as it
gives the flavor of the day at the Central Command.
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I was ordered by Sujono to get something to
eat for these gentlemen. So we sat down and
had some rice and SOME meat side dishes. When
I went to get the rice in my room, I noticed
that someone was sleeping in my bed.... It was
Col. Latief.
We sat eating for about an hour, and then
Sujono called me and handed me an envelope,
saying that I should take it to Capt. Suradi,
who was supposed to be at Radio Republic...
(When I got back) I was ordered to cook up
some more rice. So I did. I noticed at this
time that Untung had been seated in the back
of the room, and neither changed his place
nor said anything. There were two civilians
*there and I asked Sujono about them, and he
answered that I didn't need to know.
Then, after I had cooked enough rice for them,
I was ordered by Sujono to take a sealed
envelope to Air Sergeant Suwadi's place,
which was located within the complex. When
I got there, someone met me at the door; I
learned later from Sujono that the man was
Aidit. I had to wait three or four minutes
there, and then I was given a small envelope
containing a reply and was ordered to deliver
it. Aidit gave me the envelope; he was wear-
ing glasses.
9
General Supardjo had arrived back at Halim only
a little while after Untung and Latief and the others.
He came from the Palace by helicopter. (Omar Dani had
sent the helivopter from Halim to pick up Supardjo after
word had been received that the President was not at the
Palace.) Dani is reported to have welcomed Supardjo
with the exclamation "Success:'' Then he explained that
Sukarno would soon arrive at the air base. Since it
would still be a little while before he could report to
the President, Supardjo asked Dani for permission to
meet with the leaders of the .oup at Sgt Sujatno's house
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in order to obtain the latest information on the develop-
ment of the coup from the Central Command. Sgt. Sujatno
has confirmed that Supardjo came to his home soon after
the other coup leaders arrived and that he joined them
at the first meal served that morning. There is no in-
formation as to what was discussed, but presumably the
formation of the Revolutionary Council was one of the
topics. General S.Ipardjo signed the Decree establish-
ing the Revolutionary Council while he was at Sgt. Sujat-
no's house with the Central Command at this time.
The New Order is Announced
The Decree was one of three important orders is-
sued by the Central Command that morning: Decree No. 1,
which was signed by Untung, Supardjo, and Air Force
Colonel Heru, concerned the formation of the Revoltition-
w ary Council; Decision No. 1, which was signed by Untung
only, listed the members of the new council; and Deci-
sion No. 2, which was also signed only by Untung, con-
cerned ranks and promotions in the military. Untung has
said that it was approximately 1000 hours when he signed
the Decree and about 1100 hours when he signed DecisWns
No. 1 and 2. This would check perfectly with the time,
as best we can calculate it, that Supardjo was at the
Central Command. We know that he arrived there after
Untung and the others did, around 0930 hours; he and
Untung could well have signed the Decree at just about
1000 hours, as Untung claims. At 1100, when Untung is
supposed to have signed the Decisions, Supardjo had left
the Central Command and was with the President.*
*There seems to have been a two-hour delay in the case
of both the Decree and the Decisions between the time
that the orders were signed and the time they were first
broadcast on the radio. The apparent disagreement be-
tween various sources on the matter of the timing of the
broadcasts would seem to result from the fact that the
(footnote continued on page 26)
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The point to be emphasized in connection with the
timing of these orders is that they were signed before
Untung and the rest of the Central Command learned of
Nasution's escape though they were broadcast after they
had finally received an accurate report. Untung seems
to have made no attempt to stop the broadcasts after he
realized that Nasution had actually escaped, but perhaps
there would not have been time to do it, or he may have
*.oht that it was already too late to stop them.
The importance of settling the matter of the time
that these orders were signed and then broadcast lies in
the fact that it argues against the thesis that the Decree
establishing the Revolutionary Council was an ad hoc deci-
sion of the Central Command, a last desperate effort of
a failing movement. It has been argued that the coup lead-
ers were obviously improvising at this point in the un-
foreseen situation of having missed one of the prime tar-
gets of the coup and having failed to get the public dnp-
port of Sukarno for their undertaking. In support of this
hypothesis, it is argued that the rather peculiar assort-
ment of names on the Revolutionary Council could only
reflect an extemporaneous selection; furthermore, there
is the established fact that many, if not most, of the
persons on the Revolutionary Council had not been consulted
ahead of time. The argument simply does not stand up in
the face of what is known to have been the time sequence
of the orders. Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence
that the Revolutionary Council was always part of PKI plan-
ning for the coup, even if some of the major participants
(footnote continued from page 25)
orders were re-broadcast at regular intervals after they
were first announced. Thus, Decree No. 1 was first broad-
cast at 1200 and again at 1300 and 1400 and 1430 hours.
Untung heard the 1200 broadcast but Sukarno didn't hear
the news broadcast about the Revolutionary Council until
1430 hours. The so-called Decisions were first announced
at the 1300 hours broadcast.
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of the coup (such as Sukarno perhaps) were unaware of its
full implications.* From the beginning, the coup leaders
were prepared to announce the formation of the Revolution-
ary Council as an element of the coup; they did so, very
much according to plan, at a time when they still thought
everything else had gone pretty much according to plan.
Sjam is reported to have brought the original copy
of Decree No. 1 out of his briefcase at Sgt. Sujatno's
house. According to Untung, "we took turns reading it,
first myself, then Supardjo, and then Lt. Col..Heru.
Then we signed it.. .I was (already) acquainted with the
contents and purport of the decree."
The purpose of the Decree was to eliminate
the Generals' Council from the Dwikora Cabinet.
We didn't mean to eliminate Sukarno from the
cabinet. We intended that Sukarno would ap-
point a new cabinet, but the Decree said
that the Revolutionary Council would appoint
it.
The precise formulation contained in the Decree was as
follows:
.With the collapse of state power into the
hands of the Indonesian Revolutionary Coun-
cil, the Dwikora Cabinet is considered to
be decommissioned. Until a new cabinet is
formed by the Indonesian Revolutionary Coun-
cil, the former Ministers are authorized to
conduct routine business, to maintain peace
and security within their respective depart-
ments, but are prohibited from appointing
new officials or taking any actions of con-
sequence.
*The evidence as far as Sukarno's knowledge of the
Revolutionary Council is concerned is contradictory.
- For a fuller discussion of this point, see p. 91.
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For the time being, the Indonesian Revolu-
tionary Council will be the locus of all
authority of the Republic of Indonesia...
As agencies of the Indonesian Revolution-
ary Council, provincial revolutionary
councils will be formed, as well as regency
revolutionary councils, district revolu-
tionary councils, and village revolutionary
councils, with the councils consisting of
both civilian and military personnel who
support the 30 September Movement unreserv-
edly.
At the least, the statement is ambiguous. There is ab-
solutely no mention of Sukarno in any context--a most
curious omission. The office of the Presidency is not
even mentioned. It is left entirely to one's own inter-
pretation whether there would be any change in the ofice,
either in the person holding the office or the power of
the office itself.
With the announcement of Decision No. 1 of the 30
September Movement, it was clear that Sukarno was not a
member of the Revolutionary Council, whether it was pre-
sumed that he would continue as President or not. Untung
was to serve as Chairman of the Council, and General
Supardjo, Air Force Col. Heru, Navy Col. Sunardi, and
Police Commissioner Anwas were to be the vice-chairmen.
Omar Dani, Air Force Major Sujono, and Col. Latief were
among the other 40 members. Thus, with the exception of
Sukarno and Aidit and Aidit's two high-level agents, Sjam
and Pono, all of the major participants of the coup who
were at Halim were included as members of the Council.
The coup group may well have intended.that Sukarno's
authority remain as before in the new government but may
have had special reasons for not wanting to mention his
name in connection with the coup. 'As we will see later,
this was probably the explanation for the curious omis-
sion of any reference to Sukarno in the Decree. It may
not have occurred to them that their declaration might
be construed .as being aimed at the President rather than
simply at the cabinet. Under the circumstances, however,
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of its being absolutely routine to praise Sukarno at length
at every occasion, the failure to make any reference what-
soever to the President was quite likely to be interpreted
as an indication of anti-Sukarno motives. The Decree
seemed to convey the impression that the President had
been put aside.
It is possible, of course, that the coup leaders
did not intend that Sukarno continue as President, with
undiminished powers. If so, the PKI must have been plan-
ning a double-cross of the President and some of the mili-
tary leaders involved in the coup who clearly believed
that they were acting in support of Sukarno. (This point
is examined later, in connection with the testimony of
various individuals who were involved in the planning of
the coup.) From the point of view of the PKI, the Revolu-
tionary Council would have been the perfect Nasakom Cabinet
that the party had long been pressuring Sukarno to form.*
On the face of it, its membership was representativle of
the major power groups in Indonesia. Almost half of the
45 members were government officials, a few of them high-
level, like Foreign Minister Subandrio and Deputy Prime
Minister Leimena. Among the leading political figures
were the top party leaders, either the chairman or the
secretary-general, of the seven major non-Communist ppli-
tical parties. There was no Communist party leader of
equivalent status; of the five known Communists on the
Council, three were lesser known members of the PK1 Cen-
tral Committee. In the case of the military, which com-
posed the other half of the Council, there had obviously
been the same deliberate effort to have all four of
donesia's armed services--the army, navy, air force, and
*As the most immediate goal in its long-range plan to
seize power peacefully, the PKI was demanding equal repre-
sentation with the Nationalist and Religious parties in
Indonesia in a so-called "Nasakom" cabinet. The word
"Nasakom" was a word coined from the first letters of the.
Indonesian words NASionalis (nationalist), Agama (religious),
and KOMunis (Communist).
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police--represented. Among the Army officers included
were 6 Generals �of the Army, one of them being Gen. Umar
Wirahadikusumah, the Commander of the Djakarta area who
had been first on the scene at Nasution's home, after
the raid on his house. Gen. Umar was one of the many
Council members who have categorically denied knowing any-
thing about the Revolutionary Council before they heard
their names read off on the radio as members of the
Council. A high-level PKI official has said that even
the PKI members on the Council were not informed ahead
of time nor was their approval requested.
Actually, the Revolutionary Council was the per-
fect Communist front organization. With only one-ninth
of its membership known to be Communist, it included as
many well-known anti-Communists as Communists and pro-
Communists together. From what was generally known at
the time about its various members, therefore, Communist
control of the group was not readily apparent. However,
there was a group of middle-level military officers who
were almost inconspicuous among the list of well-known
figures; this group held the balance of power on the
Council. Practically nothing was known about these men,
especially their politics. Few people outside the In-
donesian military had ever heard of Untung or Heru or ,
Sundardi or Sujono or Latief. It might be assumed that
they were anti-Communist like the majority of the Indon-
esian military. Who would have suspected that they were
so totally under PKI influence, even if not Communist
party members, that they were prepared to do the party's
bidding, even to the point of conspiring to murder the
top Army leadership?
President Sukarno at Halim
Soon after signing the Decree establishing the
Revolutionary Council, General Supardjo left the Central
Command at Sgt. .Sujatno's house and went back to Halim's
Operations Command Center, where'the President had arrived
at about 0930 hours. Sukarno had received
a general report from Omar Dani but was awaiting a detailed
report from General Supardjo on the events of the day.
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Supardjo's much-delayed meeting with the President,
which finally took place about 1030 hours, has been the
subject of conflicting stories, many of them pure specula-
tion, no doubt. It would certainly be a major factor in
determining the role of Sukarno in the coup if we knew
for sure what transpired at the meeting. According to
Untung (whose testimony on the coup seems to provide the
most reliable and complete story of events), after General
Supardjo reported on the coup and the kidnapping of the
Generals, Sukarno asked two questions: (1) if it was
true that General Nasution had been captured, and (2) why
was Untung leading the movement. Supardjo replied that
it was true that Nasution had been captured and that Untung
assumed the leadership because "he was the one consider-
ed most appropriate by the comrades." Some reports have
claimed that Sukarno also asked Supardjo where Untung
was, but apparently it was General Sabur, the Commander
of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard and Untung's0m-
mediate superior, who had come to Halim at Sukarno's call,
who asked Supardjo that question later in the day.* Ac-
cording to the most well-known version of the Sukarno-
Supardjo meeting (the official Army version), Sukarno is
reported to have patted Supardjo on the back and said in
Dutch: "Good job." Although it is quite believable--and
it may well be true--that he did this, it can not be troved.
Supardjo denies it and Untung is not known to have com-
mented on it. Similarly, there is disagreement as to
whether or not Sukarno said to Supardjo: "Now, then, I
shall take over the leadership and appoint another Com-
mander-in-Chief." Untung has denied that Sukarnc said
*Apparently, General Sabur arrived at Halim while
Supardjo was talking to the President. Once at Halim,
General Sabur stayed close to Sukarno, accompanying him
to Air Commodore Susanto's house (which was on the base)
when the Presidential party moved there from Operations
Command soon after 1200 hours. General Sabur remained
with Sukarno all afternoon and finally accompanied him
to the Presidential Palace at Bogor that evening after
the collapse of the coup.
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anything about taking over the leadership. Apparently,
the subject of the new Commander-in-Chief of the Army did
come up, because Supardjo asked that he be given an op-
portunity to consult with his "comrades" on the matter.
The President answered: "Yes, all right, but return im-
mediately."
For a second time that morning, Supardjo went to
the Central Command at Sgt. Sujatno's house and briefed
Untung, Latief, Sujono, Sjam, and Pono on the results of
the meeting with the President. After conferring, they
decided to recommend to Sukarno that he appoint Maj.
_General Pranoto, then third assistant to Army Chief of
Staff Yani, as the new Commander of the Army.*
*General Pranoto had succeeded General Suharto as Com-
mander of the Diponegoro (Central Java) Territorial Divi-
sion. Apparently, Nasution had been responsible for his
removal as Commander before his normal tour of duty in
that command was up. During his years as commander of
the Diponegoro Division, he is reported to have done noth-
ing to obstruct Communist influence in the military. '
At the time of the coup, Pranoto was director of per-
sonnel for the Army, which meant that he had authority
in the crucial matter of military assignments. From the
point of view of the PKI, he was ideally placed to serve
the party's interests. Since the coup, it has been re-
vealed that Pranoto was a "contact" of the PKI Special
Bureau, just like Untung, Latief, Sujono, Supardjo, and
Dani. He and Latief were both "managed" by Pono, the
number two man in the Special Bureau and one of the cen-
tral figures in the coup. Pranoto was known to be a
close friend of Dani. It was rumored that his relations
with Suharto were very cool, for personal as well as
political reasons. In Pranoto, the PKI and Sukarno would
have had a Commander of the Army as responsive to their
wishes as Dani was as Commander of the Air Force.
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Apparently, the Central Command still had no defi-
nite information that Nasution had escaped,. although by
this time they seem to have been alerted to the possibility
of this having happened. At both the Central Command and
Operations Command there was general confusion and uncer-
tainty as to what really had happened, as conflicting
reports began to be received.
When Supardjo re-appeared at Operations Command,
the possibility that General Nasution had eluded his cap-
tors was beginning to be seriously considered 'as more
and more reports confirmed Sukarno's first information
on the subject. For a matter of some hours now the Presi-
dent had been in doubt. As early as 0630 hours he had
received a report from Col. Saelan that Nasution had
escaped. Since that time, he had been trying to verify
that report. He had sent Col. Ebram to Nasution's house
to check out the information, but the Colonel had ten
unable to learn anything definite about Nasution's where-
abouts. General Supardjo had assured him that reports
of Nasution's escape were not true, but soon thereafter
Gen. Sabur arrived at Halim to tell him just the opposite.
It is difficult to establish just when Sukarno
finally was convinced by the reports that Nasution had,
escaped. As long as he continued to receive conflict-
ing reports--which was all morning long and into the
afternoon--he may simply not have known what to believe.
In that case, he--and the rest of the coup group--may
have made some of the important decisions of the day in
a state of uncertainty, not knowing for sure what had
occurred at Nasution's home but aware of the difference
it made to their planning whether Nasution had escaped
or not.
At their second meeting of the day, which took
place as soon as Supardjo returned to Operations Command
following his conference with the coup leaders on the
matter of the appointment of a new Army commander, Sukarno
and Supardjo discussed the report that Nasution had
escaped. According to Supardjo, the President said to
him: "It is Nekolim that will benefit. Yes, in a
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revolution, such things will happen, and when they do
it is Nekolim that benefits."* Again according to Su-
pardjoiSukarno asked his advice about what to do now.
Supardjo replied: "It depends on Bapak (Indonesian word
'for "father" which was commonly used to refer to Sukarno).
I have two battalions that are at the President's dis-
posal." Apparently, Sukarno did not make a decision at
that moment.
It seems that Nasution's escape--or the possibility
of it--had a profound effect on the President. If it
was not the main reason, it was certainly a contributing
factor in his final decision to stop the movement. We
can only speculate.as to the main factor influencing
Sukarno's decision. It may have been the failure of the
coup to capture Nasution and realization that the coup
plans had seriously gone awry. Or it may have been his
shock and disapproval over certain aspects of the actlion,
such as the murder of the generals, which he may not have
anticipated. Or it may have been his concern that Suharto
had rallied the army to oppose the coup in a way never
anticipated by the coup leaders.
Apparently, Sukarno was very much concerned to
learn that two battalions of the RPKAD, the paracommando
units of the Army under the command of Col. Sarwo Edhy,
had arrived in Djakarta and were waiting further orders
from Suharto. These two paratroop battalions, which had
been stationed just outside the city, had been scheduled
to depart for North Borneo several days before the coup.
Unknown to Sukarno, their departure had been delayed be-
cause of some confusion over transportation. Quite pos-
sibly, the coup plans had taken into account the fact
that the paratroopers would have departed for Borneo by
the time of the coup; apparently, no one had checked to
see whether they had actually departed on schedule.
Sukarno is reported to have shown great interest in the
Nekolim was an acronym for NEokolonialisme-KOLonialisme-
IMperialisme, the three evil isms according to Sukarno.
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RPKAD on the morning of the coup. According to a very
reliable source, he protested to Supardjo at one point:
"You told me the RPKAD would not be in Djakarta." Supard-
jo is reported to have assured Sukarno that it made no
difference to the coup plans.
However, around 1200 hours, Sukarno called Supardjo
in to tell him of his decision to stop the movement. Ac-
cording to Supardjo, the President asked him to talte care
to prevent further bloodshed. Supardjo said that he and
the two battalion commanders would see to this. Then,
according to Supardjo, the President said: "If you can't
stop the movement, you'll be butchered." In the official
Army version of events, Sukarno is reported to have said:
"Be careful. If you can't stop the-movement, I'm the
butcher."
If Sukarno ever had any intention of makingta pub-
lic statement in support of the coup--as the coup leaders
have intimated that he did--he had apparently given up
all thought of it now. From the moment that he issued
the order to stop the movement, his main concern was
clearly to dissociate himself from it; he would hardly
have considered anything that would implicate him further.
4
At this point, President Sukarno left the Opera-
tions Command Center and moved to the nearby home of Air
Commodore Susanto. Earlier that morning, Major Sujono
had personally informed Susanto that his house would be
occupied by the President at 0800 hours. (This would tend
to confirm other indications we have that the coup lead-
ers definitely expected Sukarno to join them at the air
base that morning, either on his own initiative according
to a prearranged plan or as a hostage of the coup group.)
Apparently, Sujono had thought that Sukarno would go
directly to Susanto's house when he arrived at Halim.
Sukarno had asked to go to Operations Command first, how-
ever, possibly because he wanted to see Omar Dani.
Sukarno was to spend all afternoon at the home of
Susanto; he was there until about 2030 hours when he
finally left Halim to go to Bogor Palace. Amazing as it
might seem under the circumstances he apparently spent
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a good part of his time there just resting and sleeping
--and listening to the radio. He was at Susanto's house
when he heard the radio broadcast about the Revolution-
ary Council. According to some reports, the President
was surprised to learn about the establishment of such
a Council. After the coup, he was quoted as saying that
he disapproved of the Revolutionary Council; but, if that
was true, he took no action whatsoever at the time to do
anything about it.
And the explanation for this would seem not to
have been that he was a prisoner or virtual prisoner of
the coup group and therefore not able to influence the
course of events at Halim. On the contrary, Sukarno
seems to have been very much his own free agent from the
time that he went to Halim at his own initiative to the
moment that he decided to leave for Bogor, several hours
after Leimena and others at the airbase had first urgeO
him to depart.* His complete independence of .action that
day was certainly clear from the fact that he sent his
own emissaries back and forth from Halim all afternoon.
It was from one of these emissaries that Gen. Suharto at
KOSTRAD headquarters first learned that Sukarno was at
Halim. Sukarno sent a courier to Nasution as well as
*After the coup, Sukarno repeatedly emphasized his
"freedom of action" throughout the day at Halim and the
fact that he had gone there in the first place of his
own free will to avoid the threat of "undesirable events"
in Djakarta and to be near an airplane in case of emerg-
ency. It seems that he said this to prevent the Army
from using his supposed "arrest" by the coup group and
"vicious PKI elements" to destroy the PKI. He was con-
cerned at all costs not to allow the Army to make it look
as though the already implicated PKI had taken action
against the President rather than against the Council
of Generals. Despite his particular motives for stres-
sing the point after the coup, it seems that he was not
distorting history at all by emphasizing that he was not
a-prisoner of anybody while he was at Halim.
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Suharto asking them both to come to Halim. Couriers dis-
patched by Sukarno were also in touch with Gen. Sabur,
Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard, Deputy
Prime Minister Leimena, Gen. Pranoto, Navy Commander
Martadinata, and Police Commander Sutjipto. The message
was the same in every case, that Sukarno wanted to see
these men at Halim immediately.* Clearly, Sukarno was
under no restraint from the coup leaders in communicating
with people outside Halim Air Force Base.
One of his most trusted and loyal advisers--First
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Subandrio--
with whom Sukarno was also now anxious to confer, was not
in Djakarta at the time. He had left town on the morn-
ing of the 29th, along with twelve other ministers of
the cabinet, for an official inspection tour of Sumatra.
(No specific reason for the trip was ever given.) On the
*Apparently, Martadinata, Sutjipto, and Leimena checked
first with Suharto before deciding to go to Halim. As
we shall see, Leimena delivered a message to Sukarno from
Suharto that the President should be out of Halim byt1630
hours, as Suharto was considering attacking the airbase
if the coup forces had not surrendered by then. Leimena
and Gen. Sabur were the only two men of those contacted
by Sukarno who went to Halim. Suharto refused to allow
Pranoto, Martadinata, and Sutjipto to go, on the grounds
that the Army "had already lost enough generals." It is
not clear whether Sabur asked Suharto's approval, first,
as Leimena did, or whether he went on his own, as soon
as he received Sukarno's summons; most likely, it was the
latter. It is surprising that Sabur was not with Sukarno
when the President went out to Halim in the morning. As
Commander of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard, he was
usually with Sukarno whenever he went anywhere. The where-
abouts of Gen. Sabur had been one of the questions that
everyone had been asking all morning. Where was President
Sukarno? Where was Gen. Sabur? And why was he not at
Halim if Sukarno was there?
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afternoon of the 1st, when Sukarno suddenly had need of
his confidant, Subandrio was in Medan. Sukarno ordered
his own Presidential jet airplane, which was normally
kept at Halim Air Force Base instead of Djakarta's com-
mercial airport for reasons of security, to fly up to
Medan to pick up Subandrio.* The President may have been
in communication with Subandrio earlier in the morning
to tell him of the news of the coup, but this is not
certain. There is still some confusion about the first
communication Subandrio received about the coup. Ac-
cording to one story, he received a written note from a
courier who said he was acting on instructions of the PKI
representative in the North Sumatran National Front; this
was about 1000 hours. Apparently, he was not informed
that Sukarno's personal plane was on its way up to Medan
to get 'him; he does not seem to have realized that until
the plane was already there. Sukarno probably did not
think of sending a plane for Subandrio until the earlyi.
afternoon, when events made Subandrio's presence at Halim
suddenly very important to him.
Sukarno's independence of action at Halim extended
to the use of the coup-controlled radio to broadcast a -
Presidential statement to the nation. For everyone listen-
ing to the radio that morning the most puzzling phenomenon
of the day must have been the fact that the President did
not speak. The original Untung.announcement had strongly
suggested that he would soon appear and explain to the
nation what was going on; but he did not. Finally, at
1330 hours, an announcement was read over the radio that
"Sukarno was alive, safe, in good health, and still in
control of the state and the revolution. It was explained
that the announcement was made on the authority of General
Sabur, the commander of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential
*It is unclear precisely when the Presidential plane
left Halim; no one seems to have taken note of the time
that they heard a plane overhead,'as they did later that
evening when two planes departed Halim--one carrying Aidit
and the other Dani--and a third plane landed (it was
Sukarno's jet returning from Medan).
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Guard. Later, it was announced that Sukarno had tempor-
arily taken ever the leadership of the armed forces and
that he had appointed General Pranoto as the "caretaker"
commander of the army "to carry out the day-to-day busi-
ness of the army."*
In hindsight, the statement authorized by the Presi-
dent and issued in the name of Gen. Sabur seems to have
been a move by Sukarno to dissociate himself from a fail-
ing movement. It may not have seemed that way at the time,
however. Certainly, it was not the strong public endorse-
ment of the coup by Sukarno that the coup leaders evidently
expected him to make. The President carefully avoided
committing himself on the coup. It might be presumed,
however, that he was in agreement with what had been done
since he did not condemn the action taken against the
generals that morning. Moreover, in appointing General
Pranoto as the "caretaker" commander of the army, he
definitely was acting in the interests of the coup leaders.
*In the opinion of some observers, Sukarno's appoint-
ment of a "caretaker" commander of the army suggests 4
that he had definite information that the generals were
dead. At the time, only the leaders of the coup and
those directly involved in the killing of the generals
knew this for sure. Sukarno could only have gotten this
information from the coup leaders themselves. Suharto
and the rest of the world, still in doubt about the fate
of the generals, were quick to seize upon the announce-
ment of Pranoto's appointment as an indication that Sukarno
had inside information on what had happened to the generals;
the announcement seemed to confirm their worst fears that
the generals were already dead. In Sukarno's defense,
however, it seems that this is not conclusive evidence.
The President might have appointed a "caretaker" command-
er of the army if he thought that the generals had simply
been kidnapped and were being held some place. The "care-
taker" commander would be just that; he would take charge
of the army temporarily, until there was definite word
about the generals.
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The one thing that seemed clear from he announcement
was that Sukarno was not a prisoner of events. The fact
that it was an announcement from the President, issued
with the authority of his trusted security chief, and
not an "Untung" announcement seemed to indicate that
Sukarno was not the victim of any sort of coup attempt.
But though the statement seemed to imply that
Sukarno approved of the coup, that was not enough to save
it. At a time when a public endorsement by Sukarno--and
only that--might well have turned the tide in its favor,
Sukarno refused to commit himself on the coup explicitly,
publicly. It is quite clear now that the coup leaders
felt themselves betrayed by the President, whether they
had good reason to expect a public statement of support
from the President or not. Col. Latief is reported to
have been "very aggressive" in urging General Supardjo
"to force Sukarno to give his blessings to the movemer�t."
He indicated that Supardjo should threaten Sukarno if he
refused. It is clear that he had a radio broadcast by
Sukarno in mind, as Latief is quoted as saying "Bring
a tape recorder, so that Sukarno's voice can be taped
and broadcast," Major Supeno, Commander of the 530th
battalion, who heard the conversation, drew the conclu-
sion that there was a possibility that Sukarno would be.,
killed if he resisted their pressure. Although it was
obviously a mistaken judgment, it suggests the amount of
pressure the coup leaders tried to exert on Sukarno to
get him to make a public statement of support. At this
point, however. Sukarno was not about to be found support-
ing a dying movement. He was maneuvering to preserve
his independence of action whatever the outcome of the
coup; in the statement broadcast over the radio he hoped
to re-assert his own authority over the situation without
committing himself on the events of the past several hours.
This was, Of course, the turning point of the coup.
The coup leaders had tried and failed to get Sukarno's
support at a crucial stage, when their coup plans had
seriously gone awry with the escape of one of the prime
targets of the coup and when their last hope lay with
Sukarno.
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Dani Seals His Fate
Two hours after Sukarno had studiously avoided
committing himself in public and after the coup was all
but lost, it was announced over the radio that Air Force
Chief Dani had pledged the support of the air force to
the coup. This had been made official in an order-of-
the-day signed by Dani himself.* The explanation for
what would seem to have been an incredibly poorly timed
decision on Dani's part was that he had drafted the order
early in the morning--when he apparently felt so sure
things were going well that he was willing to commit the
entire air force organization to the coup--but it was
not broadcast until that afternoon. - Dani has given the
following account of his actions that morning:
I awoke (he had spent the night at Operation�
Command) at .about 0600, bathed, etc.. till 0630.
At 0710 I heard the radio news broadcast which
mentioned the kidnapping of the army generals.
Between 0730 and 0800 I received a telephone
call from Major Suparto who said: 'Bapak
(the President) will be taken to Halim.' I
wanted to pick him up but Major Suparto would 4
not allow me. I called Major Sujono to take
care of the President's security because the
President was entering Halim. I remained at
the Operations Command office and did not go
outside. I then drafted the concept of my
Standing Order. My custom in drafting an
order was to draft points. I gave these
points to Major Willyarto so that they could
be refined before the order was sent to the
Department of the Air Force. I told Major
Willyarto not to broadcast the order yet.
*Dani's statement appeared in Harlan Rakjat on 2 October,
but it was announced over the radio before that, on the
- afternoon of 1 October. It was dated 0930 hours, 1 October
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(Later) I accompanied the President to the
house of Commodore Susanto for a rest. He
ordered the summoning of the Navy and Police
Force commanders. (After conferring with
them) he decided to issue a statement. I
then ordered Major Willyarto: 'My state-
ment may be issued. I need not examine it
first.'*
After stating that the coup action had been taken to safe-
guard the revolution and the president against "CIA sub-
version," Dani's order pledged that the air force would
"always and continuously support and uphold any progres-
sive revolutionary movement and combat any action which
endangers the Indonesian revolution." With the broad-
cast of the order, Dani's fate was all-but sealed. His
complicity in the coup was now documented; he could never
hope to disclaim any involvement as Sukarno had left self
-
self the option of doing.
Suharto: The Making of a Hero
It must be remembered that people who had any idea of
what was going on during the period of Untung's dominance
were very few. They were nearly all at Halim or KOSTRAD
headquarters in Djakarta; the few others who were not
--such as the emissaries going back and forth between the
two places and the military negotiators whom Suharto sent
*Dani may have been under the impression that Sukarno
intended to issue a statement of support for the coup
rather than the noncommital statement about his still
being "in control of the state and the revolution." It
seems that Dani would not have issued his order-of-the-
day pledging the support of the Air Force to the coup
if he had not thought that Sukarno's statement would
also commit the President to the 'side of the coup.
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Chief of the Air Force Dani
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to confer with the troops surrounding the Palace and the
radio station--were not discussing things with the general
public.
To the ordinary citizen, things probably seemed
pretty much as usual. Except for the fact that the tele-
phones were not working, business went on as usual. Only
a few blocks away from Merdeka Square, one would have
been unaware of the events taking place a short distance
away. The streets of Djakarta were not guarded, and no
curfew or state of emergency was declared. (The next day,
a curfew was imposed.) One could move around the city
freely. When the coup was first announced on the radio,
most of Djakarta's government workers had already arrived
at their offices. They put in a normal working day. It
was noted that PKI headquarters was open, as usual; employees
had been seen coming to work at the normal time. Contrary
to some reports, the office had not been open all qght.
Even at Halim Air Force Base, the momentous events
of the day might have gone unnoticed to an outside observer.
The principal figures of the coup were quietly secured
in three inconspicuous homes of air force personnel who
lived on the base; besides these three homes, only one
other building was being used by the coup forces--the4
Operations Command Center, which was normally the center
of activity on the base. The troops available to the coup
which were not stationed around Merdeka Square in Djakarta
were gathered at Lubang Buaja, out of sight of the main
part of the air base.
Around Merdeka Square, however, it was a different
story. Troops were stationed all around the Square.
Machine guns were set up in front of the U.S. Embassy and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the radio
station and the telecommunications building, all of which
fronted on the Square. All the main arteries into the
square were sealed off, including the railroad station,
which meant that traffic in the whole area was blocked
off. Thus, in spite of the heavy concentration of troops
and the presence of machine guns and other military equip-
ment, there was an almost eerie quietness about everything.
One could sense the tension in the atmosphere, but on the
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surface everything was calm, abnormally calm. American
observers who watched the events of the day from the win-
dows of the U.S. Embassy, which had a view across Merdeka
Square in the direction of the Palace, described it as
"the spookiest day" of their lives. They, like most people.
had little idea what was going on. Since the telephones
whren't working, it was impossible to get news as to what
was happening in other parts of the city.
As one looked at Merdeka Square, the scene was one
of seeming inactivity. The only noticeable activity, as
the afternoon wore on, was that of emissaries and the of-
ficers from KOSTRAD who shuttled back and forth across
the square; conferring with the commanders of the armed
units in front of the Palace and radio station.* Suharto
had taen care to avoid hasty action. With two battalions
in revolt, stationed just across Merdeka Square from KOSTRAD
headquarters, he had a potentially explosive situation on
his hands. He was concerned above all else to prevent
bloodshed. His strategy would be to try to talk the forces
surrounding the Palace into surrender. It was a strategy
of bluff, threat, negotiation, and cajolement--in the tradi-
tional Javanese manner.
As his first move, Suharto had tried to contact g
the commanders of the other three armed services to explain
his strategy to them. He won assurances of help from
both the naval command and the police force. However, he
was never able to make contact with Air Force Chief Dani;
as he later explained:
*Merdeka Square is too large actually to see across
it. On its long side, it is about half a mile 1onV. It
is a huge grassy expanse, with trees that obstruct one's
vision across it. As mentioned earlier, the location of
the Palace, Army Headquarters, KOSTRAD Headquarters,
Gambir Railroad Station, the U.S. Embassy, the telecom-
munications building, the Ministry of Defense, and the
radio station around this one main square in the center
of Djakarta makes it a rather unique setup for seizing
power. All of the vital objectives of a coup attempt are
right there.
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�
�41' "4
4 $ _ .�
PROJEK ;PP;
JMAHAN PEGAil
TEL INDONESIA
sk
Agj.fait'' -4174
Siliwangi troops from West Java move into
Djakarta under General Suharto's command
PROJEK 1,p0-
PERUMAHAN PEGAVAI-i
HOTEL INDONESIA t
Siliwangi troops in front of the Hotel Indonesia
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Difficulty was experienced in attempting to
contact the Air Force. I sent liaison officers
to Halim...but things did not go as smoothly
as they had with the Navy and police. They
had assigned liaison officers to KOSTRAD to
facilitate communication, but it was not so
easy to establish coordination with the Armed
Force.
Suharto had received an early report that Dani had been
abducted along with the generals, but about 0800 hours
he received definite information that this was not true,
that Dani had been "saved" by his own men, who had picked
him up at his home about 0200 or 0300 hours and taken him
somewhere. At this point, Suharto seems to have been more
confused than suspicious about Dani's whereabouts and
the reasons for the difficulty in establishing contact
with the Air Force command. Naturally, he became sy.spi-
cious of the role of the Air Force in the coup when he
realized that Halim was being used by the Coup forces as
their center of operations, but apparently it was only
after Dani's order-of-the-day was broadcast (around 1530
hours) that he finally accepted the fact of Dani's com-
plicity in the coup. As he said later:
...Then, Dani made the announcement support-
ing the coup. First the leader of the Air
Force had been 'saved' before the movement
had been launched, then it had been difficult
to achieve coordination with the Air Force,
and lastly the statement of support had
been issued. Even a fool could see that
the Air Force had to be grouped with the foe.
With pledges of support from the Navy and the police,
and the run-a-round from the Air Force, Suharto set about -
the business of winning over the troops of the two battalions
that were acting on the orders of Untung and associates.
To help him in the task he assembled various officers who
had friends in the two battalions or who had commanded
them at one time or another. One of these was General
Basukhi Rachmat, the commander of the East Java Terri-
torial Division, who was in Djakarta to brief General
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Yani on Communist strength in the military in East Java.
(He had conferred with Yani at the latter's home late
on the evening of the 30th, just a few hours before Yani
. was shot and killed in his home.)
Suharto was able to discover that whereas the com-
ponent units of the 454th and the 530th battalions were
stationed at different key points around Merdeka Square,
the commanders of the units themselves--Major Sukirno
of the 454th and Major Bambang Supeno of the 530th�were
inside the Palace. (It will be remembered that the two
commanders had reported to the Central Command at the
Aerial Survey Office after the troops under their command
had taken up positions in front of the Palace; from there,
they had gone with Gen. Supardjo to the Palace to report
to Sukarno.) Suharto sent special emissaries to the deputy
battalion commanders and the company commanders left in
charge. To their astonishment, the rebel troops snaliped
smartly to attention and saluted as they approached to
confer with the officers in charge. This was an indica-
tion that at least the ordinary soldiers were confused,
with no clear idea whom they were serving. The deputy
battalion commanders told Suharto's emissaries that they
were there to protect President Sukarno from a coup by
the Generals' Council.
Eventually, Suharto himself met with the deputy
commanders. He assured them that there was no generals'
coup, that they had simply been tricked into believing
that when in fact they were being used to protect the
activities of a coup movement. He explained that the
Revolutionary Council had suspended the cabinet and
Sukarno's name was not on the Revolutionary Council.
Finally, he warned them that if they did not go back and
collect their men and report to him at KOSTRAD headquart-
ers, he'd be "forced to take drastic action." Within
about two hours, the 530th Battalion had assembled,
boarded trucks, and reported to KOSTRAD. With the 454th
Battalion, Suharto was not so successful. Just as the
deputy commander was passing on to his colleagues the
story that Suharto had told him, the battalion commander
.returned, resumed control, and kept his men working in
the service of the coup.
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At this juncture, the Presidential couriers from
Halim began to arrive in Djakarta. Apparently, they had
no trouble in persuading Deputy Prime Minister Leimena
to go to Halim since the President wanted to confer with
him there. They also contacted Gen. Umar and Gen Pranoto,
but Gen. Umar, at least, referred them to Suharto, saying
that he was acting only on Suharto's orders. The couriers
then moved on to KOSTRAD headquarters to ask Suharto to
send Pranoto and Umar to Halim.
The arrival of the Presi4ntial couriers at KOSTRAD
headquarters (shortly after noon) and the exchange of
messages that they delivered was to prove a turning point
of the coup. Up to this point, Suharto did not know where
Sukarno was, although it seemed clear that he was not in
the Palace. Now he realized that the President was at
Halim, but obviously not there as a prisoner in any strict
sense, since he had the liberty to send messengerstinto
the city. His relationship to Untung was ambiguous, but
the possibility that Sukarno was involved in the kidnapping
of the generals was now wide open.*
*According to one source, Suharto's first thought4
about Sukarno had been that he was dead. Early in the
morning, as events started to unfold and there was no
word from Sukarno, Suharto is reported to have figured
that the coup leaders had learned of the President's
death and moved quickly to neutralize the Army in the
struggle for power that was expected after Sukarno's
death. After Untung's announcement of a provisional
government, Suharto was in touch with the Sultan of
Jogjakarta, with whom he discussed the idea of the
Sultan's going to Bandung to set up a rival government
there. The Sultan is reported to have advised Suharto
against this idea until they had more definite informa-
tion on Sukarno. The Sultan apparently had a feeling
that Sukarno just might be involved in the coup; he
told Suharto that "the whole thing sounds like Sukarno
to me." He realized that it would be a mistake to
announce the formation of a rival government that might
later seem to have been a move against Sukarno. After
the coup, the President could have used this as
(footnote continued on page 48)
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Suharto decided to send one person--Deputy Prime
Minister Leimena--to Halim to negotiate with the President.
He refused to allow Gen. Umar and Gem Pranoto and the
others whom Sukarno had asked to see to go there, on the
-grounds that "we have already lost enough generals."
Actually, Leimena delivered an ultimatum to Sukarno from
Suharto. Suharto told the President to leave the airbase
h. 160 hours; if he didn't, the Army would attack Halim.*
If the couriers gave Gen. Suharto the crucial in-
formation that he needed to take full command of the
situation, their errand was of equal moment to Sukarno.
When they returned to Halim with Suharto's flat refusal
to allow Pranoto or Umar to confer with the President,
Sukarno realized that Suharto had not -only declared
against the conspirators but had effectively neutralized
all the high army officers who might be used to cover up
the Untung coup. No doubt to his shrewd eye, the sitsp-
tion seemed already hopeless.** It is in the light of
(footnote continued from page 47)
evidence that the Army was in fact plotting his overthrow.
From this point on, Suharto is reported to have acted on
the assumption that Sukarno might be involved in the cout.
When he learned later in the day that the President was
at Halim, he had very definite reason to suspect his in-
volvement.
*As we shall see, Sukarno did not leave Halim by 1630
hours and Suharto did not open fire on the airbase, as he
had threatened. He decided to wait a little longer, in
the hope of avoiding a direct fight with Sukarno. In the
end, Leimena was successful in persuading the President
to go to Bogor. He was the one who talked Sukarno out
of going to Central Java which Aidit and the other PKI
leaders were trying to persuade Sukarno to do.
**An indication of Sukarno's appreciation of the change
in the balance of forces in the mid-afternoon was the
"rescuing" of his children from the Palace, where they
had beOp all day. At about 1600 hours, the children were
brought out to Halim and from there flown to Bandung,
out of harm's way. It is clear that Sukarno felt at this
point that the.Palace would not stay much longer in Un-
tung's hands and the children had to be removed before
the Army took over there.
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the information gained by Sukarno upon the return of the
couriers that we must understand his decision to announce
over the radio that he was "well and safe and still in
control of the state and the revolution"--an announcement
that seemed to be a move by Sukarno to dissociate himself
from a failing movement.
Meanwhile, Suharto had taken advantage of the new
information that he had acquired to make one final attempt
to break up the troop formations outside the radio station
and the telecommunications building. This time he gave
the 454th Battalion an ultimatum: either it must evacuate
its positions by 2000 hours or he would blast it out with
his own guns and troops.* Suharto was still very much
concerned to avoid bloodshed. By 1800 hours, however,
he had his troops in offensive position, ready to assault
the radio station and telecommunications building.
However, the attack was not necessary. In no mood
to fight, the rebels quietly withdrew and moved out by
truck in the direction of Halim; Suharto did nothing to
hinder their orderly withdrawal. He was only too happy
to have the center of the city cleared of Coup forces
without violence.
*Actually, Suharto was not in a position of overwhelm-
ing military strength in threatening the coup forces in
Djakarta with an ultimatum. As one of his first moves
after assuming command of the army, he had called up from
its base about 15 miles outside Djakarta the crack para-
commando unit (RPKAD) led by Col. Sarwo Edhy. Together
with a battalion of the Siliwangi (West Java) Division
that was already in the capital for the Armed Forces Day
parade on 5 October, the RPKAD units were the only troops
that he had available at his disposal in Djakarta. He
couldn't have taken the Palace or the radio station and
the telecommunications building in the morning or even
in the early afternoon. Only after the 530th Battalion
withdrew, late in the afternoon, was he in a position to
threaten the 454th Battalion, the sole remaining coup for.'
in the city.
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As the withdrawal of these troops proceeded, how-
ever, a new armed force appeared on the scene. Armed
Communist youths suddenly emerged at the south end of
Merdeka Square, having come from the direction of Halim,
it seemed. To their obvious surprise, they were abruptly
disarmed and arrested by Suharto's forces. They surrend-
ered without a fight. Under interrogation, the Communist
youths admitted that air force officers at Halim had is-
sued them the weapons with which they were armed and had
ordered them into the city.*
This development in the coup has been the subject
of much distortion. At the time, the presence of such
armed and undisciplined elenents in the center of the city
was the cause for genuine alarm on the part of Suharto,
to whom.it seemed that the PKI and its front groups had
resorted to arms. More violent events, possibly a general
attack, in Djakarta or elsewhere, could be expected. Euch
speculation, based on the involvement of a considerable
number of Communist youths in a disorganized and pointless
entry into Djakarta in the late hours of the coup, may
have been responsible, in part, for the exaggerated reports
of PKI involvement in the military events of the coup.
As noted earlier, armed PKI civilians were incorrectly
--but persistently--reported to have participated in the'
raids on the generals' homes; they were also supposed to
have been included among the troops guarding the Palace
and radio station. When Suharto's forces finally occupied
the radio station and telecommunications building, they
apparently did find some of these Communist youth elements
inside; but they had only just arrived on the scene. It
is now an established fact that the Communist front groups
that were armed by the coup leaders as a kind of "reserve
*Estimates of the numbers of Communist volunteers who
were sent from Halim into Djakarta vary considerably,
with some estimates as high as 3,000. We are inclined
to think that the reports of there being around 3,000
are exaggerated, although this is the figure most often
reported. Apparently, not all of the Communist youths
were armed.
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force" were not sent from Halim into Djakarta until late
in the afternoon. They had played no role in the coup
up to that point--except as witnesses to the murder scene
at Lubang Buaja, where they had spent the whole morning
and most of the afternoon.
Early that morning, a certain Major Sukrisno of*
the Air Force whom Major Sujono had personally recruited
for the special coup assignment of commander of these
"reserve troops" at Lubang Buaja, had received his orders
from Sujono to "get weapons from the Air Force ammunition
depot at Mampang Crossroads" (which was the headquarters
of the Regional Air Force Command for the Greater Djakarta
area). Sukrisno was informed that "His Excellency the
Minister/Chief of Staff of the Air Force (Dani) has in-
formed the Chief of Staff of the Regional Air Command of
this matter; if he is not there and time is pressing,
then the ammunition depot there can be broken intol.. A
vehicle for this purpose will be waiting at the 3rd light
pole of the Djakarta Bypass." Estimates of the number
of weapons taken from the Mampang depot and distributed
to members of Communist front organizations that morning
range from 300 to 10,000 with 3,000 probably being the
best estimate. The weapons were all small arms of C9inese
origin, with the "Chung" trademark stamped on them. The
Indonesian army was known not to have any weapons of that
type. There is absolutely no doubt that the arms were
the property of the Indonesian Air Force.
We have reliable information that the military
leaders of the coup--particularly Untung--had strong
reservations about using the Communist volunteer troops
in the military operation of the coup. Untung has testi-
fied:
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I had not given permission for the use of
the People's Youth groups (in the raids
on the generals' homes). My reasons had
nothing at all to do with the battle ex-
perience and ability of the troops, but
rather with discipline. If the militarily
undisciplined and inexperienced troops of
tht People's Youth were used, a situation
could develop during the military action
in which these forces would not obey the
orders given by the leaders. Whereas what
we required at the time was a discipline
dedicated to the carrying out of orders.
That is why I rejected the idea of using
the People's Youth.
As we shall see later, it was the plan of the coup leaders
to arm these volunteer troops with the thought of using
them as a "reserve force" to guard Halim Air Force Base.
However, when Suharto showed energetic opposition to the
coup, never expected by the leaders of the coup, and when
Sukarno failed them in their hour of need, panic appar-
ently struck the people at Halim. The handling of defense
and logistics had proved completely inadquate. Air Force
units promised had not shown up and neither had a cavalry
unit. The coup leaders were desperately short of rein-
forcements for the units guarding the Palace and the
radio station; these units had been on duty since early
morning, and, among other things they had not eaten all
day. The hundreds of Communist youth volunteers who
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awaited orders at Lubang Buaja were neither well trained
nor experienced and thus were totally unprepared to confront
army units of proven capability; but it was decided to
send them into Djakarta anyway, as the only reinforce-
ments available. They were instructed in the use of the
secret password with which they could identify themselves
to the coup forces guarding the Palace and radio station.
When they arrived in Djakarta at Merdeka Square, they
confidently called out this password; but instead of the
counter-password, they were greeted with pointed weapons
and swiftly put under arrest by Suharto's forces. Un-
known to them, the rebel army units previously in the area
had quietly evacuated to Halim.
By 2000 hours Suharto was in control of the whole
downtown area around Merdeka Square. Soon thereafter,
the radio station broadcast an announcement that it
had been liberated from counterrevolutionary contrcil by
the armed forces loyal to Suharto. An official Army an-
nouncement then explained that the coup was definitely
a counterrevolutionary action, that a number of army
generals had been kidnapped and the radio station il-
legally occupied, that Suharto had temporarily taken over
leadership of the army and was now in full control of
the situation, and that both Sukarno and Nasution were'
safe.
At about this time Suharto received a second com-
munication from Sukarno, who asked for a clarification
of the situation. Suharto sent back the message that
Sukarno "must move from Halim." Because of the dangei
of more nonmilitary forces being armed by the Air Force
and sent into Djakarta from Halim, Suharto had decided
that he must establish control over the air base that
night. He said that he would wait for confirmation that
Sukarno had departed before attacking the base.
The Collapse of The Coup
Back at Halim, Sukarno was torn with indecision,
- as he received conflicting advice from his advisers. By
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then, the coup leaders were in a state of desperate gloom
and making plans to flee. Dani and others urged the Presi-
dent to fly with them to Madiun in Central Java, where
they could establish a second front. Apparently, Sukarno
-seriously considered doing this. There is good evidence
that Aidit fully expected Sukarno to join him when he
made arrangements for a plane to fly him out of Halim.
At the last moment, however, Sukarno was talked out of
the plan. Deputy Prime Minister Leimena, who had been
summoned to Halim by Sukarno and who had stayed close
to the President all afternoon, seems to have been pri-
marily responsible for changing Sukarno's mind. He
argued that Sukarno ought to disentangle himself from
-the coup and go straight to his palace at Bogor, where
he normally went every Friday afternoon (and it was then
Friday evening) to spend the week-end. It is not known
what words of wifely advice Sukarno may have received
from Dewi on the matter. She hurried out to Halim byt.
car and talked with him shortly before he left Halim.*
*Apparently, Sukarno had left a note for Dewi when he
left her home early that morning. In it he is reported
to have said that he had received information from several
persons about "things that had occurred in the Army thed
preceeding night." He explained that "the men who were
carrying out this so-called revolution intended to safe-
guard Bapak and did not intend to oppose him," so Dewi
should not worry because "Bapak was safe."
Later, Dewi made the following comments about her
meeting with Sukarno at Halim that evening: "As regards
the conversation between Bapak and myself at that time,
I asked Bapak what he knew about the things that had hap-
pened. Bapak said, as I recall, that there were several
generals in the Army who wanted to try to stage a coup
against Bapak and that several other men had learned of
this before they could do so and had taken action to
safeguard Bapak. Gen. Pandjaitan and another general (I
florget whether it was Gen. Harjono or Gen. Parman) re-
sistei arrest and a fight occurred and they were killed."
. Dewi appears to have been completely unsuspecting of
any important event in the offing, before the coup. If
Sukarno did know of the plans for the coup beforehand,
(footnote continued on page 55)
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Afterwards, she returned to her home in Djakarta; he
went on to Bogor, his week-end home which he shared with
his second wife Hartini.
Suharto wanted to be very sure that Sukarno was
safely out of Halim before he ordered any offensive
action against the base; he recognized the grave conse-
quences of anything happening to the President which
might be considered his responsibility. At about 2200
hours he received a long distance call from Bogor saying
that Sukarno had arrived there. Suharto ordered Col.
Alex, who was in Bogor, to check out this information
personally. He found Sukarno in the Palace.
With the sure knowledge that Sukarno was no longer
at Halim, Suharto began his move against the last strong-
hold of those forces. He selected the RPKAD paracommando
unit led by Col. Sarwo Edhy to spearhead the attack on
Halim. He ordered them to infiltrate the base undef cover
of darkness and not to shoot unless fired upon. Through-
out the night, the paracommandos quietly surrounded the
base and infiltrated its perimeter. The only shooting
incident took place around midnight; Suharto's antiair-
craft units opened fire on an incoming plane, which they
thought might be bringing supplies to the rebels. It was
Sukarno's own jet airplane that had been sent up to Medan
to bring back Subandrio. Subandrio had decided not to
return to Djakarta,
(footnote continued from page 54)
he apparently did not say anything about them to her.
After the coup, she seemed slow to realize that he might
have approved of the action taken against the generals
(she may still not believe that he did); for a long while,
she seemed honestly not to understand why he did not
take firm action against those responsible for the mur-
ders. About two weeks after the coup, when Dani and his
family were living in the Palace under Sukarno's protec-
tion, she is reported to have remarked privately that she
could not understand why Sukarno was protecting Dani as
"everyone knows" that he was implicated in the coup.
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however, so he was not on the plane. It managed to land
safely without being hit.
About an hour and a half later (around 0130 hours
on the morning of the 2nd), another plane was heard over-
head. It was definitely identified by several witnesses
at the time as a plane of the Indonesian Air Force, but
only a very few people would have known of its secret
mission, Just before midnight, General Supardjo, who
was still acting as the chief liaison between the Central
Command of the coup at Sgt. Sujatno's house and Dani at
Halim's Operations Command Center and Aidit at Sgt. Suwadi's
house, arrived at the Operations Command Center and spoke
to Dani about an urgent request from Aidit for the use
of an Air Force planeto fly him to Jogjakarta that even-
ing. Dani immediately arranged for a plane. Col. Latief,
who happened to be out searching for Maj. Sujono and Sjam
at the time, actually saw the plane take off; he was told
that Aidit and his two bodyguards were being flown out
,to Jogjakarta; he later reported this to Untung when he
returned to Sgt. Sujatno's house. According to one story
(told by the sister of the pilot of the plane), Aidit was
obviously furious about something; at one point, he re-
portedly threw his coat on the ground and stamped on it.
This story, which may or may not be true, fits nicely �
with other information we have about Aidit's state of
mind that evening. Apparently, he was furious at Sukarno,
who by then had left Halim and was at Bogor. He may have
had some reason for thinking that Sukarno would accompany
him to Central Java; as noted earlier, Sukarno seems to
have considered this seriously and only at the last moment
to have changed his mind. If Aidit had earlier felt be-
trayed by the President when he failed to make a public
statement of support for the coup, his sense of outrage
and betrayal must have been all the more acute when he
realized that Sukarno had again changed his mind and was
not going with him. Later, Aidit is reported to have
said that it was Sukarno who ordered him to flee to Central
Java and that he was to find a safe hiding place for the
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President there.* It is possible that Aidit still had
some hope of Sukarno eventually joining him in Central
Java when he left Halim, but he had already lost his best
chance for success in establishing some kind of a second
front in Central Java, which we know that Sjam and Pono
--and presumably Aidit--were arguing for during those
last desperate hours at Halim--when he failed to convince
Sukarno to go with him then.**
Dani fled soon after Aidit. He and Air Commodore
Leo Wattimena left together on a C-130 Hercules aircraft
of the Indonesian Air Force. Some five hours later, they
finally landed at Iswahjudi Air Force Base in Madiun;
for most of that time, they had been flying around aim-
lessly, as the pilot monitored the security situation at
Halim and other airbases.
The Central Command of Untung, Sujono, Latief,
Sjam, and Pono was now in utter despair. Apparentty, the
original coup plans had not provided for this particular
contingency, and Untung and the others seem to have been
*When Aidit arrived in Semarang on the morning of
2 October to confer with PKI leaders Lukman and Sakirman
after the collapse of the coup, he is reported to have
told them that the purpose of his coming to Central Java
was "to prepare conditions for moving Sukarno to Jogjakarta."
Apparently, there was also another occassion on which he
referred to Sukarno's plans to join him in Central Java; he
indicated that the President had been the one to suggest the
idea.
**Apparently, Aidit and Sjam and Pono had no success
in convincing Untung and the other military leaders of
the coup of the possibility of establishing a second front
in Central Java. According to Untung's testimony in
court, "Sjam proposed that a follow-up movement be launch-
ed. We made no reply to Sjam's proposal. In general,
our thinking was very much influenced by the unsuccess-
ful Pasupati Movement (the operation to kidnap the seven
generals)."
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at a complee loss as to what to do under the circumstances.
Various sources have reported Untung as being "almost in
a daze" or "bewildered" or "just sitting around, not doing
anything." Even Sjam reportedly became confused and seemed
.unsure what to do; he didn't have the ready answers to
Untung's questions that Untung had come to expect from
him. It is not clear what contact Sjam may have had with
Aidit during those last hours at Halim; it is possible
tr;at he acted pretty much on his own.
In part, the lack of decisive leadership from the
military leaders of the coup can be explained by their
state of absolute exhaustion after the strain of the day
and the lack of sleep. But it also strongly suggests
that they were not really used to making the crucial deci-
sions on matters of such importance. It was almost as
if they expected someone to tell them what to do in the
situation. As we shall see later, this was exactly what
had been the case with respect to Untung, Latief, and
Sujono. .;Sjam had made all the important decisions, cer-
tainly all the political decisions, relating to the plan-
ning of the coup and he had always decided everything with
the utmost confidence and assurance. It was not clear
to Untung and the others whether he made certain decisions
on his own or whether he checked everything out with Aidit,
but they felt reasonably sure that Aidit at least knew
and approved of the main lines of the coup planning. The
fact that Sjam did not take the same control of the situa-
tion on the evening of the 1st that he had earlier in the
planning of the coup suggests that either he did really
panic as his plans for a coup blew up in his face or he
was not prepared to make the decisions involved without
first checking with Aidit and there was neither the time
nor the opportunity for the two men to coordinate a whole
new plan of action in keeping with the fast-changing cir-
cumstances of the day. Probably, it was a little bit of
both. Certainly, communications between Aidit and Sjam,
as the day wore on, were not very frequent, if they oc-
curred at all. There is nothing to indicate that Siam
knew ahead of time of Aidit's decision to fly to Central
Java; it appears that he learned of it when Col. Latief
returned to the Central Command and reported it to Untung
and the others there. It is somewhat surprising that
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Sjam did not go with Aidit that night to Jogjakarta. They
may have had some understanding, however. that Aidit would
go to Central Java to try to keep the situation there in
hand while Sjam would stay in Djakarta to help manage
things there.
In any case, Sjam left Halim, sometime in the early
morning of 2 October, in the company of Gen. Supardjo.
They made their way on foot to the home of a PKI member
in Djakarta, where they spent that day and night together.
The next day they went their separate ways. Untung and
Latief left Halim together, about the same time. For at
least a week, they stayed together, travelling around the
environs of Djakarta but apparently not going into the
city. Sujono seems to have stayed at Sgt. Sujatno's
house that first night. It would have been natural for
him to be at Halim, since (before the coup) he was the
Commander of the Air Force troops assigned to the defense
of the base.
At dawn, when Col. Edhy's paratroopers rushed the
airbase, the leaders of the coup had scattered. Many of
the troops of the 454th Battalion, which had been evacu-
ated to Halim after its earlier guard duty at the Palace,
had wandered off during the night.* Those who were ltft
*From the interrogation reports of the soldiers of the
454th who left their posts that night at Halim, it seems
that they had no clear idea of where they were going or
how they were going to get there. But they now realized
that they had been tricked into believing that the: were
defending Sukarno against a coup attempt whereas in fact
they had been used to defend a coup action. Some had some
vague idea of returning to their post in Central Java
but no idea how they would get there; others talked of
turning themselves in. When Suharto the next day announced
a general amnesty to all those soldiers involved in the
coup who promptly turned themselves in, they did just
that. Thus, none of them got very far from Halim that
night, before turning around and going back into Djakarta
to report to KOSTRAD headquarters.
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put up practically no resistance. By 0610 hours, Suharto
had taken Halim--without the loss of a single man.
Reflections of the Coup Throughout Indonesia
As there is a great deal of confusion about events
connected with the 30 September Movement that occurred
outside Djakarta. it is important to clarify just what
hdppEned in cities like Semarang, Jogjakarta, and Solo,
which followed Djakarta's lead in establishing Revolution-
ary Councils.ds called for in the Decree of the 30 Septem-
ber Movement broadcast from Djakarta at mid-day on 1 October.
In the three key cities of Central Java, there oc-
curred the same basic pattern of military action followed
by 4 public statement of support for Ontung's movement
and an ;announcement of the formation of a Revolutionary
rouncil. Very shortly after the Untung announcement on
the radio, Col. Suherman,. Chief of Army Intelligence for
.Untung had been an intimate confidant of Suherman
when the latler was Battalion Commander and Untung a
Company Commander in the Central Java Territorial Divi-
sion. On the two trips that Untung made to Semarang
after he was transferred to Djakarta in May 1965, he had
stayed at Suherman's house. Thus, he had last seen Suher-
man about a month and a half before the coup. On the
second trip in August, he had stopped off in Srondol,
staying at the home of Major Sukirno, who had succeeded
Untung as Commander of the 454th Battalion, In his testi-
mony at Untung's trial, Sukrisno stated that there had
been no discussion of a coup on that occasion. No doubt,
Sukrisno was telling the truth. Untung himself was not
brought into the planning for the coup until early Septem-
ber. Most likely, Untung and Suherman never discussed
the mat:er of the coup, either. Suherman's activities
on behalf of the coup were almost certainly arranged by
.the regional bureau of the PKI Special Bureau in Semarang.
There is no evidence that any of the military officers
i.footnoe continued on page 61
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Central Java, stationed in Semarang, acting in close col-
laboration with Col. Marjono, chief of personnel, and Lt.
Col. Sastrodibroto, bureau chief for civil-military rela-
tions, seized control of the Divisional headquarters and
placed the Commander of the Central Java Division, Gen.
Surjosumpeno, under arrest.* Sometime around mid-morning,
Suherman occupied the studio of Radio Indonesia in Semarang
to broadcast two important announcements: one, that he
had taken over command of the division and, two, that a
Revolutionary Council in Central Java had been formed in
accordance with the Decree of the 30 September Movement.
Subsequent to the radio announcement from Djakarta,
a Major Muljono stationed in Jogjakarta went to see his
commanding officer, Col, Katamso, to urge him to accept
the Untung proclamation and declare the Jogjakarta Com-
mand behind it. When Katamso stalled, Muljono sent a
squad of men loyal to him to arrest Katamso and thl.deputy
commander, Lt. Col. Sugijono.** The two men were taken
(footnote continued from page 60)
involved in the coup in Djakarta discussed plans for the
coup with military officers in other cities. The PKIt
Special Bureau would have handled such matters as coordinat-
ing events in Semarang or Jogjakarta or Solo with those
in Djakarta.
*Surjosumpeno was able to trick the young officers who
guarded him into leaving him alone long enough to allow
him to make his escape from the Divisional Headquarters.
From there he fled southwards out of Semarang to Magelang,
where he contacted local military officers. Widespread
reports that he was one of the victims of the 30 Septem-
ber Movement were not true.
**Apparently, the troops that were sent to arrest Kat-
amso first looked for him at his home before they went
to the district military headquarters where they found
him. The story was spread that, not finding him at home,
they murdered his wife and 8 children ("brutally chopping
them to bits"). Again, there was no truth to the story,
although it is still widely believed, no doubt because
it has been repeated so often. Katamso and Sugijono were
killed, however; they were the only victims of the 30
September Movement in Central Java.
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to the army barracks three miles outside Jogjakarta and
held there all day. Muljono then ordered his troops to
surround the palace complex of the Sultan of Jogjakarta,
who happened to be out of town at the time. He also
seizea the Jogjakarta Radio Station. At 2000 hours Radio
Indonesia in Jogjakarta began broadcasting support for
Untung's coup in Djakarta, which was itself now in the
last stages of collapse.
Sometime in the afternoon of 1 October, the newly
appointed commander of the Solo (Surakarta) military
district, Lt. Col. Ezy Suharto, together with his chief
-of staff and a brigade commander under him, were put un-
der arrest by a certain Major Iskandar., after they had
delayed in giving support to Untung's movement. At 1800
hours, some two hours before Jogjakarta, Radio Indonesia
in Solo put out a statement on the formation of a
Revolutionary Council for Solo on the model of the L
Central Revolutionary Council announced by Untung. This
initial statement was issued by the Communist mayor of
Solo, Utomo Ramelan, whom the top leaders of the PKI
(Aidit, Lukman, and Sakirman) would visit the very next
day for high-level discussions of PKI policy in the after-
math of the coup's failure.
Nothing of the sort that happened in Semarang,
Jogjakarta, and Solo happened anywhere else in Java,
not even in East Java, where there were many powerful
centers of Communist strength. According to one uncon-
firmed report, the Governor of Bali is reported to have
made some statement about the formation of a Revolution-
ary Council for Bali, but nothing more came of it, if in
fact he ever made such a statement. There was much con-
cern at the time about Sumatra, where the PKI was thought
to have an impressive capability for paramilitary-type
activities that could create widespread civil disorder.
The leftist Governor of North Sumatra, Army General Ulung
Sitepu, is known to have sent a cable to Djakarta con-
gratulating Untung on his "move to save the Republic" and
pledging the full support of North Sumatra to the 30
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September Movement.* But otherwise, there was no observ-
able response from Sumatra to events in Djakarta. The
city of Medan was quiet; no unusual activity by any group
was noted at any time after the news from Djakarta was
first received. There was no evidence of any unusual mili-
tary action in Surabaya, either. In the days after the
coup, certain wall posters that appeared in Surabaya sup-
porting the coup were suspected to be the work of the PKI;
otherwise, there was no known PKI activity in support of
the coup anywhere in Sumatra. Between 2-12 October, about
150 PKI leaders, plus many ordinary members of the party
from all areas of Sumatra, went into hiding in the jungle
mountain areas of North Sumatra, at various prearranged
locations. It was presumed that they were organizing them-
selves into a para-military force for an all-out showdown
with the army, but no such showdown ever materialized.
In keeping with Aidit's policy, they had simply gone into
hiding until the situation cleared. They never challenged
the army in any resort to armed force. Several hundred
of them were finally captured by the army, having put up
almost no resistance--which was the story of the PKI sur-
render to the army all over Indonesia after the coup.
But on the day of 1 October, the prospect of mili-
tary opposition from the supporters of the 30 Septemter
Movement in Central Java and other areas outside Djakarta
seemed quite real to Suharto. Around 2000-2100 hours,
messages began to be received in Djakarta from Central
Java that the radio station in Jogjakarta and Semaral:g
were in rebel hands. Once Sukarno decided to go to Bog();
rather than Central Java, Suharto was free to consider
his move against the rebel strongholds in Central Java
without the concern for the President's safety which had
*On 8 October, after the collapse of the coup, Gov.
Ulung Sitepu and his wife fled Medan, taking all their
personal valuables with them. They were reported to have
gone to the Kabandjahe area where he had a strong left-
ist following.
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influenced his decision not to attack Halim until he was
sure that Sukarno had left the airbase. Suharto's strategy
of winning over the forces loyal to Untung in Central Java
was very much the same strategy he had used against the
troops acting under the orders of the coup leaders in
Djakarta. He began with what was to prove a long series
of appeals and countermanding of orders over the military
telex system and the radio. In a radiogram to Central
Java he explicitly disavowed Col. Suherman's order to all
commanders within the Central Java Territorial Division;
as a former commander of that Division, he was undoubtedly
hoping to rally loyalties to himself. In the meantime,
he ordered army units in Central Java to be placed on 24-
hour combat readiness to resist any seizures of govern-
ment authority by the revolutionary councils; otherwise,
they werenot to take any precipitate action that might
lead to a civil war.*
By late afternOon on 1 October the staff officers
of the Central Java Territorial Command had decided with-
out reservation against the rebel forces of Untung and
Col. Suherman. The reason that some of the troops appar-
ently hesitated in following the lead of the officers
was their uncertainty as to Sukarno's position on the
coup. At the height of the coup fortunes on 1 October,
the troops of the rebels were estimated to have the
strength of only one battalion; during the next two days,
these forces gradually melted away, much as the troops
of the 530th and 454th battalions deserted the cause of
the coup in Djakarta and went. over to the side of Suharto.
*There was never any plan for the use of West Javanese
or any other non-Central Javanese forces against the rebels.
Central Java Divisional Commander Surjosumpeno, who had
escaped from the rebel officers who had put him under
arrest, felt assured that he could deal with the situa-
tion, and Suharto thought he should be given the chance
to do so.
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Semarang was the first of the rebel cities to fall.
The troops of Suherman had been hearing on the radio about
the failure of Untungls coup in Djakarta. Suherman's
authority dwindled rapidly after that. Division Commander
Surjosumpeno had brought loyal troops to the outskirts
of Semarang. After "Suharto-Style" negotiations with some
of the rebel officers, the troops were largely won over.
On the morning of 2 October, Surjosumpeno re-occupied
Semarang without a shot being fired. Suherman, Marjono,
and Sastrodibroto fled with a handful of troops still
loyal to them.*
Surjosumpeno began sending tank and paratroop units
to Jogjakarta and Solo to try to win back the loyalty of
individual units there. Some crucial battalions were won
over, but the two cities were still in rebel hands that
afternoon when the afternoon editions of the newspapers
in the two cities came out. That afternoon a large demon-
stration supporting Untung's coup took place in the main
part of Jogjakarta. The major PKI mass organizations were
restrained from action, but the local Communist youth
group was conspicious along with other youth groups of
the other political parties. Apparently Muljono was able
to influence the Communist youth more than the PKI lead-
ership. Their participation in the demonstration wa.6 to
prove very damaging to the PKI's effort to claim complete
non-involvement in the coup. The only bloodshed of the
coup in Central Java occurred that same afternoon in
Jogjakarta. Katomso and Sugijono were removed from their
temporary place of incarceration and taken out of town
and shot.
In Solo also, the pro-coup tide was still strong
on 2 October. Placards indicating support for Untung
were plastered all over the city. Groups of Communist
*After the failure of the coup, Suherman and Col. Mar-
jono hid in the mountains of Central Java in the region
of Jogjakarta. They were finally captured in December
1965.
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vnith wandered about in a vaguely threatening way; almost
e%eryone else kept off the streets.
Late in the day of the 2nd, there were signs that
the tide had begun to change. At 0130 hours on the 3rd,
Sukarno made his radio broadcast to the nation, and this
was relayed to Jogjakarta and Solo. Anti-Untung placards
oegah To appear. By 4 October, the radio stations in
.ities were in the hands of Surjosumpeno's men, and
local military commanders arrested by the coup group were
released unharmed. The situation remained tense but calm
with both pro-coup and anti-coup groups unwilling to start
_anything. As we shall see later, Aidit and other top PKI
leaders were able to move about the city of Solo openly,
even though it was militarily in Surjosumpeno's hands.
By the morning of 5 October overt military resist-
ance to Surjosumpeno had ceased throughout Central Ja0a.
Aside from the murders of the two Jogjakarta army chiefs,
there had been an astonishing lack of violence. Cities
and loyalties had changed hands silently and peacefully.
It had been a game of bluff and counter-bluff, threat and
counter-threat, appeal and counter-appeal.
The Coup de Grace for the PKI
In Djakarta, the outcome of the coup had not hung
in the balance even the short period of 2-3 days as it
had in Central Java. By the end of the day on 1 October,
the coup forces had fled in defeat and Suharto was in full
control of the situation. Untung had not held the city
long enough for any sort of mass demonstration of support
--either spontaneous or otherwise--to materialize. Had
there been plans for a demonstration, like the one in
Jogjakarta, for 2 October or the days following, it would
naturally have been called off in the hopeless situation
of the utter collapse of the coup. Thus, there never was
the spectacle of groups of Communists and other leftists
out on the streets of Djakarta in support of the coup--as
there was'in Jogjakarta and Solo.
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In view of this, one important development of 2
October is all the more intriguing and mystifying. It
is the editorial that appeared in the PKI newspaper Harian
Rakjat, published in Djakarta on the morning of 2 October.
In its banner headline, Harlan Rakjat claimed that Untung
had saved President Sukarno from a coup of the generals'
council. Accompanying the headlines was a crude cartoon,
showing a mighty fist, labeled 'the 30 September Movement',
smashing into the face of an Indonesian general. The
general's pockets were stuffed with money; he had dollar
signs for epaulettes; his shoulder badges showed him to
be a member of the Council of Generals; and his cap was
stamped with CIA; propping him up was a particularly un-
pleasant-looking Uncle Sam. Next to the cartoon, on the
front page, was a brief editorial, only 202 words in length,
which condemned the Generals' Council and called Untung's
action "a patriotic and revolutionary measure." Although
it claimed that the "nature of the action was an igternal
army matter," the editorial expressed the thought that
"the sympathy and support of the people" ought certainly
to be for the coup.* On the whole, it was a rather cautious
editorial, but this was really beside the point; the dam-
age had already been done simply by going on record in
support of the coup. In but 202 ill-advised words, which
gave the coup the PKI's public endorsement, Harian Rakjat
had provided the army with the documentary justification
for the PKI's own obliteration.
*The PKI was shrewd in deceiving the public into think-
ing that the 30 September Movement was nothing more than
an internal problem of the Army. The coup had been de-
liberately staged to look that way, for instance, in the
selection of Untung as the nominal leader of the coup.
His first public proclamation of the coup emphasized the
point that the coup was an internal matter within the
army. The Harian Rakjat editorial simply picked up the
theme that had already been decided on as the cover story
for the coup. It proved to be a convincing cover story
that was accepted by many people at the time.
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In keeping with the paper's normal publishing
routine, the 2 October morning edition was probably set
and printed late the previous afternoon.* At that time,
events seemed to be going well enough for the coup forces
that the newspaper's editors would have felt confidence
enough in expressing such an opinion. As far as the tim-
ing is concerned, they could have been reacting to events
as they happened, but it seems clear that they were actu-
ally prepared for events to the extent of having the edi-
torial ready for publication before 1 October. It is
doubtful that the editors would have taken a stand on a
matter of such importance except on the direct orders of
the Politburo--or Aidit himself--which would almost have
to have been agreed upon before the coup. The editorial
reflects a cautious-but-positive attitude which would
have appealed to Aidit and suggests that he may even
have written it himself. For these reasons, which can
be deduced from the editorial as it appeared and whentit
appeared, it would seem that the PKI must have had fore-
knowledge of the coup. Considering all the other evid-
ence we have that the PKI not only had foreknowledge of
the coup but was deeply involved in planning the affair,
it is obvious that the editorial was part of the planning
from the beginning. The editorial stressed the point
that the coup was purely an internal army affair which
*Apparently, the 2 October edition of Harlan Rakjat
was on the newstands at the regular time on the morning
of 2 October, which suggests that it was printed as usual
the afternoon before. One other newspaper that appeared
on 2 October--Suluh Indonesia--was published later than
usual that day. Although it was stated that it was due
to "technical difficulties", obviously, it was due to the
coup. Suluh Indonesia's reaction to the coop ifi interest-
ing. It headlined its support and that of the PNI for
Sukarno and denied knowing anything about the presence
of PNI people on Untung's revolutionary council. In this
way, it avoided taking a direct stand on the coup, in
contrast to the stand taken by Harian Rakjat.
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was the same point that Untung made in his first public
announcement of the coup. Obviously, this was the story
invented by the PKI to cover up PKI involvement in the
coup. The editorial in Harian Rakjat was simply part of
PKI planning ahead of time to have it accepted as the real
explanation for the coup.
There is still the unanswered question of why the
PKI leaders who were responsible for Harian Rakjat did
not stop its distribution early on the morning of 2 October
when they must have realized that the coup had failed
miserably. Though the newspaper would have been printed
and ready for distribution, they could certainly have pre-
vented its circulation. The fact that they did not was
probably because they were acting on previous instructions
from Aidit or the Politburo and they were not prepared
to do anything different without new instructions on the
matter. In the confusion of the moment, Aidit obviously
did not have the time or the opportunity to contact the
editors of Harian Rakjat, if the matter of the editorial
even occurred to him. He was totally occupied at the time
with more important matters, such as trying to get Sukarno
to go with him to Central Java--and when that failed, with
the matter of his own flight to Central Java, his personal
safety, and his urgent need to contact Lukman and other
top PKI leaders to decide on party policy in the emergency
situation of the coup's collapse.
Whatever the reason, the publication of the 2 Octo,..
edition of Harian Rakjat with its editorial endorsing the
coup was an act of political suicide. In this instance,
the practice of democratic centralism within the party,
which normally gave the party a certain strength because
of its ability to react quickly to change (since it was
totally responsive to the will of the central leadership),
worked against the party, since various leadership levels
within the party waited for orders from above instead of
acting on their own according to their own best judgment
of the situation. When the chain of command\broke down
--as it did on the night of 1 October--the party was all
but paralyzed and suddenly made very vulnerable to attack.
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Burning of the Communist Youth Headquarters
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1
-
. �����
� . ..��� .
� '/
7. atti..-011
PKI Headquarters after the anti-Communist
demonstration in Djakarta on 8 October 1965
p.
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The Postlude
The Indonesian coup of September 1965 may well
prove to be one of the most significant events of the
post-war period. The political repercussions of the coup
have not only changed the whole course of Indonesian
history but they have had a profound effect on the world
political scene, especially that of Southeast Asia.
In the three years since the coup we have seen in
Indonesia (1) a massive purge of the Communist party
organization in which thousands of people lost their
lives in one of the ghastliest and most concentrated
bloodlettings of current times,* (2) the toppling of
President Sukarno, who before the coup had the stature
of a demigod on the Indonesian scene, and (3) a compApte
turnabontt in the country's international alignment--
from that of being one of Communist China's closest
allies in growing estrangement from the rest of the
world and one of the harshest critics of the West to
a new posture of being a friend of the West, seeking
the goodwill of all other nations of the world except
Communist China. These developments have al/ come about
as a direct result of the coup. In a sense, they are
really part of the story of the coup. But since each is
also a story in itself and since this paper is intended
to focus on the coup itself, they will not be treated in
detail. Only those post-coup developments that seem to
shed more light on the actions or intentions or sympathie=
of the main actors in the coup will be included in this
brief postscript to the coup.
*Estimates of the number of people killed in Indonesia
in the anti-PKI bloodbath after the coup range from 87,000,
the official Indonesian government estimate, to 500,000.
The figure of 87,000, which is the figure the official
commission appointed by Sukarno to investigate the anti-PKI
massacres accepted as the best estimate of the number of
people killed, is probably too low. The U.S. Embassy esti-
mated the figure to be closer to 250,000. It would be a
Mistake to put too much faith in any of the various esti-
mates. It was impossible, even at the time, to get occur-ate
figures of the number of people killed in one neighborhood.
(footnote continued on page 71 )
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As with the actual events of the coup, which were
treated in the preceding section, the post-coup development
discussed in this section are, for the most, matters of
established fact; they are part of the record against
which we must examine the words and testimony of various
individuals as to their role in the coup.
The Central Command in Hiding
The five men who composed the Central Command of
the coup, who had emerged from obscurity to play the main
role in a drama of unforeseen consequence, disappeared
from the scene altogether as quickly as they had first
appeared. After midnight on the 1st of October, they
played no further part in influencing the course of events.
They were hunted men, the object of an immediate apd un-
relenting search by the Army for all those responsible
for .the coup. Their-one and only concern became that of
self-preservation. They were constantly on the move, and,
(footnote continued from page 70 )
Since it wasn't safe to travel around in Indonesia in those
days, many areas were never visited by anyone interested in
determining the number of people killed. Thus, there never
was--and never will be--a reliable figure of the numbers
dead as a result of the Indonesian coup. Undoubtedly, vast
numbers were killed. The killings in Java alone put the
Mau Mau massacres and the killings in the Congo in the
shadow, although the latter got much more publicity. In
terms of the numbers killed, the anti-PKI massacres in
Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the
20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930's,
the Nazi mass. murders during the Second World War, and the
Maoist bloodbath of the early 1950's. In this regard, the
Indonesian coup is certainly one of the most significant
events of the 20th century, far more significant than many
other events that have received much greater publicity.
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as the army search for them intensified, it became harder
and harder for them to find safe places to hide; when ,
they did, they were virtually confined to that place, day
in and day out. General Supardjo, who evaded capture
-longer than any of the other military officers involved in
the coup (he was finally arrested in February 1967), has
described the torture of his life as a fugitive for almost
one and one-half years. During the whole time, he found
only two or three occasions to communicate with former
coup associates who were also in hiding.
Sjam came to the house twice but didn't stay
there. Apparently he was dodging raids and
discussing the security of various people. I
didn't have any discussions with him.
I moved around to various houses in Djakarta.
I changed identity cards. I practically nevert
went out. I was introduced as a relative of my
various hosts. During all that time I never
left Djakarta. People with whom I lived financed
me. Once, for a period of one month, I ate nothing
but rice and slept on the floor on a mat and an
old pillow.
Once I was able to send a message to my family
in Bandung; they replied only that they were all
right. I never saw them.
For nine days after the coup, Untung and Latief
travelled around the countryside outside Djakarta. The
next d,ly Latief was arrested in his wife's home in Dja-
karta. Untung headed for Central Java. Two days later,
*Apparently, Latief was shot in both legs before he was
captured. An infection is reported to have developed, re-
sulting in the amputation of both legs. Although there has
never been any confirmation of �this, it is interesting that
Latief never appeared at any of the court trials. He was
not given a trial like Untung, Dani, Subandrio, Sudisman,
Sjam, and the others, and his testimony at other trials,
such as Untung's trial, was written testimony. There has
been no reliable report on his physical condition from
one who has seen him in prison. He may still be alive, out
it is thought that he was probably one of the four military
leaders of the coup (one of whom was Untung) who were exe-
cuted in December 1967.
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he was recognized by two soldiers (though he was wearing
civilian clothes) as he rode on a public bus which was
on its way to his home town, and he too was arrested.
He has described his travels after the coup:
From the time that I left Lubang Buaja up to
11 October I remained out of Djakarta, but I
kept going around and around between Polonia,
Djatinegara, and Utan Kaju together with Col.
Latief.* On 10 October Col. Latief requested
that he and I split up and thus I split from
Col. Latief, and on 11 October I and Damiri
left Djatinegara for Krawang and then went
directly to Tjikampek where we spent the night.
Between 12-13 October I went to Central Java
but on 13 October I was arrested by the Tegal
Branch of HANSIP in Tegal . . . and taken to
Bandung . . . and from there by armored car t.
to Djakarta, where I have been under interrogation
According to one account of Untung's capture, which is prob-
ably apocryphal, the first words that Untung spoke after he
was taken into custody were "That fellow Bung Karno (Sukarno)
has let me down."**
Air Force Major Sujono was captured next, sometime
around 15 October, though the circumstances of his arrest
are not as well known. After these early arrests of
three of the five men comprising the Central Command,
it was almost a year and a half before the Army captured
General Supardjo. He has commented as follows on his
activities during that time:
Sjam and I left Lubang Buaja and headed south
toward the highway. I was wearing civilian
*Polonia, Djatinegara, and Utan Kaju are suburbs of
Djakarta at the southern end of the city in the direction
of Halim Air Force Base. Thus, Untung was traveling around
in the area between Djakarta and Halim for over a week
after the coup.
**Tarzie Vittachi reports this in his book The Fall of
Sukarno. He does not give the source of his information
on Untung's capture.
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The capture of Untung
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Untung at his trial
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clothes. We boarded a small bus headed for
Djakarta. We got off at the Tjitjih building
and Sjam took me up an alley to a house behind
the building. There Sjam and I separated. I
had hoped that Sjam would take me to Sukarno
so that things could be settled further.
I was transferred to another house. The house
probably belonged to one of the two civilians
who were at the Central Command.
I still had the letter from the President*....
My conversations with Marto Suwandi (in whose
house Supardjo lived for a while) dealt mainly
with my efforts to meet with Sukarno. My only
intention was to discuss the follow-up to the
dispersal of the troops , since I had been given
the assignment (by the President) of dissolving
the troops of the 30 September Movement. How-
ever, it was impossible to meet with Sukarno.
I wrote a letter to the President saying that
Sukarno's order had been carried out and the
troops dispersed and explaining that this move-
ment was not solely of a military nature since
many of the people were involved. I asked the
President to make a radio announcement which
would allow me to meet safely with him. I
gave it to another man, but there was no reply.
I was considering being dropped pear the palace
and working my way in, but Suwandi didn't agree.
No answer ever came from the palace.
I wrote letters to the commander of KOSTRAD and
the Army caretaker commander saying that I had
not been consulted about the inclusion of my
*Supardjo is reported to have had in his possession a
letter from Sukarno which he used as a letter of intro-
duction to the various people who befriended him during the
time he was in hiding from the army after the coup. Accord-
ing to several reports, the letter was nothing more than the
signed order which Sukarno is reported to have given Supardjo
on the dispersing of the troops after the decision to stop
the 30 September Movement had been made.
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name on the list of members of the Revolutionary
Council and that it should be stricken from the list.
I was convinced that the situation would get better.
I depended completely on the President.
Once in mid-September 1966, Sudisman (the PKI leader)
came to Suwandi's house. We talked about the security
problem. They wanted to stay at Suwandi's house
because this house seemed to be the safest, but I
refused them. We also talked about the coup. Sudisman
said the failure of the coup was due to the rashness of
Aidit and his followers. I told him the problem was
one of exploiting victory. It should not have been
stopped when Sukarno so ordered. The Central Command
lacked military technique. There was no unity of
command, what with Untung, Sjam, and the others; and
logistics were disorganized. We did not disst,iss the
matter of rebuilding the PKI. I have never been a
member of the PKI. The inclusion of my name (in the
Revolutionary Council) was their doing.
Supardjo's capture led to the arrest of Sjam in early
March 1967 in Tjimahi, West Java, a small town near Bandung.
On PKI orders, Sjam had left Djakarta within a week of' the
coup and taken refuge in Bandung; he had left there for Tjimha
only two days before his capture. During the months in hiding,
he had been able to contact the new PKI leadership in Djakarta
only three times--at the end of 1966, in January 1967, and in
February 1967--if we are to believe Sjam's own testimony on
these matters (and this writer at least, is prepared to accept
Sjam's statements in this regard, for the reasons given on
pages 311-316*). In mid-1966 Sjam had learned of the party
leadership's decision to dissolve the Special Bureau, which he
had headed, and transfer its functions to the West Java Greater
Regional Committee. In reply to an inquiry regarding his status,
he was informed that he was released from all responsibilities
as Chief of the Old Special Bureau; it was emphasized that his
safety was a matter of continuing concern to the party leader-
ship. In his last communication with the party leadership,
Sjam forwarded certain suggestions he had on the new organiza-
tion of the party to the PKI leaders in Djakarta.
*In addition to the general comments .on the validity of
interrogation reports as evidence that are made in the Appen-
dix (pp. 311-316), there are one or two particular comments that
should be made in the case of Sjam. Once the Army got Sjam to
(footnote continued on page 76)
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General Supardjo facing Trial
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As is well known, the complete reorganization of
the party on a new covert basis had been forced upon the
party after the virtual obliteration of its former overt
leadership by the army after the coup. By the time Sjam
was arrested in March 1967, four of the five members of
the Standing Council of the Politburo and six of the ten
members of the full Politburo had been killed. Njono,
the Chief of the Greater Djakarta Committee of the PKI
and a member of the Politburo who, as we shall see, was
directly involved in the coup (he was in charge of PKI
"operational-technical" preparations for the coup, such
as the arrangements for the training of a PKI reserve
-force to be used in the coup) had been the first impor-
tant Communist leader to be arrested after the coup. He
had not gone into hiding immediately after the failure
of the coup as the other PKI leaders had done, but had
continued to show up every day at the party headquarters
in Djakarta. His capture on 5 October 1965 preceded title
arrests even of the military officers who had been the
nominal leaders of the coup. In February 1966, Njono
was the first tried in court and sentenced to death for
his involvement in the coup.
(footnote continued from page 75)
talk, it seems that he was almost anxious to tell everything
that he knew about the coup--almost out of a sense of pride,
it seems. At his trial, he actually boasted that he was
"the brains behind the 30 September Movement." Whatever
his motivation, he was the most cooperative of witnesses
and his testimony has been well borne out by tbe testimony
of other people involved in the coup. One independent fact
that seems to confirm the reliability of his testimony is
the fact that he was denounced as a traitor by the PKI after
his capture and interrogation by the Army. According to
reliable sources, PKI party members were informed of Sjam's
treason to the party at secret party meetings in late 1967.
Those who could be compromised by Sjam were warned to take
special precautions since it would have to be assumed that
he had told the Army everything that he knew about the coup
and the secret operations of the PKI.
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The main blow to the PKI was, of course, the arrest
and execution of Aidit, which came fairly early in the
course of arrests made by the Army of PKI leaders--on
22 November 1965. Soon after that, Lukman and Njoto,
the number two and number three men in the PKI leadership,
were killed escaping capture. Sudisman, the fourth-ranking
leader of the PKI, was captured by the army, tried in court,
and sentenced to death. Sakirman, the fifth member of the
Standing Council of the Politburo, was killed later that
same year, in November 1966.
Aidit's Last Days
Aidit's capture and summary execution--on 22 November
1965--by paracommando units of the Army under General Sarwo
Edhy climaxed weeks of search-and-destroy operation p against
the Communist3in Central Java after the coup. This opera-
tion alone was enough to make national heroes of the
paracommandos who organized the raids on the homes of
known Communists throughout the area, leading finally to
the arrest of Aidit in Sambeng Gede, a small town near
Semarang in Central Java. Aidit's travels after the coup
up to his death are a fascinating story and are also of
considerable interest to anyone studying the coup.
About two hours after he left Halim by plane, Aidit
arrived in Jogjakarta, sometime around 0400 hours on the
morning of 2 October. From there, he was driven by a
certain Air Force Major Sudarjo to the home of Sutrisno,
an important local PKI leader. Aidit is reported to have
warned Sutrisno to call off any demonstrations he might
have planned and at all costs not to allow the PKI to be
.provoked into violent action. He said that the PKI
should indicate complete, unconditional support for any
policies the President might announce.
Aidit left Jogjakarta for Semarang almost immedi-
ately, travelling in a black Fiat 1300 seda, dressed as
a Moslem in a sarong and black pitji (hat). At 0800 hours
*Aidit was disguised as a religious teacher with a sarong
wound around his waist, a white shirt with short sleeves, and
dark glasses. He had abandoned the white suit with the
three gold stars, the uniform used by cabinet ministers,
which he apparently loved to wear.
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/
Njono, as he appeared as the first defendant at
the special military court trials after the coup
4
Njono before the military tribunal
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he arrived at number 14 Dempo Street in Semarang, which
was the home of an important PKI leader who was responsible
for all of Central Java. His objective was to contact
Lukman and Sakirman, the number two and number five men
in the party hierarchy, whom he knew to be staying at that
house. (Aidit himself had ordered Lukman and Sakirman to
go to Semarang just before the coup so that they would be
safely out of Djakarta and in a position to influence events
in Central Java; they had left Djakarta by car on the evening
of 28 September and arrived in Semarang the next day around
noon.) Soon after Aidit arrived at the designated house
in Semarang, so too did Sujono Atmo, the Acting Governor
of Central Java, a known Communist sympathizer whose posi-
tion would allow him to do much to keep the overall situation
in control. Sujono Atmo joined in the.. discussions between
Aidit, Lukman, and Sakirman. After about an hour, all four
set off in the direction of Solo (Surakarta) in Sujono Atmois
official limousine. They stopped only once in Bojolai.i,
for an hour, to brief a prominent local PKI official.
Once in Solo, they went straight to the home-,of;Com-
munist Mayor Utomo Ramelan. Presumably lengthy discussions
were held with Ramelan along the same lines as those Aidit
had had with other PKI officials that day. That evening
the Commander of the Panasan airbase just outside Solo was
summoned to Ramelan's home. He came, but apparently not
without some misgivings--as by now the PKI was under general
suspicion for its role in the coup. In the course of the
evening's discussion, Aidit reportedly requested the use
of a plane to fly to Bali. Lieutenant Colonel Sujoto
refused, on the excuse that none was available. He did
promise to deliver a letter to Sukarno for Aidit; but the
following morning--perhaps influenced by Sukarno's radio
broadcast early on the morning of 3 October--he appears
to have decided that it would be best not to associate
further with Aidit, and he returned the letter to him.
Aidit was busy in Solo the next day and the days
following that. He toured the villages of Baki, Sewu,
and Djagalan, all situated around Solo, and he may have
travelled as far as Madiun and Kediri to visit other
centers of PKI strength. In every place, he told the
people who assembled to hear him that there must be no
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demonstration of support for the coup; and in none of the
places he visited was there ever any movement or activity
or demonstration on behalf of the coup. He was obviously
completely successful in getting the people to follow his
policy--a policy of wait and see. A tense and watchful
stillness reigned everywhere, but there was no sign of
PKI activity anywhere.
Sometime before 5 October, Aidit presumably drafted
the statement that was issued on the morning of the 5th
by the PKI information bureau in Djakarta. The statement
was the strongest denial of PKI participation in the coup
that the party was ever to claim. It stated explicitly
that the PKI was not involved in the coup, that the coup
leaders had not requested the approval of party members
whose names werelincluded in the revolutionary council;
that the coup was purely an internal affair of the army.
Besides the obvious intent to dissociate the PKI frpm the
coup, the statement was intended to strengthen Sukarno's
hand in settling the matter, rather than the Army; the
PKI had good reason to fear that the Army would use the
coup to gain the upper hand against Sukarno. After all,
if the coup was strictly an internal army matter, as the
PKI claimed, it was logical for the Army to insist on its
own right to settle the matter. Aidit wanted the coup
accepted, on the one hand, as an internal army affair in
which the PKI had played absolutely no part and, on the
other, as a political matter which only the President
could solve. The 5 October PKI statement expressed the
full support of the party for whatever political settle-
ment Sukarno announced. It is interesting to note him
similar this statement was to Aidit's instructions to
Sutrisno and other PKI officials with whom he talked in
Semarang and Solo. The same points *ere also stressed
in a letter he is reported to have written to the East
Java Regional Committee on 2 October--all of which sug-
gests that the 5 October PKI statement was also drafted
by Aidit. In essence, it was the message that he carried
to the PKI wherever he travelled after the coup.
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On 4 October Djakarta Radio had broadcast the news
that there would be a plenary session of the Cabinet at
the palace in Bogor on 6 October, which all Ministers
were urgently requested to attend. It was decided that
Aidit and Lukman would both attend. Early on the morning
of 5 October Lukman set off for Djakarta in his own of-
ficial limousine. Stopping only in Pemalang near Brebes
to talk to local PKI cadres, he reached Djakarta about
1530 hours that same day. The next morning he proceded
to Bogor, where he made his last public appearance.
It is unclear why Aidit did not also travel to
Djakarta by car (possibly it was for security reasons).
In any case, he was apparently determined to make the
trip by plane; but once again he was frustrated in his
travel plans. On 4 October he urged Mayor Utomo Ramelan
to go with him to visit the commander of Panasan airbase
again. Once again Colonel Sujoto refused to give hint,
an airplane to go to Djakarta to attend the cabinet meet-
ing. About 1500 hours the next afternoon (5 October)
Aidit and Ramelan made a last forlorn appearance at
Panasan; but Sujoto found new reasons for being unco-
operative. Aidit and Ramelan left the base soon after-
wards, and Aidit at least was never seen in public again.
For six weeks Aidit lived in hiding'in Central
Java, moving around between Solo and Semarang. If he
ever had any serious thought of fleeing Indonesia or
escaping to a more remote area of the country--some
sources claim that he thought of going to Bali, among
other places--he did not get very far. In Central Java,
which was the area where the PKI had its greatest strength,
Aidit had a rather remarkable defense organization.
Trained and armed workers of the PKI and its youth orga-
nizations formed a kind of private army whose special
duty it was to provide complete safety for Aidit. There
was an elaborate warning sytem to signal the arrival of
outsiders in the town in which Aidit was hiding. Thus,
he always had time to escape when army units appeared on
the scene to raid the homes in a certain district.
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The story of Aidit's capture provides a fascinating
story in the literature of successful intelligence oper-
ations. It involves an agent of the Indonesian army
intelligence service who managed to penetrate Aidit's
.:lose circle of bodyguards. After several incidents which
were calculated to win Aidit's complete confidence, "Agent
II" at one point had Aidit hiding in his own home. In a plan
that Aidit was working on at the time of his capture--a
plan of escape to Djakarta in which Aidit was to don
an air force uniform with complete identification letters
and be driven to Djakarta in a Russian-built jeep of the
Air Force--"Agent H" was to be his sole companion on
the trip. At the last moment, however, Aidit apparently
became suspicious.
Suddenly, he asked the unsuspecting 'Agent 11' to
take him back to Sambeng Gede where he had been
hiding safely and receiving extraordinary protec-
tion from his followers working for the railroad
that had a depot in the neighborhood. 'Agent H'
could not refuse without causing greater sugpicion
. . . The slyness and fine strategy of 'Agett H'
had lured Aidit out of this beloved hiding place.
He had moved to H's house which he had thought
safer, but he was now full of suspicions. 'Agent
H' had made it easier to catch Aidit.
At 2000 hours in the evening of 22'November the biggest
military contingent ever used in a raid on Communist homes
entered Sambeng Gede. Every house was searched.
Aidit was found hiding in the house of one
Hardjo-Sumartono in a secret room of only one
yard width. It was entered by a small door
from the dining room. A cabinet stood in front
of the door and hid it completely. Before the
soldiers reached the house they had to pass the
railroad depot with workers faithful to Aidit.
They blew the whistle of a locomotive to give
Aidit time to get into his hiding place should
he be outside the secret room.
But inside Hardjo-Sumartono's house, the soldiets noticed
a pair of sandals beside the dining room cabinet. They
moved the cabinet, and out crawled D. N. Aidit.
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General Suharto inspects the RPKAD (the paratroop commandos) after their successful opera-
tion against the Communists in Central Java. RPICAD commander General Sarwo Edhy (cen-
ter) is shown in the car with Suharto.
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Various documents have been presented which pur-
port to be Aidit's interrogation report; but they all
appear suspect. It is extremely doubtful that Aidit
would have "confessed" to any of the things mentioned in
the reports. A rather lengthy "self-criticism" of PKI
strategy at the time of the coup--which was first published
in the Japanese press and attributed to Aidit--is more obvi-
ously faked. It is not at all Aidit's style, nor is it
his thinking. There is no convincing evidence that Aidit
submitted to interrogation or signed anything during the
time he was held prisoner by the army.* Probably within a
matter of hours--of a day, at the longest--he was executed
by shooting. The army has never given any of the details
of Aidit's death or burial, which might have been used by
those wanting to make a martyr out of him.
The only document of those purportedly written by
Aidit after the coup that does appear genuine is a leiter
from Aidit to Sukarno, written in Solo on 2 October (it
will be remembered that Aidit asked Lieutenant Colonel
Sujoto to deliver a letter to Sukarno that evening). It
is not clear exactly how Aidit finally managed to have
it delivered to Sukarno, but apparently the President
received it on 6 October. Lukman could have brought it.
with him when he returned to Djakarta, after having been
with Aidit in Central Java; he saw Sukarno at the cabinet
meeting at Bogor on the morning of 6 October. In the
letter, Aidit notes that he is in good health and then
goes on to describe the coup as an internal army affair
in which the PKI should not meddle (although he states
his approval of such a "cleaning of the revolutionary
apparatus" and his condemnation of the General's Council).
He then recommends to Sukarno that he issue a presidential
directive along the following lines:
*A PKI member who was a companion of Aidit in hiding was
later interrogated by the Army. He is the source of much
of the information on Aidit after the coup, such as the
report that Aidit received a communication from Sukarno
around the middle of November (discussed on the following
page). Apparently, some of the information that this
source provided was, either deliberately or not, but in
any case, wrongly attributed to Aidit himself. At a ple�ry
meeting of the cabinet in Bogor on 15 January 1966, Sukarno
officially denied the validity of reports dealing with
the interrogation of Aidit,
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1. The settlement of the problem of the
30 September Movement lies solely in
the hands of the President.
2. Calm is required to reach a settlement.
3. All instruments of the revolution, particu-
larly the armed forces and political
organizations, and the press and radio
should operate as they did before the
30 September Movement.
4. Security problems should be turned over
to the police.
5. Mutual faultfinding and the making of
charges and counter-charges should be
forbidden.
The specific points are interesting inasmuch as they are
precisely the lines of action Sukarno tried to follow
after the coup. In almost every respect, they are com-
pletely contrary to the program of action urged on the
President by the army.
According to a PKI member who was Aidit's com-
panion in hiding and who was later interrogated by the
Army, President Sukarno answered Aidit's letter via a
courier in mid-November. Sukarno is reported to have
told Aidit that he was not yet able to make the kind of
speech Aidit recommended, that he was only able to make
speeches of a general nature. He said that he was "trying
to change the thinking of the commanders so that they will
think about something else besides the 30 September Move-
ment." Sukarno is also reported to have told Aidit that
he should not remain in Solo any longer: "Leave there
quickly and try as hard as you can to get back to Djakarta.
A pickup would encounter technical difficulties."
No other source has reported that Sukarno sent a
reply to Aidit's letter, so the information is unconfirmed.
However, it is quite possibly true. We know that just
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before his capture (which would have been just after he
received Sukarno's communication) Aidit was working on
a plan that would enable him to travel to Djakarta. This
suggests that he was following Sukarno's advice soon after
he received it. If it is true that Sukarno advised Aidit
to "get back to Djakarta," it suggests that -Sukarno may
have had some idea of offering him Presidential protection,
such as he offered Dani in allowing him to live at the
palace after the coup, or of providing him a means of
escape from Indonesia, which he also provided Dani and
which Aidit was unable to arrange himself. Otherwise, it
seems that Aidit would have been much safer in Central Java
-than in Djakarta.
Dani Under Sukarno's Protection
Before we look at Sukarno's actions after the coup,
there is one other important participant in events at Halim--
Air Force Chief of Staff Dani--whose actions after the coup
are of interest in connection with the coup. When President
Sukarno rejected Dani's request that they leave Halim and
go together to Madiun, Dani was forced to go on without him.
After he landed at Iswahjudi Air Force Base in Madiun, some-
time around 0600 hours on the morning of the. 2nd, he gave
a briefing to the officers on duty there, at which he is
known to have said that the President was at Halim almpst
all day, the day before, and that he (Sukarno) had rer.:eiv,
a report on the coup from General Supardjo personally, whotA--
Dani added--Sukarno patted on the back when he finished
giving the report. That afternoon Dani flew back to Semplak
Air Force Base in Bogor, with the obvious intention of re-
joining Sukarno, who was at his week-.end retreat at the
palace there. At a second briefing session for Air Force
officers at Semplak, Dani refused to explain the whole
incident of the coup because, he said, "it would bring in
the name of the President."*
*Two weeks later, Dani is reported to have called a meet-
ing of Air Force officers and told them not to mention the
President's name in connection withthe events that occurrEd
(footnote continued on page 85 )
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Dani stayed close to the President for many days.
He and his family moved into the palace at Bogor and
lived there with Sukarno until October 13th, when Sukarno
finally moved back to Djakarta. Even after that, Dani
continued to accept Sukarno's protection by staying on
in the palace at Bogor. On 19 October Sukarno arranged
for Dani to use his own private airplane to fly to Phnom
Penh, where he and his family lived in exile for six months,
in personal safety, which even Sukarno could not guarantee
in Indonesia, considering the mood of revenge of the Army
toward those involved in the coup. Sukarno had seemed to
yield to Army pressure in removing Dani as Chief of the
Air Force, but obviously he was not concerned with the
justice of punishing those responsible for the death of
the Army generals, as he made an outrage of any sense of
justice in the matter by immediately appointing Dani to
a new official position as a civilian--that of Minister
(footnote continued from page 84)
at Halim on 1 October. Actually Dani had been the
one to talk most about Sukarno's presence at Halim
that day. None of the other important participants in
the coup, who were also at Halim, had so casually--and
so unnecessarily--bandied about the name of the President
in connection with events at the airbase. Aidit,
Untung, Supardjo, Latief, Sujono, Sjam, and Pono are
not known to have made any reference to the fact that
Sukarno was there to anybody (until some of them were
forced to discuss various facts about the coup under
interrogation by the army, after they were captured).
Meanwhile, Dani had made several intriguing references
to the President in different briefings to Air Force
officers. He must have realized his error in doing
this and tried to undo the damage caused by it by
later ordering the Air Force not ever to mention Su-
karno's name in connection with events at Halim on
1 October.
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of Aviation--a job that provided an official excuse for
leaving the country.*
It is not clear why Dani finally agreed to return
to Indonesia in April 1966, when it seemed virtually
certain that he would only be tried and convicted for his
obvious involvement in the coup. Suharto's people are
known to have been in contact with him in both Paris and
Phnom Penh and to have urged him to return to give a full
account of what he knew about the coup. In letters ex-
changed with General Suharto, Dani apparently gave the
Army reason to think that he had information implicating
President 3ukarno in the planning of the coup. Either the
Army or Dani may have suggested some kind of a deal which
promised Dani a certain immunity if he told his story to
the authorities; there is nothing to substantiate this,
however.** Whatever the explanation, he voluntarily
returned to Indonesia and, immediately upon his returni,
was placed in custody by the Indonesian Army and later
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. His testimony
in court made none of the sensational revelations about
Sukarno that many people expected; instead, the case cen-
tered very much around his own role in the affair.***
*When Dani left Indonesia in October, it was reported'
in the press that he was leaving on an aircraft procurement
mission, the first stop of which would be Phnom Penh.
Later, in December, when he made a quidk trip to Par,
the same reason was given. Yet, in fact, he conducted no
such business in either place. In Paris, the Indonesian
Embassy personnel would have nothing to do with him;
although he claimed to be on an official mission on orders
from the President.
**According to several reports, Dani consented to return
to Indonesia after receiving assurances from the Army that
he would not be prosecuted if he testified in court against
Sukarno.
***In this connection, it is interesting to note that
Dani's leggthy testimony at the Sukrisno trial in July 1966
was never released to the press. Presumably, it implicated
Sukarno in the coup.
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There were several good reasons why Suharto may not have
wanted to turn Dani's trial into a trial against Sukarno.
At that point in time, he was primarily interested in
putting the blame on the PKI for the coup. He could af-
ford to wait on the matter of Sukarno. He copld always
threaten (and later did threaten) to use Dani as a wit-
ness against Sukarno in a public trial of the President
and in this way force concessions from Sukarno without
ever having to disclose Sukarno's involvement in the coup
in a trial. With the death of Aidit, Dani may have been
the only person who knew the full story of Sukarno's in-
volvement in the coup. As long as Sukarno lives, it
would seem that Suharto might want to keep Dani alive--as
a potential witness. It is interesting to note that,
as yet, he has not been executed, though he is under
sentence of death.
1.
Sukarno in a Losing Cause
As.for Sukarno's actions after the coup, leaving
aside for the moment the question of his involvement be-
forehand,* one can say nothing less than that they com-
mitted him to the side of the coup. Everything he did,
or said after the coup was in the interest of quieting
the national furor raised over the generals' deaths, pro-
tecting those involved in the coup, and restoring the
political situation to that existing before the coup.
Colonel Sarwo Edhy was the first Army commander
to meet with Sukarno after the coup. On the morning of
2 October he went to Bogor to confer with the President.
He asked Sukarno about the fate of the generals. After
*The question of Sukarno's involvement in the planning
of the coup is discussed in the last section of this
paper which deals with events leading up to the coup, in-
cluding the decision to stage the coup.
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a moment's pause, Sukarno replied that this was a common
matter in a revolution. Colonel Edhy reported this to
Nasution as soon as he left the Palace. It was this com-
ment of Sukarno that Nasution was referring to in his
speech of 20 February 1967:
Is it proper and acceptable for a healthy
mind to view the 30 September affair, which
shook the foundations of the life and liveli-
hood of the people and the state, as nothing
more than 'a ripple in the ocean of the revo-
lution'?
At a meeting with the armed forces commanders,*
which he called later that same afternoon at Bogor Palace
Sukarno rejected various suggestions for firm measures
against the Communists and other persons involved in the
coup; he insisted that such questions be left to him for
resolution. When Suharto asked him just what measures
he was going to take, Sukarno replied- 'Don't be stub-
born. Leave the political settlement to me ' Suharto
asked: "What about our missing generals? Sukarno re-
plied: "See, you are too stubborn. Leave it to me."
During the meeting, he turned to General Ad:Jie and said
"I have not appointed you to command the army because ytSu
are too stubborn and too much known as an anti-communist."
The generals left the meeting depressed and dissatisfied
but acquiescing to Sukarno.
*Present at the meeting were Sukarno, Deputy Prime
Minister Leimena, Dani, Suharto, Army General Adjie,
Pranoto, General Sabur, Police Commander Sutjipto, Navy
Commander Martadinata, Air Force Commander Sri Muljono
Herlambang, and several other army officers. According
to what is probably an apocryphal story, Suharto is re-
ported to have confronted Dani at the meeting. Holding
up a Chung rifle (Chinese-made rifle) that the Communist
volunteers had in their possession when they were dis-
armed by the army on the day of the coup, he demanded to
know: "Where did this come from?-
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In a brief speech broadcast from Bogor Palace on
the morning of 3 October, President Sukarno labelled as
untrue the charge made by Suharto in his radio broadcast
on the evening of 1 October that the Air Force was in-
volved in the 30 September Movement. He called for the
immediate establishment of an atmosphere of calm and
order, in which the Army and the Air Force would not be
set against each other. In his appeal for continued
unity, he emphasized the need for bolstering the anti-
Nekolim spirit--a bogus issue that he was again and again
to insert into the settlement of the coup. It was strik-
ing that there was no word of regret for what had happened
to the generals and no indication that the government
would take any action against those responsible for their
deaths and no word of appreciation for Suharto and the
forces under him who had moved to reestablish the govern-
ment's authority. There was no call to the PKI front
groups to surrender their arms--in fact, no reference to
the PKI at all. It was the beginning of a contest of
wills, with Sukarno trying desperately to create the im-
pression that the political situation had not changed as
a result of the coup and the Army insisting that every-
thing had changed.
The Army was quite understandably outraged by 4
Sukarno's refusal to honor the dead generals on the day
of their state funeral on Armed Forces Day (October 5th),
a day which originally had been planned as a national
celebration but which was now proclaimed to be a day of
official mourning. Sukarno did not attend the funeral
services. He added insult to injury, as far as the Army
was concerned, in designating Subandrio to represent him.
In this instance, perhaps for the first time, he offended
the conscience of the whole nation. The solemn funeral
procession through the center of Djakarta was watched by
thousands of silent onlookers who lined the streets ten
deep and by many thousands more watching on television.
The night before, film clips of the exhumation of the
bodies from the hasty grave at Lubang Buaja, which Suharto
had personally witnessed, had been shown on T.V., with
a short statement by Suharto about "the cruel murders of
our generals who were innocent." The next day, the nation
was still reeling in a state of deep emotional shock.
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Army Headquarters on the day of the generals funeral
Tr"6
The funeral procession as it leaves from Army Headquarters
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Armored trucks bearing the coffins
through the streets of Djakarta
t.
..1
Relatives and wives of the
generals arrive at the cemetery
The graves of the six
murdered generals
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General Nasution on the day of
the generals' funeral
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At the gravesite, Nasution, looking tired and desolate,
made a short speech in a voice breaking with emotion.
The whole diplomatic corps--except the Chinese�and all
of official Djakarta--except Sukarno--were there.
The next day Nasution's little daughter died of
wounds suffered during the raid on the Nasution home on
the night of 30 September-1 October. The poignant scene
of Mrs. Nasution carrying her daughter to the grave touched
the hearts of millions of people around the world. Expres-
sions of sympathy were received by the family from the
high and the low in Indonesia, from the leaders as well
as private citizens of many other countries, but not from
Sukarno. Sometime later, Sukarno is reported to have
summoned the Nasutions to the Palace. _Dewi reportedly
broke into tears when she saw "the sadness on Mrs. Nasu-
tion's face."* On this occasion, Sukarno uttered the
only words of compassion for the Nasutions that he ist.
ever known to have expressed.
*According to one story, Dewi turned to Sukarno and said:
"Bapak, why don't you punish those communists who can do
such brutal things to people like this?" Sukarno told her:
You don't understand these matters. They are more complicated
than a woman can understand."
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Because of the critical condition of his daughter
that morning, Nasution had not been present at the cabinet
meeting called by Sukarno at Bogor at 1000 hours on 6
October. Dani and Subandrio, both of whom were now liv-
ing at the Palace at Bogor, attended, staying close to
Sukarno throughout the four-hour meeting. Njoto and
Lukman of the PKI were also there, but not Aidit.*
Sukarno delivered a brief description of events of the
week, along with an exhortation that the people's fears
and resentments must be calmed. In the course of his
recital of events, he did condemn the savage killings
--for the first time--and he said that he did not sanction
the Revolutionary Council "since only the President can
dissolve the Cabinet." His remarks suggested that these
were the only two things about the coup that he had not
approved--the murdering of the generals and the establish-
ment of the Revolutionary Council with the announcement
that the Dwikora Cabinet was dissolved He propose0 that
all newspapers, including the PKI's Harian Rakjat, now
be allowed to resume publication. (The military refused
to permit this.)
*After the cabinet meeting, Njoto and Lukman are re-
ported to have talked in private with Sukarno, who urged
the PKI to remain calm. Sukarno promised to take action
within a week to protect the party. Njoto and Lukman
are reported to have asked Sukarno not to appoint Suharto
as the new army commander since Suharto was known to be
anti-PKI. Sukarno said that he would take care of this
matter also. On 9 October, when still the PKI had received
no decision from Sukarno and there had been no abeyance
in the Army's campaign against the party, Njoto and Luk-
man went to Bogor again to see the President. This time,
however, they were not allowed to see him nor were they
permitted to deliver a letter they had prepared for him
asking for his decision. For a long time after that, the
PKI waited patiently for the protection that Sukarno had
promised the party. But this time, Sukarno was not able
to save the PKI.
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Subandrio was the chief spokesman at the cabinet
meeting; he argued at length that the events of the past
week suggested to him that a U.S. and British invasion
of Indonesia was imminent and, thus, Indonesians should
avoid "intra-familial squabbling." Several other ministers
gave their opinion. Then Sukarno spoke again, telling
of past attempts on his life and his ability always to
forgive and not be vengeful (he compared himself to the
prophet Mohammed who, in the course of much experience,
had never given precedence to revenge). He said he al-
ways thought only of the revolution and how to safeguard
it-and never of himself or of taking revenge on his enemies;
this he said, was what Indonesians should do now.* The
cabinet meeting ended with a moment of silence for Indo-
nesia's dead heroes.
In public, Sukarno did not condemn the killing of
the generals, as he had at least done in private at lqbe
cabinet meeting. In connection with the matter of the
killings, he sought by every means he could to discredit
the official Army version of just how the generals had
been killed. The following incident is a good illustra-
tion of his persistent efforts after the coup to tone
down the atrocity stories that were being told about the
death of the generals. Major General Sutjipto claimed '
to have been shocked by a conversation he had with the
President two weeks after the coup. According to Sutjipto,
Sukarno complained about the exaggerated press coverage
*President Sukarno made his concern for the revolution
the primary subject of his public remarks after the coup,
in an obvious effort to direct attention away from the
events of 1 October to the ongoing revolution, which re-
quired the unified efforts of all Indonesians under his
leadership. Thus, in his speech of 23 October 1965, he
said; "It is not a matter of myself: It is not the
matter of the generals: It is not the matter of the
hundreds of Pemuda Rakjat members who have been killed:
It is none of these things: It is the matter of the
revolution: The revolution must go on:"
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of the generals' murders. He said that the three generals
still alive when they reached Lubang Buaja had been executed
"in an orderly and graceful manner by the decision of a
kind of people's court." According to Sukarno, the gen-
erals were blindfolded before being shot and the execution-
ers "apologized first" before killing them. It was almost
as if Sukarno was trying to give a certain legality to
the proceedings at Lubang Buaja that morning. General
Sutjipto would probably have accused Sukarno of telling
a deliberate lie about the circumstances of the generals'
deaths, since he (Sutjipto) was probably convinced of
the truth of some of the wilder stories of atrocities at
Lubang.Buaja. Actually, as suggested earlier, Sukarno's
version of what happened at Lubang Buaja may have been
a rather accurate description of events--though his pur-
pose in insisting on his version was obviously not just
to establish the truth. The incident definitely suggests
that Sukarno had his own sources of information on Ievents
at Lubang Buaja (presumably, the coup leaders themselves)
and was not convinced by the army version of events.
After Sukarno told General Sutjipto that the reports of
PKI cruelties published in the newspapers were untrue
and that General Suprapto, Sutojo, and Parman were shot
"at the �decision of a kind of people's court at Lubang
Buaja," General Sutjipto asked the President where he' got
this information. Sukarno is reported to have tried to
avoid the question, saying that General Sutjipto should
not be so emotional.
On other occasions Sukarno tried to belittle the
fact of the generals' murder. In the course of an inter-
view in early 1966, he was asked about the coup. He passed
off the question with the comment that he didn't know why
there was so much interest in the coup, since it only
involved the murder of six generals, compared to the
slaughter of thousands of Communists in the horrible after-
math of the coup. He went on to say that he thought that
"those people instigating the anti-PKI massacres, namely,
the Army and the CIA, ought to be brought to trial." On
this and other occasions, Sukarno never showed any parti-
cular sympathy for the martyred generals.
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Moreover, in the three years since the coup, Sukarno
has never sought to change the initial impression he gave
of his attitude towards the 30 September Movement. He
has never said that the coup was counter-revolutionary;
in fact, he has never suggested that the 30 September Move-
ment was carrying out a coup at all. Although the guilt
of the PKI in planning the coup has long since been estab-
lished, he has refused to place the blame on the PK1.
His speeches have continued to favor the PKI, which he
has praised as the party that has suffered the most casu-
alties and displayed the most merit in the Indonesian
revolution. For months after the coup he resisted mount-
ing pressure in favor of banning the PKI; since its dis-
solution by Suharto, he has regretted the action.
In the months following the coup, Sukarno made
several brave, but as it turned out, futile attempts to
restore the balance of power to its pre-coup status quo.
Perhaps the most striking thing about his major political
moves after the coup was their demonstration of his utter
contempt for Nasution and his basic hostility toward the
army. If it was not completely clear before the coup,
his post-coup politics certainly made it unmistakably
clear that he was quite prepared to take the most obvious
and drastic steps--without any pretense what_soever--to "
eliminate the army as a serious contender for power. That
he might have been involved in an attempt to eliminate
the top leadership of the army in the way of the 30 Septem-
ber Movement is not at all out of keeping with tte trend
of his politics before the coup and especially after the
coup. Sukarno acted absolutely contrary to Nasution's
recommendations on the matter of a Presidential Order re-
establishing law and order and upholding justice after
the coup. His Presidential Order of 21 October was modeled
closely after the six-point recommendation of Aidit for
a political settlement of the coup; it altogether ignored
Nasution's five main proposals, including One for estab-
lishing a special tribunal to 'hear testimony on the events
of the coup and the activities of those involved in it.
When in February 1966 Sukarno finally announced his long-
awaited "political solution" to the coup, it was nothing
Jess than a direct challenge to Nasution and the Army.
In a bold move to restore the pre-coup Nasakom cabinet
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(in which all major political parties including the Com-
munist Party were represented), Sukarno announced the
formation of a new cabinet on 21 February, which was al-
most identical to the old cabinet except for the absence
of four names: Aidit and Njoto of the PKI (who were dead),
Admiral Martadinata, a strong supporter of Nasution and
Suharto, and--Nasution. If the President would dare to
dismiss Nasution in February 1966, when the latter had
the sympathy and respect of a whole nation after the tragic
events that had befallen his family and his associates
as a result of the 30 September MoVement, how much more
likely would he have been to eliminate him from the scene
four months earlier?
As is well known, Sukarno's challenge to the Army
and to Nasution did not go unanswered.* This time, real-
izing full well that it was Sukarno or the Army--since
*Many people thought that Nasution would react to his
dismissal from the cabinet by taking power forcibly.
But if they did, they were sadly disappointed; for he
did not react in any such way. He seemed almost not-to
react at all; he just seemed to accept his dismissal,
without one word of protest. As he confided to friends
later, All I could think about at the time was my
daughter and the sadness of my wife."
But if he was still in a state of shock and unable
to react to the momentous events on the political scene,
there were other leaders in the Army and other people in
Indonesia--namely, the students--who reacted strongly
to Nasution's dismissal. A new force in Indonesian poli-
tics had been born in January 1966 with the first of many
student demonstrations against Sukarno; in March, there
were more demonstrations against the dropping of Nasution
and Martadinata from the cabinet and the inclusion of
Subandrio and Dani in it. It is difficult to say who led
whom, whether it was a case of the Army leading the stud-
ents or vice versa. It is a fact that elements of the
RPKAD, dressed in civilian clothes, took the lead in many
of the student demonstrations. On the other hand, the
Army would probably not have moved against Sukarno with
the courage that it did if the students had not provided
support and encouragement. It was clearly a case of the
Army and the students reinforcing one another.
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,
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Student demonstrations against Sukarno after the coup
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t.
Students demanding the trial of Sukarno
Students demonstrating against Sukarno at the Medical Faculty grounds
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Sukarno was now obviously the sworn enemy of the Army--
the Army leadership decided to do what it had never
really done before--fight back against Sukarno. The out-
come of that struggle is now well known. In March 1967,
'one year after Sukarno defied the Army by dropping Nasu-
tion from the cabinet, the Army finally won the battle,
when Sukarno was forced to surrender all his powers as
President of Indonesia.*
- *In March 1966, there was a dramatic confrontation
between Sukarno and the Army. At the first meeting of
the newly appointed cabinet on 11 March, Sukarno and
Subandrio received word that it looked as though the Army
was about to move against the Palace. At the time, the
Palace, which was where the cabinet was meeting, was un-
der a virtual state of seige. The Army had surrounded
the place to block the entry of the cabinet members into
the Palace for the cabinet meeting. The meeting had gone
on as scheduled only because Sukarno arranged to have the
cabinet members flown in by helicopter. In the midst of
the meeting, Sukarno and Subandrio received a message
that prompted them to leave the meeting at that very mordent,
so promptly, in fact, that Subandrio is reported to have
left his shoes behind. As they drove out of Djakarta on
their way to Bogor, there was a dramatic confrontation
between the RPKAD and the Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard. For
a moment, it looked as though there would be an armed
clash, but this was averted when the RPKAD allowed Sukarno
to pass.
A week later, the Army took force into its own hands
On 18 March, a number of cabinet members, including Suban-
drio, were arrested on Army orders. Sukarno held out an-
other whole year. Considering the odds that were against
him, it was a remarkable performance. But, in the end,
he was finally forced to surrender his powers as President
of Indonesia in March 1967.
For a good account of the Army-Sukarno struggle for
power after the coup, see Indonesian Upheaval by John
Hughes, David McKay Company, Inc., 1967.
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Former President Sukarno
President Suharto
,
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� � �
7,-; "s�s, ��
� �� ; � �
���
�
vy
General Nasution (center) and Suharto (right) after
the latter became Acting President of Indonesia
Acting President Suharto (right) and Chairman of the MPRS Nasution
(center) inspect a model of the new Indonesian Parliament Building
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The Conspiracy
Two years after the coup, only two of the twenty-
or-so persons who figured most prominently in the coup
and probably together knew the whole story of the coup
are still alive today and have not been interrogated by
the Indonesian Army. Those two are Sukarno and Pono,
the latter of whom is still at large, having managed to
escape capture by the Army longer than any of the others.
Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto of the PKI were killed resist-
ing capture or soon afterward, before they could be in-
terrogated. The principal military figures in the coup
--Untung, Latief, Sujono, Supardjo, and Dani--and the
following PKI officials--Njono, Sudisman, Pens Pardede,
and Sjam--plus former foreign minister Subandrio were
arrested and interrogated at length before being tried
for treason and sentenced to death.*
*In September 1968, President Suharto admitted for
the first time that Untung and three other military lead-
ers of the coup had been executed in Deci-mber 1967. ,It
seems certain that Sujono was one of the three besides
Untung, as there were reports at the time that he and
Untung had been executed together. Probably, Latief was
one of the other two who were executed.
On 2 October 1968 President Suharto turned down tie
clemency appeals of nine other accused conspirators in
the coup. Among those denied clemency were Sudisman,
Njono, Supardjo, and Sjam, all of whom were under sentence
of death. Njono and Sudisman were promptly executed on
29 October. As of mid-November, Sjam and Supardjo were
not known for sure to have been executed, but it is
expected that they will be soon, if the have not been
already.
If it is true that Sujono and Latief were two of the
three military leaders of the coup executed at the same
time as Untung, that would leave only Dani and Pono (who
has not yet been captured) alive of the principal figures
(footnote continued on page 98)
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In addition to these principals in the coup, hun-
dreds of other persons have been arrested and interrogated
in connection with the coup. Some, like Lt. Dul Arieff
.who was in command of the troops sent to kidnap the gen-
erals, and Major Bambang Supeno and Major Sukirno, the Com-
manding Officers of the 530th and 454th Battalions, who
were held responsible for their actions in the coup, have
received prison sentences. Others, like Sgt. Sujatno,
whose home on Halim Air Force Base was used by the Central
Command, and other of the military officers and men who
fought on the side of the coup but who did so under false
impressions created by their superior officers, have been
relieved of any responsibility in the matter; they have
provided valuable information about the leaders of the
coup, their activities before the coup; and their actions
on 1 October. In addition, there were witnesses to the
scene--such as the family members of the generals at home
on the night of 30 September-1 October and the witnesses
to the murder scene at Lubang Buaja later that morning
and witnesses to the later travels of Aidit and others.
All these and countless other people who might have known
something about PKI planning and activities before the
coup or something about the thinking and/or actions of
men like Untung or Sujono before the coup have also been
exhaustively interrogated by the Army. Probably, by now
the Indonesian Army knows everything that it will ever
know about the 30 September Movement. It is not likely
that Sukarno will ever tell what he knows. Certain things
(footnote continued from page 97)
in the coup. There is good reason for Suharto to want
to keep Dani alive so long as there is any chance of
Sukarno's ever being tried for his role in the coup.
(According to the latest reports, Suharto has ordered
an interrogation of Sukarno to begin in early 1969.)
Dani and Subandrio are probably the only two people who
know the full story of Sukarno's involvement in the coup,
except, of course, for Aidit, who is dead. As mentioned
previously, Dani is reported to have implicated the Presi-
dent in the planning of the coup in secret testimony he
gave the Army after he turned himself in to the Army.
Both Dani and Subandrio are under sentence of death; both
have appealed to President Suharto for clemency. So far
as we know, Suharto has taken no action on their clemency
pleas.
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about the coup--such as Sukarno's and Aidit's precise
roles in the coup and Dani's relations with both of them--
will probably never be known for sure. But it has been
the history of conspiracies, especially those involving
persons in high office, that certain facts have remained
unproven and thus always open to some doubt.
As good a history of the Indonesian coup of 30
September 1965 as could ever be written could probably
be written at this time, some three years after the
event--if one had access to all the information that the
Indonesian Army has. Obviously, no one outside of a few
persons in the Indonesian Army has seen all the evidence;
but enough has become available during the past three
years that we can feel reasonably sure that we have not
only the main facts about the coup as it occurred on 1 Octo-
ber; but also most, if not all, of what is known about the
conspiracy behind the events of that day. Of courste, the
information about the conspiracy is based entirely on the
interrogation of the people involved in the conspiracy, in
contrast to our knowledge of the events of the coup itself
and the days immediately following, which comes from a
great variety of sources. Naturally, this kind of evi-
dence must be considered in a slightly different light
than the evidence that was presented in the first two'
sections of this paper dealing with the coup and the events
afterward. For a fuller discussion of the validity of the
evidence that is presented in this third section of the
paper, we refer the reader to the discussion of the interro-
gation reports that is included in. the Appendix.*
*See the Appendix on pp. 311-316: "Some Comments on
the Interrogation Reports".
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The Role of the PK1 Spe.Aal Bureau
The actual planning for the coup was started and
finishfd in the one month of September 1965 in the course
of se.en or eight meetings, which were held late in the
evening either at the homesof Capt. Wahjudi, Col. Latief,
oi Sjam, or at Lubang Buaja. Altogether, eleven persons
were involved in these meetings: Sjam, Pono, Untung,
Latief, Sujono, Capt. Wahjuci, Major Agus Sigit, Gen.
Supardjo, Walujo, and two unidentified women. Not all were
present at every meeting; the last four persons .named at-
tcaded only one meeting, that of 29 September, Only Sjam,
Untung, and Latief attended every meeting.
As of the beginning of September 1965, Untung, the
Commander of the 1st Battalion of the Tjakarabirawa Presi-
dential Guard, Latief, the Commander of the 1st Infantry
Brigade of the Djakarta Command, and Sujono, Regimental
Commander of the Halim Air Force Base Defense Troops, all
stationed in Djakarta, had never met one another. They
had something very much in common, however, which was soon
to bring them into a fateful alliance. They each had for
some time been having regular contacts with highly-placed
PKI agents, who were none other than the second and third
men in charge of the PKI's super-secret Special Bureau,
charged with infiltrating the military organization. In
the case of Latief and Sujono, their PKI contact man--or
"pembina" as they called him--was a man called Pono; in
the case of Untung, it was a certain Walujo.
These two men are now known to have been the close
associates of a third man--a man called Sjam--another deep-
cover PKI agent, who was a close friend and trusted as-
sociate of Aidit in the inner circle of the PKI leadership.
Sjam had joined the PKI in 1948, having known Aidit for
several years before that. When Aidit was arrested in
1948 upon his return from China, Sjam is supposed to have
"assisted him greatly" while he was in prison. For a num-
ber of years, he was head of the Ship and Dock Workers
Union, an affiliate of the PKI national front organization
for trade unions. It is not clear when he was elected to
the Central Committee of the party, but about 1960 he became
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a member of the Organization Department of the Central Com-
mittee which was headed by Aidit himself.* In November
1964, Sjam was given the special assignment of heading a
new covert organization that was set up directly under
Aidit anddharged with carrying out special duties (mainly
covert operations) such as infiltrating the armed services.
Even the existence of the Special Bureau was a secret with-
in the PKI; it is not exactly clear who, besides Aidit,
knew anything about it. One would think that the four other
members of the Standing Council of the Politburo (Lukman,
Njoto, Sudisman, and Sakirma4 must have known, but, judging
from his interrogation report, Sudisman did not. Neither
Njono, a member of the Politburo, nor Pens Pardede, a
member of the central committee and a candidate member of
the Politburo, appears to have had specific knowledge of
the Special Bureau.**
*Before the Special Bureau was set up as an autonomous
organization that was completely free of the control of
the central committee or the politburo, with absolute
authority over its own organization, administration, per-
sonnel, logistics, etc., the Organization Department of
the Central Committee directed all illegal activities of
the PKI. After the formation of the Special Bureau, in-
filtration- of the armed forces which had been carried on
by the Organization Department was transferred to tte
Bureau. Infiltration of government organs, political par-
ties, and mass organizations vas still conducted by the
Organization Department, %inch Hutapea headed after 1965.
**Actually, it is not too surprising that Njono and Pens
Pardede and even Sudisman, a member of the Standing Coun-
cil of the Politburo, did not know about the Special Bureau.
According to Communist Chinese'doctrine-on the "Coordination of
the Legal and Illegal Struggle";
The very existence of a secret or covert com-
munist organization must be unknown, its per-
sonnel must be unknown as Communists, its
work carried on in complete anonymity. It
is unknown not only to hostile security
(footnote continued on page 102)
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Siam himself has provided the fullest account of
the organization and functions of the PKI Special Bureau.
Under interrogation by the Army in mid-1967, he stated
the following:
The Special Bureau was the Party's special
apparatus which handled special affairs,
namely work which could not be accomplished
through the other overt apparatus, primarily
in the military field and other fields which
had to be undertaiten clandestinely.
The Central Special Bureau was the special
apparatus of Comrade Chairman of the CC/PK1,
Aidit. The regional Special Bureaus were
branches of the Central Special Bureau. They
executed activities in the regions and were
responsible to the Central Special Bureau.
Horizontal relations among the Regional
Special Bureaus were not permitted.
(footnote continued from page 101)
forces and the general public--it is unknown
even to all except a few of the overt party,
if there is one. Only the topmost leader-
ship of the legal party knows of even the
existence of the secret party much less the
identities of its members, and even this top-
most leadership knows the identity only of
the secret center....
Only the center of the secret party has
any contact whatever with any element of the
legal party. The cadres of the secret party
are not in hiding--on the contrary, they are
living open, normal lives in the community.
It is their status as members of a secret,
revolutionary organization, dedicated to the
violent overthrow of the regime, which is
illegal.
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The leadership of the Central Special Bureau
consisted of the following; [the names of
persons involved in the coup have been under-
lined for emphasis]
1. Kamarusaman (Sjam)-whose duty was to co-
ordinate the work of the entire bureau,
both central and regional offices; in
addition, to assist in the management
of Special Bureau contacts within and
outside the Armed Forces. [In this con-
nection, Sjam stated; 'I directly handled
(cultivated, managed) the following Armed
Forces members; Gen. Supardjo, Major
Suganda, Col. Sidik, Capt. Sumedi, Col.
Mustofa, Col. Pasha (who never executed
the Party tasks given him), and others
whom I cannot remember. I also directlyl
managed non-military government officials;
among them Djunta Suwardi of the Customs
and Excises Office, who was a sympathizer
but not a party member.']
2. Marsudidjojo (Pono)-the second in command
whose job was to manage PKI cells* within
*"Cells" may not be the best translation of the word
used by Sjam. These were not Communist party cells in
the ordinary- sense of the word. The way the word is
used in connection with the operations of the Special
Bureau, it refers to the officers in a particular mili-
tary unit who were being "managed" by the same 'manager"
or "organizer" from the Special Bureau; most often, they
were not Communist party members but Communist sympathizers.
In this sense, Col. Latief, Major Sigit, Captain Suradi
and Captain Wahjudi composed a "cell" within the First In-
fantry Brigade; in other words, they were the men from
the First Infantry Brigade with whom Pono had succeeded
in establishing regular contact. In theory, at least,
there was supposed to be no horizontal contact between
(footnote continued on page 104)
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the First Infantry Brigade of KODAM V,
consisting of Col. Latief, Major Sigit,
Capt. Suradi, and Capt. Wahjudi; the Air
Force Defense Troops, consisting of
Major Sujono, Capt. Gatot and others;
the Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard, consist-
ing of Marj. Slamet among others; the Army
Department, including Gen. Pranoto among
others; KODAM V Military Police; and the
police force (not: yet set up).
3. Stibono (Walujo)-the third man in command
whose assignment concerned finances as
well as the cultivation of party cells
in the Air Force, consisting-of Air
Marshal Omar Dani, Air Commodore Siswadi,
Col. Heru Atmodjo, and others; and the
(footnote continued from page 103)
members of the same cell. They did not meet together,
as a group, with their "manager", as members of the
same Communist party cell in any Communist party or-
ganization attend regular meetings of the cell. There
was only a vertical relationship between these men
and their manager. In short, it was more of an intel-
ligence organization than an extension of the Communist
party organization.
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Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard, consisting of
Col. Untung, Lt. Col. Ali Ebram, 1st Lt.
Dul Arief, and others.
4. Two other members of the Central Special
Bureau worked in the field of management
training within the special bureau and
also managed Party members within the
Navy. A sixth was assigned to the secre-
tariat of the Special Bureau (admin,
documentation, etc.) as his basic task
while he also managed party members and
sympathizers in private business and govern-
ment in Djakarta. The seventh member of
the Central Special Bureau worked in the
general field of providing information
on youth, worker, peasant movements, etc.
5. There were also five staff members assist-
ing the Central Special Bureau as medical
officers, messengers, etc.
Under the Central Bureau, there were 10 regional
Special Bureaus, one for: the Djakarta Raya
area, West Java, Central Java, Bali, South
Kalimantan, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South
Sumatra, Riau, and the South Celebes.
According to Sjam, the Special Bureau was "charged
with the task of preparing for armed struggle," which was
not the official policy of the PKI at the time. Aidit seems
definitely to have been opposed to the adoption of a mili-
tant line on revolutionary armed struggle in Indonesia;
as long as things were going so well for the PKI under
Sukarno's protection, he believed that the best policy
for the PKI was one of strong support for Sukarno, the
renunciation of force as the way to gain power in Indonesia,
and the espousal of the peaceful, parliamentary road to
"socialism." Sjam himself may have favored a more militant
domestic policy. After the coup, he is known to have argued
in favor of armed struggle by the PKI against the Army.
His position as chief of the Special Bureau in charge of
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covert activities (including preparations for armed strug-
gle) also suggests a natural inclination in that direction.*
Despite Aidit's preference for legal struggle over
armed struggle--at least, so long as Sukarno lived--he
might be considered to have made one concession to the argu-
ment for armed struggle in late 1964, when he set up the
Special Bureau as the special covert apparatus of the
party charged with the task of preparing for armed strug-
gle, in addition to its other covert duties. He was look-
ing ahead to the time when Sukarno would no longer be around
to balance the PKI against the Army; some kind of a show-
down with the Army seemed almost inevitable after Sukarno's
death.
.It does not seem to have been Aidit's policy to arm
PKI party members (which would have involved the covert
shipment of relatively large quantities of arms to the PKI
from abroad); instead, he seems to have settled on a policy
of PKI infiltration and subversion of the Armed Forces.
Rather than train and arm his own armed force, pretty much
from the beginning, he seems to have concentrated his ef-
forts on subverting the Indonesian military. To this end,
his main targets within the military seem to have been
middle-grade officers in positions of command. If the
PKI could win the loyalty of these officers, he figured
that he could count althe men under their command to fol-
low their orders; in a showdown with the army, these units
would defect to the side of the PKI.
The extent of PKI penetration of the military was
certainly never realized by the army leadership before the
coup; it clearly came as a surprise and a shock to Nasution
and Suharto and the other army generals after the coup
*In 1962 Sjam visited Communist China, North Vietnam,
and North Korea for the purpose of studying -people's revo-
lutionary warfare." He received special intelligence
training in the preparation and activation of armed rebel-
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when they learned about the operations of the PKI and
the Special Bureau from the confessions of Untung, Latief,
Sjam, and others. The extent of the penetration was
shockingly evident in one fact that was revealed--that
Sjam himself had acted as a double agent in pretending
to be an informer for the Djakarta Military Command.
From 1955 until the outbreak of the 30 September Move-
ment, he had passed reports on the PKI and other poli-
tical parties to the Army, in the process of which he
had gained information on such things as the organiza-
tional structure and personnel of the Djakarta Command
and other Army offices, the political views of Army of-
ficers, and the political analysis of the Army. Sjam
claims that he learned about the Generals' Council in
this way.
PKI Recruitment of the Military Officers
t.
As noted above and also made clear from the dates
of Sjam's early activities as a double agent. the PKI pro-
gram of infiltration in the armed services pre-dated the
formation of the Special Bureau. We have good evidence
that the party was active along these lines in the early
1950's and thereafter, although its activities were no
doubt very much stepped up after 1964, when all illegal
operations of the PKI in the Armed Forces were transferred
from the Organizational Department of the Central Commit-
tee to the Special Bureau under Sjam. Untung, for instance,
was first recruited by the PKI sometime around 1950.
At the tilre he was stationed in Solo, and it was there
that he met two PKI cadres named Sudarmo and Slamet.
Prior to that, he had had no direct contact with the
party, although he was known to have Communist sympathies
and to have fought on the side of the Cdmmunists in the
Madiun uprising of 1948. From 1950 until January 1965,
when he was transferred to Djakarta, Untung had regular
meetings with Sudarmo and Slamet. Very shortly after he
arrived in Djakarta, he was contacted by another pm mem-
ber--named Walujo--in very much the same way that he had
first met Sudarmo and Slamet in Solo. Since he had moved
to Djakarta, he now came under the direct management of
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the Central Special Bureau of the PKI; his new contact
man, Walujo, was none other than the #3 man in charge
of PKI illegal activities in the Armed Services.
Under interrogation by the Army, Untung later de-
scribed his meetings with Walujo in Djakarta. He said
that they usually took place at-the Officers' Mess during
his off-duty hours "in an atmosphere of secrecy." The
subjects discussed were normally the political situation
and the concepts and speeches of Sukarno. As Walujo de-
scribed the political situation to Untung, the "implemen-
tation of Sukarno's concepts--such as Nasakom and the
5th force--was impossible because of the Armed Forces,
which were against these concepts." In their discussions,
Walujo repeatedly referred to the high standard of living
of the senior Army generals who were "against Sukarno."
Untung has said:
All the time I was in Djakarta and meeting
with Walujo, my promoter in ideology, he
always provided me with indoctrination re-
garding the economic difficulties of soldiers
nowadays and the fact that there was no
longer any loyalty to the Generals from
their subordinates, which in my view was
true; he also provided me with information
on the existence of the Generals' Council,
which was also mentioned to us later during
our meetings with Sjam.
There can be no doubt that these meetings had a
profound effect on Untung. He has been described by one
source who knew him well as "a simple man, dedicated to
Sukarno but politically naive. He could easily be in-
fluenced by others." Another has described him as being
of "unimpressive intellect, fanatically devoted to Sukarno."
He was a rigid Moslem who "deplored luxury and depravity
and resented the high life and immorality of some of the
senior generals. He was not a clever man." "He was physi-
cally but not 'intellectually impressive" according to an-
other. The PKI had obviously picked their man well. Un-
tung would be amenable to their control; and now, with
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his transfer to Djakarta and his new assignment as bat-
talion commander of the Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard,
he was particularly well-placed, from the point of view
of the PKI.*
*After the Madiun uprising of 1948, in which Untung
fought on the side of the Communists, his military career
was in eclipse for a period of years. In the West Irian
Campaign of May 1962, however, he distinguished himself
as commander of one of the two companies of the 454th
Battalion ,that were air-dropped into Irian. As the hero
of the campaign, he was soon promoted from captain to
major, and from then on, his career was on the upgrade
He was appointed commander of the 454th Battalion and,
a few months before the coup, was given the prestigious
assignment of battalion commander in the Tjakrabirawa
Palace Guard. Only 40 years old in 1965, Untung had a
promising future in the Army at the time of the coup.
On 19 February 1963, on his return from Irian, Untung
was presented with a medal by President Sukarno. The
scene was the lawn of Merdeka Palace in the presence of
the diplomatic corps and high government officials. The
major was clad for the occasion in battle dress; behind
him in similar array stood five companies from the guer-
rilla force. Following Untung's report, Sukarno pinned
medals on his chest and those of his associate guerr:lia
leaders, amidst applause from the assembled public. A
few days later, Sukarno entertained the heroes with "an
evening of merriment."
An Indonesian reporter who interviewed Untung shortly
after his return from West Irian was struck by Untung's
"display of sincere emotion." Asked to comment on his
memories of his service as an Irian paracommando, Untung
"assumed a sad expression and replied, his voice choked
with emotion";
Yes, the name Gunung Ginopa (a town in West
Irian) has been a beacon flashing to our
souls every second. Gunung Ginopa is the
symbol of our sacrifice, the symbol of ex-
treme loyalty and of suffering not easily
(footnote continued on page 110)
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The Planning of the Coup
Untung's activities on behalf of the coup began
on 4 September 1965--less than a month before the event.
On that day, in the course of a regular meeting with
Untung, Walujo mentioned that he wanted Untung to meet
a certain Col. Latief, Major Sujono, and Captain Wahjudi.
He said that he would make arrangements to introduce Un-
tung to them.
(footnote continued from page 109)
forgotten. We have immortalized Gunung Ginopa
as the name of the Heroes' Cemetery there.
Thirty-five of our people lie there, forever...
our comrades from the same unit...our comrades
who dropped from the same airplane.
A quite different picture of Untung was given by a
lieutenant who served under him in the Irian campaign.
According to the lieutenant, Untung was very ambitious.
When he was about to be dropped into Irian he was still
a captain but was given the local rank of major for the
occasion; he refused to jump until he had been given
the insignia of his new rank, and so another major gave
his up for Untung. According to Untung's fellow officer,
Untung was known as an atheist, a loner, and cruel. On
landing in Irian he abandoned one of his men in the jungle
because he was disabled, on the argument that it was
better one should die than that all should be placed in
difficulty. Although he prevented his men from picking
up transitor radios while in Irian, he himself brought
back several, which he got by blackmailing some Chinese.
Presumably, the truth about Untung's character lies
somewhere between these two extremes. One thing that
seems clear is that he tended to be rather puritanical
and strict with his men.
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On the same day, Col. Latief--who had been having
regular meetings with another deep-cover PKI agent who
was Walujo's immediate superior as the #2 man in the
Special Bureau, a man whom Latief knew only as Pono--was
approached by his contact man on the same matter. As
Latief has described it:
Around the beginning of September on a day
and date which I have forgotten,* Pono
(whom I had already met) arrived at my
house with another person, whom he identi-
fied only as Sjam. During this meeting,
Pono told me that within a few days there
would be a meeting of several comrades
from the military at the house of Captain
Wahjudi. During this meeting, Pono did
not talk much but said that in two days
I would be picked up and brought to the
house of Capt. Wahjudi, while Sjam at
that time did not say a word.
*Although Latief says that Sjam and Pono came to
his home "around the beginning of September on a day
and date which I have forgotten," he then goes on to
describe what happened "two days later." The events
that he describes are known to have occurred on 6
September, which would date his first meeting with
Sjam on 4 September.
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The First Meeting: The Participants Meet
Two days later, thE first "get-acquainted" meeting
of the men who were to plan and lead the 30 September Move-
ment was held at Capt. Wahjudi'S home late on the evening
of 6 September 1965.* Presumably, the othertmen had been
informed of the meeting in much the same way that Untung
And Latief had been told. Around 2000 hours, Pono arrived
at Latief's house and invited him to go with him to Wah-
judi's home. Latief recalled that
we arrived at Capt. Wahjudi's.home together,
around 2030. There I found Lt. Col. Untung,
Air Force Major Sujono, Infantry Major Agus
Sigit, Wahjudi, Pono, and Sjam.- All seven
of us entered the dining room, and after we
spt down all the doors were closed. Then
Pono introduced Sjam to us all; he said:
'Comrades, Mr. Sjam is a comrade of ours who
will join us and lead further discussions.'
Then Sjam took over the meeting, and the
first thing that he mentioned was the.Gen-
erals' Council. Perhaps he did this to
attract our attention. He spoke as follows:
'At the present time the ekisting Generals'
Council is sabotaging the concepts of the
great leader of the revolution...If the Presi-
dent should become ill, there is a great
possibility that the generals will take over
the government. If this haribens, of course,
the situation would become Worse and they would
destroy the PKI and other prtigressive parties.
Thus at the present time we must as quickly as
possible to set up or plan a new government
through establishing a revolutionary council
*At his trial, Untung was asked why the first meeting
was held at Wahjudi's house and not at his house. Untung
replied: "the reason for that was that the appointed
place for the meeting had to guarantee a maximum of security
and could not be a place where there v)ere' a lot of people
around."
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which will be supported by the progressive
and revolutionary parties and mass organi-
zations.'
After having heard the remarks of Sjam,
there was a reaction on our part and
because the meeting was not very well
regulated, questions arose all at once
which more or less centered on the revo-
lutionary council and how it would be
set up. Sjam answered; 'you need not
know that. Everything'will be regulated.'
Then we asked who the leaders of this
council would be and Sjam said we would
find out later.
Because it was very late and we began chatting
among ourselves, it was planned for us to L
meet again three days later.
Wahjudi, Untung, and Sujono have given their own
accounts of the first meeting of the coup group on 6 Septem-
ber, which all tend to confirm the essential truth of
Latief's recollection of the event. Only Wahjudi fails
to note the presence there of one of the other six men
(he forgets Sujono); otherwise, there is complete agree-
ment as to who was there. Wahjudi"s account is the most
amusing of all in his profession of great surprise when
these men suddenly arrived at his home for a meeting he
claims he knew nothing about in advance;
At the time I did not actually know that a
meeting was to be held, but then Col. Latief
arrived with two men, and then some other
persons arrived, and then they began to dis-
cuss things in the house. Untung and Major
Sigit, Col. Latief and Sjam and Pono were
there. I did not know who they were, but
I only recognized that they were civilians.
As far as the meeting at my home was con-
cerned, I did not consider it a meeting
because there was no leader, and hence it
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only seemed to be a kind of get-together.
It was then explained by Sjam that the meet-
ing was taking place at a critical and im-
portant time in view of the fact that there
was conflict among the different groups in
the country. He said that we should safe-
guard the revolution and protect Sukarno.
But if Wahjudi's protests seem a bit disingenuous,they
may not be altogether misleading. For some reason that
is not altogether clear, Wahjudi does seem to have dis-
appointed Sjam and Pono in their plans for him to play
an active role in the coup. After the first two meetings
that were held at his home, he did not attend any of the
later meetings; needless to say, the meetings were held
elsewhere. According to Sujono, Sjam brought up the sub-
ject of Wahjudi at the meeting on 23 September when he
informed the group that Wahjudi would no longer be conling
to the meetings.
We heard a discussion between Latief and Sjam
to the effect that we should simply do with-
out Captain Wahjudi. Later on I asked about
Capt. Wahjudi, and Latief replied that he had
failed to show up at several meetings and so
we would no longer count on his attendance at
the meetings. Sjam offered the explanation
that Capt. Wahjudi could possibly have been
detained because of family affairs. After
that, we didn't ask any more questions about
it.
In the meantime, Major Sigit also said that
he would not be able to participate in this
action. He only said that 'circumstances' did
not permit his taking part.
Wahjudi has had only the following to say about his with-
drawal from the coup group:
One day Untung approached me at my home to
invite me to another meeting, but I was busy
with the affairs of the battalion and I
never attended a meeting after that.
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It may be that family problems or the pressure of work made
it difficult or impossible for Wahjudi to attend the meet-
ings without arousing suspicion. (At least, on one occa-
sion, Untung was unable to attend a scheduled meeting be-
cause his duties in the Palace Guard kept him elsewhere,
so the meeting was postponed.) It is more likely, how-
ever, that Wahjudi had reservations about becoming involved
in any such plot as Sjam and the others were contemplating.
He may not have been as convinced as Untung and Latief and
the others of the existence of the Generals' Council and
its plans for a coup and, thus, the need for a countercoup
or, if he was, not so willing to assume the risks of being
a part of it. It is interesting that he took no steps to
notify the authorities of the plotting under way, however.
We just do not know enough about Wahjudi or his political
views to explain all his actions; and the same is true for
Major Sigit, who also withdrew from the coup group before
the planning for the coup was well underway. BothImen
were subordinates of Col. Latief in the First Infantry
Brigade and both were members of the same "PKI cell" as
Latief, which meant that they all had Pono as their "manager"
from the PKI. Obviously, Sjam and Pono thought they could
be persuaded to play an active role in the coup or they
would not have brought them together with the others at
the first meeting on 6 September; but in this case, they
seem to have been wrong in thinking they had that much con-
trol over Wahjudi and Sigit.
After the first meeting on 61September, Untung seen--
to have been totally convinced that the Army leadership
was planning a coup, though Sjam had presented him no
factual proof of this; he was also persuaded that Sukarno
health was failing. At his trial, he said that "it was
on the basis of these considerations that I swiftly or-
ganized meetings with other officers in order to effect
an offensive to block the Generals' Council.. .Naturally
I did not report this to my Commander." On 7 September
he is known to have summoned one of his company commanders
in the 1st Battalion of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment--Lt.
Dul Arief, who was later to be given command of the troops
charged with the kidnapping of the generals--to his bedroom
in the Army barracks, where the following conversation is
purported to have taken place:
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Untung: How many men, who can be put in
action, have you?
Dul Arief: Approximately, one company.
Untung: Have you understood my question?
Dul Arief: Yes, I have. I know something about
this, as I have already been told
by,my organiser.
Until we had the full picture of the organization and opera-
tion of the Special Bureau that Sjam provided after his
capture, we could not have appreciated the relationship
between Untung and Dul Arief. Of the 9 men whom Sjam named
as among those whom Walujo "managed" in the Air Force and
the Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard, Untung and Dul Arief were
two of the three men he listed from the Tjakrabirawa guard.
In other word, they were members of the same "cell", in
the sense that the Special Bureau used this word to refer
to the various individuals who had been recruited from a
particular unit of the Indonesian military; all the members
of a "cell" would have the same "manager" from the PKI,
in this case, Walujo. If Dul Arief referred to Walujo as
"my organizer" in the above conversation with Untung (as
Untung claims he did), this would suggest that they both
must have had some knowledge of the other one's contacts
with the PKI, even if they did not realize that they both
had the same PKI "manager." Although there was supposed
to be no contact between the members of a Special Bureau
"cell" within a certain military unit, the individuals
concerned may at least have had some idea who the other
PKI contacts were. Or it may be that Walujo had gotten
in touch with Dul Arief shortly before 7 September, as he
had with Untung on 4 September, and that he had told Dul
Arief that he would soon be contacted by Untung on a mat-
ter of utmost importance on which Dul Arief should cooper-
ate fully with Untung. Dul Arief's answer to Untung's
question, above, that he understood exactly what Untung
meant because "I have already been told something about
this by my organizer" strongly suggests that Walujo had
recently contacted him for this purpose. Since it is clear
that Sjam and Pono and Walujo were responsible for bringing
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together the military officers who were involved in the
highest level of military planning for the coup, beginning
with the meeting on 6 September, it is perfectly reason-
able to assume that they set up most, if not all, of the
contacts between these military leaders and the men under
them who would play a subordinate role in the coup. If
one compares a list of the military officers involved in
the coup with the list of PKI contacts in the military who
were being "managed" by the Special Bureau,. the Similarity
is striking. Obviously, the Special Bureau was behind the
planning for the coup; for the most part, the people in
volved in the coup were "assets" of the Special Bureau in
the military whom the PKI had been "cultivating" for years
for just such a military operation.
The Second Meeting: Sjam Takes Charge
t.
The meeting of the coup group that was held on 6
September was a prototype of those that followed through-
out the month. The same five people�Sjam, Pono, Untung,
Latief, and Sujono--were almost always present; Sjam pre-
sided at every meeting and was always in charge. He pro-
nounced the party's'political analysis of every political
matter and handed down its decisions as directives to the
officers, brusquely overriding all questions and objections.
As the month passed and the discussions concentrated more
on military planning, he retreated somewhat from the center
of the stage in allowing the military officers to make more
of the purely military decisions in preparation for the
final moment, when the shooting was about to begin, when
he would withdraw altogether to the sidelines and leave
them to face the shock of the day. In the last days, the
meetings were transferred to Lubang Buaja and Col. Latief
was in control tr all practical purposes, as it became a
matter of assembling and organizing troops into units, check-
ing equipment, etc.
After the first meeting on 6 September, a second meet-
ing was held in Capt. Wahjudi's home on 9 September. ,Again,
it was held late in the evening-'around'220.0-hours:--ind was
attended by the same seven people who were present at the
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first meeting. As Latief remembered it, the discussion
centered on the Revolutionary Council. The officers
wanted to know exactly who would be on the Council, but
Sjam brushed aside their questions with the persistent
reply: "You comrades need not get excited; every thing
has already been ta-en care of, so we can all be quiet
now." Latief's answer to an interrogator's question
about his attitude toward Sjam's authoritative way of
handling everything at this meeting is of interest:
Question: Why did you and your comrades in
that second meeting not show any reaction in
hearing Sjam say that everything would be
taken care of, as though his words were un-
changeable? Who did you think-was deciding
things as stated by Sjam? Were they decided
by Aidit himself through Sjam or by Sjam him-
self?
Latief: Sjam was not speaking at this meet-
ing on his own authority but in behalf of
his superior, and in this regard Sjam was a
delegate from the PKI Central Committee (CC/PKI).
Although Sjam did not say who issued these
instructions to him, I, as. a sympathizer of
the PKI, am convinced that the one who regulated
the words of Sjam was comrade Aidit.*
*Whether or not Sjam referred to Aidit by name or other-
wise indicated that he got his orders from Aidit is a point
on which there seems to be some disagreement in the inter-
rogation reports of Latief, Sujono, and Untung. Latief
indicates that Sjam never said anything about the orders
coming from Aidit though he (Latief) was sure that they
did. Sujono remembered one time when Sjam referred to
"the Chairman;" it was then that Sujono realized that
Sjam represented the PKI (at first, he thought he was a
member of the military). At his trial, Untung testified
that Sjam stated that he was a friend of Aidit and. on
knother occasion, a messenger from Aidit. Untung was not
(footnote continued on page 119)
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Question: (Although you believed that Aidit
was the one making the decisions), did you hesi-
tate regarding the setting up of the Revolu-
tionary Council?
Latief: Indeed so. I hesitated regarding the
setting up of the Revolutionary Council because
each time I asked Sjam about this I never got
a definite answer as though this thing were
top secret.
Question: If th's is so, from the first and
second meetings you could tell that this was
a very grave plan and you were hesitant on
every matter put before you: Why did you not
(footnote continued from page 118)
necessarily concerned to quote Sjath'S precise words, how-
ever; he was simply answering a question as to whether or
not Sjam indicated that he spoke for Aidit. Sjam himself
might have referred to Aidit as "the Chairman".
In his official report on the Indonesian coup, General
Suharto indicated that Sjam was explicit in telling the
military officers that all the planning for the coup was
being done by Aidit:
At every meeting Untung and his comrades always
inquired from Sjam whether the entire plan for
the coup was known and approved by Aidit. Sjam
replied: 'Every plan connected with the coup
has already been approved; moreover Aidit al-
ways inquires about the attitudes of each indi-
vidual at the meetings.'
Suharto was making explicit what was undoubtedly true--that
Sjam did report to Aidit on the meetings and did receive
his orders directly from Aidit. But it is doubtful that
Sjam made the statement attributed to him by Suharto; he
would have been more discreet than that; furthermore, none
of the interrogation reports (that we have seen) mention
any such statement.
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withdraw from this plan? Was there no desire
on your part to destroy this plan by report-
ing it to the Commander in Chief of KODAM V?
Latief: For the sake of the interests of .the
PKI to which I am sympathetic, I did not report
this matter to the Commander in Chief.
The interrogator asked Untung a similar question about his
uncritical acceptance of everything Sjam said:
Question: You act as though all the provisions
were issued by Sjam and were swallowed without
any reaction or questioning as to why they were
so, despite the fact that what Sjam issued was
not acceptable to your thinking: Why was this?
Untung: I can reply to this as follows: In
fact we as military members, both I myself, Col.
Latief and Maj. Sujono, who attended that meet-
ing, had placed our complete confidence in
Sjam as a representative of the Party with
which we were tied in closely in ideology,
namely, the Indonesian Communist Party.
The Third Meeting: The Question of Troops and the Role
of Sukarno
After the meeting on 9 September, the third meet-
ing of the coup group was held on 13 September at 2130 hours
at Col. Latiefs home. Latief explained the change in the
meeting place, as follows:
At first, it was proposed to hold this meet-
ing at Capt. Wahjudi's house again, but be-
cause there had been several meetings there,
it was requested that the next meeting be
held in my house, although in fact this was
not too tactical because I usually have many
guests and I have a large family. But Siam
instructed that it be held at my house.
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The major topic of discussion at the third meeting was the
question of troops. Apparently, each man, in turn, gave
his estimate of the number of men from his respective unit
that he could make available to the coup. Sujono's pledge
of a trained force of some 3-4,000 people was particularly
noteworthy. He was referring to 3-4,000 Communist volun-
teers--young men and women from the Communist youth and
women's organizations--who had just completed a short
course of a week's duration in military training at Lubang
Buaja conducted in great secrecy by Sujono himself. [We
will have more to Say about this particular force and the
secret training program at Lubang Buaja later.] After Sujono,
Latief and Untung gave their estimates of the number of
troops available from their units. Thereupon, a heated
exchange between Sjam and Major Sigit is reported to have
taken place as to whether or not a force of this size was
sufficient to start a movement.* The incident was another
good illustration of Sjam's absolute unwillingness to
tolerate disagreement or doubt. He is reported to have
become very angry and to have ended the exchange with the
retort: "Bung, we also are military people and we can
decide military matters." According to Latief, "the meet-
ing then skipped to other matters to calm everyone down."
At this point, the crucial matter of the role of Sukarno
in the coup was raised for the first time, in a question
by one of the military officers. Sjam reportedly replied
that "the great leader of the revolution has his own role
also. The Bung will later on obtain a separate settlement."
*This incident underscores some of the doubts that Major
Sigit apparently felt about the coup plans. We know of
another occasion, too, when he expressed doubts about cer-
tain other features of the coup planning. After the second
meeting of the group on 9 September, he is reported to have
approached Col. Latief at the Infantry Brigade headquart-
ers and to have asked Latief what he thought about the whole
idea of the Revolutionary Council and specifically the idea
of making Untung the chairman. He asked Latief: "Do you
think he is willing and capable of leading the Revolution-
ary Council and facing the major parties and mass organiza-
tions? Do you know why he was selected to be chairman?"
Latief said that he had brought up this matter with Sjam
but had never obtained an answer.
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Latief says that everyone present concluded from that
"that no matter what happens, the President must play a
role. With this view, which we all had, Sjam was silent
and gave no reaction at all and owing to the fact that it
was very late, the meeting was closed at this point."
The Fourth Meeting: The Question of the Generals and
the Choice of a Leader
Sjam and Pono had requested that the next meeting
oe held at Latief's home again, and so six days later, on
19 September, Untung, Latief, Sujono, Sjam, and Pono met
there at 1700 hours for their fourth meeting together.
The group was now down to five people, with the defection
of Major Sigit and Capt. Wahjudi from the group; from now
on, these five men would meet together every other day
until just before the coup, when they would bring other
people into their discussions at the last moment to brief
them on their respective assignments in the coup. In the
Interval of six days before the last meeting and this one
on the 19th, Untung had been in touch with Maj. Sukirno,
the Commander of the 454th Battaion Of the Central Java
Division, stationed in SOmarang. Apparently, Untung had
gone to Central Java for the express purpose of meeting
Sukirno; the two men had met in Untung's home in Tjidurian
on the morning of 15 September. Untung must have explained
something of his plans to Sukirno, for he obtained Sukirno's
assurance that he could use the troops of the 454th Battalion,
which would be in Djakarta towards the end of the month
for the Armed Forces Day parade on 5 October. Maj. Sukirno
informed Untung that the 530th Battalion of the East Java
Division was also scheduled to take part in the parade and
presumably would be arriving in Djakarta about the same
time as the 454th Battalion, around the 25th or 26th of
September. Untung reported his conversation with Sukirno
to Sjam and the others at Latief's home on the evening of
the 19th. He.also informed the group of the preparations
that Lt. Dul Arief of the Tjakrabirawa was making to have
the troops of the Tjakrabirawa ready for their kidnapping
assignments. This led into a discussion of the target of
_these raids; namely, the specific generals on the list to
be kidnapped.
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As Untung explained it, Sjam made the initial sug-
gestion of each name and then there was a general discus-
sion of that particular general; in every case, the group
agreed with Sjam on the seven names he proposed.
Untung: As to the suggestion of the names of
the generals who had to be 'secured,'
this was done jointly but preceded
by a proposal of Sjam. For instance,
as to Gen. Nasution, in general,
we were all of the same idea. But
the proposal came from Sjam. The
same for Gen. Yani, Parman, Harjono,
Sutojo, Pandjaitan, and Suprapto.
Altogether, there were seven people
included.
Question: What was the opinion of the planners
of the 30 September Movement as to
other generals in the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and Police Force?
Untung: In this case, everything was based
on the information that_ the seven
generals belonged to the Council of'
Generals who were to stage a coup.
At the meeting on 19 September Sjam
said that according to the last
information he had, Gen. Yani had
urged Gen. Nasution to immediately
realize the Coup, but Gen. Nasution
could not approve of this action.
He said that Gen. Yani was already
making preparations.* Thus, based
*Untung explained that Sjam said that "Gen. Yani had made
ready -two Saracen armored cars on Djalan Daksa as part
of his preparations for a coup." After an investigation,
it turned out that the two Saracens were made ready by
Gen. Yani, Gen. Muskita, and Gen. Ginting "in order to
escape should something happen."
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on the information Sjam had, it
was considered necessary to im-
mediately 'secure' the generals.
Untung's testimony reinforces the observation made earlier
on the basis of the military raids on the various generals'
homes on 1 October that General Suharto was not a target
of the 30 September Movement. Contrary to widespread
belief, he did not escape capture in some near-miraculous
way as Nasution did; no effort was ever made to get him.
The other interesting point in Untung's testimony is his
explanation of Sjam's way of obtaining agreement from the
military officers on various points that he obviously had
already decided--such as precisely which generals would
be eliminated.
It is of interest to look into the matter of just
what Sjam and the others intended with respect to the
generals--whether they intended from the beginning to
kill the generals or to arrest them (on charges of plot-
ting against the government) and hold them incommunicado
until the coup was a fait accompli,. or whether they had
no clear idea what they would do with them since it de-
pended on whether they were captured dead or alive.* At
his trial, Sjam insisted that it was not the plan of the
PKI to kill the generals. When asked why it was that the
generals were killed, he responded: "We simply lost our
senses."
Untung has said that Sjam always used the Indonesian
word "mengamankan"--which means "to secure or render harm-
less"--in speaking of the action to be taken against the
*Just what the PKI intended and what Sukarno may have
Intended to be done with the generals are two different
questions. There is a good deal more ambiguity about
what Sukarno intended and what he may have thought the
PKI intended than there is about what the PKI intended
itself. Sukarno's thinking in the matter is discussed
later in the paper.
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generals. Apparently, he never spelled out exactly what
he meant by this and the military officers never ques-
tioned him closely. They must have felt reasonably sure
that they knew what he meant, and the indications are that
they accepted the fact that he meant that the generals
would be killed.* During their interrogation, none of
the military officers involved in the coup claimed that
they were shocked or even surprised by the murder of the
generals, although Sujono, in the process of disclaiming
any responsibility for the decision to kill the generals,
does make it look as though he was not exactly sure what
was to be done with them. After Lt. Dul Arief turned the
generals over to Air Force Major Gatot Sukrisno at Lubang
Buaja, Sukrisno immediately reported to Sujono; Sujono
claims that he sent a courier to the Central Command,
which was still at the Aerial Survey Office in Djakarta,
to request orders, which he insisted be in writing. The
order came back, signed by Latief, that the generals who
were still alive should be "disposed of" immediately.**
If Sujono's story is true, it suggests that he did
not have standing orders to kill the generals as soon as
they were brought to Lubang Buaja; but this would probably
have been the case even if the coup leaders had planned
to kill the generals from the beginning. On such an-
*During his interrogation, Latief was asked if he ap-
proved the murder/kidnapping of the generals. He answer-
ed; "We approved of the murder of the generals because
we were forced to do so by the PKI."
It is interesting to note that Latief did not use the
word "kill" or something like it--like "shoot" or "execute"--
but instead said that the generals should be "disposed of."
It was really no more direct a way of saying that the gen-
erals should be killed than to say that the generals should
be "rendered harmless" as Sjam had explained the action
to be taken against the generals. Yet, Sujono was obviously
in no doubt what "to dispose of" meant.
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important matter, Sujono would probably have been instructed
to report to the Central Command when the various raiding
parties arrived back at Lubang Buaja with the generals;
the final order to kill the generals would not be given
until the Central Command knew for sure whether or not
all the generals had been captured and whether dead or
alive. It is interesting to speculate just what Sjam
and the others would have ordered Sujono to do with the
generals had they realized at that moment that Nasution
had not been captured. Actually, at that point, they
were committed to killing the generals who were still
alive, since three of the generals had already been killed
resisting capture. No matter what they intended with
respect to the generals, they obviously had to be pre-
pared for the eventuality that some of the generals would
be killed in the process of capturing them. As mentioned
earlier, the order to the officers in charge of the kid-
napping missions had been to bring back the generals "(dead
or alive." Gatot Sukrisno, the commander of the volunteer
forces at Lubang Buaja, testified at Untung's trial that
Latief told him and the other officers involved in the
raid on the generals' homes that "it was advisable that
the generals not be shot in their homes but rather gotten
rid of at some other place."
The other main topic--besides the generals who
were to be eliminated in the coup--that was discussed
at the secret meeting of 19 September was the choice of
a leader for the 30 September Movement, which was still
unnamed at this point (as we shall see later, Sjam gave
the movement its official name of 'the 30 September Move-
ment' at a later meeting of the group on 29 September).
In response to a question about the need for a leader
when the movement announced itself later on, Sjam
broke the news that Untung would be the leader of the
over-all movement." Apparently, no one was more sur-
prised than Untung. He says that he immediately ques-
tioned Sjam as to why he had been selected. Sjam re-
plied: "because you are not known here and are rela-
tively new and because you are the personal bodyguard
of the President." Apparently, both Sujono and Latief--as
well as Untung--had reservations about this decision. Later,
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Untung and Sujono are reported to have approached Sjam to-
gether to ask if it would be better if "a higher ranking
officer and a more appropriate officer be selected to head
this movement." Sjam closed the subject--as he was wont
to close all matters of controversy--with the firm opinion
that "it is better if Untung heads the movanent for the
reasons I have mentioned."*
At the end of the meeting, the military officers
asked Sjam about the political support for the coup. He
replied that there should be no anxiety on that score:
What is of primary importance is whether
the plans for the kidnapping of the generals are
successfully carried out. Should they suc-
ceed, then automatically all the political
and mass organizations and the parties will
support us, that is the PKI and all its polt.-
tical and mass organizations and sympathizers,
the PNI and its political and mass organiza-
tions and sympathizers and other parties which
presently join us in activities in all fields.
In regard to political preparations in areas outside Djakarta:
�
The Regions have made preparations earlier
than we and the Regions are meatay waiting
*The tact that Untung was a battalion commander in the
Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard was doubtlessly a consideration
in the PKI's selection of him as the leader of the 30
September Movement. It would naturally be assumed that
any action he would take would be in defense of the Presi-
dent; thus the fact that he was leading the 30 September
Movement would be taken as an indication that at least
the coup was pro-Sukarno. This was obviously not the main
reason why the PKI chose Untung as the leader of the coup,
however; a much more important consideration was the fact
that Untung could be trusted completely to follow PKI orders.
Sjam would never have admitted this to the other military
officers involved in the coup, of course.
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for the results of our movement in Djakarta.
The areas already prepared are Bandung,
Central and East Java.
Sjam's comments on the mobilization of political support
for the coup are of special interest as an indication of
the preparations that the PKI was making along this line
in advance of the coup. With the premature collapse of
the coup, nothing of this sort ever materialized; the lack
of any observable response from the PKI (except its edi-
torial in Harian Rakjat on the morning of 2 October) to
_events in Djakarta on 1 October was particularly mystify-
ing at the time. If the PKI had engineered the coup or
was in any way involved in it or merely sympathetic to it,
why had it failed to mount an all-out propaganda campaign
in support of it? Certainly, it was not because it was
unable to do so. In comparison with other parties, the
PKI was unique in its ability to mobilize public opintion
in Indonesia; within a matter of hours, it could mount A
propaganda campaign in support of any policy, complete
with mass demonstrations of support involving thousands
of people, public statements of support from leaders in
all fields, and all kinds of editorial comment in the
PKI-controlled mass media. The absence of all these normal
signs of PKI support for the coup prompted some observers
to conclude that the PKI obviously was not involved in the
coup; they could not reconcile the party's willingness to
risk an action like the 30 September Movement with its
failure to undertake an all-out push, especially when the
missing element was support in the propaganda field. We
now know, of course, that the fact that the PKI did not
stage an impressive show of public support for the coup
was not because it was not involved in the coup or some-
how caught off-guard by the timing of the coup or not
sympathetic to it--indeed just the opposite was true. At
the same time, the fact that it had been very much involved
in the planning for the coup and yet had failed to follow
through with a propaganda offensive was not because it had
not considered this in its over-all planning for the coup.
The fact of the matter was that the PKI had made the most
careful plans for the mobilization of political support
after the coup, but had called off these plans at the last
moment when the coup ran afoul and the party realized that
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it would not have Sukarno's support for an action that
had been badly bungled.
We still do not know much about the PKI prepara-
tions in the political field. Sjam never discussed them
with the military officers, who are our main source of
information on the planning of the coup. We do know,
however, that it was Aidit's plan to send the top lead-
ers of the PKI to various cities throughout the country
a day or so before the coup; they would personally co-
ordinate political activities in the various areas.
(Lukman and Sakirman were sent to Semarang in Central
Java and Pens Pardede to Medan in Sumatra, for instance.)
Aidit had obviously given much thought to the matter of
political support for the coup. This was one matter that
could not be arranged for completely ahead of time, be-
cause of the need for secrecy. Too many people would be
involved to bring them into the coup planning. Aidtit
had done everything that he could in the way of planning
the PKI political response and still keeping it a secret.
He had briefed his key lieutenants in detail on what
should be done; they would have the responsibility of
coordinating PKI activities after the coup. Obviously,
he considered it a matter of the utmost importance or
he would not have assigned his key men to the job.
Having sought to reassure the military officers
that the matter of political support for the coup had
been taken care of by others and they should have no
worries along this line, Sjam pressed one final point
on the meeting of 19 September--namely, the need to im-
plement the coup as soon as possible. Untung agreed
but said that it would be necessary to wait at least
until the end of the month, when the troops of the 454th
and 530th Battalions would arrive in Djakarta. From
this point on, Sjam's pressure on the military for haste
and Untung's concern for adequate military preparations
would be the underlying currents at every meeting of the
coup planners.
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ihe Fiftn Meeting: The Question of Arms and An Important
Newcomer to the Group
It was decided that the next meeting would be held
on 21 September at Sjam's house; however, due to a mis-
understanding regarding transportation, the meeting was
postponed until 23 September. According to Untung, the
fifth meeting on the 23rd was not really an official meet-
ing of the group but more of an "informal discussion,"
because Sujono was unable to be there. This was the
first meeting of the coup group that began as early as
.1630 hours, and Sujono had been called to a meeting with
the Minister of the Air Force (Dani) at the same hour.
Nothing more is known about the alleged meeting between
Sujono and Dani, but Untung's mention of it is very in-
teresting; if true, it could be of some significance.
Only four days earlier, Dani had returned to Indonesia
from a secret mission he had made to Communist China on
the direct orders of President Sukarno. Besides Dani
and Sukarno, only two other persons knew of Dani's mis-
sion--Subandrio and Aidit. The Indonesian army was not
informed of the trip and was not to learn anything about
it until after the coup.
The whole story behind Dani's trip to China will
probably never be known; but the following facts have been
established with reasonable certainty. Dahl arrived in
Peking on 16 September aboard an Indonesian Air Force
jet and stayed there three days, returning to Indonesia
on the same plane on 19 September. Upon his return, he
reported on the results of his mission, first, to Suban-
drio and, then, to President Sukarno. (He reported to
the President while they were attending the wedding of
Dr. Ruslan Abdulgani's daughter on 21 September.) He
never submitted a report to the armed forces leadership
or to the Minister Coordinator for Defense and Security
(Nasution), who would normally have been informed about
such a matter. The trip was kept a secret from Nasution
and the Army leadership until well after the coup, and
presumably Sukarno intended that it always be kept a
secret. At Dani's and Subandrio's trials, however, it
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was revealed that Sukarno had sent Dani to Peking in mid-
September to make the final arrangements for a shipment
of Chinese arms to Indonesia that Chou En-lai had first
mentioned to the Indonesians some nine months earlier.*
In Peking, Dani is known to have had a private meeting
with Chou, with whom, among other things, he is reported
to have discussed the shipment of 100,000 small arms to
Indonesia.
Thus, it would seem that a deal between Sukarno
and the Chinese involving the shipment of 100,000 small
arms from Communist China to Indonesia was in the process
of being negotiated, if it had not already been concluded,
at the time of the Indonesian coup. It had been negoti-
ated at the very highest levels, by Sukarno and his per-
sonal representative, Dani, on the Indonesian side and
by Chou En-lai himself on the Chinese side. It was ob-
viously intended to be kept very secret; as we havv seen,
only four persons in the Indonesian government knew any-
thing about it. (It is interesting in this regard that
Dani was one of the four persons. It shows the closeness
of his relationship with Sukarno, which would seem to be
a very important factor in understanding his role in the
coup. In this case, he was in the select company of Aidit
and Subandrio; on this basis, the three of them might
well be considered to have been Sukarno's most trusted
confidants.)
The precise connection, if there was any, between
Sukarno's arms deal with the Chinese and the coup is not
so easily established. It seems that Chou's offer of
*According to Subandrio's interrogation report, Chou
En-lai offered to provide Indonesia "with 100,000 pieces
of light arms free of charge for the purpose of equipping
the fifth force" in January 1965, when Subandrio was in
Peking for talks with the Chinese leaders.
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weapons to Sukarno--an offer that was first made in Jan-
uary 1965�was in connection with Sukarno's plans for a
"fifth force" in Indonesia.* The issue of the "fifth
force" was one of the most controversial issues of the
day. The military, that is all the leaders of the armed
services with the exception of Dani, were strongly op-
posed to the idea. The PKI was very much in favor of it
for the obvious reason that it provided an excuse for
arming peasants and workers sympathetic to the PKI. They
always presented the idea in different forms, of course.
In public, they spoke of the "fifth force" only in terms
of national defense in combatting the raids on Indonesia
from Malaysia; they would hardly have mentioned the other
reason they had for wanting a "fifth force."
So anxious were the Chinese for Sukarno to provide
the PKI with an excuse for developing an armed capability
that they were quite likely to have offered to supply the
arms that would be required--as an added inducement for
Sukarno to agree to the idea of a "fifth force." It would
seem to have been the case that the C!linese had agreed
to supply arms to Sukarno on a covert basis with the "fifth
force" in mind; there is nothing to indicate that they
knew of the coup planning and were sending arms to Indo-
nesia with that specific purpose in mind. On the other.
hand, it can not be ruled out.
As far as Sukarno was concerned, he could have
sent Dani to Peking to arrange for the shipment of Chinese
arms to Indonesia, also with the thought that they would
be used to train and equip a "fifth force." Or he could
have sent Dani there to arrange for an immediate shipment
*By "fifth force" Sukarno meant a kind of militia along
the lines of the Chinese "people's militia." It would be
a trained and armed body of citizens--both peasants and
workers�who would constitute a fifth force in addition
to the army, navy, air force, and police; in times of na-
tional emergency, it would serve as a special defense
force in support of the other four services.
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of arms, with the thought that they would be used in the
coup (assuming of course, that he knew of the coup plans).
The timing of Dani's secret trip, less than two weeks be-
fore the coup, does suggest that it was somehow connected
with the coup. Assuming that Sukarno did know of the coup
planning and was trying to arrange for an immediate ship-
ment of arms to Indonesia, it does not necessarily follow
that he informed the Chinese of his reasons for wanting
the arms immediately.
To get back to Sujono and the others who were active-
ly planning for the coup, it is possible that Dani called
Sujono to a meeting on the afternoon of 23 September to
inform him of the availability of Chinese arms for the
coup--although this is pure speculation. However, it
will be remembered that it was Sujono who made the arrange-
ments to get the Air Force arms that were stored in'the
Mampong ammunition depot on the night of the coup; will
also be remembered that these were Chinese arms. It is
not at all clear when these arms were received in Indonesia.
It is possible that some of them were received just before
the coup, in other words, after Dani's trip to China; on
the other hand, covert shipments of Chinese arms to Indo-
nesia are known to have been received in Indonesia before
then.* So it is impossible to tie the Chinese arms used
in the coup to Dani's trip to China conclusively, though
the presupposition is strong that they were somehow linked.
Similarly, it is impossible to say for sure that Dani's
meeting with Sujono on 23 September was in connection with
the coup, though there is reason to suspect that it was.
*The covert shipment of Communist Chinese arms to In-
donesia before the coup is discussed in much greater detail
in Section IV, pp. 171-173. Suffice it to say at this
point that the Chinese are known to have been shipping
arms to Indonesia. All of the arms in question appear
to have entered Indonesia through the harbor at Djakarta:
they were stored in nearby Air Force depots. There is
no evidence that any of the arms were turned over to the
PKI before the coup. Apparently, it was Sukarno, rather
than the PKI, who had negotiated a secret arms deal with
the Chinese. There is no good evidence that the PKI was
receiving secret deliveries of Chinese arms at all, cer-
tainly not in any sizeable quantity.
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With Sujono absent, the meeting of the coup group
at Sam's house on 23 September was attended only by Sjam,
Pono, Untung, and Latief. As Untung remembered it, the
main topic of discussion was the troops that would be avail-
ab:te ro the coup forces. Pono informed the group that
II:ere was no longer any doubt about the 530th battalion;
the troops of that battalion, as well as the 454th, had
uefinitely been committed to the side of the coup. Pono
also indicated that armored support, consisting of about
30 armored cars from the ...:Cavalry, would be coming from
Bandung, although the commander of the cavalry unit was
still uncertain. Untung pressed him for a more definite
answer as to who would lead the unit and how many tanks
would be involved. With his good commanding sense, Untung
had immediately sensed the importance-of an armored unit;
his concern that it should be definitely committed to the
coup forces was to run like a thread through all the later
meetings of the cogpgroup. Again and again he wouldtpress
for news of it and a-pledge that he could count on it.
His uneasiness was to prove very well-founded; the vital
tank unit that Sjam and Pono had talked so much about never
did show up on the day of the coup.
Besides his report on 'the troops and armored units
that would be available, Pono had some other interesting
news to tell Untung and Latief at their meeting on 23
September. He informed them that a new member would soon
be joining their discussions--no less a figure than General
Supardjo, who would be coming from West Borneo, where he
was serving as Commander of the 4th Combat Command engaged
in "confrontation with Malaysia. It was no accident or
chance that Supardjo just happened,to'be. coming to Djakarta
at this time. It was all part of Sjam's planning from the
beginning. The reason that Supardjo was involved in the
coup was precisely the same reason that Untung, Latief,
Sujono, and the others became involved; he was a PKI sym-
pathizer who was being "managed" by the Special Bureau of
the PKI and could be counted on to serve the will of the
party. Supardjo was actually the prize "asset" of the PKI
in the Indonesian military. Probably because of his rank,
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he was personally "managed" by the chief of the PKI Special
Bureau--Sjam himself. How far back his secret contacts
with the PKI went is not clear. We only know that for a
matter of months, perhaps a year or more, he was in regular
contact with Sjani. (Presumably, he was in and out of Djakarta
often enough, in connection with his assignment as Commander
of the 4th Combat Command, that he could have managed to
see Sjam fairly regularly.) We do not know anything about
Supardjo's actual recruitment for the coup, not even whether
he was contacted in West Borneo or when he was in Djakarta
for a visit. Presumably, he was kept informed of the coup
planning during those last weeks before the coup when he
was still in West Borneo. Although he was to play an im-
portant part in the last minute preparations for the coup
and a major role in the actual events of the coup on 1 October,
he could not have come to Djakarta much ahead of the event
without arousing suspicion. (His arrival in Djakarta on
28 September was kept secret until the day of the qoup).
Apparently, it was arranged between Supardjo and the PKI
that he would receive an emergency telegram in West Borneo
to come to Djakarta because his daughter was sick; this
would be the signal that the coup was about to begin.
Supardjo received the telegram on 28 September; he flew
to Djakarta that same day. Had his daughter really been
sick, he would have had no reason not to notify the auth-
orities of this fact and request leave to visit her in
Djakarta; on the contrary, he left his post in West Borneo
without even notifying the Army leadership that he was
leaving. He was in Djakarta a full two days before Suhar:_
or Nasution learned--by chance--that he was there. (It
will be remembered that Gen. Umar reported to Suharto that
he had seen Gen. Supardjo at the Palace on the morning of
the coup.) Had he had proper reasons for being there--either
official or nonofficial�he would not have made such an
obvious effort to keep his presence there a secret. In
short, there can be no doubt that he came to Djakarta for
reasons connected with the coup; and no other reason. The
fact that Pono mentioned that Supardjo would be coming to
Djakarta soon during the meeting of the coup group on 23
September makes it clear that the PKI arranged everything
connected with his arrival in Djakarta to take part in the
coup.
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The Sixth Meeting: The Training of the Volunteers and
A Promise from the Cavalry
After meeting on 23 September, the .next time that
Sjam, Pono, Untung, Latief, and Sujono met together was
on the 25th, once again at Sjam's house, around 1700 hours.
Sjam was obviously getting impatient to move; he announced
that the movement would have to be touched off within the
next few days, sometime before the end of the month, or
it would be too late. (Although he always attributed his
sense of urgency to the likelihood of a coup by the Gen-
erals' Council, he was probably more concerned about the
possibility of his own coup plans becoming known than the
possibility of the Generals seizing the initiative.) Un-
der pressure from Sjam to begin the movement, Untung was
still concerned about the two things that had all along
been the big question marks as far as the military plkan-
ning for the coup was concerned: the armored troops and
the volunteer troops that were receiving a short course
in military training at Lubang Buaja in preparation for
the coup. At this point, it would probably be well to
clarify certain facts about these volunteer troops about
which there has been a good deal of confusion.
On 11 September 1965, a small staff of Air Force
officers. with Major Sujono in charge, began a secret
military training course for Communist volunteers at
Lubang Buaja. In the three weeks before the coup, some
4,000 members of the Communist youth (Pemuda Rakjat) and
women's (Gerwani) organizations received a week's mili-
tary training and political indoctrination. It would
have been most improbable that such a training program
could or would have been conducted at Lubang Buaja, so
close to Halim Air Force Base, which Dani visited regu-
larly, without his knowledge and/or approval. For one
thing, Sujono would have to have accounted for his time,
since apparently he was involved full-time in the instruc.
tion of the volunteers. Actually, Dani had admitted that
he knew that the training was going on though he has denied
that he gave the order for it. In a rather tortured and
obviously insincere explanation, he has said:
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I never issued an order to Major Sujono to
train the people at Lubang Buaja. At one
point I heard that the training was not going
too well so I ordered Commodore Dewanto to
correct it. ...When the first class (of
volunteers) was almost over, I was asked to
speak at the closing ceremony.
Sujono's testimony contradicts Dani's on this point; he
has said that he was acting on the direct orders of Dani.
As for Sukarno, he never expressed the least sur-
prise after the coup when it was discovered that Communist
party members and sympathizers had received secret mili-
tary training at Lubang Buaja during the month of September.
Dani's obvious knowledge of the fact that Lubang Buaja
was being used as a secret training base would also seem
to implicate Sukarno. Dani is not likely to have 4come
involved in the training, as he obviously was if he spoke
at the closing ceremony, unless he was sure that Sukarno
knew and approved of it. In short, both Dani and Sukarno
must have known what was going on. Whether they actually
ordered the training as part of a long-range plan to
create a "fifth force" or the more immediate purpose of
the coup or whether it was more a question of their being
informed of the coup preparations that were underway by
other people is not so clear.
There is no doubt that the training itself was
part of the preparations for the coup. The timing of
the training is convincing evidence in itself. The
first course began within a few days of the first meet-
ing of the coup group on 6 September. The fact that
Sujono was put in charge of the training program is
further evidence; he was, of course, deeply involved in
the planning for the coup at the time. At the meetings
with Sjam, he regularly reported on the progress of the
training of the volunteer forces as part of the military
planning for the coup. Finally, there is the fact that
the volunteer forces were involved in the events of the
coup on 1 October. For these reasons, it seems to us
that the training of Communist party members and sympathiz-
ers at Lubang Buaja during the three-week period before
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the coup when all the other preparations for the coup
were underway must have been part of the coup prepara-
tions.* All the talk about a "fifth force" by those in-
volved in the coup may have been intended, in part, as
a cover for the training of troops for the coup. If the
training had been discovered before the coup, it would
almost certainly have been represented as training for
the "fifth force." After the coup, Dani seems to have
resorted to the same cover story in his explanation of
the training that was underway at Lubang Buaja.
The nature of the training given to the PKI volun-
teers, the selection of the volunteers themselves, and
the choice of the training site all tend to support the
conclusion that the training was a crash training pro-
gram of auxiliary troops for the coup. The site of the
training was the place where the murder of the generals
took place on 1 October (although it was within the five-
kilometer zone of responsibility of Halim Air Force Base,
it was generally considered to be part of the town of
Lubang Buaja. The tent in which the generals were kept
was within a few yards of the public kitchen which the
volunteers used.)
*The testimony of Pens Pardede, the PKI leader, is
interesting in this regard. Although he was a member
of the Politburo, he was apparently not privy to the
plans that were being made for the coup. During his in-
terrogation, he stated:
Lightning [fast] training was being given
to the Pemuda Rakjat (PKI youth organization)
and the Gerwani (PKI women's organization) by
Air Force officers. When I asked one member
of the Pemuda Rakjat, because I wanted to know,
he replied in an unconcerned way that the
training was for the defense of the airbase.
But I at that time presumed that the Pemuda
Rakjat and the Gerwani were being trained in
connection with the coming coup.
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The PKI had managed the whole business of recruit-
ing the volunteers. According to his own confession,
Njono, the Chief of the Greater Djakarta Committee of the
PKI, was put in charge et all the "operational-technical
preparations for the coup, including the contacting, co-
ordinating and then activating of the PKI reserve forces
for a rush training course at Lubang Buaja." On 8 Septem-
ber secret instructions issued in the name of the party
central leadership were received by the various party or-
ganizations in the Greater Djakarta area, explaining that
a special military training course would begin on 11 Sep-
tember. The training would be conducted by the Indonesian
Air Force. Each subsection committee of the party was
to select 10 trainees, each branch committee of the PKI
youth organization, 6 trainees, and each branch committee
of the women's organization, 2 trainees.* The volunteers
were ordered to report to the air force camp at Halim at
1430 hours on 11 September; they would be housed in the
barracks at the camp.
*The greater Djakarta area committee of the PKI com-
prised about 50 subsection committees, so there should
have been about 500 volunteers from the party, if each
subsection committee had been successful in getting 10
volunteers. The volunteers from the Communist women's
and youth organizations were in addition to these 500.
The first group of volunteers, which included both PKI
party members and members of the Communist youth and
women's organization, who received a seven-day military
training course from 11-18 September, is reported to
have included 1,200 volunteers.
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Various sources have reported that the PKI had
plans for the military training of approximately 4,000
men and women. Apparently, these plans were largely
fulfilled, although it meant that there was only time
for "lightning training" since the training course had
to be kept to a week if 2-3 training courses were to be
scheduled before the coup. The first group of 1,200
volunteers completed a week's training course on 18
September, a second class of 1,500 trainees finished on
25 September; and another class of 1,500 arrived at
Lubang Buaja on the afternoon of 28 September for a
third training course that was interrupted by the coup
itself.* As we shall see later, the final decision of
the coup leaders to start their movement on the 30th
was made on the 28th, the day that the third training
course began. In the two days remaining before the
coup, Sujono gave the third group of volunteers an even
more accelerated course in basic military training L
than the other volunteers had received. Even with two
days' training, it was thought that they would--in
Sujono's words--"give a push to the movement against
the Generals' Council."
*The number of volunteers involved in the program
seems fairly well established. Several sources have
reported the same figures given above as the attendance
at the various courses. In his interrogation, Latief
said that Sujono reported to the coup group at one of
their meetings that he had trained between 3-4,000
Communist youth and women and other PKI sympathizers
at Lubang Buaja.
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The military exercises at Lubang Buaja were conducted
in the strictest secrecy. According to one participant,
the volunteers were told that anyone daring to betray the
secret would be shot. The Air Force officers who conducted
the training--who were all officers of the Air Force defense
command that was assigned to guard Halim Air Force Base
(Sujono's regiment), not officers of the so-called Air Force
Quick Action Command or regular Air Force as we think of
it--obviously did not reveal their true identities. Major
Sujono was known as Major Djojo and Major Katuk used the
name of Lt. Col. Imam. Virtually all of the volunteers
interrogated after the coup mention these two names as the
names of the officers in charge of the training. Besides
the small staff of officers, there were perhaps an equal
number of enlisted men who led the drill exercises. Train-
ing.was given in weapons, defense, and guerrilla warfare,
and thre was political indoctrination in PKI ideology,
Marxism, et. alia.
At the meeting on 25 September, Sujono reported on
the preparations that were going on at Lubang Buaja. While
those preparations were progressing nicely, he was less
reassuring about the matter of the armored troops. It was
still not clear how many troops would be available and who
the cavalry commander would be. The same tensions tat
had been discernible at earlier meetings were even clearer
at this one. Untung was obviously growing more and more
nervous about the matter of armored support; he indicated
that he was not prepared to proceed with the plans for the
coup until he was absolutely certain about the cavalry.
Sjam, on the other hand, was getting more and more impatien+
He informed Untung and the other military officers that
there could not be any question of a delay past the end
of the month; the movement would have to be touched off
before 30 September. At this meeting on the 25th, he tenta-
tively set the date for the coup for 29 September. Accord-
ing to Untung, however, this was not definitely agreed
upon by everyone at the meeting, because "we had not met
the troops of the 454th and 530th battalions and were not
assured of armored support." But although Untung may not
have felt definitely committed to a deadline of 30 Septem-
ber or 29 September and may still have felt that the
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timing of the coup would have to be determined by the mili-
tary officers who were responsible for the military success
of the coup, he was being overtaken by the rush of events
that waL taking place on a schedule which called for a
coup on the 29th or 30th. It could almost have been fore-
seen at this point that in the end he would be swept up
in the momentum of events and plunged into a venture that
he had grave misgivings about--at least, from the military
point of View.
After the meeting on 25 September, Untung was able
to satisfy some of his doubts about the 454th and the 530th
_battalions. He went straight from the meeting to Gambir
Station in Djakarta to check on the arrival of the two
battalions. They had not arrived then; but later in the
evening after he had returned to the barracks, he happened
to see the 454th arriving at the barracks. He immediately
made contact with the battalion commander, Major SukiTpo;
and arranged for someone from the battalion to meet with
him in the morning. Capt. Kuntjoro, the deputy commander,
kept the appointment; but since the 530th had not yet ar-
rived in Djakarta, Untung and Kuntjoro decided to meet
again at 1400 hours the next afternoon (27 September) with
the commander of the 530th. After that meeting on the 27th,
Untung was assured of the participation of the two battalions
in the coup. His subordinate in the Tjakrabirawa Guard,
Lt. Dul Arief, who had been put in charge of the operation
to seize the generals, was present at the meeting to dis-
cuss the involvement of one company from each battalion
in the PASOPATI troops under his command.* After their
*PASOPATI was the codeword for the troops under Dul
Arief's command that composed the raiding parties on the
generals' homes; BIMASAKTI was the codeword for the troops
under Capt. Suradi's command that were to secure the Pre-
sidential Palace, radio station, and communications build-
ing; and PRINGGODANI was the codeword for the troops under
Major Gatot Sukrisno's command that were to defend Halim
Air Force Base.
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meeting with Untung, Dul Arief took Capt. Kuntjoro and Lt.
Ngadino of the 454th and Capt. Suradi of the 5301.h for a
review tour of Lubang Buaja.
The Seventh Meeting: The Decision on D Day
After the tour, there was a meeting at Sjam's house
at 1900 hours that evening; it was the seventh time that
Sjam and Pono had met together with the military officers
who would soon be left alone to shoulder the responsibility
for the coup as its nominal leaders. At the meeting, Untung
discussed the review that the officers mentioned above had
made of the base at Lubang Buaja that afternoon. It was
decided that the PASOPATI troops which would be involved
in the raids on the generals' homes would start those raids
from Lubang Buaja. There was another discussion ot the
matter of the cavalry, which was still not settled. Appar-
ently, it was the feeling of the meeting that D Day could
not possibly be set for the 29th, which was then only two
days away. It was decided that the group would meet again
on that date for one last review of the pIan before
was put into effect.
.1
Just when the decision was made to start the Move-
ment on the night of 30 September-1 October is one oi the
most crucial questions about the Indonesian coup, It has
a major bearing on one's whole explanation of the coup.
For instance, the thesis that the coup was a contingency
plan of the PKI in the event of Sukarno's death or incap-
acitation that was put into effect prematurely because the
PKI thought that Sukarno was seriously ill, perhaps dying,
after word was received that he had faltered during his
speech to the 3rd Congress of .the CGMI on the evening of
29 September., hinges largely on the question of whether
the decision to go was or was not taken before the 29th.
Since the evidence is that the decision was made on the
28th, it would seem that the theory that the coup was
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triggered by something that occurred on the 29th, namely,
the fact that Sukarno seemed to falter and need assistance
in the midst of delivering a speech, must be discounted.
On the afternoon of the 28th, Untung is reported
to have informed Lt. Dul Arief that D Day was still not
known but that he should await orders after the 29th. It
would seem from this and other evidence that the military
leaders of the coup were informed of the decision on D Day
on the 29th. There is general agreement between the in-
terrogation reports of Untung, Sujono, Latief, and Supardjo
that Sjam "issued the order that D Day would be the fol-
-lowing evening" at the last meeting of the coup group,
which took place at Sjam's house on 29 September around
2400 hours. The next morning, Untung informed Dul Arief
that "the event would take place that evening."
Though the military leaders were informed of the
decision on the timing of the coup on the 29th, the deci-
sion seems to have been made on the 28th, by Aidit himself.
That afternoon Aidit is known to have had a very long ses-
sion of almost 5 hours with Lukman, the number 2 man in
the party, and Sakirman, a member of the CC/PKI; immediately
afterward, Lukman and Sakirman left Djakarta by car for
Semarang, where they waited for two days for the coup to
begin.* Presumably, Aidit was giving them their last in-
structions before the coup
*Lukman and Sakirman left Djakarta in Lukman's official
car; they arrived in Semarang on the morning of 29 September
and went straight to the house of an important PKI leader.
According to several sources, they were visibly in a high
state of nervousness. Apparently, they spent most of the
day sitting around a transistor radio in the living room.
The next morning they got up early to listen to the first
news broadcast of the day. As the day went by, they grew
more and more nervous. Lukman ordered his chauffeur to
change the registration plates on his car and to take away
the flag pole placed in the middle of the bumper. They
stayed up late that night listening to the radio, but the
(footnote continued on page 145)
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Within a short time of Lukman and Sakirman's depar-
ture from Djakarta, Anwar Sanusi and Nursukud of the CC/PKI
were also on their way to different parts of the country;
by the time of the coup, they would be in the Celebes and
Sumber, respectively. The fact that these PKI leaders whom
(footnote continued from page 144)
news they were waiting to hear never was announced; finally,
they went to bed. The next morning they heard Idntung's
announcement on the radio while they were having breakfast;
reportedly, everyone in the house was ecstatic. Soon after-
ward, Lukman and Sakirman moved to another house in Semarang
where they spent the day and night of 1 October.
The next morning Aidit came to that house and together
they all left for Solo. Apparently, Lukman a9d Sakir-
man were quite surprised to see Aidit in Semarang. ' (This
would seem to indicate that Aidit planned to remain in
Djakarta if all had gone well with the coup. No doubt, he
would have wanted to be close to Sukarno, especially if
the President had Made some kind of formal statement en-
dorsing the coup.) Apparently, Lukman and Sakirman were
confused about what had happened in Djakarta. Aidit re-
ported everything that had occurred, including Nasution's
escape, and explained his purpose in coming to Central Java
as that of preparing things for the arrival of Sukarno in
Jogjakarta.
An interesting sidelight to the story of the coup is
the fact that Sakirman aid General Parman, one of the vic-
tims of the coup, were brothers--one, a high-level offi-
cial in the Communist party, and the other, a senior
general in the Indonesian army and a staunch anti-Commun-
ist. Whether or not Sakirman realized ahead of time that
his brother would be one of the generals killed in the
coup 'is not clear; he may not have. After the coup, he
seems to have been very much affected by his brother's
death and full of regret about the coup. When Aidit saw
him for the first time after the coup, that morning in
Semarang, he is reported to have immediately offered
Sakirman his "apologies and regret" on the death of his
brother.
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Aidit had designated to coordinate party activities in
crucial areas of the country after the coup left Djakarta
on the evening of 28 September and/or the morning of 29
September is not in itself conclusive evidence that the
decision to start the movement on the night of 30 Septem-
ber-1 October had necessarily been taken by then; Aidit
could have ordered Lukman and Sakirman and the others to
Semarang and the other cities on the 28th with no definite
idea of when the coup would begin other than that it would
be within the next 2-3 days or so. However, it strongly
suggests that Aidit had in fact decided on a definite date.
According to Njono's confession, it was definitely Aidit
who fixed D-Day for 1 October at 0400. All we can say for
certain is that the decision was made sometime before the
evening of 29 September, when it was communicated to the
military leaders, that is, sometime between the evening
of 27 September and the evening of 29 September. That
leaves 28 September as the most likely time, especially
since what we know of Aidit's own activities that last week
in September also seems to suggest that the final decision
was made on the 28th, when he is known to have had lengthy
consultations with Lukman, the number 2 man in the party.
After their meeting, there was a flurry of activity on
the part of Aidit and the other PKI leaders that is sug-
gestive of the last minute preparations that would follow
a definite decision to go ahead with the coup on the 30th.*
Supardjo's arrival in Djakarta on 28 September at
the PKI's call would seem to be another indication that
the date for the coup had been decided by the 28th. As
*As a sidelight to Aidit's activities the last two or
three days before the coup, there is the fact that his
wife returned to Indonesia from a year's study in North
Korea on 27 September. Aidit and the children are report-
ed to have met her at the airport in Djakarta on the evening
of the 27th. Thus, she was out of the country until three
days before the coup. It seems most unlikely that she
would have known about the coup planning before she returned
"(footnote continued on page 146a)
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noted earlier, Supardjo was summoned from West Borneo by
a prearranged signal that the coup was about to begin
--namely, a telegram that his daughter was sick and he
should come to Djakarta immediately; presumably, either
Aidit or Sjam sent the telegram. In any case, Supardjo
received it in the early afternoon of 28 September and
left immediately for Djakarta. Arriving there later that
same afternoon, he went first to his own home in Sunter
and then directly to Sjam's house. In his own words:
That afternoon I checked first at Sjam's house.
I met him there and talked with him. Evidence
regarding a council of generals obviously
(footnote continued from page 146)
to Indonesia. She claims not to have known about the coup
at all. After her arrest by the Army after the coup, she
told the Army interrogators that "prior to the coup I had
not heard anything about the coup, nor were any insinua-
tions made." She said that she went to bed at 2000 hours
on the night of 30 September and "heard about the coup
the following morning over the radio and was shocked:"
Some people have argued that Aidit would not have
had his wife return to Indonesia if he had known that
there was going to be a coup and, thus, he must not
have known or been involved in the coup planning. This
seems a ridiculous argument. Obviously, Aidit was confi-
dent of success and would bave seen no danger in Mrs.
Aidit's returning to Indonesia just before the coup.
Secondly, he would not have wanted to change her travel
plans lest it arouse suspicion. It is an open question
whether he told her about the coup after she got home.
The very next day after her return, he made the final
decision on the timing of the coup.
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existed, for example, the troop concentrations
in Senajan and also the extraordinary activity
that was taking place with the arrival of Army
personnel in Djakarta.
On the morning of the 29th I saw Dani. I gave
him news from Sjam...I asked him what would
happen if there was a coup and then I suggested
that we go first with a countercoup.
Supardjo's meeting with Dani on-the morning of 29
September is obviously a very significant meeting in con-
nection with the coup. There is no evidence that Dani and
Supardjo were more than acquainted with one another; cer-
tainly, they were not good friends and had had no regular
contacts with one another. Thus, there was absolutely no
reason for Supardjo to have reported to Dani as Commander-
in-Chief of the Air Force, except in connection with the
coup. It must be remembered that he did not report to
General Yani or Suharto or General Umar or any other of
his commanding officers in the Army who should normally
have been informed of his presence in Djakarta; indeed,
he made every effort to keep his presence in Djakarta a
secret from the Army.
What Dani and Supardjo actually discussed at their
meeting on 29 September is one of those things we will
probably never know for sure about the Indonesian coup--just
as we will probably never know for sure what Dani and
Sukarno talked about when they met together privately that
same morning. Obviously, it would tell us a lot about the
coup, particularly about Sukarno's and Danl.'s roles in it,
if we knew. It can only be presumed that Supardjo was
informing Dani that the coup was about to take place; Sjam
may well have told Supardjo the exact date that was set
and Supardjo may have informed Dani of this, so that Dani
could check it out with Sukarno. It is a well established
fact that Dani was with the President early on the morning of
the 29th, and the circumstances of their meeting leave no
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doubt that it was a matter of great urgency and secrecy.
Sukarno received Dani in his bedroom in the palace ahead
of the other people who were waiting outside for their
scheduled appointments with the President. This fact
alone shows the access which Dani had to the President;
it also suggests that Sukarno probably, knew what Dani had
to discuss. In his interrogation, Dani explained the
subject of their conversation as follows:
I reported to the Pxesident that there was a
group within the army which was dissatisfied
with the Army leadership and which intended
to make some changes. I said that I had heard
about this from Gen. Supardjo. The President
ordered me to meet him in Bogor on 3 October
at 1000 hours together with Gene/al Supardjo.
Upon reaching home, I sent a communication
to Air Commodore Wattimena to summon General
Supardjo because he had been summoned by theL
President to appear on 3 October. At that
moment General Supardjo arrived and so I sub-
mitted tu him the President's summons... .The
next time I met Gen. Supardjo was at Halim on
1 October.
As noted before, Dani was often evasive in his testimony
after the coup. One has the feelIng tnat he was certainly_
not telling the whole truth about has conversation with
Sukarno on the 29th. He was not too likely to come right
out and admit that his purpose in seeing Sukarno that morn-
ing was to convey a message to him from Aidit and Sjam,
via Supardjo, that the coup would take place on the night
of the 30th. Instead, he would certainly try to phrase
it in such a way that it would look as though he had been
concerned to warn the Presider:: about something� that he
had just learned from General Supardo, that the troops
under his command were restless and seemed about to take
some kind of action. Actually, it would not have been too
far from the truth to say that he lepol-ted to the President
"that there was a group within the army which was dissatis-
fied with the Army leadership and intended to make some
changes;" it would just not have been the whole truth.
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The matter of Dani's and Supardjo's scheduled appoint-
ment with Sukarno on 3 October is ambiguous. If Sukarno
did in fact ask Dani and Supardjo to come to Bogor at 1000
hours on the 3rd, it could have been for one of several
different reasons. On the one hand, it could have been
to receive the congratulations of the President for the
part they were to play in the coup. On the other hand,
it could have been for further discussions of the matter
that Dani had raised with the President--namely, the like-
lihood of a coup or some other action against the top Army
command from within the Army. If Sukarno had really been
concerned about this possibility, however, it does not
seem that he would have waited five days to explore the
matter further with Dani and Supardjo. It is interesting
that the President apparently just assumed that Supardjo
would still be in Djakarta on the 3rd, although he must
have known that Supardjo was away from his command in West
Borneo without the knowledge or permission of his superiors
in the Army. In the Army's eyes, Sukarno was definitely
guilty of conspiring to keep Supardjo's presence in Djakarta
a secret. In his speech of 12 February 1967 indicting
Sukarno for his role in the coup, General Nasution made
quite a point of the fact that Sukarno was one of the few
people who knew that Supardjo was in Djakarta for reasons
connected with the coup and yet he did not report this to
the army. If the President expected to meet Supardjo on
3 October, as he told Dani, he either expected Supardjo's
presence in Djakarta to have become known and justified
(as it would have been if the coup had been a success) or
he expected to meet with him secretly. As it is highly
unlikely that Supardjo could have come to the Palace in
Bogor without being noticed, the fact that Sukarno made
plans to receive him there on 3 October would seem to in-
dicate that Sukarno definitely thought that the coup would
be a fait accompli by then.
There were, of course, many ways that Aidit and Sjam
could have communicated their decision on the timing of
the coup to Sukarno. Dani's meeting with Sukarno on the
morning of the 29th was just one possibility. According
to one unconfirmed source, Aidit met with Subandrio that
Same morning; there is no information as to what was dis-
cussed, but Subandrio could certainly have been trusted
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to relay a message to the President.* Aidit was in the
company of Sukarno himself later in the evening of 29
September. They both addressed a meeting of university
students in Djakarta. Although Aidit was not scheduled to
speak, Sukarno is reported to have closed his speech with
the words "Now we must hear from Aidit." In a short ex-
temporaneous speech, the PKI chairman explained that "the
*The subject of Subandrio's involvement in the coup is
discussed in the following section of the paper, which is
concerned with events leading up to the decision on the
part of the coup leaders to take violent action against
the army leadership. Suffice it to say here that whereas
Subandrio obviously knew about the plans for the coup,
he was not actually involved in the planning and he did
not participate in any way in the events of the coup it-
self. He was not even in Djakarta at the time; he had
left town on the 29th in the company of NJOLO of the PKI
and several other cabinet ministers on a speaking tour
of North Sumatra. They had just arrived in Medan on the
morning of 1 October when news of the coup was received
there. On the eve of his departure, Subandrio is known
to have conferred at length with Sukarno; the next morn-
ing he became very active, meeting with various cabinet
ministers, including Aidit. Whether or not the coup was
discussed at any of these meetings is unknown, but it
probably was. On the night of 28 September. Sukarno
would not yet seem to have known that the coup was defi-
nitely planned for the night of 30 September-1 October,
so he could hardly have forewarned Subandrio of the pre-
cise time. However, they both must have known that it
would be soon, most probably before Subandrio returned
to Djakarta from his tour. Under the circumstances, they
probably discussed what Subandrio should do when he re-
ceived word of the coup. On the morning of 29 September,
Aidit would have known that the coup would take place
the following night, so he could have told Subandrio then.
Subandrio was obviously not surprised when ne received
the news of the coup on the morning of 1 October.
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PKI had become great, precisely because it dared to do and
to act; it was always prepared to act to implement its
conclusions arrived at creatively." These words take on
special meaning, in hindsight, when one realizes that they
were spoken by a man who had the night before taken the
fateful decision to alter the balance of power in Indonesia
by violent means and that at that very moment preparations
were well underway for the movement to start about the same
time the following night. We will probably never know
whether Aidit and Sukarno had the occasion for any private
communication that evening.
-The Eighth Meeting: The Order To Go
At about the same time, however, the people who were
responsible for the actual details of the coup were meet-
ing at another place in secret. It was the eighth--and
last--meeting of the coup group. Once again, they met at
Sjam's house; but this time there were four newcomers to
the group, two whom Untung knew and two whom he did not,
the first two being Gen. Supardjo and Walujo, Untung's PKI
"contact" man from the Special Bureau, and the other two
being two women whose identity remains unknown to this day.
(Presumably, they were members of the Communist women's
organization. the Gerwani, which was involved in the train-
ing exercises at Lubang Buaja, but this is not at all cer-
tain.)
At this late date, the matter of the armored troops
was still not solved and Untung was still worrying about
it; it was the'first subject raised at the meeting. Ap-
parently. Latief had checked :he armored troops that had
arrived in Djakarta for the Armed Forces Day celebration
on 5 October, and a certain Lt. Susilo whom Sjam and Pono
had said would be among tne troops was not there. It was
hard to convince Pono that this could be so; he kept in-
sisting that the lieutenant just "had to be there" because
it had been "arranged by a comrade in Bandung." (From this,
it would appear that it was the fault of the PKI official
in Bandung that the armor. that Sjam and Pono kept promising
Untung never materialized; they too had been misled in
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believing that everything had been taken care of.)* Ac-
cording to Untung, he asked Pono how they could possibly
proceed with such vague assurances of armored support and
no definite information that it was available.** Sjam
was obviously not prepared to let the matter of the armor
interfere with the orders he had from Aidit to begin the
movement the next night. Under the circumstances, he was
forced to overrule Untung on the one military question
that uad been of prime importance to Untung and the other
military leaders--the need for armored support. Sjam
answered Untung that "as long as the PASOPATI troops were
successful in their mission, the movement could go ahead
without the cavalry."
*Although it would seem that Sjam and Pono really
believed that the Special Bureau in Bandung had made-the
necessary arrangements to have armored support for the
coup, it is possible that they were deceiving Untung on
this point. They knew that he considered the Cavalry
essential to the coup plans. They may have let him think
that everything had been taken care of, right up to the
last moment, when it was too late for him to back out
of the coup or argue for a delay. He did not realize
that the Cavalry would not be committed to the coup un-
til late on the 29th, less than 24 hours before the coup
was scheduled to begin.
**In his interrogation report, Latief also indicated
that he had serious reservations about going ahead with
the movement when it became "obvious that there were no
tanks." He said: "In view of this situation I became
hesitant regarding the movement and I said to Sjam that
this was no game, this was a big thing."
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At this point, Latief is reported to have asked
Sjam about the plans after the generals had been "disposed
of." Sjam replied that "after Phase I is completed, then
we will send a delegation to the President."* In answer
to Latief's question 'Who would be in the delegation?'
*Sjam's comments about the delegation that would go
to Sukarno are interesting, first of all, because that is
precisely the plan that was followed. [It will be remem-
bered that Supardjo was the head of the delegation that
went to the palace around 0600 hours on the 1st.] Nothing
else was ever mentioned by Sjam or the other people at
the September meetings as a follow-up plan to the kid-
napping missions; apparently, nothing else was planned.
This is one of the best indications we have that the
action that was planned as 'The 30 September Movement'
consisted of the arrest and murder of the seven Army
generals and a certain planned response from Sukarno;
other than that, the only thing that was planned was the
mass political support that, together with Sukarno's
blessing, would have seemed almost certain to carry the
day for the coup.
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Sjam replied "You will know this later." Thereupon, he
issued the order that D day would be the following evening
and the movement would be called the '30 September Move-
ment.'*
It is of interest why the night of 30 September-
1 October was chosen as the time for the coup and why the
movement was called "The 30 September Movement," when
actually it got underway in the early mornihg hours of
1 October and was proclaimed to the world on 1 October.**
The most commonly heard explanation of the timing of the
coup--that the 30th of September was not really chosen
by the coup leaders as the ideal time for their coup but
was thrust upon them by outside events, namely, the sud-
den turn for the worse (or what seemed like a sudden turn
for the worse) in Sukarno's condition--has already been
discussed and dismissed as the likely explanation. Some
of the other explanations that have been offered include
the following:
It is possible that the reason the 30th of
September was chosen is simply that it happen-
ed to be the night when Untung himself was
on night-duty at the palace and could act
with maximum freedom. Or because it was a
Thursday night, a time when, in universal
Javanese belief, magical forces are abroad
*Later, when he was questioned about Sjam's announce-
ment of this decision, Latief told his army interrogators:
"I asked Sjam if this was the decision of the CC/PKI and
Aidit; if this was the case, we would accept it because
it was the party speaking, despite the fact that we had
a great many questions."
**Sukarno was the only person to refer to the coup as
the 1 October Movement. He used the Indonesian word
"Gestok," meaning 1 October. The Army had invented an
. ingenious acronym--Gestapu--from the Indonesian words for
s "30 September Movement"--"Gerakan September Tija Puluh."
They were using the word, with all its Nazi -Connotations,
as the official name of the coup. Sukarno obviously was
hoping to have "Gestok" accepted in place of "Gestapu".
It never was. The word "Gestapu" will be forever associ-
ated with the Indonesian coup.
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and spiritual strength and support are most
readily obtained. Malam Djumat begins at
sundown on 30 September and continues until
the new day breaks on 1 October. It is a
night for melekan, the practice of staying up
all night in prayer and meditation. We know
that the night of the coup Mrs. Yani and
General and Mrs. Parman were engaged in
melekan. Thus, the 30th of September would
have its own esoteric significance, indicat-
ing the moment of inspiration.
Actually, none of these explanations is particularly con-
vincing. Untung was not on duty at the palace during the
night of 30 September-1 October; he was expected to report
for duty sometime around 0700-0800 the next morning. A
little while before he was due to report, he simply called
up and said that he would be late that morning. Thug, it
really made no difference whether he was or was not on
duty with the Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard at the time of the
coup. The particular associations which the 30th of Sept-
ember might have had for Untung and some of the other
military leaders who were inclined toward mysticism would
certainly not have been a major consideration with Aidit
or Sjam or any of the other PKI leaders; and, if one thing
is clear, it is that it was Aidit and the PKI who were
responsible for the timing of the coup, certainly not Untung,
who had reasons for wanting to delay.
There was probably no special reason why the 30th
of September was chosen as the date for the coup. As we
have seen, Sjam had originally set the 29th as the date
but had relaxed the deadline when Untung and the others
convinced him that preparations could not possibly be com-
pleted by then. Apparently, Aidit and Sjam were determined
that there should be no delay past the end of the month,
however. September 30th was the last day they would con-
sider. Exactly why they felt that it was a matter of such
urgency is not completely clear�whether it was because
they genuinely feared some action by the Generals' Council
on or before Armed Forces Day on 5 October or because they
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were concerned about the security of their own plans,
which by then involved a larger number of persons than
could be counted on to keep the secret.*
As for the decision to call the movement "The 30
September Movement," Sjam probably thought of the move-
ment as beginning on the 30th, even though the actual raids
on the generals' homes were not made until the early morn-
ing hours of the 1st. The troops were assembled at Halim
that evening, and by midnight everything was ready to go.
Aidit and Sjam may have had one definite reason for not
wanting to call the movement "The 1 October Movement;" that
is the association.of the date with Communist China's Na-
tional Day. It would have been assumed that the PKI was
behind a coup in Indonesia that was named after the Great
October Revolution in China. As it-was, the timing of the
coup on 1 October was probably an unfortunate thing for
the PKI; it suggested a certain connection betweent.the
Chinese and the coup in Indonesia which, regardless of
whether it was true or not, was used to discredit both
the CCP and the PKI in Indonesia after the coup. The idea
that "The 30 September Movement" was named for the day
that the decision was actually taken to go ahead with the
coup, as some observers have suggested, is not supported
by the evidence, which leaves no doubt that the final deci-
sion was made at least a day or two before that.
The Last-Minute PKI Preparations
After the military leaders of the coup received the
order from Sjam at the last meeting of the coup group on
29 September that the movement, now officially called the
*In the following section of the paper, which centers
around the decision to stage the coup and the events lead-
ing up to that decision, Aidit's thinking with respect to
the Generals' Council is examined in much greater detail.
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30 September Movement, would begin the following evening,
the word was quickly passed around town to the various
people involved in the plot. For the next twenty-four
hours, they would be engaged in frantic, last-minute pre-
parations that were somehow kept secret despite the
flurry of activity. Njono, the Chief of the Greater
Djakarta Committee of the PKI who was the PKI man in
charge of the "operational-technical preparations" for
the coup, including the organizing of a reserve force
of PKI volunteers, who had been staying at Lubang Buaja
with the volunteers, was notified of the decision about
D-Day sometime around 1700 hours on 29 September, via a
-PKI courier who was sent out to Halim. He immediately
alerted the PKI organization for the Djakarta area.
Sometime around midnight, the 5 PKI command posts in
the city were issued orders to contact the party's
"special security force" (TIK) members, which was what the
volunteers who had received military training at Lubang
Buaja were called; they were told to report to the command
post headquarters "immediately." According to one source,
the TIK troops were told that they might be away from home
for a long period; they were instructed to bring only the
clothing they had on, as they would be issued uniforms and
weapons when they arrived at Lubang Buaja.* Several Air
Force trucks were seen at one of the command headquarters
that night, and it is believed that they were used to
transport the troops to Lubang Buaja. At Lubang Buaja,
*The volunteers who were interrogated by the Army after
the coup gave very much the same story as to when and where
they received the arms they used in the coup. Around noon
on the 30th they were gathered together at Lubang Buaja
and given firearms with the strict instructions "to pro-
tect the region, to suspect even their friends, and to shoot
anyone attempting to flee." One volunteer recalled that
"he and other youths were taken by bus to Lubang Buaja
during the night of the 29th-30th and at 1400 hours the
next day they received weapons and military clothing with
the instruction to be on their guard against military
activities in the area."
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the volunteer troops joined the 1,500 volunteers who had
arrived there the day before to begin their week of mili-
tary training in the 3rd training course to be conducted
by the Air Force since 11 September.
At Njono's order, the Djakarta PKI command posts
advised the various field posts under their jurisdiction
to be alert for action within the next 24 hours. Party
members were instructed to give no assistance to military
units unless the units were accompanied by known Party
officials; if the military personnel were vouched for by
PKI officials, the local field posts were to feed, shelter,
and assist them in any way that was needed.
Apparently, the party leaders received special brief-
ings, conducted by Sudisman himself; at the central commit-
tee office in Djakarta on the 29th. According to the in-
terrogation of PKI/CC member Suwardiningsih, SudisRan ex-
plained that senior officers in the Army would soon pre-
empt the coup of the Generals' Council and would establish
a Revolutionary Council which the PKI would support. Suwardin
ingsih was instructed to repeat the oral briefing to the
Palembang Greater Regional Committee in South Sumatra;*
*On 1 October, Suwardiningsih heard Untung's radio an-
nouncement. Using the name of Mrs. Sukono, she left Djak-
arta by plane at 1100 hours that morning and arrived in
Palembang at 1230 hours. Her task was to deliver the oral
instructions given her by Sudisman to the Palembang Regional
Committee (CDB). At the Palembang CDB office, she met and
discussed the situation with the CDB leadership. After
she had delivered the instructions from Sudisman, she dis-
cussed the means for delivering these instructions down-
ward, how to muster broad support for the coup from the
mass organizations, political parties, and important offi-
cials in Palembang, and how to undertake a broad campaign
in the form of wall writing, pasting of placards, posters,
etc. In the hope of getting the national front regional
executive board to support the movement, she got the Palem-
bang CDB to issue a statement in support of the coup in
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presumably, she was one of several envoys of the CC/PKI
sent by Sudisman to the various regional committees of the
PKI for the purpose of mobilizing and leading the PKI pro-
gram in support of the coup.
Some of the more important PKI leaders, like Pens
Pardede, who were members of the Central Committee and
Secretariat, had been briefed on the coup several days
earlier. On 26 September, the members of the Secretariat,
which Sudisman headed, were informed that a coup would
take place sometime before 5-6 October, but no definite
date was set. Sudisman explained that "since this action
is to be purely a military one, our workers must carry out
their work as normal. However, it is possible that the
action may not succeed and therefore our personnel must
be scattered, some in Djakarta and the rest in the regions."
He asked Pens Pardede, who was present at the-meeting,
if he had any preference as to where he would like to go;
at his own request, Pardede was assigned to Medan. He was
told to await later instructions when he would be informed
of the exact date of the coup; he should be prepared to
leave immediately after receiving that information. Ap-
parently, Pardede was informed of the decision on the tim-
ing of the coup on the 29th; he left Djakarta about 24
hours later, in the early morning hours of the 1st, when
the coup was just getting underway. Apparently he was
surprised to discover, upon stopping by the ,CC/PKI: head-
quarters on the morning of the 30th, that the word about
the coup had filtered down to the level of the ordinary
(footnote continued from page 157)'
its name. Altogether, Suwardiningsih held 4 meetings with
the Palembang CDB leadership, on 1 October, 3 October,
5 October, and 6 October. At the latter meetings they dis-
cussed the security measures taken by the state against
the CDB office following the collapse of the coup; these
included the seizure of all the CDB office equipment. At
.the last meeting, Suwardiningsih warned her comrades to
exercise great care and not to be disheartened by the wave
of terror that was being organized against the PKI.
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party workers, so quick had been the operation to inform
party members of the secret undertaking in the offing.
In-Pardede's own words;
On 30 September at about 1100 I went to the
office of the CC/PKI in Djakarta to pick up a
handbag in order to leave on my "go-to-the-
people" trip. Upon arriving at the office
the comrade who gave me the pouch by the name
of Nurali, the deputy chief of staff of the
CC/PKI secretariat, said to me 'When are you
leaving?' I replied 'tomorrow, very early.'
Then he said 'perhaps you will not be able
to leave, because later on tonight the anti-
generals people will play their game.' He
meant that they would stage a coup. I then
asked 'Where did you hear this from?' He
replied 'from Ngatman, whom I know as a membler
of the Djakarta veterans executive board.
I then said 'Report this to Sudisman.' He
said 'Ahn, Bung Disman certainly already knows.'
'Even so, let him know,' I said further. I
didn't quite believe hearing this from a
staff member, who in my thinking would not
know anything about this....I continued to
make preparations for the party's assignment
to go to Medan; I left my house at 0200 on
1 October.
The Last-Minute Military Preparations
With the PKI organization in Djakarta alerted to a
coup within the next 24 hours and with envoys of the PKI/CC
on their way to the regions to explain the coup, when it
happened, to the people in the areas, a special briefing
of the military commanders of the various units involved
in the coup was held at Lubang Buaja around mid-day on the
30th. Apparently, Latief was originally scheduled to
give the briefing but for some reason he was unable to be
there and so Dul Arief, the commander of the PASOPATI
- troops which were charged with the kidnapping of the Army
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generals, gave the briefing; neither Untung nor Sujono was
present. Dul Arief explaindd the organization of the coup
forces into three commands; The Kidnapping and Attacking
Command (PASOPATI) under his leadership, the City Control
Command (BIMASAKTI) under Capt. Suradi, and the Base Com-
mand (PRINGGODANI) under Major Gatot Sukrisno; the three
commands would be responsible to a Central Command. He
then explained the respective assignments of the command-
ers at the briefing. Lubang Buaja was to be "the main
center of preparation, meaning that the troops participat-
ing in the coup would depart from there and return there."
According to Ngadimo, one of the Company commanders from
the 530th battalion, who was at the briefing, Dul Arief
"essentially told the commanders to carry out their duties
effectively and, if there was any opposition, to meet it
with force." At the end of the briefing, he asked Ngadimo
to explain the tactics to be used in the capture of the
generals; Ngadimo elaborated the plan of attack that was
used at each of the generals' homes: that of having one
contingent of troops surround the house and another patrol
the streets outside, while the third contingent went inside
the house to bring the general out.
We know very little about the activities of the coup
leaders during the day of the 30th. Presumably, the mili-
tary officers were engaged in their regular military duties.
Their activities in connection with the coup during the
whole month of September had been pretty much limited to
the evening hours, so as not to arouse suspicion by their
being absent from work. No doubt, they would have been
particularly careful the day before the coup to do nothing
that was out of the ordinary and likely to attract any at-
tention. Sujono spent the day as he had spent the last
three weeks�training the Communist volunteers at Halim.
As far as is known, Untung and Latief were pefforming their
normal duties with the Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard and the
1st Infantry Brigade, respectively. We have no reports on
what Aidit, Sjam, Supardjo--or Sukarno and Dani--did during
the day. There may well have been some kind of communica-
tion between them, perhaps even a meeting between certain
of them, which would be of considerable interest in con-
nection with the coup; but there is no evidence of any.
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In the late afternoon, Sujono is known to have at-
tended to one matter of considerable importance to the coup:
arranging for a safe place for the VIPs who were to be safe-
guarded at Halim. The duty was referred to as the VIP
Security Command, and Sujono had been appointed commander
of the VIP Security Command. Apparently, his orders were
that the following persons were to be safeguarded at Halim:
Sukarno, Subandrio, Aidit, All Sastroamidjojo, and Njoto.*
On the afternoon of the 30th, Sujono is reported to have
asked his aide, Sgt. Sujatno, "to look for a place where
certain officials could be safeguarded." According to his
own testimony, the officials he had in mind were Subandrio,
Aidit, Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Njoto; he intended to find
a place for Sukarno himself.**
Apparently, Sujono was also in charge of the arrange-
ments for the use of the Aerial Survey Office in Djakarta
as the Central Command headquarters of the coup. Me went
*Obviously, these plans were made befcmait was known
that Subandrio would be out of town at the time of the
coup. If he had been in Djakarta, he would alnost certainly
have gone to Halim, as both Sukarno and Aidit did.
**Apparently, Sujono did not decide on a place, for
Sukarno until the morning of the 1st. At 0530 hours on
the 1st, he is reported to have gone to the home of Com-
modore Susanto which was located at Halim Air Force Base.
It was decided than that Sukarno would come to Susanto's
home when he arrived at the airbase later that morning.
At 0600 hours, Sujono is reported to have stopped at the
Operations Command Center at Halim to tell Dani, via his
adjutant, that the President would arrive at Halim between
0800 and 0900 hours and would be brought to Susanto's
house. At 0630 hours, Sujono went back to the Aerial
Survey Office building in Djakarta where Untung, Latief,
Sjam, and Pono had established the Central Command.
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to the Aerial Survey Office himself, sometime around 1730
hours on the 30th, but apparently he was not successful
in negotiating its use by the coup group the following day.
He then asked Air Force Col. Herd, who must have had bet-
ter connections with the office, to arrange the matter.
After Heru made the arrangements, he went to the Aerial
Survey Office to prepare the building to serve as the coup
headquarters.
Sujono was occupied with a nu... oi other important
errands during the evening and night of the 30th, such
as checking on the supply of Air Force weapons for the
volunteers and transporting Aidit to Halim. But somehow,
he managed to squeeze in a review of the troops at Lubang
-Buaja. The review had been scheduled for around midnight,
and we know that Untung, Latief. Sjam,_Pono, and General
Supardjo arrived there about 2230 hours;* Sujono and .
Major Sukirno, the Commander of the 454th Battalion got
there an hour or so later. The troops themselves had �been
assembling at Lubang Buaja since early evening. Several
of the units had been in a drill that afternoon in rehearsal
of the military parade that was planned for Armed Forces
bay on 5 October; Suharto himself had reviewed the drill
only a matter of hours before these same troops were in-
volved in the coup action.** The troops had only just
*Untung had gone to Sjam's house around 2100 hours.
Apparently, it was arranged that the coup group would meet
there because according to Untung, "the leadership party
consisting of myself, Gen. Supardjo, Col. Latief, Sjam,
and Pono went out to the Base in a civilian Toyota Jeep
which belonged to Col. Latief and a Mazda which belonged
to Sjam. Lubang Buaja was quite busy with troop prepara-
tions."
**Somehow, the fact that he had reviewed the troops of
the 454th the afternoon before the coup made it come as
an even greater surprise to Suharto that they could have
been involved in a coup against the Army Command that very
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returned to the barracks from the day's duty when they
were ordered to Lubang Buaja.* Thus, there had been no
suspicious movement of troops during the daylight hours,
just as there had been no unusual activity on the part
of the military officers involved in the coup during the
day.
After their review of the troops at Lubang Buaja,
the leaders of the coup were apparently satisfied that
everything was ready for the operation to begin--although
they were not totally happy with the preparations that had
been made. At Lubang Buaja, they had received a last-
minute disappointment in discovering that "the prepara-
tions promisel !by Sujono--namely, the arranging for a
unit of the Air Force Quick Action (PGT) troops--had not
been made." It was suggested that the PGT troops be re-
placed "by a platoon of troops from the masses (i.e. the
Communist volunteers) under the leadership of Capt. Gatot."
However, Col. Latief and Untung rejected this becaue "the
troops could not be guaranteed"--in Untung's words. (This
is another indication that the coup leaders never intended
the Communist volunteers to play a role in the operation
to seize the generals or surround the palace and radio
station; they thought of them as a reserve force in the
*Apparently, the staging ground for the regular mili-
tary troops involved in the coup was a little removed
from the training site of the Communist volunteers, even
though they were both at Lubang Buaja; so the two groups
were never in close proximity. This would seem to be the
explanation for the vagueness of many of the regular mili-
tary men involved in the coup on the question of the part
played by the Communist volunteers in the coup. It will
be remembered that the volunteers were not involved in
any of the raids on the generals' homes or the operation
to neutralize the palace and the radio station; they ap-
peared on the scene in Djakarta much later in the day,
when the silent struggle for Djakarta was almost over
and the city back in the hands of Suharto and the Army.
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defense of Halim only--and possibly, later, as a spearhead
for the political mass action program that was planned in
support of the coup, if all had gone according to plan.)
According to Untung:
it was rather disappointing that the prepara-
tions of Maj. Sujono were not too good. When
Lt, Dul Arief reported to me that the PGT
troops were not there, I told him to regulate
the PASOPATI assignments with less personnel
since one target was missing, namely, General
Sukendro,* Then, Lt. Dul Arief gave a final
briefing. After the briefing was over, at
0130 hours on 1 October, the PASOPATI troops
pulled out towards their targets, with the
stipulation that D hour was 0500 hours. The
leaders, namely I myself, Gen. Supardjo, Col.
Latief, Sjam, and Pono went to the first head-1.
quarters in the Aerial Survey Office Building.
We arrived there about 0200 hours.
As mentioned earlier, the great majority of the troops
involved in the coup action seem to have had no real under-
standing of the drama in which they played a part. They
were given only the one briefing by Dul Arief shortly be-
lore they departed on their mission into Djakarta. .As he
explained it, the Generals' Council was going to stage a
coup against Sukarno; as members of the Tjakrabirawa Palace
Guard and other units loyal to Sukarno, they had been
called upon "to effect the personal security and safety
of the President." Sukarno was reported to be in "great
danger" and the palace about to be "attacked." Dul Arief
may have mentioned something about some kidnappings that
were planned; if not, some of the troops must have learned
about them from some other source. After the coup, a
*As noted earlier, Gen. Sukendro was in China at
the time of the coup. Had he been in Djakarta, there would
hive been eight generals--rather tharnseven--as the targets
of the 30 September Movement.
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number of them confessed to having known that "some people
were to be kidnapped although it was not known who." It
is doubtful that the commanders could have gotten the men
to follow them, if they had known who the victims of the
kidnappings would be. This was kept a secret--until the
very moment when the trucks carrying the PASOPATI troops
stopped in front of the generals' homes. The troops sent
to surround the palace were similarly tricked into believ-
ing that they were going to guard the President who was
supposed to be in the palace. Just as Aidit and the PKI
had calculated, the men had simply followed the orders
of the commanders; the PKI had been right in thinking
that all the party had to do was to win the loyalty of
the commanders.
At the very moment when his strategy for the coup
seemed about to be vindicated, Aidit was being escorted
to Halim by one of the military commanders whose loyalty
he had won. According to Sujono, Supardjo ordered him
to pick up Aidit around 0130 hours on the 1st. It is
not clear whether Sujono met Aidit at Sjam's house or
the house of a certain Soegito; there are conflicting
stories. Aidit definitely was accompanied by two body-
guards, who stayed with him the whole day of the 1st
while he was at Halim, and who accompanied him on the,
plane on his flight from Halim to Jogjakarta on the morn-
ing of the 2nd. According to Sujono again, Supardjo
asked him to report to Aidit that there had been no
change as far as D-hour was concerned; it was still
planned for 0500 hours.
I recall that at the time Aidit asked: 'Where
will I be taken?' I told him that he would
be taken to Halim directly, and then he ques-
tioned me further, asking about 'whose place,'
and I replied that it would be the home of
one of my subordinates. He then asked me if
the house was very far from the air base and
I answered that it was two-and-a-half kilo-
meters. Then he asked if Supardjo, Latief,
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and Untung were at the Command Center. I
said that as far as I could tell they had
not yet had time to arrive at the Aerial
Survey Office....Then we went to Halim.
After we arrived there, I reported to
Supardjo that Aidit had arrived at the
designated security locatiOn..
Soon after he reported to Supardjo at the Aerial
Survey 'Office, Sujonowas off again to Halim, again on the
orders of Supardjo, to make arrangements for Sukarno's
Stay at Halim.
I got in touch with Commodore Susanto, who
indicated his readiness and willingness (to
have Sukarno spend the day at his home). I
reported this to Dani, who was at the Opera-
tions Command Center at Halim. Dani orOpred
me to be sure that effective securities were
taken with regard to the protection of the
President. I then returned to the Aerial
Survey office, at a little past 0630 hours.
As I arrived, I noticed Gen. Supardjo, Major
Bambang of the 530th and Major Sukirno of
the 454th, and Lt. Col. Heru, all dressed -in
full military attire. When I asked them
where they were going, they said they were
going to the President's Palace.
It was not long after this that I received
a report from Major Gatot Sukrisno, the com-
mander of the troops guarding Halim, verifying
that the generals had been turned over to
him and asking what should be done with the
ones who were still alive. Latief ordered me
to answer the inquiry in writing, with the
words 'By the order of the Chief of Staff of
the Command Center, the ones remaining alive
should be done away with.'
The order had been given. The 30 September Move-
tent ,was a fact: '
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The Prelude
The evidence is overwhelming that the PKI planned
the 30 September Movement in every detail. It decided
who would lead the movement, what military units would
be involved in the operation, which generals of the Army
would be killed, when the coup would take place, what
VIPs would be safeguarded at Halim, and how the political
campaign in support of the coup would be managed after-
wards. That it got others to execute the deed does not
change the fact that it was primarily responsible for the
whole affair. If we accept this as a fact, proven beyond
any reasonable doubt, we have still to explain it, in the
light of certain other things we know to be true about
the Indonesian scene at the time of the coup. For in-
stance, why should the PKI, a party which for fifteen years
had adhered consistently to a policy of peaceful, cpnsti-
tutional struggle and which by that struggle had advanced
to a position closer to the seat of power than any other
free world Communist party, suddenly have decided to risk
everything on a military coup?
Probably the first thing to be established in seek-
ing the answer to that question is whether or not there
had been any change--which might not have been recognized
at the time--in the PKI's thinking on the matter of proper
tactics for the party to follow on the domestic scene.
It would seem that there either had to be some basic
change in the thinking of the leadership, particularly
Aidit, or else there had to be extenuating circumstances
that suddenly made the PKI act contrary to its own estab-
lished policy.
PKI Domestic Policy
Ever since D.N. Aidit, in the aftermath of the
Madiun Rebellion of 1948, began picking up the pieces of
- a shattered PKI, the party's policy had been one of peaceful,
constitutional activity and close cooperation with those
political groups and forces in the new republic which might
acquiesce in such collaboration. At the time, such a policy
had seemed essential to the bare survival of the party,
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The Standing Council of the Pia Politburo in September 1965
mdit
Njoto
Luianan
�
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to say nothing of its regrowth. As the years passed, it
proved a remarkably successful policy in terms of the
advances made in PKI membership, mass following, and
political influence.* As Sukarno found the party an
increasingly useful balancing force to the Army, which
represented the most serious threat to his leadership,
the PKI reaped the greatest advantage of all from its
policy of collaborating with the '"nationalist-bourgeoisie"
in its winning of the President as its great benefactor.
With Sukarno's protection and encouragement, the PKI actually
became the predominant party in Indonesia; by 1960 it could
be said it was "directing the whole course of Indonesian
politics." Adam Malik, the present Foreign Minister of
Indonesia has analyzed its success; "-it was due not so much
to any majority that it possessed or might possibly gain,
but to the protective hand of Sukarno. Mainly because of
this, the PKI, a minority, assumed the quality of a majority."
In the situation of Indonesia's headlong slide towards
the left, with Sukarno and the PKI in the4ead, the time
seemed near at hand when the Communists would take over
control, of the country--either with the passing of Sukarno
from thq scene, or possibly before that. Most observers in
the West conceded this.** The Soviets and the Chinese seem
*Aidit built the PKI from a party of less than 10,000
members in 1951 into the third largest Communist party in tne
world (behind the CCP and the CPSU) and the largest party
outside the bloc. Party membership was over 2,000,000 in
1963 and over 3,000,000 in 1965. On the Indonesian scene,
the PKI was not only the largest party in terms of membersrir,
but it was the best organized and most dynamic political
entity in the country.
**By 1964, it was the reasonable conclusion of all Indo-
nesian experts that Indonesia would soon become a Communist
state. Guy Pauker, writing in November 1964, was of the
opinion that "even if the Communists ghould lose Sukarno as
a protector, it seems doubtful that other national leaders
would emerge in the near future capable of t'allying Indone-
sia's dispersed and demoralizedrahtiCCommunitt'forces.
Furthermore, these forces would lack the ruthlessness that
made it possible for the Nazis to suppress the Communist
Party of Germany a few weeks after the elections of
5 March 1933, in which the latter won 5 million votes or
almost 13 percent of the total."
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to have been reasonably confident of it. Indonesians
seemed resigned to it.* Certainly, the PKI had good
reason to believe it.
On the basis of these acamplishments, the do?-
mestic policies of the PKI could only have been judged
an unqualified success. Aidit himself was probably
more confident than ever of the correctness of the PKI
line, which was closely associated with him personally
He had been the one to formulate the strategy of the
"united front and the party's growth" which had been
the party strategy since 1951; before that, the party
had been engaged in an underground struggle (1926-45)
and then the struggle against the Dutch (1945-51); it
had no history or experience in the kind of "peaceful
tactics" that Aidit mapped out for the party as the road
to power in an Indonesia under Sukarno.
Although Aidit seems to have enjoyed considerable
support within the PKI leadership on domestic policy,
presumably some of the leaders felt more strongly in
favor of these policies than others. While there was
no public airing of the differences within the party
and all the PKI leaders gave the same party line in any
public: discussion of an issue, domestic or international,
there does seem to have been some differences in emphasis
between the speeches of Aidit and Njoto..* For instance, on
the theme of "armed struggle" versus "peaceful transition
to socialism" as the correct road for the PKI in Indonesia,
Njoto!s: speeches emphasized the armed struggle_going.
on in other places, such as Cuba,afid;Algeria._ .(See,.Njoto's
speech of 6 February 1963.) While Aidit could be ex-
pected tompport these revolutionary movements, his
speeches concentrated on the struggle in Indonesia and
the particular tactics of the PKI in that struggle. Ae -
the success of these tactics became more and more obvious,
Aidit spoke with greater and greater conviction and an
increasing note of authority about the PKI's contribution
(and implicitly, his own contribution) to Marxist theory
on the assumption of power; it became a predominant theme
in his speeches. On 12 October 1964 he answered a series
of questions on the PKI and the Indonesian revolution with
the unprecedented claim that:
*Iw,Indonesia, just before the coup, overt anti-communism
had become virtually a crime; even the military paid lip
service to the huge PKI-sponsored rallies. Everything rein-
forced the idea that the PKI would take over after Sukarno died.
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Among the world communist parties the PKI is the one
that has the most authority to talk about the 'peaceful
transition' toward socialism, because the PKI takes part
in both the central and local governments and it has the
actual potential to carry out its policies.
The rapid development of the PKI is a result of its
correct policy, a policy of resolute opposition to
imperialism and the establishment of a National Front
in Indonesia....It is because of this correct political
and organizational line that the PKI has now become a
party with a membership of over 3 million, while in
1951 it had only 8,000 members. (Emphasis added)
As long as Aidit had been Chairman of the PKI, the party had
rejected the Chinese model of violent -agrarian revolution as
impractical in Indonesian conditions. Right up to the time
of the coup, there was no sign that it had changed it views
.on the subject.
It hardly seems necessary to point out that Aidit
obviously considered his policy of "peaceful transition to
socialism" only as a means to an end. As a Communist, he
was certainly not opposed to armed struggle or violence;
he just did not consider it the best policy for the PKI at
that time. That he adthitted the'possibility of the PKI's
resorting to armed struggle sometime in the future was made
clear in a private conversation he had with Phillip Abbott
Luce, a member of the U.S. Progressive Labor Party and a
Castro sympathizer, who met Aidit in Cuba in July 1963
they were both attending Cuba's 26 July National Day celt�
brations. In his book The New Left (1966) Luce writes:
One evening I spent nearly two hours in a private con-
versation with Aidit, who told me that the PKI was con-
temptuous7of the CPUSA. The PKI was only using the
democratic process in Indonesia to the advantage of the
Communists. He assured me that as soon as it appeared
as if the Communists were beginning to lose in the bid
for power, they would institute a guerrilla war and
topple the government.
No driubt, if Aidit had ever become convinced that the Commu-
nists were losing out in the struggle.for power, he,would
have opted for armed struggle. However, the possibility uf
this happening must have seemed very remote to him in 1963,
*Indonesian Ambassador Ratnam, who knew Aidit well, described
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when he made the above statement to Phillip Abbott Luce;
and in 1964 and 1965 it would have seemed remoter still.
With each passing day, it looked more and more as though
Indonesia was about to fall into the hands of the Communists.
The PKI's Armed Capability
If Aidit had been seriously concerned about the
possibility of the PKI having to resort to armed force,
it seems that he would have done more to develop an armed
capability for the PKI. Just what capability the PKI
actually had for armed struggle is still open to some ques-
tion. There are a number of reports that the Chinese were
shipping arms to the PKI. According to these reports,
the arms were being off-loaded at several different places
along the coast of Java and Sumatra and were being stored
in PKI "safe" places nearby. Despite the persistence of
such reports, there is no convincing evidence that they
were true. No great store of PKI arms has ever been
found, before or after the coup. (The few caches of arms
that the Indonesian Army is reported to have discovered
at various outlying locat.lons along the coast, which are
probably the basis for the reports of Chinese arms being
shipped to the PKI, have never been definitely linked to
the PKI.) It is almost unbelievable that PKI stores of
arms could have remained a secret after the coup, when
thousands of party members were interrogated by the Army.
Nor is it likely that hidden supplies of arms would not
have been used by the PKI against the Army during those
days of the Army's mass repression of the party, but the
fact is that the Communists did not fight back and were
not armed to resist the Army. So, in conclusion, the PKI
does not seem to have brought a supply of arms and ammuni-
tion into Indonesia over the years or over a period of
several months before the coup, as has been reported again
and again in connection with the coup. The charge has
been made and repeated so often that it is sometimes dif-
ficult to establish the source of the reports; but they
would all seem to be without foundation.
(footnote continued from page 172)
him as "a dedicated Communist, a witty conversationalist,
and absolutely ruthless"; "he would have sacrificed any
friend on the spot."
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In part, the explanation for the persistent but
apparently erroneous reports of Chinese arms being shipped
to the PKI is that these reports have been confused with
other reports, which do seem to be true, of Chinese arms
"being included in shipments of Chinese materials for Sukar-
no's CONEFO complex in Djakarta. Apparently, some Chinese
arms were definitely discovered in crates marked "Construc-
tion materials--CONEFO"; all of the crates in question
came into Indonesia through the Djakarta harbor. Accord-
ing to several reliable sources, Sukarno had issued an
order that the shipments of materials for CONEFO be moved
directly from the harbor to the CONEFO construction site;
they were not to go through the usual customs inspection
and processing. It was explained that this was to avoid
unnecessary delay, and it was known that Sukarno was in
a great hurry to finish the CONEFO project. With the
revelation that covert shipments of arms were included
in the shipment of building materials, however, it seems
clear, in hindsight, that Sukarno was actually making the
necessary arrangements to protect the delivery of Chinese
arms that were being shipped to Indonesia secretly. Ob-
viously, he had negotiated a secret arms deal with the
Chinese. As we have already seen, the Chinese arms that
were being received in Djakarta were being stored in Air
Force depots in and around the city. So, the reports that
Chinese arms were being shipped into Indonesia were true.
But it was Sukarno, not the PKI, who was receiving the
arms. They might or might not have been used by the PKI
and others in training for the "fifth force," if that prd-
gram had gotten underway. Before it did, they were used
in the coup--by the PKI volunteer troops that had received
a quick course in military training for the specific pur-
poses of the coup. It was the Air Force, not the PKI,
that made the arms available to the volunteer troops.
Besides the matter of arms, there is the question
of military training that the PKI might have been giving party
members. Prior to the start of the special military train-
ing course at Lubang Buaja, which was given to some 4,0016
volunteers from the PKI for the particular purposes of the
coup, the last three weeks before the coup, party members
are not known to have received military training in Indone-
Sia. Apparently, lectures in military theory and strategy
were given at the higher party school, bit only the lead-
ership levels of the party atteAded these courses and
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actual military training was not involved. The only
military training that ordinary party members are known
to have received was a course in "military tactics and
the art of revolution" that the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) gave selected foreign Communists at a school near
Kunming, China. We have inadequate information as to the
number of Indonesians who might have attended this school
but it was certainly a very small number in relation to
the membership of the PKI.*
In conclusion, then, the PKI had no significant
capability of its own for armed action as late as November
1964, when Aidit founded the Special Bureaunto prepare for
armed struggle;" certainly, any armed capability that it
had was far less than was generally thought at the time,
when there were constant rumors of Chinese shipments of arms
to the PKI and military training that was supposedly being
given to PKI party members. Probably the main reason why
Aidit had decided against a policy of training alid arming
the PKI (which would have involved the covert shipment of
relatively large quantities of arms from Communist China)
was that he was unwilling to take the risks involved in
such a program. If it became known (and it would have been
very hard to keep it a secret) that the PKI was actively
preparing for armed struggle, it would have vitiattd his
whole effort over the past 15 years to create just the
opposite image of the PKI--as a party that operated entirely
within the legal political system of the country. He was
obviously concernec: not to risk anything that would seri-
ously compromise the PKI's policy of peaceful transition
to socialism," which he considered the key to the PKI's
success during the past 15 years and its best hope of
winning power in the future.
The PKI's Covert Apparatus
With this reason for not wanting to get the PKI
involved in the illegal business of secreting arms into
*According to one member of the PKI youth organization
who admitted to having received pare-military training in
China, approximately 300 Indonesians were at the same
military training school near Kunming in October 1965.
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Indonesia or in a military training program on a mass
scale, Aidit had made no effort to provide the PKI with its
own armed force. Yet, because he could not definitely
rule out the possibility of the PKI's having to resort to
armed force sometime in the future, if things suddenly
changed for the worse, he seems to have been concerned to
develop some kind of covert apparatus, distinct from the
overt apparatus of the party, which could be assigned the
task of preparing for armed struggle, should that ever
become necessary.
In late 1964, he seems to have followed the Chinese
Communist prescription for an "illegal shadow organization"
separate from the legal, overt Communist party in setting up
a new covert organization within the PKI, whose special
purpose it would be to prepare for armed struggle. It was
a "secret, revolutionary organization," in the sense that
the Chinese use the term to refer to the illegal, secret
party organization that directs the illegal struggle that
is carried out independently of the legal struggle:
Illegal struggle refers to the status of
the strugglers, not to the nature of the
techniques emploTTa. The illegal, secret
party is not simply a party which has been '
banned by the law or which has made the
decision to engage in armed insurrection.
Such a party is a known party--its leaders
and members are identified even though they
may be in hiding or in a jungle insurgent
camp. The very existence of the secret
party is unknown, its personnel are unknown
as Communists, its work is carried on in
complete anonymity. It is unknown not
only to hostile security forces and the
general public--it::is unknown even to all
except a few of the overt party. The
cadres of this party are not in hiding--
on the contrary they are living open,
normal lives in the community. It is
their status as members of a secret, rev-
olutionary organization, dedicated to the
violent overthrow of the regime, which is
Illegal.
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The new organization--called the Special Bureau�was a
completely autonomous organization within the PKI, answer-
able only to Aidit. It had absolute authority over its
own organization, administration, personnel, logistics,
and everything else. Not only was it completely free of
the control of the central committee and the politburo,
but the members of the central committee and the politburo
were not even informed of its existence, must less of the
identity of its members. This was in keeping with Chinese
Communist doctrine:
Only the center of the secret party had any
contact whatever with any element of the
legal party. Only the topmost leadership
of the legal party knows of even the existence
of the secret party much less the identities
of its members,and even this topmost leader-
ship knows the identity only of the secret L
center.
It is not clear who, besides Aidit, knew anything about
the Special Bureau. PKI leader Njono insisted in his in-
terrogation that "knowledge of the party's secret organi-
zation was held exclusively by Party Chairman Aidit." It
seems fairly clear that neither Njono nor Pens Pard4de,
both of them politburo members, had any specific knowledge
of the Special Bureau; apparently, Sudisman and Sakirman,
members of the five-man Standing Council of the Politburo,
were not informed either. Lukman and Njoto, the other
two members of the Standing Council along with Aidit,
would seem to be the only ones who might have known,
though there is nothing to indicate that even they did.
This is one of those points that we may never know for
sure; there may be only one man alive today who knows
the answer�Sjam.*
In its organization, as well as its discipline,
the Special Bureau followed the Chinese prescription.
There was a Central Special Bureau and 10 regional Special
Bureaus; horizontal relations among the regions bureaus
were not permitted. Again, this was in keeping with
Chinese doctrine that:
*As noted previously, President Suharto has denied
Sjam's appeal for clemency, and it is expected that his
death sentence will be executed shortly. There are un-
confirmed reports that he has already been executed.
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there must be no lateral communication
between parallel units of the secret party,
not only at the cell level, but all*the
way to the top. Only one person in a
subordinate unit is to be known to the
next higher unit. Any coordination of
activity must be done by vertical communi-
cation up to and down from the center.
The following Chinese discussion of the role of the
individual member of an illegal Communist party could almost
have been written about Sjam, Pono, Walujo, and the other
_members of the Special Bureau and the work they were doing
to subvert the Indonesian Army:
The illegal party member must make friends
on a wide scale--people who respect him,
have faith in him and in the end will fol;pw
his leadership . . . He must also be a dili-
gent student of his surroundings, both
physical and social. He must be aware of
the contradictions in society. He must
seek out those elements in the community
who have grievances against the regime,
such as army officers who resent political
control, waste of money and military
inefficiency, or religious leaders who
find the society increasingly immoral and
profligate, or peasants who suffer from
neglect of their needs.
(Emphasis added)
The illegal party worker is obviously primarily concerned to
establish himself in his profession and in the community at
large as a person whom others admire and respect and whose
lead they will follow. He is not necessarily concerned to
convert others to Communism; in fact, he may not even reveal
himself as a Communist. He is simply interested in estab-
lishingisome sort of control over certain key people, who,
for one reason or another, are in a position to influence
events in a way favorable to the communists.
From a variety of sources, we now have a fairly clear
picture of the operations of the Special Bureau. The most
striking thing about those Bureau operations is that, with
few exceptions, they were all concentrated in the military
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field--which was not exactly according to Chinese Communist
doctrine on the subject. The Chinese model calls for infil-
tration of the entire fabric of society� the illegal party
organization is not usually so totally directed toward the
military. Obviously, Aidit and Sjam felt no great concern
about the PKI's strength vis-a-vis- the other political
parties or in the mass organizations or among the peasants
or in the government, et alia. In concentrating their
covert activities so completely on the military, they were
obviously concerned about just one thing: the threat too
the PKI from the military.
In the case of the military, priority would obviously
be given to winning the loyalty of the men in command
positions. If the PKI could win their loyalty, it could
count on the men under their command to follow their orders;
in a showdown with the army these units would defect to
the side of the PKI. There can be no doubt that the whole
operation of the Special Bureau was aimed at the officers
in just such key positions. One can go down the list of
military officials "managed" by the PKI Special Bureau,
and almost without exception, they held some command post,
either a company command or command of a battalil5n or a
special unit like the Special Defense Force at Halim Air
Force Base or, even, a command like the 4th Combat Command
of KOSTRAD in West Borneo, which General Supardjo held.
Dani was almost a special case as Commander of the entire
Air Force; with him, the PKI had penetrated right to the
top of the Indonesian military comman&
Itmust be remembered that the Special Bureau had
been organized less than a year before it was given the
job of planning the military operation of the'30 September
Movement.' By the time of the coup, the Central Bureau,
which managed contacts in Djakarta only, had established
a pattern of regular contacts with over 40 officials, most
of them military officials but a few of them non-military
government officials, in Djakarta. We have no way of
estimating the number of people who were being "managed"
by the ten regional bureaus. Sjam himself did not know
them all, since "it was the right of each regional bureau
to conceal this information;" he could remember the names
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of only 12 of the regional "contacts" but he indicated
that there were "many others."*
*New information indicates that PKI contacts in the
military may have been even more widespread than we first
thought on the basis of Sjam's testimony. From the in-
terrogation of Sjam, Untung, Latief, and the other mili-
tary officers involved in the planning for the coup in
Djakarta, we have a fairly good picture of the operations
of the Central Special Bureau in Djakarta, but we are
just beginning to get some picture 0f the extent of the
Special Bureau operations in Central and West Java, where
there were regional bureaus of the Special Bureau. We
still have no information on the role of the Special
Bureau in events in Semarang, Jogjakarta, and Solo or the
day of the coup, but presumably Col. Suherman, Major
Muljono, and Major Iskandar, who followed Untung's lead
in establishing Revolutionary Councils in these three
cities, were "contacts" of the Special Bureau, just like
Untung, Latief, Sujono, Dani, and Supardjo. It seems
that the Special Bureau must have been responsible for
coordinating events in these cities with those in Djakarta.
In late July 1968, the Indonesian Army was shocked
to learn the extent of PKI penetration in the KODAM VI
Military Region Command of the Siliwangi (West Java) Divi-
sion of the Army, which was believed to be one of the Army -
most reliable units. The deputy commander of KODAM NI
(Col. Djukardi Sastradiwiria) was arrested in July on
suspicion of involvement with the PKI. His testimony is
a good example of recent information we have received
on PKI operations in West Java. Djukardi told of being
introduced to Sjam around 1953-54. He said that Sjam ex-
plained to him that he was a member of the PKI Malam
(Night) and that, in contrast to the PKI Siang (Day) whose
members were overt, PKI Malam members were secret and
compartmented from each other. Djukardi was in regular
contact with Sjam until 1958 or 1959. After this he was
visited by a man named Rachmat, who had a letter of intro-
duction from Sjam. According to Djukardi, Rachmat con-
tacted him in August 1965 and told him about Sukarno's
(footnote continued on page 181)
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By late 1965, the PKI had made a good beginning in
subverting crucial elements in the military, and it had
plans for extending its operations in this field and in
supporting fields, such as the police field. Given a
few more years, it might well have managed to subvert
enough military officers to make it a real contest between
the anti-Communists and the pro-Communists in the mili-
tary. As it was, by late 1965, even though it was not
in a position where it would have wanted to risk a general
test of strength with the military, it was in a position
where it could at least contemplate carrying out a limited
military operation--such as the kidnapping of a number of
Army generals and the seizure of a few key installations
in Djakarta. A practical measure of the military strength
(footnote continued from page 180)
illness and about the plan of the Council of Generals to
seize political power. Rachmat asked him to make mili-
tary preparations within the KODAM VI Area Command to
anticipate the generals' coup. In early September 1965,
Rachmat and Djukardi are supposed to have met with Sjam
and Supardjo in Bandung to discuss the plans for the.dcoup.
Later in September, they met with other military officers
in KODAM VI to discuss the kidnapping or killing of senior
Siliwangi Division officers. When, according to Djukardi,
he declined to take command of the KODAM VI coup forces,
Rachmat said he 'would take command himself. Djukardi
gave the names of at least 16 other officers in KODAM VI
whom he knew to be contacts of Rachmat.
This is about the best evidence we have that the
Special Bureau planned kidnapping/murders of senior Army
officers in other cities than Djakarta. The similarity
between the KODAM VI coup planning and the action taken
by Col. Suherman, Major Muljono, and Major Iskandar against
senior officers of the Diponegoro (Central Java) Division
makes it clear that the Special Bureau organized events
in Semarang, Jogjakarta, and Solo just as it planned and
organized the kidnapping/murders of the Army generals in
Djakarta.
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of the PKI in late 1965 would actually be the 30 September
Movement. It seems that almost all the resources of the
Special Bureau were involved in the coup. We know that
Aidit was concerned to commit the maximum number of troops
at his disposal to the coup action, even to the extent
of rushing the training of some 4,000 volunteer troops
as an auxiliary force; most of the known "contacts" of
the Special Bureau played some role in the coup. In
short, the coup was the supreme military effort that the
PKI was capable of at that time. It bespeaks both the
success of the Special Bureau's program of subversion in
the Armed Forces that the PKI could even bring off such
a thing as the kidnapping of the Army.s whole top command
and also the general state of unpreparedness of the PKI
at the time for an all-out challenge from the military.
In summary--Aidit had all along tended to belittle
the chance of a military challenge of the P1(1. Arounq
1964, however, he apparently began to take the possibility
of a showdown with the army a little more seriously, as
Sukarno's death or disability began to seem like a distinct
possibility before the PKI could assume power. By the
time of the coup, he had made a good beginning in his plan
to subvert the Indonesian military as the preferable way
for the PKI to acquire some capability for armed struggle,
without the risks involved in a program to train and equip
PKI party members.
PKI Policy Toward Sukarno
There is one other aspect of the PKI domestic
policy that should be mentioned before we look at the
PKI in the context of the Indonesian political scene in
the months just before the coup. That is its general
policy toward Sukarno. Aidit's policy toward the Presi-
dent was almost certainly a crucial factor in the PKI's
involvement in the coup.
. � Although there seems to have been no serious dis-
agreement within the party over Aidit's general line on
"peaceful transition to socialism," there does seem to
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have been some dissension over elements of that policy,
such as the degree to which the PKI should subordinate
its interests to those of Sukarno. No one, including
the militants, would have argued in favor of a major
challenge to Sukarno; it was obvious that his policies,
both domestically and internationally, for the most part,
favored PKI interests; the longer he lasted as President,
the better were the party's chances of assuming power
without a major struggle. It was generally agreed that
the best hope of the PKI lay in the careful and loyal
implementation of his policies. According to �one reli-
able and knowledgable source,
Aidit maintains his position by virtue of his
being the party's principal point of contact
with Sukarno and the fact that the party's
strategy, at this time at least, is to support
Sukarno.
As a way of ingratiating the PKI with Sukarno, the
Indonesian Communists had adopted a deliberate "tactic
of flattery" toward the President. They studied his words
and his doctrines and his aspirations for Indonesia with
the same diligence that they studied Communist writings.
The speeches of Aidit and the other PKI leaders were-el-
ways generously adorned with quotations from the "Great
Leader of the Revolution." In treating Sukarno's formu-
lations with quasi-theological reverence and in making
him the object of their "cult of personality," the Com-
munists were not only appealing to Sukarno's boundless
vanity but at the same time reinforcing the image of
themselves as his true disciples and therefore his most
deserving political heirs.*
*Sukarno never stated publicly:that he viewed the P1(1
as his heir, but this image was gradually built up through
- the subtle interplay between the President and the Com-
munists.
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To be sure, Sukarno was not ungrateful. On 23
May 1965, at the 45th anniversary celebrations of the
PKI, he acknowledged the party's unswerving support. He
participated in the elaborate anniversary ceremony, ex-
changing compliments with the PKI leaders. In his speech
on the occasion, he said that the PKI was truly his "best
disciple," that "Indonesia could never emerge as a
major power without the help of the Communists."
I embrace the PKI, because it is a revolu-
tionary force. PKI go forward. PKI never
retreat. PKI grow. PKI be strong. Onward.
Aidit, in particular, sang the wisdom and glory
of President Sukarno louder and more unequivocably than
any other Indonesian political leader. In an interview
in March 1965, he said:
The President is my teacher, my leader.
He is a great patriot. He is fighting
against imperialism more than the leaders
of socialist countries. The other parties
in Indonesia meet him often. But the PKI
is mentally closer to the President.
Apparently, some of the more militant leaders of the PKI
had certain doubts about the wisdom of the party's support-
ing the President to the extent that Aidit was carrying
the policy. They were reportedly disturbed at the con-
tradiction between party strength and party subservience
to Sukarno.
At the time of the coup, Aidit probably had more
influence on Sukarno than any other person. More than
ever before, he was pushing Sukarno on matters of vital
interest to the PKI--like the "fifth force" and the
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"troika" idea and the idea of a NASAKOM cabinet.* Of
the two men, however, Sukarno still had the upper hand.
For the time being, Aidit was willing to accept that; he
would go along with whatever Sukarno decided, expecting
to gain the upper hand that way.
Even if Sukarno's decisions went against the
PKI--such as Sukarno's deciding to give only
four posts to the Communists in a cabinet of
75 or his refusing to arm 10 million peasants--
Aidit took them in great good humor, never
*By 1965, the PKI had made a Nasakom cabinet a virtual
demand of the party; it was the furthest they had ever
gone in pressing their own objectives on the President.
In the spring of that year, they began to press other
demands--one that would have imposed a "troika" policy
on the chiefs of staff of the armed forces and another,
the 'fifth force" concept, that would have placed small
arms in the hands of Communist party members. Aidit's
"troika" proposal envisaged a policymaking board composed
of nationalist, religious, and, of course, Communist-repre-
sentatives at the various command levels, from the chief
of staff to the lowest level of command. When General
Yani heard of Aidit's "troika" proposal, he went person-
ally to the President to protest the idea. He is reported
to have told Sukarno; "I am a Nasakomist, and my Nasakom-
ism is the same as yours. There is no need to introduce
Nasakom into the armed forces. The elements of Nasakom
are already present with each member of the armed forces.
The Indonesian armed forces have had the Nasakom idea
from their beginning." Sukarno and the PKI later made
fun of the Army's so-called "Nasakom spirit" in little
songs and verses that became rather well known at the
time. Everyone knew that the Army was doing what it could
to resist the idea of Nasakom councils in the Army although
it made a pretense of supporting Sukarno's idea of Nasakom
in general.
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openly doubting or criticising Sukarno's
verdict...It must have been highly reassur-
ing for Sukarno to hear from Aidit (in his
interview in March 1965) that 'many think
I can influence the President. He is not
influenced by anybody.' These are exactly
the words President Sukarno liked to hear.
T:lere were supposedly three people who knew how to flatter
Sukarno to get their way. One was Aidit. One was Suban-
drio. And the third was his wife Devi.
Background to a Coup: September 1964-March 1965
The process of eliminating all effective opposi-
tion to Sukarno and his policies, which had been the main
political trend in Indonesia over the years, was greatly
accelerated during the fall and winter 1964-65. Appar-
ently aware of his declining health and afraid that gradual
evolution would not result in the fulfillment of his
grand design for Indonesia, Sukarno seems to have decided.
sometime around the fall of 1964 to speed up the process
of neutralizing or liquidating all independent power
centers obstructing his purposes. Assisting him in this
task was the PKI, first and foremost, but also the In-
donesian Air Force under Dani, first Deputy Prime Minister
Subandrio, a host of Communist sympathizers, and an in-
creasing number of opportunists who climbed on the band-
wagon as soon as it got rolling.
The process of eliminating the opposition proceded
by stages. After a first move by Sukarno to remove or
reduce the opposition from a certain quarter, the PKI
would immediately move in with a vicious anti-America
campaign designed to link the opposition within Indonesia
with the "foreign enemy." Sukarno would then accuse the
opposition of treason to the Indonesian revolution and
have its leaders removed from Office and their party
organization and publications banned.
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President Sukarno with Aidit at Merdeka Palace, Djakarta, 1965
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After the rumors about. Sukarno's failing kidney
became current in the fall of 1964, a movement supported
from behind the scenes by Third Deputy Prime Minister
Chaerul Saleh and supported openly by Minister of Trade
Adam laiik began a major polemic with the PKI. Upon
Sukarno's return from overseas in the late fall, he
promptly banned the BPS, or the ''Body to Support Sukarno-
ism' ds the movement was called. This was the start of
a serles of bannings and purges in 1965, each of which
strengthened the status and power of the PKI as well as
of Sukarno.
On 8 January, after withdrawing from the United
Nations, Sukarno banned the Murba Party, which had obvi-
ously been involved with the BPS, although Sukarno had
not attempted to link the two when he first moved against
the BPS,' On 24 February, following a dramatically
*Apparently, both Subandrio and the PKI were shocked
by Sukarno's decision to withdraw Indonesia from the
United Nations and his boldness in banning the Murba
Party. According to a reliable source, "Sukarno's im-
pulsive decision (re Indonesia's withdrawal from the
U.N.) horrified even his friend and straightman Suban-
drio, who, as Foreign Minister, had to carry out the
order. He delayed the formal letter of withdrawal for
three weeks before he signed it, hoping that the Bung
would change his mind. Subandrio told officials at the
Foreign Ministry that the decision had been 'too whimsi-
cal.' PKI leader Lukman is reported to have told a
group of leaders of PKI-controlled front groups in Solo
that the top PKI leadership was 'taken aback' by President
Sukarno's daring in pulling out of the U.N.; he said that
it was far more daring than the PKI leadership had expected.
He said the PKI leadership was also "surprised by Sukar-
no's show of guts in banning the Murba Party." Accord-
ing to Lukman, the complete eradication of the Murba Party
was the top priority task of the PKI throughout Indonesia.
He claimed that Sukarno had warned PNI and NU leaders
that if they did not purge their parties of counter-revolu-
tionary elements he would also ban their parties. Because
of these "progressive policies of the President, the PKI
intended to increase its support of Sukarno, according
to Lukman.
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heightened anti-American campaign in Djakarta, Sukarno
banned the newspapers which had supported the BPS, which
he characterized as a CIA plot to "kill Sukarnoism and
Sukarno." (The bans of these newspapers gave the PKI
'complete control of the informational field.) A few days
after the banning of these papers, he ordered the retool-
ing of the '45 Generation, another political vehicle of
Chaerul Saleh which also had widespread connections among
government and military officials. In April, a predomin-
antly PKI governing board was installed in the new board
of governors of the '45 Generation organization. Murba
Party members Saleh and Malik were effectively "re-tooled"
by losing control of most of their operational governmental
responsibilities. In September, Sukarno announced that
the '45 Generation was completely under his control;
Chaerul Saleh publicly begged for forgiveness.
Following the banning of the BPS press, a numbdr
of new Moslem newspapers suddenly appeared in Djakarta
which, although initially treading gingerly on PKI toes,
gave promise of eventually replacing the BPS papers in
attacking the PKI. Sukarno moved promptly to neutralize
this new threat. In a series of decisions, the Moslem
organizations were placed under the supervision of Suban-
drio. Thus, the Moslem-PKI issue had been dampened down'
by September, although there were still isolated incidents
of violence between the two groups.* Now Sukarno could
concentrate his attack on the two most important citadels
of anti-PKI power--the PNI right-wing and the Army lead-
ership.
*The Moslem issue was by no means settled. Certain
of the more docile Moslem organizations were behaving them-
selves, but the HMI (the organization of Moslem Univer-
sity students) was still active. As noted above, there
were several incidents of violence between the Moslems
and the PKI in 1965. If most of the Moslem organizations
had been intimidated by Sukarno, some, like the HMI,
were far from dead.
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For several years the President had been working
to convert the PNI into a virtual mirror of the PKI in
terms of its espousal of pro-Communist positions and at-
titudes. Although the party had gone along with the
general pro-Communist orientation of the government,
there had been considerable foot-dragging on the part
of a small group of moderates in the leadership, such
as First Chairman Nardi and Central Java Chairman
Hadisubeno. Opposing this group of moderates was the
pro-Communist PNI Secretary General Surachman, who had
the backing of All Sastroamidjojo and other central board
members. In March 1965, Sukarno stepped up his campaign
to "re-tool" the PNI to the point where it was obvious
that purges would soon occur. Addressing an extraordin-
ary meeting of the PNI in Djakarta on 25 and 26 March,
he Claimed that "recent events" had cleared the road for
the socialist stage of the Indonesian revolution;* he
called unequivocally for the ouster of "false Marhaenists"
from the PNI, whom he identified implicitly as anti
*It was Sukarno, rather than the PKI, that was pushing
the idea that Indonesia was about to enter the sociaList
stage in the spring of 1965. Apparently, the PKI was not
happy with the various statements that Sukarno was making
to this effect--such as the speech that he made to the
Provisional People's Consultative Congress (MPRS) on 11
April. Apparently, the party had two main objections.
According to PKI theory, there should be a "strong, co-
hesive government-acknowledged force to guide Indonesia
into the socialist stage," In the view of the PKI, only
the PKI could act as such a force. Yet, in reality, the
only strong cohesive force in Indonesia in 1965 was the
army; which the PKI obviously considered the wrong vehicle
for leading Indonesia into the socialist stage. The
second objection was that, according to PKI theory, In-
donesia could pass into its socialist stage of develop-
ment only after the national democratic stage had been
completed. According to the PKI, this was not the case
in Indonesia in 1965.
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Communists. On 4 May, the first "false Marhaenist" was
ousted; a special meeting of the PNI central board re-
moved Hadisubeno from control of the Central JAva PNI.
At the PNI anniversary celebration on 26 July, Sukarno
spoke again of Indonesia's entry into the "socialist
stage;" this time he implied that the entry might neces-
sarily be a violent one.* Once again, he called for the
ouster of "false Marhaenists" from the PNI. About ten
days later, a specially-convened meeting of the PNI
leadership council officially purged Hardi and his fol-
lowers from the party and gradually thereafter replaced
them with either pro-Communist or Communist sympathizers.**
The PNI had-all but collapsed as a political force cap-
able of resisting Sukarno. Only the Army remained.
For a long While, the Army had been experiencing
increasing concern over the political situation, especi-
ally the situation in Central Java; where the PKI had(
its greatest strength_ Some of the generals, alarmed by
the increasing ascendancy of the PKI in Central Java,
are known to have felt that the tide was turning against
the Army in Indonesia as a whole. In January, General
Yani and a group of his most trusted advisers in the Army
*In this speech on the occasion of the PNI 38th anni-
versary celebration, Sukarno publicly identified himself
with the 1926 PKI revolt. He said that the PKI had been
right to try to seize power violently, even though it had
not succeeded at the time. He implied that the entry
into the socialist stage in Indonesia might be violent.
Apparently, even the PKI was shocked by Sukarno's espousal
of the violent entry into socialism. The party had been
espousing the peaceful transition to socialism. Actu-
ally, as noted before, the PKI had not been pushing the
idea of Indonesia's entry into socialism, certainly not
the way Sukarno was.
� .**As an indication of how leftist Sukarno had become
in 1965, the "false Marhaenists" who were purged from
the PNI for being anti-Communist are among the leftist
opposition to President Suharto today.
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began to meet together informally to discuss the deteriorat-
ing political situation and what the Army should do about
it. The group, known as the "brain-trust," included four
other generals, besides Yani: Gen. Suprapto, Gen. Harjono,
Gen. Parman, and Gen. Sukendro. Contrary to widespread
belief, Gen. Sutojo and Gen. Pandjaitan, who were also
victims of the Indonesian coup along with Yani, Suprapto,
Harjono, and Parman, were not members of the "brsin-trust."
They were close friends of�Yini and were generally con-
sidered to be among "Yani's boys" in the Army, but they
were not part of the group that began to meet together
regularly, in secret, in January to discuss political mat-
ters pertaining to the Army.*
Around the same time that Gen. Yani and a group
of his most trusted advisers in the Army began to meet
together for secret discussions of the political situa-
tion, the Army was presented with a proposal from the PKI
which represented the most serious challenge it had' yet
*This group of five generals which began to meet to-
gether regularly in January 1965 to discuss political
problems affecting the Army was, almost certainly, the
group that the PKI was warning Sukarno about. Aidit re-
ferred to the group as the "Generals' Council." There
was another organization in the army that was also known
as the Generals' Council, which was concerned solely with
the matter of promotions and appointments. Gen. Yani and
the Army tried to divert attention away from the group
of generals who were meeting together informally by bring-
ing up the subject of this other organization that was
also called the Generals' Council. It obviously had
nothing to do with the group of generals, known within
the army as Yani's "braintrust," who were meeting to dis-
cuss political matters.
All of the generals who were included in the "brain-
trust" or "Generals' Council", as Aidit referred to it,
were victims of the 30 September Movement, except for Gen.
Sukendro, who was in Communist China on the day of the
coup.
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faced. In late January, it was revealed that Aidit had
requested Sukarno to arm peasants and workers as a special
defense force or "people's militiav--the so-called "fifth
force."* The PKI and Communist China were to keep up the
pressure on Sukarno on the matter of the "fifth force"
all during the spring and summer of 1965; Sukarno himself
was to remain uncommitted on this issue. However, in
April, he took a definite step in the direction of under-
mining the Army as an independent political force. At
a special meeting of the military commanders that month,
he ordered the Army to get into step with the revolution
and revise its defense thinking in keeping with his own
thinking of Nekolim (Sukarno's word for "imperialist"
nations, particularly the U.S. and U.K.), rather than
Communist China, as the main enemy of Indonesia.
Many of the Army's senior officers are known to
have been deeply concerned about these .new orders, whl�ch
they believed opened the way for the disintegration of
the Army's strong anti-Communist posture. They were very
much aware of the fact that Air Force Commander Dani had
sold out to Sukarno and the PKI and was actively assist-
ing in the campaign against the Army. The Army held a
series of conferences to "turn the wheel toward the left"
as Sukarno demanded, but behind the scenes Yani and a fey
other senior generals in the Army were meeting in secret
to discuss ways of resisting Sukarno's moves to destroy
the Army as a political force opposed to the radical move-
ment to the left. It is clear that the Army was on the
defensive and was reacting to initiatives by Sukarno and
the PKI. There is no evidence that the Army was planning
anything more than countermeasures to resist Sukarno and
the PKI's bold new moves to crush it.
*Sukarno was actually the first to use the term "fifth
force." Aidit had spoken of "arming workers and peasants"
in presenting the idea in the first place. After Sukarno
originated the name "fifth force," everyone called it
that.
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In early May, Sukarno ordered the newly created
National Defense Institute placed under civilian control
and the introduction of a number of pro-Communist courses
in the curriculum. A few days later, he made another
proposal that would all but have destroyed the /Willy as
a political as well as an anti-Communist force. He pro-
posed that Nasakom advisory councils (in which the PKI
would have been represented along with the other parties)
should be formed to advise military commanders at all
levels, from the top echelon down to the military districts.
The PKI obviously had in mind a political commissar system
similar to that of Communist China. Sukarno himself cited
the example of Communist China in discussing the idea for
Nasakom advisory councils in the Army. Probably even more
than the "fifth force," the political commissar system
as proposed by the PKI would have destroyed the Army as
an independent power in Indonesia. The generals were
determinedly against the idea. Although they were aforced
to mouth support for it, they had successfully resisted
implementation of any such political commissar system in
the Army up to the time of the coup.
As of early August 1965, then, Sukarno's balance
sheet showed a mixed picture. On the one hand, he had
crushed the Saleh forces and removed the anti-Communtpt
strength in the PNI, and he had neutralized the Moslems,
making it possible to crush them at a later date. But
the Army had held. He may well have decided that unless
there was a change in the Army .leadership the Army was
not likely to give in on the matter of the "fifth force"
and the even more controversial matter of introducing
Nasakom councils in the command structure of the Army.
In other words, he may have begun to think of purging
the Army leadership, as he had purged the PNI leadership.
The Gilchrist Letter
In late May 1965, President Sukarno had a dramatic
confrontation with Army Commander Yani over two issues;
one of them, the Generals' Council and the other, the
Gilchrist Letter. Since the story of the Gilchrist Letter
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is of interest in connection with the coup, it may be well
to discuss it before taking up in detail the Generals'
Council.
Sukarno is reported to have called in Gen. Yani
and the commanders of the other armed services, as well
as Defense Minister Nasution, to discuss the Gilchrist
Letter the very same day that Subandrio first showed the
letter to the President. That was the 26th of May 1965.
According to Subandrio, the letter had been mailed to
him at his home address in an envelope bearing a Djakarta
postmark but no return address. A covering letter, which
was unsigned, explained that the letter had been found
in the home of Billy Palmer, an American businessman,
whose house had been raided by the Pia. (The raid on
Palmer's home had been well publicized in the Indonesian
press.) In other words, the covering letter implied
that the Gilchrist Letter had been furnished to Subandrio
by the PKI.
The Gilchrist Letter purported to be a letter written
by Sir Andrew Gilchrist, the British Ambassador to Indon-
esia, in March 1965. According to Subandrio, it was a
letter that Ambatsador Gilchrist sent to the British Foreign
Office, reporting on a discussion with the U.S Ambassador
to Indonesia concerning U.S. and British plans for sub-
version and overthrow of the Indonesian government in
collusion with Indonesian military leaders. In the letter,
Gilchrist was alleged to have referred to "our local Army
friends."
According to his testimony in court, Subandrio
ordered the BPI, Indonesia's intelligence organization
which he headed, to check out the authenticity of the
document. He was told that both the handwriting and the
form of the letter were the same as that of other docu-
ments taken from the British Embassy at the time of the
burning of the Embassy about eight months earlier.
Subandrio claimed that he was convinced by this report
of the authenticity of the document and, he gave the
letter to the President on 26 May 1965.
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Sukarno appeared to be genuinely alarmed by the
Gilchrist Letter. His haste in calling in the commanders
of the armed services and the Minister of Defense to dis-
cuss the document would seem to indicate that he was in-
clined to accept the letter as authentic; either that,
or he was deliberately creating that impression. At the
meeting with Sukarno on 26 May, Army Commander Yani is
reported to have denied the allegations made in the
letter. He told Sukarno that Generals Parman and Sukendro
were the only Army generals who maintained close liaison
with the British and Americans and only because this was
their assignment. Either Sukarno pretended not to be,
or he was not, convinced by Yani's explanation. One or
two days later, he raised the subject of the Gilchrist
Letter again at a meeting of KODAM commanders. Several
weeks later, he gave the go-ahead to Subandrio to announce
the existence of the document as proof of U.S. and British
plotting against Indonesia. The circumstances of the
announcement were .planned to attract world-wide att6-
tion. Apparently, Subandrio planned to announce the dis-
covery of the Gilchrist Letter at the Afro-Asian Confer-
ence in Algiers. When the conference was postponed at
the last minute, he called a press conference in Cairo,
just prior to returning home to Indonesia, to make the
dramatic announcement. The fact that the press confer-
ence was held in Cairo attracted international attention,
much more so than if Subandrio had made the announcement
in Indonesia.
No doubt, at that point in time, Sukarno was pre-
disposed to think the worst of both the U.S. and the
British. He may really have believed that Britain and
the United States were in collusion with the Indonesian
military in plotting his overthrow. Ever since the PRRI-
Permesta rebellion in the outer islands in 1956-61, in
which the U.S. and Britain had been involved, he had been
deeply suspicious of the U.S.; and of the C.I.A., in par-
ticular. By the summer of 1965, when the West Irian is-
sue had been settled in his favor, Sukarno had transferred
the full fury of his anti-Dutch complex to the U.S. and
Britain. In the situation of growing tension between
him and the Army, he might easily have been persuaded
of the danger of a coup by a Generals' Council, probably
in foreign pay.
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Regardless of what Sukarno really thought--or knew--
about the Gilchrist Letter, it is now widely accepted as
fact that the Gilchrist Letter was a forgery--and a bad
one, at that. Ambassador Gilchrist and the British govern-
ment have both denied knowing anything about such a letter.
British and U.S. officials were never shown a copy of the
letter that Subandrio said was the Gilchrist Letter, but
Indonesian Army officers examined it carefully and con-
cluded, without any doubt, that it was forged. The hand-
writing in the margin, supposed to be that of the Ambas-
sador, did not match his handwriting; nor was it his style
of writing. Probably the most convincing evidence that
the letter was a forgery is the absurdity that Ambassador
Gilchrist would discuss such a matter as U.S. and British
plans to overthrow the Indonesian Government in an uncoded
letter to the Foreign Office. Equally absurd is the idea
that the letter would ever find its way into Billy Palmer's
house, if it were authentic. (He was an obvious target
for the PKI and the BPI, because of his way of life and
temperament, to play the role of the "enemy agent.") More-
over, it is highly unlikely that the British would have
been involved in anything as out of context with their
policy at the time as a_plan to overthrow the Indonesian
Government; at the time the U.K. was withdrawing from
Southeast Asia and reducing drastically its role and com-
mitments in the area. There is still another point--namely,
that it was also totally out of character for the Indonesian
Army to have been plotting the overthrow of Sukarno at
that point in time. The Army was much too divided and
on the defensive to have been planning such a move.
The question immediately arises: who forged the
Gilchrist Letter? Three prime suspects immediately come
to mind: Subandrio, Aidit, and the Chinese. All three
would have had the same motive in wanting to convince
Sukarno that the generals were plotting against him.
The motive, of course, would have been to get Sukarno
to take firm action against the generals, who represented
the main threat to both Subandrio and the PKI in the
struggle for power after Sukarno. The Chinese had a vested
interest in promoting the interests, first of all, of the
PKI and, secondly, of Subandrio, over the military in
Indonesia.
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Sukarno must also be considered among the suspects
who had both the motive and the capability for forging
such a document. (Presumably, Sukarno would have used
Subandrio and the BPI to forge any document that he wanted
forged.) If Sukarno had any thought of moving against
the Army, as he had moved against the BPS and the Murba
Party and the PNI, he would have had a definite motive
in wanting to establish a case against the Army; the Gil-
christ Letter could always be used as evidence of Army
plotting against Sukarno and Army intrigue with foreign
enemies of the Indonesian state.
In the three years since the coup, no evidence
has come to light as to who forged the letter. In the
interrogations after the coup, no attempt was ever made
--as far as we know--to question people on this particular
point. Why the Army did not pursue the matter is not
clear. Unless it was not sure that it had convincihg
proof that the document was a forgery, it seems that the
only reason it would have had for not wanting to pursue
the matter further would be the possibility of involving
Sukarno. Certainly, the Army was interested above all
else in establishing that there was no truth to the reports
that it was plotting the overthrow of Sukarno in collusion
with the U.S. and the U.K. To this end, it had every
reason for wanting to discredit the Gilchrist Letter, as
evidence to the contrary. Under the circumstances, it
is surprising that more of an effort was not made to im-
plicate Aidit, or Subandrio, or the Chinese in the forgery,
when a good circumstantial case could have been made
against all three.* At the time (i.e. in 1966), the Army
*It is interesting that the Army never tried to make
a strong case for the Chinese having forged the Gilchrist
Letter, though it tried in every other way to implicate
the Chinese in the coup. If it were proved that the
Chinese forged the letter, they would have to be judged
to have played a significant role in bringing about the
events that led to the coup, whether or not they were
directly involved in the planning of the coup.
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was concentrating on PKI involvement in the coup. For
very good reasons, it was being very circumspect on the
matter of Sukarno's involvement in the coup. When it did
.discuss the subject, it was usually in reference to Sukar-
no's actions on the day of the coup and his actions after-
wards in support of the coup. Despite evidence that
Sukarno must have had foreknowledge of the coup and must
have approved of the coup plans, the Army never went so
far as to suggest that Sukarno set the stage for the move
against the generals by fabricating evidence against the
Army.
If Sukarno was responsible for the Gilchrist Letter,
any or all three of the other suspects--Subandrio, Aidit,
or the Chinese--could have been involved along with him.
They may have suggested the idea to him and then become
involved in a plot with him in forging the Gilchrist
Letter, or they may have been used by Sukarno in a scbeme
of his own making.
The evidence as to who forged the Gilchrist Letter
is simply not conclusive. It does not support narrowing
the alternatives further. However, if we had to say which
of the alternatives seems most likely, we would guess .4
Subandrio. At least the weight of the evidence points
to Subandrio and the BPI as having been responsible for
the actual forging of the document. Whether the BPI had
Sukarno's approval for the operation of whether Subandrio
was carrying out what was Sukarno's idea to begin with
is unclear. We suspect that the operation had Sukarno's
approval.
The Generals' Council
The first reports concerning a Generals' Council
were received about the same time in May that Subandrio
claims to have received the Gilchrist letter in the mail
at his home. In this instance, Subandrio first received
the report�that a Generals' Council existed in the Army
.(1 that it was going to stage a coup because of the
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generals' dissatisfaction with Sukarno's policies--from
the chief of staff of the BPI.* Apparently, the BPI had
*It should be made clear that the reports about a
Generals' Council specifically claimed that the generals
were planning a coup. As already explained, the reports
were true insofar as they referred to a "Generals' Coun-
cil" that was meeting in secret to discuss political
matters. The reports obviously referred to the group
of five generals .(Yani, Suprapto, Harjono, Parman, and
Sukendro) who began to meet together informally in Janu-
ary to discuss the Army's response to Sukarno's new
initiatives to crush it. The reports were wrong, how-
ever, in suggesting that the generals were planning a
coup against Sukarno. At least, there is nothing that
makes us think that the Generals had any such plan; the
evidence is to the contrary.
Apparently, the first reports about a Generals' Coun-
cil were vague as to the timing of the coup that the gen-
erals were alleged to be planning. In late August and
September, however, the date 5 October began to be men-
tioned. In the last weeks before the coup, this date was
mentioned more and more often in connection with the al-
leged plans for a generals' coup. Apparently, there was
no more justification to the reports that the generals
were planning a coup on 5 October than the fact that it
was Armed Forces Day, which gave the Army an obvious ex-
cuse for bringing large numbers of troops to Djakarta for
the Armed Forces Day Parade. If the Army had been plan-
ning a coup on 5 October, only 5 days later than the coup
that actually materialized, the preparations would have
to have been well advanced by 1 October, and it seems
that it would have been impossible to keep the fact of
such preparations a secret so long. Absolutely no evid-
ence has ever come to light, however, of there having been
any such preparations. Apparently, Sukarno and the PKI
were concerned that the Army might be planning a coup on
5 October, however. That seems to have been a definite
factor in Aidit's decision to stage the coup no later
(footnote continued on page 200)
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received information to this effect from three or four
different sources, most of whom seem to have had some
affiliation with the PKI. According to Subandrio, neither
he nor his chief of staff made an effort to check the
validity of the information.
Subandrio himself seems to have been rather dubious
about these reports, at least at first. During his trial,
the following exchange took place:
Question: What was your logical conclu-
sion, after hearing of the existence of
the Council of Generals?
Subandrio: I considered it only as a
'whispering campaign.' Also, it re-
garded a domestic matter, and the BPI
was not concerned with domestic matters.
Question: Did Aidit ever ask you about
the Council of Generals?
(footnote continued from page 199)
than 30 September. Of course, there is the possibility
that the coup leaders made up the story that the generals
were going to stage a coup on 5 October as a pretext for
urging haste on Untung and the other military leaders,
who were concerned about certain military details of the
coup plot and were offering resistance to Sjam's pres-
sure for immediate action.
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Subandrio: Yes, at the meeting about
economic affairs in June 1965, and I
replied that he must be careful about
'whispering campaigns.' Also Yani,
Sukarno, and Aidit discussed the
Council of Generals; on this occasion,
Aidit only laughed about it.
Question: Did you ever give the BPI
any instruction about the Council of
Generals?
Subandrio: No, sir.
Question: When the President was ill,
after 4th August, you telephoned General
Djuhartono and you told him 'Don't join
the whispering campaign about the replace-
ment of the President, don't join the
Council of Generals'.
Subandrio: Yes, sir. I did so, but
that was only a casual joke between
Djuhartono and me, as usual.
L.
Subandrio was quite clear on the point that the BPI never
had any proof of the existence of the Generals' Council.
The BPI did not forward its reports concerning a
Generals' Council to the Defense and Security Staff or
to the chiefs of any of the armed forces. Presumably,
Subandrio briefed Sukarno, although we have no informa-
tion as to exactly when and from whom Sukarno first heard
about the Generals' Council.* It is clear, however, that
�
*Since the coup, Nasution has claimed that General
Pranoto told Sukarno about the existence of a Generals'
Council. It is not clear whether Nasution meant that
Gen. Pranoto was the first person to speak to Sukarno
about a Generals' Council or whether he was one of the
(footnote continued on page 202)
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he had already been informed about the reports when Aidit
raised the subject of the Generals' Council with him some-
time around mid-May. Apparently, Aidit had been briefed
by the chief of staff of the BPI, as Subandrio had. At
*least, he claimed that he had obtained his information
from Police Brig. General Sutarto, chief of staff of the
BPI, when he mentioned the reports about the Generals'
Council to a meeting of the Politburo in May. Aidit told
the Politburo that the Gilchrist letter tended to confirm
the reports about the Council of Generals.
Aidit is reported to have raised the subject of
the Generals' Council with the President sometime in
mid-May when he and Njoto were with Sukarno at the Palace.
The exact occasion is not known, but it must have been
sometime before 26 May, when Sukarno called in the military
t.
Trootnote continued from page 201)
persons who discussed the subject with Sukarno. It would
be interesting to know just what Pranoto told the Presi-
dent. He was not a member of Gen. Yani's "brain trust"
which was meeting in secret to plan the Army's response
to Sukarno's newest initiatives to destroy it as a poli-
tical force; therefore, he would not have known the de-
tails of the Army's thinking. He could well have learned
of the secret meetings of Yani and the other generals,
however, and it is quite believable that he would have
told Sukarno. His appointment by Sukarno as caretaker
of the army after the coup may have stemmed from his
service to Sukarno in telling him of the meetings of the
Generals' Council.
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commanders to confront them with the reports about a
Generals' Council and the discovery of the Gilchrist
letter.*
At the meeting on 26 May, General Yani is reported
to have replied to Sukarno's direct questioning on the
matter of the Generals' Council. He told the President
that there was an organization within the Army known as
the Generals' Council but that it was solely concerned
with the matter of promotions and appointments. Yani
was referring to the council that had been established
in 1956 for the purpose of advising the army commander
t.
*In a statement given under oath on 16 September 1966
Sukarno stated that it was not until the beginning of
September 1965 that he learned about the existence of the
Council of Generals. "I asked Army Commander Yani about
this council of generals after hearing of it at the
beginning of September." As General Nasution has said,
the President's oath was obviously "spurious." There is
the report of Aidit's having raised the subject of the
Generals' Council with Sukarno sometime soon after he
(Aidit) had received a report on the subject from Police
Brig. General Sutarto, the chief of the staff of the BPI,
in early May. Sukarno obviously knew what Aidit was
referring to; presumably, Subandrio had already informed
the President about the reports concerning a Generals'
Council. In any case, Sukarno certainly knew about the
reports by 26 May 1965, when he called in the military
commanders and questioned them about both the Generals'
Council and the Gilchrist Letter. This meeting has been
described by several sources--including Subandrio, who
was there. Sukarno's statement, under oath, that it was
not until the beginning of September that he learned
about the Generals' Council, is simply not true.
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on promotions and assignments.* Yani was obviously evad-
ing the issue by bringing up the subject of the promotions
and review board. Sukarno was obviously referring to a
completely different group; namely, the group of generals,
known within the army as Yani's "brain trust," who had
been meeting together regularly in secret since January
to discuss political matters.**
*There was an organization in the Army that was called
_the Generals' Council that was responsible for reviewing
promotions and assignments in the Army. Originally called
the Gatot Commission, it had become known as the Generals'
Council by the time its membership was revised in 1962.
Originally composed of six officers, it had grown to some
40 members in 1965, only 25 of whom were active at a L
time. At the time of the coup, the chairman and vice
chairman of the council were Gen. Sudirman and Gen. Suharto,
respectively. This council had absolutely nothing to do
with the other group within the Army that was referred
to by the PKI as the "Generals' Council", namely the group
of Yani and four of his most senior advisers in the Army
who were meeting together to discuss political matters.
None of the generals killed in the coup were on the pro-
motions and review board known as the Generals' Council.
All of the generals in the other group were victims of
the coup except for Gen. Sukendro.
**In hindsight, it seems that Yani did not handle things
as well as he might have. He did little to reassure
Sukarno that the Army had absolutely no thought of Staging
a coup against him. He was obviously evasive on the mat-
ter of the Generals' Council, which probably only increased
Sukarno's suspicions. It might have been better for him
to admit the existence of the "Generals' Council" and
simply explain that a group of generals had been meeting
together with him to discuss certain problems of concern
to the Army but that they certainly had never discussed
anything pertaining to a coup. Yani was inclined to laugh
off Sukarno's warnings. As we shall see, on a later oc-
casion, Sukarno was to point his finger directly at Yani
(footnote continued on page 205)
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As noted earlier, it appears that Sukarno and
Aidit reacted with considerably greater alarm to the
reports about a Generals' Council than did Subandrio.
At least, this is the impression that one gets from
Subandrio's testimony at his trial, and there are one or
two other facts that tend to support this impression.
Although Subandrio obviously knew about the planning for
the coup that was started in late August and continued
all through the month of September, he does not seem to
have been directly involved in any of the planning and
was not even in Djakarta to participate in the events
t.
(footnote continued from page 204)
and accuse him in public of "blocking the Revolutionf
of blocking me." He warned Yani that "the people will
crlish you." Yani is reported to have laughed. Appar-
ently, he made no effort after this and other similar
incidents to reassure Sukarno that he was not against
the President. Just before the coup, Sukarno is re-
ported to have summoned Nasution and Yani to ask them
once again about the reports about a "Generals' Council."
He told Yani and Nasution that he had new information
that several high-ranking generals were cooperating in
an attempt to overthrow the government. Once again, Yani
avoided a direct answer on the question of the "Generals'
Council." He is reported to have countered with the
charge that it was the PKI, not the Army, that seemed to
be preparing for a coup. Apparently, he promised Sukarno
that he would check into the matter and give him a report
within several days. At the time of the coup, however,
he had not reported back to the President.
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of the coup on 1 October.* He certainly was not essential
to the coup plans. It may be that he never was convinced
about the Generals' Council and its supposed planning for
Sukarno's overthrow and that he was, therefore, not as
'enthusiastic about the idea of the coup or perhaps not
as confident of its success as Aidit and presumably Sukar-
no.**
As for Aidit's reaction to the reports about a
Generals' Council in May and June 1965, it is clear that
he did not disparage the reports, as Subandrio may have
*As has been noted before. Subandrio seems to have
deliberately planned to be away from Djakarta at the time
of the coup. He left town on the 29th, the same day that
he is reported to have met with Aidit in the morning.
On the morning of 29 September, Aidit would have known
that the coup would take place the following night (he
had made the final decision on D-Day the day before),
so he could have told Subandrio then. Under the circum-
stances, it would be surprising if Subandrio had not
known when he left town that the coup would be staged
the next night.
**Subandrio is by nature a cautious man, certainly
much more so than Sukarno. He may well have had some
premonition that the coup might fail. Aside from its
chances for success, he may also have had some reason to
be less than enthusiastic about the whole idea of the
coup to begin with. He didn't have the backing of an
organized political force the way Sukarno had the PNI,
Aidit had the PKI, and Nasution and Yani had the Army.
His power derived solely from Sukarno. His personal posi-
tion was better served by a continuation of the existing
domestic power balance than by any attempt to upset the
balance between the PKI and the Army, as the coup would
have done, in favor of the PKI. Subandrio may well have
viewed Aidit as his chief rival for influence with Sukar-
no and his chief contender for power after Sukarno. Thus.
he may not have been altogether happy about the idea of
removing the top leadership of the Army, which represented
the main balancing force to the PKI.
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done. Whether he believed them or not, he would have had
his own reasons for wanting others, particularly Sukarno,
to believe them. His actions were certainly calculated
to give the reports maximum exposure. One of the first
things he seems to have done was to make sure that Sukarno
had heard about the Generals' Council. Soon thereafter,
he reported the information that he had obtained from the
BPI to the PKI Politburo. Reports about the Generals'
Council filtered down through the PKI organization all
during the summer. There is no doubt that the PKI as an
organization played a major role in spreading the rumor
about a Generals' Council and its alleged planning for
a coup, whether or not it was responsible for starting
the rumor.
There is still the question of whether or not
Aidit believed the reports about the Generals' Council
--and the related question of whether or not he and the
PKI were responsible, in any way, for starting the Irumor.
Apparently the original reports that the BPI received in
early May 1965 about a Generals Council came from per-
sons associated with the PKI. It is not clear whether
(1) these reports were plants of a PKI covert operation
or (2) whether the PKI was used by someone else who wanted
to spread the rumor that the Generals' Council was plot-
ting the overthrow of Sukarno, or (3) whether the reports
were not a deliberate plant by anyone at all but origin-
ated with several different sources who may have been
PKI party members or Communist sympathizers but who were
acting on their own in reporting certain information that
they had heard, namely, that a group of generals was meet-
ing in secret to discuss plans to overthrow
Sukarno. There is no evidence that the PKI was guilty
of a deliberate lie in starting the rumor that the Generals'
Council was plotting the overthrow of Sukarno; .but, on the
other hand, there is nothing that rules this out as a
possibility. The PKI party members and the military of-
ficers involved in the coup, who were interrogated after
the coup, all seem to have believed the reports about the
Generals' Council and its alleged planning for a coup;
there is no suggestion in any of their testimony that the
PKI simply made up the story of the Generals' Council.
The military officers received their information on the
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Generals' Council from Sjam and other members of the PKI
Special Bureau; they accepted his word on this, as on all
other matters. In the case of the PKI, the word came
down from the top; the reports about the Generals Council
had the authorization of the Politburo, of Aidit himself,
who claimed that he had received the information from the
BPI. Politburo members like Sudisman and Sakirman and
Niono, who were interrogated after the coup, seem to have
accepted Aidit's word completely; they do not seem to
have suspected him--even in hindsight--of having tricked
them into believing something that he knew to be untrue.
The one person who might have known if Aidit had not really
believed the reports about the Generals' Council�and
would almost certainly have known if the story about the
Generals' Council had been a PKI covert operation to begin
with--was Sjam. As far as we know, he has never given
any indication that either was the case.
In general, we are inclined to think that Aidit
probably was not responsible for starting the rumor about
the Generals'-tZuncil--though we would not altogether
rule out the possibility that he was. As to whether he
believed the reports, we are inclined to think that he
probably did. Although Aidit may well have exaggerated
his own fears of a Generals' coup, especially to Sukarno,
whom he would certainly have wanted to convince of the
threat from the Army, it seems that in the end he too
was convinced by the reports of military planning for the
coup. One reason for thinking that he was not as con-
vinced, at first, as he was later to become, is the
fact that he left Indonesia in early July for an extended
trip abroad. He almost certainly would not have gone
if he had feared an imminent coup. On the other hand,
he was apparently concerned enough to ask Sjam before he
left Indonesia to develop some kind of a plan of opera-
tions against the Generals' Council, which he had decided
was the "focus of anti-PKI activities in the army." The
fact that Aidit ordered him to develop such a plan in
May 1965, within a matter of two or three weeks of learn-
ing of the Generals' Council, was revealed by Sjam himself,
under interrogation by the Army.
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PKI Headquarters covered with photos for the 45th Anniversary celebrations
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The PKI's 45th Anniversary
One of the major political events in Indonesia
in 1965 took place in May, soon after Sukarno, Subandrio,
and Aidit first heard the reports about a Generals' Coun-
cil and just a few days before Sukarno summoned the mili-
tary commanders to the Palace to confront them with the
reports about the Council and the discovery of the Gil-
christ Letter. The event was the 45th anniversary of
the PKI which was celebrated with impressive ceremony
over a period of four days, from 23-26 May.* The import-
ance of the event as far as the coup is concerned is
simply what it reveals about Sukarno's relationship with
the PKI at the time. At the mass rally on 23 May, Presi-
dent Sukarno extolled the PKI, and Aidit personally, in
the most effusive terms that he had ever used in public
in praise of any political party in Indonesia:
Do you know what Dipa Nusantara (Aidit's
full name was Dipa Nusantara Aidit) means?
It means 'the fortress of Indonesia.'
Dipa Nusantara Aidit is truly Indonesia's
fortress.
Just now Brother Aidit mentioned why the
PKI has become a great party and why it
has expanded. The PKI has become strong.
It is now a party with a membership of 3
*At the mass rally in Djakarta on 23 May, huge por-
traits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Aidit, and Sukar-
no--the last being the, largest--lined the streets of the
capital. The Air Force dropped leaflets over Djakarta
extolling the PKI anniversary. Sukarno and Aidit were
the principal speakers at the rally. On 26 May, the PKI
gave a grand reception as the final event of the anniver-
� sary celebrations. On this occasion, Peng Chen, the
head of the high-level Chinese delegation which also in-
cluded Liu Ning-yi, was the principal speaker.
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million persons, with 3 million youths.
Why has the PKI become this kind of
party? It is because the PKI has consist-
ently been a progressive revolutionary
party. There is no doubt, brothers,
that the Indonesian revolution cannot be
completed if all progressive revolution-
ary forces are not unified into one force.
I embrace the PKI.
At the PKI Congress, I said: 'PKI go on-
ward!' Now I say: PKI, go onward, on-
ward, onward; never retreat! Brothers,
this is my message at this 45th anniver-
sary rally of the PKI. I wish the PKI
long life. Onward, onward, onward.
Should my kinsmen and my brothers (the
PKI) ever die, it would be like my own
death.
Aidit repaid Sukarno's compliment three days later, in
his speech at the pm reception of 26 May:
At the mass rally on 23 May Bung Karno
gave a high evaluation of the work and
role of the PKI. We express our profound-
est thanks for this evaluation. We are
determined to develop the PKI in conformity
with Bung Karno's speech which, among
other things, said that the PKI was an
indispensable element in the effort to com-
plete the revolution and expressed the
hope that the PKI will continue to be
strong and to flourish.
The PKI's 45th anniversary celebration epitomized
Sukarno's almost complete identification with Aidit, and
vice versa. Sukarno had not only lent his own prestige
to the affair but he had made available the considerable
resources of the Indonesian government in providing the
facilities at the large Senajan Stadium in Djakarta and
free government transportation for the large number of
participants; moreover, he had allowed the erection of
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large PKI displays throughout the city. He must also
have been responsible for the Air Force planes that
participated in the affair by dropping leaflets over the
city of Djakarta in honor of the PKI anniversary. The
participation of Sukarno and the PKI and the Air Force
together in a major political event honoring the PKI was
particularly interesting, because four months later, they
would be involved. together in another event of far greater
significance.
Aidit's Last Trip Abroad
About a month after the triumph of the PKI 45th
anniversary celebration, Aidit left Indonesia on an ex-
tended visit to Moscow and Peking. He was out of the
country for six of the twelve weeks immediately preced-
ing the Indonesian coup. As it was, his trip was cut
short by an urgent summons from Sukarno to return home.
Aidit left Djakarta on 26 June as a member of the ln-
donesan delegation, which also included Subandrio, to
the Afro-Asian conference that was sCheduled to be held
in Algiers beginning on 29 June.* It will be remembered
that Subandrio was in Cairo, on his way home from the-
stillborn Algiers Conference, when he made the announce-
ment about the Gilchrist letter. Aidit went on to Moscow
from Cairo, arriving there on 7 July.
Apparently, Aidit's visit to Moscow was arranged
only shortly before he left Indonesia. The new Soviet
ambassador to Djakarta, M.D. Sytenko, paid a visit to
Aidit on 23 June, at which time he is reported to have
*Just a short while before the Afro-Asian Conference
was to take place in Algiers, the Algerian army leader
Boumedienne overthrew Ben Bella and his government. At
the, last minute, the conference was postponed from June
... until November.
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extended the invitation to Aidit to head a PKI delegation
to the Soviet Union. Aidit seems to have accepted the
invitation on the spot. There is some indication that
he had been seeking an opportunity to hold talks with
the CPSU leaders. The Soviet delegation to the PKI an-
niversary celebrations in late May may have reported on
PKI receptivity to a Soviet initiative. On 16 June Aidit
indicated quite clearly that he would accept an invitation
to visit Moscow when he received a Pravda journalist in
his office and told him that the PKI was considering send-
ing a delegation to the Soviet Union on a long-standing
Soviet invitation.*
The day after it was announced_(on the 23rd) that
a PKI delegation, headed by Aidit, would be going to
Moscow for talks with the Soviet leaders--which came as
a surprise to a great many people--Aidit met with the
Chinese charge in Djakarta. Apparently, the Chineselhad
been taken by surprise by the news of the forthcoming
CPSU-PKI talks. They would, of course, have been very
much opposed to the idea. If Aidit had decided to have
talks with the CPSU leaders against their wishes, they
*In December 1964, when Aidit announced the PKI's
decision not to attend the Moscow Conference of Commun-
ist parties the following March, he made it clear the.:
he was accepting the Soviet invitation to visit Mosc-...
for talks with the Soviet leaders at some later date,
but not at the time of the Moscow Conference. Thus, no
left the door open to CPSU-PKI talks after the confer-
ence Apparently, Soviet Ambassador Sytenko reiterated
the Soviet invitation on 23 June after the Soviets had
received a clear indication from Aidit, presumably in
May when the Soviet delegation was in Djakarta for the
PKI anniversary celebrations, that he was ready to ac-
cept an invitation to visit Moscow then. Aidit was
referring to the original Soviet invitation in December
.1964 when he said that he was accepting a "long-standing
_Soviet invitation."
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would certainly have wanted him to stop over in Peking
for talks with them after his consultations in Moscow.
The Chinese must have decided to invite Aidit to visit
China as soon as they learned that he would be going to
the Soviet Union; presumably, that was the purpose of
his meeting with the Chinese charge on 24 June. Thus,
his trip to Communist China, like his trip to the Soviet
Union, was arranged only a day or so before he left In-
donesia to attend the ill-fated Afro-Asian Conference.
In Moscow
Little is known about Aidit's talks with the CPSU
leaders in Moscow and virtually nothing about his talks
in China. He is reported to have carried a letter to
Kosygin from President Sukarno urging the Soviet ptemier
not to persist in his efforts to have the Soviet Union
attend the Afro-Asian conference, now re-scheduled for
November. Apparently Aidit indicated his full support of
Sukarno's position against Soviet participation in the
conference to Kosygin personally. Later, he is reported
to have raised the subject again with Suslov, with whom
he had an acrimonious exchange on 28 July.
After the coup, PKI party members were briefed on
the results of Aidit's visit to Moscow, including his
meeting with Suslov. According to the PKI briefing,
Suslov requested an immediate appointment with Aidit as
soon as he arrived in Moscow on 7 July, but Aidit refused.
After he had made several tours of Moscow and Uzbekistan
and a side-trip to Bucharest to attend the Ninth Congress
of the Rumanian party on 21 July, Aidit finally agreed
to meet with Suslov on 28 July. Although the PKI probably
provided a somewhat slanted version of their meeting, it
is clear from it and other sources that the meeting was
far from satisfactory. Aidit is reported to have accused
the Soviets of splitting the international Communist move-
ment in seeking a conflict with Albania (and, by implica-
tion, China); he called on the Soviets to practice self-
criticism in this matter. Suslov blamed Albania for the
split and accused the PKI of meddling in internal Soviet
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problems. Aidit countered by accusing the Soviets of
theddling in PKI affairs, in making secret contact with
Murba party leaders who were working to destroy the PKI,
.and also of meddling in the internal affairs of the Jap-
anese Communist Party (he asked Suslov why the Soviets
had supported Shiga's anti-party group that had been ex-
pelled from the JCP). Finally, Aidit presented the PKI
position that it is impossible to build real Communism
while there is still imperialism in the world--an attack
on the Soviet program for building Communism in the Soviet
Union.
At the conclusion of Aidit's stay in the Soviet
Union, the only official notice that the Soviets took of
the CPSU-PKI discussions was a terse announcement in
Pravda on 1 August that there had been an "exchange of
views between Aidit and Brezhnev, Suslov, and Ponomarev
on the international situation, on the international Com-
munist movement, and on questions of interparty relations".
The fact that Pravda did not choose to characterize
either the talks or the atmosphere in which they took
place is a good indication that arguments did in fact
take place and that relations between the two parties
remained cool, although not openly hostile.
Itseems that Aidit gave absolutely no indication
of the approaching crisis in Indonesia in his talks with
the Soviet leaders in July. Even if the PKI had been
contemplating a coup, it seems unlikely that he would
have trusted the CPSU with the details--even the knowledge--
of its planning. Apparently, Aidit did not even discuss
the threat posed by the Indonesian army with the Soviet
leaders; there is nothing to indicate that he ever men-
tioned the reports about the Generals' Council. In fact,
there is nothing to indicate that he and the Soviet lead-
ers discussed PKI domestic policy at all. All the reports
about their talks, including the Pravda comment, mentioned
only international matters as having been discussed.
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Aidit is reported to have made one statement in
Moscow that has--incorrectly, it seems--been interpreted
as a reference to the coup or, at least, to PKI domestic
policy. He is reported to have said something along the
lines that the PKI following of the Soviet line would be
tantamount to giving up the struggle in Indonesia."
After the coup, the Soviets made quite a point of this
particular statetent of Aidit, with the obvious intention
of implying that as of July Aidit had plans for the vio-
lent overthrow of the Indonesian government. However,
since the PKI was at the time pursuing a domestic line
that was completely consistent with Soviet advice to
Communists in "national democratic states," it seems
quite clear that Aidit was not referring to PKI domestic
tactics. It is much more likely that he was referring
to the general Soviet policy towards the West--or the U.S.,
in particular. It was these policies of the Soviet Union
that Aidit considered "revisionist." It would makq.sense
that he would characterize them as "tantamount to giving
up the revolutionary struggle." He would not have described
the Soviet line on "peaceful transition to socialism,"
which was the line that the PKI was following domestically,
in such terms.
In the official Soviet report on the Indonesian coup
that was given to the CPSU Congress in late March 1966, it
was claimed that the Soviets had warned Aidit before the
coup that the PKI was not putting up a strong enough struggle
in the economic field, that should a political crisis arise,
the PKI could lose its ties with the people because it had
not done more to solve the land problem, correct the labor
laws, and improve education. Aidit was criticized for
"believing that all that was required was for the PKI to
support Sukarno and it would be guaranteed success in
taking power." Whether this was an accurate description of-
what the Soviets told Aidit or a disingenuous ex-post facto
reading of the mistake Aidit made in relying too much on
Sukarno can not be definitely determined. There are other
charges in the Soviet report--such as the explanation
given for the coup that "the PKI went over entirely to the
Chinese line and Aidit concluded that the PKI had everything
necessary to take power in Indonesia"--that would clearly
seem to be self-serving distortions of the truth; they
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suggest that the Soviets were probably also distorting
the truth on the matter of what they told Aidit before
the coup. Even if we accept the Soviet claim that they
. warned the PKI against placing too much reliance on
Sukarno, particularly in the economic field, it is not
at all clear from the Soviet report to the CPSU Congress
whether this was discussed during Aidit's last visit in
Moscow, just before the coup or sometime earlier. In
view of the vagueness about the timing and the fact that
no other report of Aidit's discussions with the.Soviet
leaders in July 1965 mentions this subject as having been
discussed, we are skeptical of the Soviets having issued
any such timely warning to the PKI just before the coup.
In Peking
Aidit was in Communist China only a few days, com-
pared with nearly a month in the Soviet Union. As noted
earlier, there is no information available on his talks
with the Chinese leaders other than the official Chinese
announcement of the talks. According to NCNA, CCP-PKI
talks were held on 3 and 4 August. Chou En-lai, Teng
Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, and Kang Sheng participated on the
Chinese side. The three PKI/CC members--Karel Supit,
Ruslan Kamaludin, and Nungtjik--who traveled to Peking
with Aidit were present on the Indonesian side, along with
Aidit and Adjitorop, the PKI Politburo member who had been
staying in Peking for some time. (He is still in Peking,
baying refused to return to Indonesia after the coup.)
NCNA recorded that the talks were held in "a cordial and
friendly atmosphere."
The two sides fully exchanged views on the
current international situation, questions
concerning the international Communist move-
ment, and other matters of common interest
to both parties. The two sides had a com-
plete unanimity of position and views on
all these questions.
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Aidit with Chairman Mao in Peking
5 August 1965
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On the morning of 5 August, Aidit and the other members
of the PKI delegation are reported to have had a "cordial
conversation" with Mao himself. Later that evening, Mao
is reported to have given a banquet in honor of the In-
donesian visitors.
Our lack of information about Aidit's visit to China
in early August 1965 is probably the most crucial gap in
our knowledge of the events leading up to the Indonesian
coup. As far as we know, the PKI did not brief party members,
either before or after the coup, on Aidit's talks with
Chinese leaders, as it did on his talks with the Soviet
leaders, in July. It seems that Aidit would have reported
on his talks with the Chinese, just as he did on his talks
with the Soviets, if the talks had been innocuous. The
fact that he apparently did not suggests that the talks were
sensitive, that they may even have involved the coup.
Any discussion that Aidit might have had with Mao or
the other Chinese leaders about a coup in Indonesia would
certainly have been held in the greatest secrecy; only a few
persons would have known of it. It is obviously in the
Chinese interest to keep anything like this that might be used
to prove Chinese involvement in the planning of the coup a
secret. It is unlikely that Aidit would have told anyone
outside of the Standing Council of the PKI Politburo and Sjam
about any conversation that he might have had with the Chinese
about PKI planning for a coup. The only member of the Stand-
ing Council to be captured alive after the coup and interro-
gated by the Army before being sentenced to death--Sudisman--
threw absolutely no light on the subject, probably because he
did not know. To our knowledge, Sjam was never questioned on
this particular point.*
*In the only reference to the Chinese at his trial, Sjam
was asked about the connection between the PKI Special Bureau
and the Chinese intelligence organization. He replied emphati-
cally that that there was "absolutely no connection whatsoever,"
at which point he launched into a lengthy discourse on the inde-
_pendence of the pm. The implication of his remarks was that
the CCP was not informed about the Special Bureau operations
- in Indonesia, and that he and Aidit were solely responsible for
all decisions regarding the Special Bureau and that they were
not in the habit of consulting the Chinese or any other foreign -
Communist party about its operations.
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In any case, it seems that Aidit could not have
discussed the specifics of the coup as it materialized
on 1 October. Although Sjam may have been working on a
plan while Aidit was abroad, most of the planning for the
coup seems to have been done after Aidit returned home
in early August. Aidit almost certainly did not have a
definite plan in mind before he left Indonesia. As men-
tioned earlier, he does not seem to have felt any sense
of urgency about the Generals' Council and its planning
for a coup at the beginning of the summer--or he would
certainly not have stayed away from Indonesia so long.
The great �sense of urgency that he apparently came to
leel in August and September seems to have been present
only after his return to Indonesia.
If one thing seems clear, it is that the decision
to stage this coup was not made before early August.
Something seems to have happened around the beginninglof
August that drastically changed Aidit's mood and immedi-
ately prompted him to begin active preparations for a
coup. There would seem to be two main possibilities,
judging from everything that we know that occurred that
first week in August. Either (a) Aidit was influenced
by the Chinese while he was in Peking that week, in
which case he could be presumed to have hurried home to.
Indonesia to carry out the coup on Chinese instructions,
or (b) he was influenced by someone or something that
happened in Indonesia that he learned about as soon as
he returned home; possibly, it was the reason for his
returning home.
Because of the timing of Aidit's visit to China
and the start of PKI preparations for the coup almost im-
mediately upon his return from China, a case can be made
on the basis of circumstantial evidence that the Chinese
must have inspired the Indonesian coup. The theory can
not be disproved on the basis of what we know about Aidit's
talks with the Chinese leaders, as we have seen. We would
not rule it out as a possibility, therefore, until we have
more definite information. However, we are not convinced
that the Chinese played any such direct role in the planning.
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of the coup, first of all, because there is no good evi-
dence that they did, except for the timing of Aidit's trip,
and secondly, because there would seem to be a better ex-
planation for others having inspired the coup.
From the Chinese point of view, what the PKI did
on the night of 30 September was to commit itself not to
an "armed struggle" on the CCP model (protracted warfare
waged in the countryside by an armed force totally con-
trolled by the party) but rather to an urban putsch, some-
thing the CCP is not known ever to have sponsored abroad.
This might not have mattered so much to the Chinese if
they thought the chances for success favorable to the PKI
and the risks acceptable. Certainly, they would have
welcomed a successful purge of the anti-Communist army
leadership in Indonesia. However, in this case, the PKI
was risking its very existence in carrying out an action
over which it did not have complete control, an actiqp
which, in the last analysis, was completely dependent on
Sukarno. The PKI was acting in concert with Sukarno, if
not in subordination to him, at the mercy of his decisions
and, as it turned out, of his betrayal. It is quite pos-
sible that the CCP trusted Sukarno so much (which is the
great mistake that the PKI made) or was so impressed with
the need for action--because of the imminent danger of-
Sukarno's death or an army coup or both--that it minimized
or failed to realize the risk of Sukarno's backing out
on a coup after the PKI had committed itself. The PKI
made this mistake.
Since the coup, the Chinese have Very definitely
tried to convey the impression that the PKI acted con-
trary to Chinese doctrine in "assuming a position subor-
dinate to the national bourgeoisie." They have suggested
that the "mistakes of one kind or another" that the PKI
made were due to the party's failure to apply closely
enough Mao's principles "for dealing with domestic counter-
revolutionaries"and for launching a new type bourgeois
democratic revolution. There was only one report at the
time that implied that the Chinese would not have approved
PKI participation in an action like the 30 September Move-
ment; according to a rumor circulating in Peking in October 1965,
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Mao Tse-tung, upon hearing the news of the coup in Indonesia,
immediately cabled the PKI with an "order" to call the whole
thing off, thereby creating confusion in the PKI ranks. Sev-
eral months later, Chou En-lai also implied that the CCP
advised the PKI against the coup--or at least that it would
have advised the PKI that way if its advice had been solicited.
In 1966 Chou is reported to have commented that the downfall
of the PKI resulted from its failure to adhere to basic princi-
ples and its refusal to accept advice (presumably CCP advice).
Unfortunately, all of these statements and rumors constitute
a self-serving position which the Chinese would be likely to
adopt whether or not they had previously approved what was
"attempted on 30 September.
For all these reasons, a direct Chinese role in the
Indonesian coup must be considered unproven. The timing of
Aidit's last visit with the Chinese leaders in Peking. is not
in itself conclusive evidence that the Chinese either knew
of the PKI planning for a coup or, further, that they might
have suggested the idea to Aidit in the first place.
Sukarno's Illness
The most significant development that first week in
August, aside from Aidit's visit to China, was Sukarno's
illness, which was thought at the time to be very serious
and which almost certainly played an important role in the
events leading up to the coup.
The facts about Sukarno's illness are now fairly well
established. He suddenly became ill on the evening of 3 August.
According to one report, he "collapsed" in the presence of
several palace officials. Sukarno told the doctor who was
immediately summoned to his bedside that he felt considerable
chest pain which had seemed to come in three separate attacks
lasting three to five minutes. He was given an electrocardio-
gram that evening and another on 4 August after two more
recurrences of the chest pain. When these showed no evidence
of coronary thrombosis, physicians treating the President
concluded that "he had had five attacks of coronary insuffi-
ciency but no coronary infarct."
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It is not clear whether there were any particular
signs that Sukarno's kidney condition had suddenly be-
come critical.* There was one report that his blood urea
nitrogen was elevated. However, in chronic renal disease,
this would not be unusual; it would be significant only
if it were elevated over its usual level, and we have
no information on that. If there had been an abrupt
change in Sukarno's kidney condition, presumably his
doctors would have put him on dialysis or at least on a
stringent diet; apparently, nothing of this sort was
done. Thus, it would seem that there was no significant
change in his kidney condition. In hindsight, it is
clear that the President did not have uremic poisoning,
which probably would have been fatal in his case and
certainly would have required a longer convalescence than
his illness took.. But at the time, there was cause for
worry. It is understandable that Sukarno's doctors should
immediately have gotten in touch with the Viennese kidney
specialist, Dr. Fellinger, who had treated Sukarno Ipre-
viously. They are reported to have sent him a cable ad-
vising him of the illness and seeking his opinion.
Besides his history of kidney disease, Sukarno
was known to have moderate hypertension which was aggra-
vated at times of stress. The combination of impaired
renal function and hypertension could give rise to a
*As was well known, Sukarno suffered from chronic
kidney disease, having lost the use of one kidney because
of kidney stones and having been advised repeatedly by
his doctors that the other one should be operated on
for the removal of a large stone in it. Sukarno had
never agreed to an operation, however. Because of a
soothsayer's prediction that "he would die under the
knife," he has an obsessive fear of surgery.
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number of complications that might suddenly cause death
at any time. (On the other hand, one can live for years
with this condition.) Under the circumstances, it is
quite understandable that Sukarno's doctors (including
the Chinese doctors who were summoned from Peking to
treat him) came to the conclusion that Sukarno was suf-
fering from some serious complication brought on by his
kidney problem, even though there were none of the usual
signs of kidney involvement.
The possibility of Sukarno's illness being nothing
more than the flu was considered at the time. Nasution,
for one, considered it a good possibility. All the report-
ed symptoms of the illness--the sudden onset, the vomiting,
the aches and pains, and the general state of exhaustion--
plus the complete recovery within a matter of a few days
are compatible with a diagnosis of a severe attack of
influenza. During the first two weeks in August, many
cases of viral infection were reported in Djakarta, with
symptoms similar to those of Sukarno. Thus, we would not
rule out the possibility that the President's illness was
some kind of viral gastroenteritis, totally unrelated to
his kidney disease.
Apparently, Sukarno was bedridden for several days.
He cancelled a speech that had been scheduled for 4 August.
He was still in bed on 6 August but was reported to be
up and working on 9 August. To cover his illness, the
story was given out that he was working on the speech
that he was to give on 17 August.
There was little public knowledge of the fact that
Sukarno was sick. However, political and military leaders
who knew of Sukarno's illness were following the situation
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closely and, as was to be expected, were engaging in
various speculations. It was natural that they should
prepare for the eventuality that the illness was serious.
The fact that Sukarno's doctors and the palace coterie
were keeping the nature of the illness so close that
even Sukarno's ministerial advisers were unable to learn
the cause or seriousness only contributed to the sense
of alarm. (Apparently, Nasution learned about Sukarno's
illness from a conversation with the wife of one of
Sukarno's doctors.)
Sukarno himself appears to have been genuinely
alarmed. One suspects that it was his own concern--as
much as the concern of his doctors--that his illness was
serious that prompted him to keep the fact of his illness
a secret from the public. The main reason, however, for
thinking that Sukarno was extremely worried is the fact
that he called Aidit home from abroad.
An Urgent Suthmons to Aidit
There is no doubt that it was a message from
Sukarno, not a summons from the other PKI leaders at.,
home as was originally reported, that brought Aidit back
to Indonesia.
Apparently, Sukarno was not willing to wait even
a day or two to see whether his condition improved before
he called Aidit home. It is not clear whether Aidit re-
ceived Sukarno's telegram on the 4th or 5th of August;
the only thing that is clear is that it was sometime be-
fore the morning of the 6th, when he departed Peking in
a hurry. It is unlikely that Aidit would have delayed
even as long as a day in returning home, so the presump-
tion is that he received the message on the 5th, or pos-
sibly early in the morning of the 6th. The Chinese press
reported that he left "by special plane," which would
indicate that the Chinese immediately made a plane avail-
able to Aidit for his emergency trip home.
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It seems that Aidit may actually have been planning
to leave Peking on the 6th or the 7th or shortly there-
after. On 5 August, he had met with Mao and been enter-
tained by him at a banquet that evening; this is usually
.the wind-up of a visit of an important dignitary to China
for talks with the Chinese leaders. Of course, the Chi-
nese could have scheduled the meeting with Mao and given
Aidit a farewell banquet on the 5th when they learned
that he would be leaving prematurely the next day. In
any case, Aidit had plans to go on to North Vietnam for
talks with the North Vietnamese leaders; he was clearly
not planning to return to Indonesia directly. After he
left on a special plane for Djakarta, the rest of the PKI
-delegation that had been with him in Moscow and Peking
flew on to Hanoi on 7 August. Karel Supit took over as
head of the delegation.
Aidit arrived in Djakarta on 7 August, in the com-
pany of two Chinese medical specialists whom Sukarno lad
instructed Aidit to bring with him to treat his kidney
condition. (This is the best indication we have that
Sukarno himself thought that his illness was a flare-up
of his kidney condition.) Presumably, Aidit and the doc-
tors hurried to the palace to see Sukarno, although we
have no reporting on this. Sukarno may still have been
in bed on the 7th. All we know is that he was out of bed
on the 9th and apparently well enough to drive to Bogor
Palace. (He returned to Djakarta on the 10th.) On the
morning of 9 August, Aidit is known to have traveled to
Bogor, accompanied by the two Chinese Communist doctors.
Sukarno's Indonesian doctors were also summoned to Bogor
that morning to examine Sukarno. It would seem that
there was a medical consultation of all the doctors on
the President's illness.
By the 9th, Sukarno was probably pretty well re-
covered. '1 A week later, he delivered his traditional
National Day speech in the normal rousing Sukarno style.
There is no indication that he was less than his usual
ebullient self at any time after this up to the time of
the coup. In fact, as we shall see, he played a very
active role in the events of the next several months.
He does not seem to have suffered any lasting effects from
his illness of early August.
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But if Sukarno was safely over this particular at-
tack, the Chinese doctors seem to have been of the opinion
that a recurrence would either paralyze or kill him. And,
apparently, they expected a recurrence toz.come soon. At
least, that was the gist of Aidit's report to the Polit-
buro which was based on the Chinese doctors' conclusions.
Aidit reported that the doctors "were very pessimistic
regarding Sukarno's health and tended to believe that he
would die or become unable to rule within a short time."
The Chinese doctors must have thought that Sukarno's ill-
ness was related to his kidney problem, or something equally
serious.
The PKI in a State of Panic
The PKI obviously felt that it had inside informa-
tion on the state of the President's health.* Aidit seems
to have accepted the Chinese doctors' conclusions completely.
His reports to the Politburo were based on these conclu-
sions; the serious state of the President's health was
accepted at all levels of the party. In mid-August, the
PKI began to make contingency plans in the event of Sukarno's
*The PKI s direct access to the Chinese doctors put
the party in the position of having more valid grounds
for concern about the President's health than existed in
.non-party circles. The question that inevitably arises
is whether the doctors were acting on Peking's instruc-
tions in giving the PKI an unduly pessimistic report on
Sukarno's health. In other words, did the Chinese take
advantage of the situation to frighten the, PKI into ac-
tion? 7There is no evidence to prove the case either way,
but we are not inclined to believe in the theory of a
doctors' plot. First of all, it seems likely that the
Chinese doctors really were convinced of the seriousness
�of Sukarno's illness; there was good reason to be. Second-
ly, there is no reason to think that the Chinese were
anxious to pressure the PKI into precipitate action.
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death. On 13 August, the Greater Djakarta Committee (CDR)
of the PKI sent special instructions to its 50 subsection
committees on the "preparations that were to be made in
anticipation of the possible death or incapacitation of
Sukarno and repressive measures by the Army at that time."
It was explained that the Army knew about Sukarno's
precarious health and was making plans to seize power
upon his death.
From this and other PKI briefings to party members
in August and September, it would seem that the PKI really
thought that the Army would move against it as soon as
the PKI was without Sukarno's protection. Since Sukarno's
death was considered an imminent possibility, the PKI was
faced with the immediate prospect of-having to defend it-
self against the Army. Aidit was under no illusions as
to the PKI's chances in a military showdown with the Army.
In some PKI documents, the view was expressed that the
Army would probably be in control in the immediate post-
Sukarno period. That the party felt very much on the
defensive was indicated in the 13 August instructions
to the party subsections in Djakarta to remove all party
documents, particularly cadres and membership lists, from
homes and offices and to hide them elsewhere. Later in
the month, party members were ordered to hide any part
documents or Marxist-Leninist books in their personal
possession; if necessary, they were to burn them. In
another instruction, party members were told to locate
homes that might be used as hideouts for party officials.
(The homes had to be located in crowded areas, away from
main roads, and have several means of entry.) The in-
formation that we have on these party briefings in August
and September, as well as other reporting on the PKI,
clearly indicates that the PKI was increasingly concerned
with three things during the weeks immediately preceding
the coup: (1) the possible sudden deterioration of
Sukarno's heath, (2) possible Army action against the
PKI, and (3) the general unreadiness of PKI cadres for
the future struggle.
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thc iotithuro
The general political situation and the subject of
the President's health were discussed at a PKI Politburo
meeting sometime around mid-August, although the dates of
this and another Politburo meeting at which the actual
decision committing the PKI to the coup was taken are some-
what less than certain. Sakirman, Njono, and Pardede, all
of whom were at the meeting, have given differing dates.
Njono spoke of "an expanded session of the Politburo around
the end of July" and another meeting of the Politburo" on
28 August." Obviously, the first meeting could not have
been in July since Njono makes it clear that Aidit took
the lead in the discussions and the-PKI Chairman was out
of the country from 26 June until 7 August. Taking into
consideration both facts--(1) that Aidit was at the meeting
and (2) that Njono remembered it as having been held
"around the end of July," it seems a reasonable conlusion
that the meeting was held soon after Aidit returned to
Indonesia. Sakirman gave 13 August as the date, and
Pardede mentioned 15 August. One reason for thinking
that the meeting may have been held on 13 August is the
fact that the Greater Djakarta Committee of the PKI is
known to have issued the party instructions referred /o
above on 13 August. It seems quite likely that these in-
structions were issued as adirect result of the Politburo
deliberations.
Besides the following members of the Politburo--
Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, Sudisman, Sakirman, Njono, Anwar
Sanusi, Pardede, and Suwandi--the secretaries of the West
Java and East Java Committees of the PKI are known to have
attended the expanded session of the Politburo. (The
secretary of the Central Java Committee could not attend
because of illness.) According to Njono, the meeting was
"of an informative character; no decisions were made."
Aidit gave information on the President's illness,
on the impatience of progressive officers in the
military with the so-called council of generals,
and the plans of the generals' council for a coup.
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In Sakirman's words:
Sukarno's illness was discussed and also
certain military and political questions
that arose in connection with Sukarno's
illness. It was concluded that should the
President die the leadership of the MPRS
would replacp Sukarno temporarily while the
possibility also existed that the political
parties would scramble to seize power and
certainly the Armed Forces would not remain
quiet but would seize upon this opportunity
to take over state power. It was also con-
cluded that within the Armed Forces, especi-
ally the Army, there had arisen severe anta-
gonism between the Generals (the term 'Gen-
erals' Council' was not used a.,t this time)
under the leadership of Nasution and Yani,
on the one side, and the middle grade offic-
ers and subordinates, on the other. It was
concluded that the PKI must support the group
within the Armed Forces that opposed the gen-
erals. The names of the officers who opposed
the generals were not mentioned.*
The PKI decision to launch the 30 September Move-
ment seems to have been taken at a second Politburo meet-
ing in late August, although again the dates are uncertain.
In his testimony in court, SaKirman gave 10 September as
the date of the meeting, but this seems unlikely inasmuch
as active preparations for the coup were already underway
*Peris Pardede confirmed this last point of Sakirman.
According to Pardede, neither Aidit nor anyone else ever
told the Politburo the names of the military officers
who would stage the coup. This is a good example of the
compartmentalization of information within the PKI as
far as the coup was concerned.
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by then. (It will be remembered that Untung and the
other military officers were brought into the conspiracy
on 4 September:) Njono's recollection of the meeting
as having been on 28 August seems more reasonable.*
Whatever the exact date of the meeting, the Politburo
clearly approved the decision to launch the 30 September
Movement. This is particularly noteworthy in that the
Special Bureau normally took its orders directly from
Aidit; not only was it completely free of the control
of the Politburo, but the Politburo was not even kept
informed of its operations. In a matter as important
as this, however, Aidit seems to have felt the neces-
sity of securing Politburo approval. With its approval,
he was prepared to turn the whole matter of the planning
and execution of the coup over to the Special Bureau.
The various accounts of the Politburo meeting on
28 August are in basic agreement as to what transpired
at the meeting. All are agreed that Aidit took the lead
in the discussions, as he had done at the first meeting
on 13 August. The burden of his argument was that (1)
the state of the President's health was serious; if he had
another attack he would probably die or be paralyzed;
(2) a Council of Generals existed in the Army that was.
discussing Sukarno's health and making plans for action
in the event of his death.** In Aidit's words, the
It is an interesting coincidence that the decision
on D Day seems to have been made on the 28th of September,
exactly a month to the day after the Politburo is report-
ed to have made the decision to start preparations for
a coup.
**Apparently, Aidit was the source of all the informa-
tion given the Politburo on the President's health. His
information on Sukarno's illness came from the Chinese
doctors; he seems to have accepted their conclusions com-
pletely--and, in turn, the other Politburo members seem
to have accepted his word on this and the matter of the
Generals' Council without question.
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question was whether the PKI should wait until the Presi-
dent died and find itself suddenly attacked (because the
generals would almost certainly know of Sukarno's death
before the PKI did) or whether the party should anticipate
the Army's action and attack first? As one participant
quoted Aidit, "Shall we jump first or wait to be jumped?
I (Aidit) am more inclined toward moving first."
Apparently, Aidit convinced the whole Politburo
of the need for prompt action. It is unclear whether a
vote was taken or whether it was simply the consensus
of the meeting that the PKI should begin to make its own
plans for a coup. According to Sakirman,
it was concluded that the situation had
heightened considerably and that the PKI
could not remain silent. The PKI had to
act first or be acted upon. According to
experience, he who acts second cannot
achieve victory; he who acts first shall
win.
According to Njono,
It was established that subsequently the
President would give his approval to these
military operations as a matter of course.
This was because the facts on the Council
of Generals were in the hands of Sukarno,
according to what Aidit said.
Special attention was given to certain other
individuals, including Subandrio. It was
established that aubandrio would adapt him-
self to the policy of the President.
The various sources are agreed on another important
point--that along with the decision to launch a military
movement there was a definite decision on the political
movement that would be launched in support of the military
movement. Njono explained that the meeting agreed "to
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launch a movement to foil the so-called coup of the coun-
cil of generals and subsequently to set up a council of
the revolution to replace the Dwikora cabinet." Sakirman's
testimony supports this:
It was concluded that-in addition to the mili-
tary movement there had to be a political
movement. The military and political move-
ments were to be led directly by the PKI and
aimed at (1) supporting resistance against
the generals and (2) setting up the Revolu-
tionary Council which would replace the Cabinet.
Of the two movements, the military movement
would come first; this was what was later
called the 30 September Movement.
During the meeting, I (Sakirman) proposed that
another course be followed; namel:, that t.
there should be deliberation among the poli-
tical parties, the armed forces. and Sukarno.*
*It is not exactly clear what Sakirman meant by "deli-
beration among the political parties. the armed forces,
and Sukarno." Presumably, he meant that this should take
place after the military operation of the coup was a fait
accompli (i.e. after the generals had been removed from
the scene). In other words, he seems to have been propo-
ing political discussions between the political parties.
the armed forces, and Sukarno as the means for arriving
at a political solution to the coup. Aidit, on the other
hand, had a very definite idea of the political solution
that was acceptable to the PKI--namely, the replacement
of the Dwikora cabinet by a Revolutionary Council whose
members the PKI would select as representative of all the
major political parties, including the Communists. Aidit
was prepared to take action along these lines, by simply
announcing the formation of the Revolutionary Council,
without consulting any of the other parties.
Sakirman's claim to having made an alternative pro-
posal to the course followed by the PKI in setting up
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It was explained that Subandrio, Dani, Marta-
dinata, Surachman and others would sit on
the Revolutionary Council. The complete
list of names would be worked out later by
Aidit, Njoto, and Lukman. My proposal was
not accepted; Aidit and Lukman provided
reasons for rejecting it.
From both Sakirman's and Njono's account of the Politburo
meeting, it is clear that the Revolutionary Council was
included in the earliest planning of the PKI for the coup,
that it was in fact agreed upon by the Politburo itself.
Other facts�such as the fact that Untung and the other
military leaders apparently had nothing_whatever'to do
with the formation of the Revolutionary Council except
to sign the Decree that Sjam gave them to sign on the
morning of 1 October--suggest that the PKI was responsi-
ble for the Revolutionary Council.* The information Oat
we have on the proceedings of the Politburo meeting makes
it clear beyond any doubt that the Revolutionary Council
was central to PKI planning for the coup from the begin-
ning; in fact, the replacement of the Dwikora Cabinet by
(footnote continued from page 231)
the Revolutionary Council is the only hint we have of
there having been any disagreement within the Politburo
on the subject of the coup. It is possible that Sakirman
was somewhat exaggerating his differences with Aidit in
an obvious attempt to exonerate himself of responsibility
for the coup. After the coup, he seems honestly to have
regretted the whole affair, for very personal reasons,
namely, the fact that his brother (General Parman) was
one of the victims of the coup. He may not have realized
that Gen. Parman would be killed.
*At his trial, Sudisman admitted that the PKI had
drafted Untung's "first announcement" and "the Decree"
establishing the Revolutionary Council. It had also
picked the members of the Revolutionary Council which
Was intended to reflect "a broad coalition of people who
had endorsed Nasakom."
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the Revolutionary Council was the main political aim of
the coup to be realized after the military objective of
eliminating the top Army command had been realized.
Njono's and Sakirman's accounts of the Politburo
meeting also help to clear up another matter, namely,
the role that the PKI intended the Revolutionary Council
to play in the government after the coup. There was con-
siderable confusion about this at the time, because of
the wording of the Decree, which failed to mention Sukarno
or the office of the Presidency or the cabinet. It is
clear from Njono's and Sakirman's testimony that the
Revolutionary Council was intended to replace the Dwikora
Cabinet. There was no intent on the part of the PKI to
do away with Sukarno; he was definitely to continue as
President--with all the same powers. Neither the office
of the Presidency nor the role of the cabinet in the
government would have been changed as a direct resqlt of
the coup. All that the coup would have changed wagethe
composition of the cabinet. From the point of view of
the PKI, the Revolutionary Council would have been the
perfect Nasakom cabinet that the party had been long de-
manding:*
*In his testimony in court, Sjam denied that the coup
was to be followed by the establishment of a Communist
government. He asserted that the Revolutionary Council
would have formed a "Nasakom coalition government slate
to present to Sukarno." When the judge tried to imply
that Sukarno would not have accepted such a coalition
cabinet, Sjam snapped back: "We knew he would approve:"
Politburo member Sudisman's testimony on the matter
of the Revolutionary Council supports Sjam. He described
the Revolutionary Council as "a broad coalition of people
who had endorsed Nasakom," He made it clear that the
Revolutionary Council was intended to serve "as the supreme
organ of the state faithfully implementing the policies
of Bung Karno." The plan was to replace the Dwikora
cabinet with the new Nasakom cabinet led by the PKI. The
coup was not a Communist revolution; it was intended only
to "change the Dwikora cabinet and its program." However,
in the long run, the coup was viewed as "another step on
the road to a 'Peoples' Democracy' and finally to 'Communism.'"
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It seems clear that none of the military details
of the coup were discussed at the Politburo meeting. It
was agreed that the Politburo would handle the political
matters involved in the coup and "all the preparations
.for the military movement would be turned over to Aidit."
Apparently, it was well understood that Aidit had his
own special apparatus within the party for handling
covert operations, especially operations involving the
military; it was assumed that both the planning and
execution of the military operation of the coup would
be entrusted to that secret organization. The Politburo
had to take Aidit's word on the capability of that or-
ganization for planning an operation like the 30 September
Movement; obviously, the Special Bureau had never been
involved in an operation of this magnitude before.
As the final conclusion of the meeting, it was
decided that "no matter what happened, whether the PKI
acted first or was acted upon, members of the party 1.ad-
ership should go to the regions and wait for instructions
from the party leadership."
According to Pens Pardede, there were only the
two Politburo discussions of the coup. Pardede himself
was to hear nothing more about the coup until two or
three days before it occurred when he was briefed on his
own role in it (he was to go to Medan to coordinate PKI
activities in support of the coup in North Sumatra).
Pardede testified that he had assumed all the while that
preparations were going ahead under the direction of
Aidit and the Special Bureau (he did not know the name
of the Special Bureau but he knew of its existence) but
he was not privy to the planning that was underway.
At best, it was only a week or so between the
Politburo decision "to launch a movement to foil the so-
called coup of the generals' council" and the start of
active preparations for the coup with the first of Sjam's
meetings with Untung and the other military officers.
Obviously, Aidit and Sjam were not disposed to waste any
time. It does not seem to have taken them long to work
out the actual plan for the coup. It will be remembered
that Aidit had asked Sjam to develop some kind of a plan
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of operations against the Generals' Council in May 1965,
just before he left for Moscow. Presumably, Sjam had
been working on a plan during the summer while Aidit was
away. There is nothing to indicate that either he or
Aidit was thinking in terms of the elimination of the
generals at that time, however. The idea of a military
coup against the generals seems to have crystallized in
August, after AidAt's return to Indonesia. Thus, it
seems that the actual planning for the coup was probably
done the last week or two in August. Perhaps, as he
claims, Sjam deserves the credit for having planned the
Indonesian coup. Since his capture, he has admitted--in
fact, boasted--that he was "the brains behind the 30
September Movement."* Just what contribution Aidit made
to the planning is unclear; certainly, he approved all
the plans.
Sukarno Recovered...and with Aidit
While the Politburo was discussing the political
crisis arising from Sukarno's illness, the health of the
President gradually improved. Actually, Sukarno seems
to have been sick only about a week; by the 9th of Auflust
he was apparently almost completely recovered. It was
another week before he appeared in public, however. It
was widely speculated that he would be unable to participate
*As a witness at Sudisman's trial, Sjam was asked by
the judges: "Who was really responsible for the coup?"
"I was," he said proudly. This was the only point of his
testimony that was not confirmed by Sudisman, who immedi-
ately objected. He said that he and Sjam were both carry-
ing out Aidit's orders. "I (Sudisman), as a ranking party
leader along with Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto, bore full re-
sponsibility." Sjam immediately denied that Sudisman was
a party leader at the same level as Aidit, Lukman, and
Njoto. Reportedly the court was amused by the display
of rivalry between the PKI leaders.
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in the National Day celebrations marking the 20th anniver-
sary of Indonesia's independence, but this was disproved
when the President appeared on 17 August, apparently in
his customary good health, to deliver a rousing Sukarno
.speech. This did not make the PKI pull back. As we have
seen, it was ten days later, at a Politburo meeting, that
the final decision on the coup was taken.
Sukarno's activities the last two months before
the coup are a matter of great interest. Obviously, they
hold the answer to what is probably the most important
question about the Indonesian coup that remains unresolved
today: the question of Sukarno's involvement in the plan-
-fling of the coup.* Unfortunately, not too much is known
about Sukarno's activities those last two months before
the coup, at least not too much that can be connected with
the coup.
In early August, when Sukarno was suddenly taken
ill, it will be remembered that he summoned Aidit home
from Peking. The PKI leader was one of the few persons
who saw Sukarno while he was sick. All during August and
September, Sukarno and Aidit were in constant contact.
There were numerous official occasions which brought them
together; on these occasions, there was almost always an
opportunity for talk in private.** Aidit and Sukarno saw
*By 'involvement' is meant the whole range of possi-
bilities from Sukarno's not having been involved at all,
even to the extent of his having foreknowledge of what
the PKI was planning, to the possibility that he knew and
approved PKI plans for a coup, to the possibility that
the idea of the coup was his to begin with and Aidit and
the PKI were doing his will in carrying out a purge of
the Army that both Sukarno and the PKI stood to profit from.
**One such official occasion was the occasion of Sukar-
no's presenting Aidit with the order of the Mahaputra Star.
The ceremony took place in the state palace on 13 September.
The decoration of Aidit was reported to be for his accomplish-
ment -in obtaining additional credits and a supply of arms
.(apparently from the Chinese) for the use of the police
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Suhandrio, Sukarno and Chinese Foreign Minister Chen I
at Indonesia's National Day Celebrations
August 1965
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each other at social occasions, too. Aidit was often in-
vited to the Palace in the evenings. Besides the times
that Aidit and the President were reported to have met in
private, there were probably many other meetings that went
unreported. In short, Aidit had ready access to Sukarno
just before the c9up. They could eaSily have discussed
the matter of the coup. If Sukarno ever discussed the
coup with anyone. it would certainly have been with Aidit.
(He may also have-discussed it with Dani and Subandrio.)
Although he could easily have done so, and there is good
reason to think that he did, it should be emphasized that
there is no evidence that Sukarno ever discussed the mat-
ter of the coup with Aidit--other than the fact that Aidit
and Sjam both implied that he had in certain references
to Sukarno in connection with the coup.*
"Sukarno Against the Generals' Council
During the six weeks that Aidit had been out of the
country, Sukarno had apparently become increasingly alarmed
by the rumors about a Generals' Council and its alleged
plotting for a coup. Since May, when he had first heard
the reports about the Generals' Council, he had continued
to receive other reports from the PKI and the BPI to the
effect that the generals were plotting his overthrow.
Aidit had mentioned these reports to a meeting of the
Politburo in May, before he left for Moscow. While he
(footnote continued from page 236)
mobile brigade. It was thought at the time that the an-
nouncement of the arms shipment was an attempt to explain
the shipment of arms that had already been received in
Indonesia from China. The incident is interesting as an
illustration of Sukarno's close identification with Aidit
just before the coup. In late May Sukarno had lent his
prestige to the celebration of the PKI's 45th anniversary;
in mid-September, he conferred a state honor on the Com-
munist party leader.
*Aidit implied that he had talked with Sukarno when he
told the Politburo that the President would give his ap-
proval to the coup "as a matter of course." He said that
he knew this "because the facts on the Generals' Council
are in the hands of Sukarno." Sjam reportedly told Untung.
Latief, and Sujono (at their third meeting) that "the great
leader of the revolution has his own role (in the coup). _
The Bung will later on obtain a separate settlerent."
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was out of the country, knowledge of the existence of the
Generals Council and the rumor that it was preparing for a
coup had spread throughout the PKI organization. More than
anyone else, the PKI was responsible for spreading the
rumor; by the end of the summer, it was heard everywhere
in Djakarta. By late August or early September, the
Generals' Council had become an open secret.
As mentionea earlier, Sukarno had tended to place
full trust in the information supplied him by the PKI, and
of course, the BPI. In this instance, he would have been
predisposed to believe what the PKI was telling him; namely,
that a group of generals in the Army was "out to get him;"
apparently, this time, he became convinced of it. Of course,
it is impossible to know for sure whether Sukarno really
believed that the generals were plotting a coup or whether
he just pretended to believe it--as a pretext for a coup of
his own making. All that can be said for sure is that he
acted as though he believed it. After the coup, he said
in public that he believed it, but he might have said that,
whether or not it was true, to justify the coup. A more
convincing performance was his direct confrontation with
Nasution shortly after the coup, when he charged Nasution
with complicity in the Generals' Council. Nasution grimly
denied it. Then Sukarno said: "But you were aware of a
plan by Yani and his men to take power from me." Nasution
denied this, too. Sukarno lost his temper and said: "You
are lying. You must have known." Nasution then replied:
"Bapak, false accusations are even worse than murder."
(The reference was to Nasution's belief that Sukarno had
been responsible for the murder of the generals.) On this
and other occasions, Sukarno seemed truly incredulous that
the Army had not really been plotting his ouster.*
*Apparently, Nasution himself had the impression that
Sukarno believed the reports about the Generals' Council.
In his speech of 20 February 1967 indicting Sukarno for his
role in the coup, Nasution had the following to say about
his meeting with the President in November 1965:
General Suharto reported to me that slanders about
me were reaching the President. On the general's
initiative I met with the President in November
in an attempt to lay to rest the slander that I
(footnote continued on page 239)
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Shortly before the coup, around 20 September, Sukarno
is reported to have summoned Nasution and Yani and asked
them about the -reports about the Generals' Council, which
he had asked them about at least once before, on 26 May,
at the meeting of military commanders at which he first
raised the subject of the Generals' Council and the Gilchrist
Letter. On the latter occasion, Sukarno is reported to have
told Nasution and Yani that he had new information that sev-
eral high-ranking-generals were cooperating in an attempt to
overthrow the government.* When Nasution and Yani asked for
(footnote continued from page 238)
was involved in the attempt to assassinate the
President, and so on. I received the impression
that the President still was mot convinced that
the story about a council of generals was a
slander and that he still entertained doubts
about several generals.
Therefore, with the agreement of the commanders
of the four services, I appointed the Odang
Committee to investigate the truth of the
matter. The committee found absolutely no
evidence that the council of generals was
planning a coup as has been announced. This
was reported to the President. There is no
doubt that the President received information
that led him to suspect the Army, and during
the incident (the 30 September Movement) he
retained his suspicions and placed the most
trust in Supardjo and his followers. This is
proven by his own statement and by his letters
to Dewi on 1 and 2 October. The letter of 1
October said that Sukarno had received informa-
tion from several persons about things that had
7.occurred in the Army. It said that the men who
were carrying out this so-called revolution in-
tended to safeguard Bapak and did not intend to
oppose him, so Dewi should not worry because
Bapak was safe.
*According to a reliable source, the PKI told Sukarno in
mid-August that the Generals group was planning a coup for
5 October (Armed Forces Day). When Sukarno later learned
that an unusual number of army generals and troops were to
(footnote continued on page 240)
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the names of the generals, Sukarno refused to divulge them.
Apparently, Yani and Nasution avoided a direct answer on
the question of the Generals' Council. Instead they coun-
tered with the charge that it was the PKI that seemed to be
preparing for a coup. In support of their argument, they
presented Sukarno with a report on recent PKI activities,
which showed a definite increase in violence on the part of
the PKI. It is unclear whether Yani and Nasution showed
Sukarno the Army report on the PKI on the same occasion that
Sukarno confronted them on the question of the Generals'
Council. There may have been two different meetings.
A conversation that Sukarno is reported to have had
with General Adjie in July is about the best evidence we
have that Sukarno was genuinely concerned about the possi-
bility of an Army coup. The conversation is even more
interesting in connection with the question of Sukarno's
involvement in the coup. According to an unconfirmed
report, Adjie, the pro-Sukarno but anti-Communist commander
of the Army in West Java, was approached by Sukarno in
July with the report that Yani and other senior generals
were plotting a coup against him. Sukarno is reported to
have promised Adjie that he could have Yani's job as
Commander-in-chief of the Army if Adjie helped to preserve
order during the trying period after Yani and the other
generals were arrested. There was no mention of PKI in-
volvement or of any intention to assassinate the generals.
According to the report, Adjie agreed, and the deal was
settled when Sukarno bestowed a medal on Adjie and singled
out the West Java Division of the Army for praise in his
National Day speech on 17 August. For his part, Adjie made
a public statement that he would obey only orders from
(footnote continued from page 239)
be in Djakarta for the Armed Forces Day Parade, he became
concerned. Around 20 September, the PKI reported to
Sukarno :that these army units were being issued a double
issue of ammunition. According to the source, this
convinced Sukarno that the generals were planning a coup
and he agreed with the PKI that counterplans should be
made.
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Sukarno, no matter what happened.*
The Month of September k Flurry of Speeches
With the exception of Adjie, the Army generals came
under strong attack from Sukarno in his National Day speech
of 17 August. In the context of the speech, it was obvious
that he meant the generals when he said:
Those who were progressive yesterday are
possibly retrogressive, anti-progressive today.
.Those who were revoluticnary yesterday are
possibly counter-revolutionary today. Those
who were radical yesterday are possibly soft
and resistless today . . . Even if you were
formerly a.-bald-headed general in 1945, if
you split the revolutionary national unity
today, if you are an enemy of the main
pillars of the revolution today, then you
have become a force of reactionon.
The speech was the first in a series of fiery speeches by
Sukarno in August and September that contained the same
violent condemnation of the army leaders. Usually, the
phrase "capitalist bureaucrats" was used, but that de-
ceived no one. In the tortuous phraseology of Indonesian
politics, everybody knew that "capitalist bureaucrats"
meant the army generals who were blocking the Communists'
and apparently the President's way.
*According to the source of the report on the Sukarno-
Adjie conversation, the deal Sukarno made with Adjie explaiLiz
why Untung and the PKI thought they could hold Djakarta
with only a few battalions. They were confident that Adjie
would not order the Siliwangi troops under his command
against the coup forces. Apparently, it was not Adjie
who ordered the Siliwangi troops into Djakarta on the
morning of the coup but a subordinate commander whose unit
was already in Djakarta. Adjie didn't move even after he
heard the radio announcement about the revolutionary
council. On 2 October, Suharto is reported to have con-
tacted him and ordered him to bring troops to Djakarta,
but Adjie refused until he contacted Sukarno. Apparently,
when Adjie learned that the PKI was involved in the coup
and heard that the generals had:been killed, he backed
out on _Sukarno and finally moved his forces against the
coup.. He behaved weakly after that, as far as the Army
was concerned, in not taking a strong stand against
Sukarno, however.
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On 1 September, Sukarno spoke at a police "Revolu-
tionary Doctrine" rally. At one point in his speech, he
looked directly at the four service commanders sitting
in the front row and in dolce voce addressed each one in
turn. To Dani, he said that the Air Force was a good
revolutionary-force, because it was studying Marxism-
Leninism (a reference to Dani's introduction of courses
in Marxism-Leninism-in the Air Force). To Martadinata, he
said that the Navy was a revolutionary force now, although
it had been in "some trouble" earlier in the year. To
Police CoMmander Sutjipto he said that the police force
would soon be a revolutionary force because of its new
-"Revolutionary Doctrine" program. To Yani, he said: "But,
the Army is NOT a revolutionary force. It is still blocking
me. I will use my charismatic power and turn the people
against you. The people will crush you." Yani is reported
to have laughed.
The next day, Subandrio took up Sukarno's theme.
On 2 September, he told an audience in Menado: "If the
leadership in Indonesia is in the hands of corruptors,
the people have the right to take over from them. Power
must be in the hands of the people, and it is you who will
determine the destruction of the corruptors." On 9 September,
he urged a student gathering to "smash �the exploiters and
capitalist bureaucrats, annihilate the pilferers of the
state's wealth." On 21 September, Subandrio told another
audience that the Indonesian revolution had given birth to
a lot of heroes, but that some of these heroes had now
turned into traitors. These "heroes-turned-traitors" had
not been strong enough to face the trials of the present
era. On 25 September, Subandrio announced that an opera-
tion to eliminate the "capitalist bureaucrats" was imminent.
Sukarno probably gave more speeches the last month
before the coup than he gave in any other month as Presi-
dent. As the time for the coup drew near, he was averaging
four or five speeches a week. One of the most significant
was his speech to the PSII Congress in early September,
in which he spoke of the "five generations of Indonesian
revolutionaries." Once again, as he had done in his speech
at the PNI anniversary celebration on 26 July, he publicly
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identified himself with the 1926 PKI revolt, or what he
labelled the second generation of Indonesia revolutionaries.
Historians had always identified Sukarno with the "third
generation," which formed the nucleus of the PNI, the
political party that Sukarno founded. There is no evidence
that he was ever involved with the Communists in the 1926
revolt. Yet, in his speech to the PSII Congress, Sukarno
asserted:
I was always a member of the second generation.
After the 1926 revolt, when the PKI leaders
were in jail, they smuggled letters to me,
urging me to carry on the struggle (against
the Dutch) . . . . The third generation . . .
I was never one of them. They were revision-
ists, collaborationists . . . You can't do
anything gradually. You have to seize power
by force.
Sukarno's commitment to the PKI had never been so strong.
It had reached the point where he was prepared to re-write
history--to make it look as though he had always been
committed to the PKI and its espousal of the violent seizure
of power. His reason for emphasizing the violent seizure
of power was obviously connected with Indonesia's entry
into socialism, a theme which he kept emphasizing in his
speeches all during September. It was clear that he thought
of Indonesia's entry into the socialist stage as imminent.
It was not a question of the future. It was now.
The PKI through its mass media, was giving maximum
play to Sukarno's every statement during August and Septem-
ber. Under interrogation, PKI Politburo member Sakirman
later spoke of the propaganda campaign that the PKI mounted
in the weeks before the coup, which he described as the
work of "readying the masses" for the coup.
*According to Sukarno, the five generations were: (1)
the Sarekat Islam, the nationalist movement in the early
1920's, (2) the 1926 PKI revolt, (3) the Algemene Studie
Group, which formed the nucleus of the PNI, with which
Sukarno is usually identified, (4) the '45 Generation,
which got independence from the Dutch, and (:) the con-
temporary revolutionary movement.
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Before the coup
.kidit
and
Sukarno
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In waiting for the date for launching the coup,
party agitation and propaganda was stepped up
considerably and directed towards the basic
target, namely, exposing the bureaucratic
capitalists. There was also propaganda aimed
at exposing the activities of the Armed Forces
Leadership. Propaganda was launched in the
form of rumor campaigns that the generals under
the leadership of Nasution and Yani were going
to stage a coup against Sukarno and the cabinet
and would kick out the leadership of the PKI.
In an editorial in Harian Rakjat on 4 September, the PKI
accused the Army of "spreading a campaign that the PKI
intends to organize a coup, whereas in fact they are the
ones preparing for a coup. The baby will be born for sure."
The metaphor of the baby was to appear again in several
of Aidit's speeches during September, for instance his
speech to a meeting of women volunteers of the Ministry
of Information on 9 September.
We struggle for something that must be born,
and we, the revolutionaries, are.the midwives
of a child of the new society. The child will
definitely be born, and we, the revolutionaries,
are taking care that it is safely delivered
and will quickly grow up.
It seems that Aidit was alluding to the "birth- of socialism
in Indonesia; the "new baby" was the "new socialist society'
that was soon to be proclaimed; the 30 September Movement
would guarantee the "safe delivery" of the "baby." At the
time, the meaning of the metaphor was not exactly clear.
The "baby" was generally interpreted to mean the "fifth
force." In hindsight, however, it seems clear that Aidit
was thinking:in much broader terms than just the "fifth
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force." He was apparently alluding to something that
Sukarno was being much more explicit about in his speeches
at the time--namely, Indonesia's entry into the socialist
stage.*
Around mid-September, Aidit and the PKI began to make
allusions in public to the event that would signal Indonesia's
entry into the spcialist stage; namely, the 30 September
Movement. It was not clear at the time, of course, but it
seems clear now that this was the event that was thought of
as guaranteeing the "safe delivery of the child"--in the
esoteric language of the PKI. In the following remarks
addressed to a meeting of the National Council of the All-
Indonesia Federation of Labor Organizations (SOBSI) on
15 September, there seems to be no question but that Aidit
was referring to the coup, which was already well into
the planning stage:
The most important thing now is the manner in
which we can excise the cancer, i.e., the
'city aevils' from tie society's body.
If we wish our Revolution to develop healthily,
we must eliminate the economic dynasty, bureau-
cratism, and 'city devils' from the whole
political and economic state machinery.
*On 30 September, only hours before the coup, PKI leader
Anwar Sanusi addressed a meeting of the State Bank of Indo-
nesia; in the course of his speech, he used the same metaphor
of the "baby" that Aidit used in his speech on 9 September:
We are now in the situation where our country
is expecting a child. The midwife is ready with
all her instruments necessary for the safe
delivery of the child, which was expected for
a long time . . . There is a handful of 'devils'
who thneaten the safety of the country and the
child to be born. The midwife, therefore, first
should drive these devils away.
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Regional organizations are ready to launch
an attack against the 'city devils'.
On 27 September, Aidit addressed a meeting of the Associa-
tion of Indonesian Students (IPPI):
We shall not surrender our fate to the
'city devils,' but will crush and defeat
them.
On the 30th, an editorial in Harian Rakjat was more ex-
plicit in calling for the execution of the 'city devils':
Embezzling the country's wealth, the 'city
devils' have evil political intentions towards
the Government and the revolution. They should
be publicly executed. The question is only
to implement it. The just demands of the
people will certainly be successful.
In his last public speech before the coup, Aidit said that
"Communist students should be daring to think and daring
to act. Act, act. act. Act daringly, daringly, and once
more daringly." The next day, as the coup forces were
preparing to act that very evening, Anwar Sanusi made the
last PKI public statement before the coup:
We are now in the situation where our country
is expecting a child. The midwife is ready
with all her instruments necessary for the
safe delivery of the child, which was expected
for a long time.
During those last weeks in September, both Aidit
and Sukarno conveyed a great sense of urgency. One or
the other was speaking almost every day, it seemed. .There
was a feeling of suppressed excitement in all their speecn-
es. From their speeches and from the press and from
the many posters that were being put up all over the city
one definitely got the feeling that something important
was about to happen--although no one seemed to know just
what. One could sense the tension in the atmosphere.
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The mood in Djakarta could probably best be described
as one of nervous expectation.
In hindsight, it seems more than a coincidence that
so many non-communist officials were away from Djakarta
at the time of the coup.* Either Sukarno or Subandrio
could easily have arranged for the many Indonesian
delegations to be-out of town on official business.
*At the time of the coup, there were no fewer than 12
different Indonesian delegations in Communist China. The
four most important and by far the largest were: (1) a
delegation of the Indonesian Provisional People's Consul-
tative Congress (MPRS), which was comprised of Chaerul
Saleh, the Chairman of the MPRS, and Ali Sastroamidjojo
and Wilujo Puspojudo, vice chairmen of the MPRS, and a
score of other government ministers including Surjadi,
the Minister of the State Budget, A. Sukendro, Minister
of State, and M. Jusuf, Minister of Light Industry; (2) a
58-member delegation of the Indonesian National Defense
Institute, led by Major Gen. Wilujo Puspojudo, President
of the Indonesian National Defense Institute; (3) a 61-
member delegation of the Air Force Staff Academy led by
Air Commodore Sri Bimo Ariotedjo; and a small delegation
of the Indonesian Cooperation Parliament led by Subamia
Deputy Speaker. All four delegations were received by
Mao on 30 September; that evening, the MPRS delegation had
a farewell banquet. It appears that the delegation may
have been planning to leave Peking just about the time
that the news of the coup in Indonesia was received in
China. Chou En-lai is reported to have broken the news
to Chaerul Saleh and Ali Sastroamidjojo and Wilujo Puspo-
judo on the morning of 1 October. The MPRS delegation
may have been uncertain what to do under the circumstances.
It stayed in Peking another three days before leaving on
a tour of south China, arriving home on 7 October.
Besides an official delegation from the PKI, there
were at least six other leftist delegations from Indonesia
invited to attend China's National Day celebrations on 1
October. There was a 3-member delegation of the Indonesian
Antara News Agency, a 4-member delegation of the All-Indo-
nesian Central Organ of Trade Unions, a 14-member delega-
tion of the Indonesian Journalists' Association, a 9-mem-
ber delegation of the Indonesia-China Friendship Association,
(footnote continued on page 248)
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In the situation of having an unprecedented number
of non-Communist government cfficials absent from the coun-
try, there was the equally unusual situation of having
all the important PKI leaders in Indonesia,* a very unusual
situation considering their regular and frequent travel
to China, the USSR, and other places. Aidit himself had
refused an invitation to attend Communist China's National
Day celebrations on 1 October. Normally, one would- have
expected the PKI to send an impressive delegation, includ-
ing someone with Politburo rank. On this occasion, however,
(footnote continued from page 247)
a 4-member delegation of the Indonesian Scientists' Associa-
tion,-and a small Indonesian Moslem delegation. There was
also a 3-member delegation from the Indonesian Party (Par-
tindo) led by Hadji Winoto Danuasmere, Chairman of the
Central Committee of the party and a 7-member higher educa-
tion delegation led by Sharif Thajeb, Minister of Higher
Education, who arrived in Peking on 30 September.
As one can see, there were a large number of Indonesian
cabinet ministers in Communist China on the day of the
-coup. � Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio had not left the
country but he had conveniently arranged to be out of
Djakarta. Together with 12 other cabinet ministers, he
had left on a tour of Sumatra on 29-September. On 25
September, when the official announcement of his planned
visit to Sumatra was made, it seemed that Subandrio was
at pains to give specific reasons for his trip and to point
out that his visit to Sumatra had been ordered by President
Sukarno. It had not been normal practice in the past for
Ministers at Subandrio's level to go into a long explana-
tion of the reason for making a routine visit anywhere in
Indonesia. It was almost as if Subandrio was preparing
an alibi for himself.
*The one notable exception was Adjitorop, who had been
in Communist China most of the summer and early fall of
1965. He is still in China, having chosen not to go back
to Indonesia after the coup.
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Aidit sent a 10-man delegation, the highest-ranking mem-
ber of which was Sidik Kertapati, a not very well known
member of the Central Committee. It is almost an obvious
conclusion that Aidit was influenced by considerations
arising from the coup in wanting to have all the Politburo
members in Indonesia around the end of September.*
There were two people who actually had plans to
be out of the country in September who changed those plans
to remain in Indonesia. One was Aidit and the other was
Sukarno. Aidit had been expected to leave with Chaerul
Saleh and the MPRS group which arrived in China on 27
September. At the last moment, as the delegation was
boarding the plane for China, Aidit announced at the air-
port that he was not going.
President Sukarno had made plans to travel to
Vienna in early September for a medical check-up, after
his recent illness, by:the Austrian kidney specialist
Dr. Fellinger, who had treated Sukarno previously. In
late August, hoWever, Sukarno cancelled his travel plans,
claiming that internal :political developments would not
permit him to be absent from the country. The fact that
he apparently considered it impossible to leave the country
in September--the month that the planning for the coup
was done--and the timing of his decision to cancel his
trip, which coincides with the approximate timing of the
decision to stage the coup, raise the possibility that
the coup was somehow tied in with his decision to cancel
his visit to Vienna. It suggests that the President at
least knew about the coup plans ahead of time.
*Presumably, the PKI gave the Chinese some explana-
tion for their sending such a low level delegation to the
1 October National Day celebration. They could probably
have come up with a satisfactory explanation without tell-
ing the Chinese about the coup, but it does suggest that
the Chinese were informed about the coup. There are other
things that suggest that the Chinese were not informed,
however, so it should not be taken as conclusive evidence.
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The Evidence Against Sukarno
Certainly, the people involved in the planning of the
coup were led to believe that the President knew and ap-
proved of the coup planning. As noted earlier, Aidit im-
plied as much when he told the Politburo that "the Presi-
dent would give his approval to the military operations
(of the coup) as a matter of course." At the third meet-
ing of the coup group on 13 September, it will be remembered
that Sjam told Untung and the others that "the great lead-
er of the revolution has his own role (in the coup). The
Bung will later on obtain a separate settlement." Accord-
ing to Latief, everyone presentcbncluded from that "that
no matter what happened the President would play a role."
All the military officers involved in the coup seem: to
have been under the very definite impression that Sukarno
had given his blessing to the coup. At the trial of former
first lieutenant Ngadimp, it was brought out that Ngadimp:
told several persons before the coup "that the idea of the
Revolutionary Council had been created by Aidit and that
the President had given it his blessing in the presence
of Subandrio." Apparently, Ngadimo got his information
from Untung. He testified in court:
My activities (on behalf of the coup) began
after I met with Lt. Col. Untung in front of
the Tjakrabirawa complex on Djalan Tanah
Abang II. He told me that there was a Coun-
cil of Generals that was going to stage a
coup against the Palace and that the Palace
was going to establish a Revolutionary Coun-
cil to counterbalance the Council of Generals.
The motive for my activities was that I felt
proud to be able to serve the President.
Untung, Latief, Sujono, Dani, and Sjam are all re-
ported to have implicated Sukarno in the planning of the
coup in the course of their secret interrogation by the
Army. Under direct questioning by Suharto, Latief is
reported to have said that "Sukarno gave the coup, in-
cluding the murder of the generals, his support from the
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beginning."* As noted previously, Sjam definitely im-
plied that the President had previous knowledge of the
coup when he answered a question about the President and
the Revolutionary Council with the retort: "We knew he
would approve:" Other PKI officials have indicated that
the PKI definitely expected the President to make a state-
ment in support of the coup.
We do not have exact information as to what Sujono
and Dani and others may have told their Army interroga-
tors regarding Sukarno's role in the coup. In the case
of Dani, there are reliable reports that he gave the Army
"documents and statements, containing allegations, and
possibly proof, that the man who gave the order for the
implementation of the 30 September 1965 coup, including
the murder of the generals, was President Sukarno himself."
Except for one letter which Dani is supposed to have
written to Suharto, in which he reportedly stated that
"neither he nor any Air Force components inv017ed in the
30 September affair undertook any actions that were not
directly ordered by the Supreme Commander (President
Sukarno) himself," we have no information what these
"documents and statements" are.** To the surprise of
*After his capture, Latief was questioned by Suharto
himself. In the course of the interrogation, which was
tape-recorded, Latief made the statement quoted above.
Suharto is reported to have sent Sukarno a copy of the
tape. He sent it via Brig-Gen. Sutjipto, since Sukarno
refused to see him personally.
**In the letter to Suharto, written while he was in
hiding in Cambodia after the coup, Dani reportedly ex-
pressed a desire to clear himself and the Air Force of
any taint of complicity in plotting the coup and request-
ed permission to return to Djakarta to stand trial in
order to exonerate himself and the Air Force. The letter
indicated that Dan's defense at such a trial would be
that he acted only on the order of Sukarno. Dani obviously
did not foresee the possibility that the Army would want
(footnote continued on page 252)
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many people who expected Dani to implicate Sukarno in
his testimony in court, his trial produced no sensation-
al revelations about the role of Sukarno in the coup.
The Army obviously intended, at least at that stage in
its struggle against Sukarno and the PKI, to put the
blame for the 30 September Movement entirely on the PKI;
(footnote continued from page 251)
to preserve some of Sukarno's prestige as the first Presi-
dent and great national leader of Indonesia even while
it was engaged in destroying him as a political force,
and consequently would not admit evidence of Sukarno's
complicity in the coup in court. If the Army had wanted
to defame Sukarno completely, Dani would have been very
useful indeed. He was useful to the Army, as it was.
The Army was able to use him to bring pressure on Sukarno
by threatening to have Dani tell the whole story of the
coup. Dani's deal with the Army was nowhere near as
helpful to him. The line of defense that he had planned
to use--that he had simply been following orders from
Sukarno�got him nowhere. It seems that he may have been
forbidden from mentioning the name of Sukarno in court.
Without mentioning him by name, it was perfectly clear
who Dani's defense attorney meant though,. when he asked:
"Is it just that this man be convicted for following
orders, while his superior, whoipve the orders, is never
brought to trial?"
Suharto is reported to have used Dani's letter of 17
February 1966 to unite the chiefs of the armed services
and various key subordinate military units behind him in
his dealings_with Sukarno. With his position thus further
strengthened, he was able to bring sufficient pressure
to bear on the President to obtain the President's dele-
gation of authority on 11 March 1966.
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the attack on Sukarno would come later and in a much dif-
ferent form.* Not only in Dani's trial but in all the
others, there seems to have been a deliberate effort to
stay clear of the subject of Sukarno's involvement in the
coup. Whenever the testimony of witnesses put the finger
on Sukarno as having prior knowledge of the coup, this
was not carried in press accounts of the proceedings.**
It is worth noting that both the Soviets and the
Chinese have made private statements that indicate that
they believe Sukarno vas involved in the planning of th
Coup. At the 23rd CPSU Congress, there was an official
report on the Indonesian coup, in which the point
*In the case of Sukarno, the Army tried to destroy hir
politically tithout discrediting him completely, a con-
sideration they did not have to worry about in the case
of the PKI. The public charges that have been made against
Sukarno concern his activities on the day of the coup and
his efforts after the coup to nrotect those involved in
the coup and to restore the political situation to that
existing before the coup, just as though nothing had hap-
pened. Sukarno's role in the planning of the coun is
still a sensitive subject, which is not discussed publicly
in Indonesia. However, very recent information indicates
that President Suharto may now be prepared to press charges
against Sukarno for his role in the coup. In ,rid-Novem-
ber 1968, Suharto is reported to have ordered an exhaustive
interrogation of former President Sukarno prior to bring-
ing him to trial in mid-1969. Presumably, the Army has
new and very good evidence of Sukarno's involvement in the
planning of the coup or it would not take this drastic
and unexpected step.
**The evidence which came out of the early trials of
Njono and others which pointed a finger at Sukarno re-
portedly made the President furious. At a private meet-
ing with Suharto at the Palace on 17 February 1966, Sukarno
ordered that his name be kept out�of all testimony being
taken.by the special military court trying the leaders
of the 30 September Movement. Sukarno wanted no repeti-
tion of the incident in which Sujono mentioned Sukarno's
name in connection with the plans to house and safeguard
Sukarno, Aidit, and Subandrio at Halim Air Force Base
during the critical hours of the coup.
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was made that the Chinese had apparently urged Aidit to
seize power on the assumption that Sukarno was dying.
In their propaganda, the Soviets had encouraged the view
that the Chinese had instigated the coup; they had not
admitted PKI involvement, however. They managed to do
this by quoting either the PKI cover story that the coup
was simply "an internal Army affair" or later statements
by the PKI denying any involvement in the coup.
Reactionary forces (in Indonesia) have in-
tensified their anticommunist campaign on
the pretext that the PKI was involved in
the 30 September Movement. The accusation
was denied by the PKI in a statement issued
on 7 October.
(Commentary by a former Soviet
correspondent in Indonesia
broadcast over Moscow Radio,
29 October 1965)
The second important point that was made in the official
party report to the CPSU Congress that had not appeared
in Soviet propaganda concerned Sukarno.
The problem was further deepened by the fact
that Sukarno himself knew, prior to the
crisis, that the Communists were trying to
seize power and he was not opposed to it.
Sukarno may have had a deal with the Communist
Party of China that in exchange for certain
areas in which to carry out A-bomb tests,
the Chinese would devise a way of doing away
with Sukarno's army. Sukarno's line was
clearly Chinese insofar as foreign policy was
concerned, but it was also clearly Chinese
insofar as his attitude to revolution was
concerned, which was a 'Putsch' ideology.
The Chinese, in private, have also indicated that
they believe Sukarno knew and approved of the planning
for the coup. At least, they have said this to visiting
Communists from Europe. In public, they have not gone
so far as the Albanians, who are usually considered to
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speak for the Chinese on matters of controversy between
the USSR and China. A lengthy Zen i I Popullit article
of 12 May 1966, analyzing the failings of the PKI, warned
that the,PKI's error lay in putting "too much faith in
the political strength of Sukarno...whose authority and
prestige did not lie on any solid base." The implication
was that Sukarno had misled the PKI on the coup. Exiled
leaders of the PKI now living in China, such as Adjitorop.
have made a similar charge. In a 3 November 1966 speech
to the Albanian party congress, Adjitorop reviewed his
party's past mistakes and spelled out the lessons that
had been learned from the "temporary setback to the
revolutionary movement." The PKI's fundamental error,
according to Adjitorop, was that it allowed "the pro-
letariat (the PKI) to assume a position subordinate to
the national bourgeoisie (Sukarno)." Again, the criti-
cism was made in the context of the coup.
If we are to admit as evidence the opinion of
others who are in a much better position to know the
full story of the Indonesian coup, we must certainly
say something about the military and other informed
opinion in Indonesia today. According to the most reli-
able sources, many of the senior military leaders and
government officials in Indonesia have expressed their
own personal opinion, in private--which they would never
admit in public--that Sukarno Was behind the 30 September
Movement from the beginning. Some attribute he planning
of the coup to Sukarno; others acknowledge that he at
least knew and approved of the coup planning. Nasution
and Suharto have said this in private. So have many, many
others. About as far as an Indonesian will go in discus-
sing the subject with a foreigner is illustrated in tne
following conversation between a high Indonesian military
official and an American reporter in early 1966. The
Indonesian official is reported to have asked: "Do you
think Dani would have risked his career if a certain
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very high-level person had not been aware of the coup?"
The American replied: "No. I imagine Subandrio knew."
The Indonesian said: ."No. Not Subandrio. Someone much
higher. Do you think Dani would have done it if only
Subandrio knew?" The Indonesian was obviously implying
that Sukarno must have given the coup his blessing or
Dani would never have become involved in it.
Apparently, the Indonesian government is now con-
sidering bringing Sukarno to trial. The Army must feel
that it has definite proof of Sukarno's involvement in
the coup--not just his involvement on the day of the coup
and afterwards, but his involvement in the planning of
the coup--to contemplate such a move. In October 1968,
Sukarno was moved from Bogor, where he had been under
virtual house arrest, to Djakarta for interrogation by
the Army. Suharto is reported to have ordered an exhaus-
tive interrogation of Sukarno, prior to bringing him to
trial in mid-1969.
No doubt, the Army has a lot more evidence of
Sukarno's involvement in the coup than it has admitted.
As far as we know, the only concrete evidence to link
Sukarno with the planning of the coup consists of (1) a
secret meeting with Dani on 29 September, eight days
after Dani reported to the President on the secret mis-
sion he made to Communist China from 16-19 September on
Sukarno's direct orders, (2) several meetings with Aidit
the last week in September, and (3) a conversation with
Brig. Gen. Sugandhi on 30 September.
It will be remembered that Dani was in China for
three days in mid-September on a secret mission that only
Sukarno, Aidit, and Subandrio knew about at the time.
Although he could have gone to China for a number of
reasons--such as to arrange for the shipment of Chinese
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arms to Indonesia or the purchase of airplanes for the
Indonesian Air Force or the exchange of information in
the atomic energy field (all of which were reported to
have been under discussion by the two governments)--he
may well have gone in connection with the coup. We
. simply do not know the real purpose of Dani's trip to
China. In any case, he reported on the results of his
trip, first, to Subandrio and, then. to Sukarno on 21
September. Eight days later, on the morning of 29
September, he met with the President again, in private.
The circumstances of tneir meeting leave no doubt that
it was a matter of great urgency and secrecy. Sukarno
is reported to have received Dani in his bedroom in the
palace in Djakarta around 0900 hours, ahead of several
other important people who had scheduled appointments
with the President that morning and were waiting to see
him. Dani had just come from a meeting with General
Supardjo, who had arrived in Djakarta from West Borneo
the previous afternoon. Supardjo is reported to have
given Dani "news from Slam," with whom Supardio had been
in contact almost as soon as he arrived in Djakarta.
According to Dani, the "news" concerned "a group within
the army which was dissatisfied with the Arms, leadership
and which intended to make some changes." Sukarno is
reported to have asked Dani to meet with him again at the
palace in Bogor (where Sukarno normally spent nis week-
ends) the following Sunday, October 3rd, at 1000 hours.
He was to bring Gen. Supardjo with him. After this brief
meeting with Sukarno, Dani reportedly hurried from the
palace to report to Gen. Supardjo -on the conversation
with the President. It was Dani's second meeting with
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Supardjo that morning. The next time he was to see
Supardjo was at Halim on the morning of 1 October.*
As mentioned earlier, Dani's meeting with Sukarno
on the morning of 29 September is a very significant meet-
ing in connection with the coup. It would tell us a lot
about the coup, particularly about Sukarno's and Dani's
role in it, if we knew exactly what the two men talked
about when they met together privately in the palace that
morning. It is probably one of those things about the
Indonesian coup that we will never know for sure, however.
It can only be presumed that the meeting was concerned
with the arrangements for the coup. The timing of it,
on the morning of 29 September, suggests that Dani was
actually informing Sukarno of the exact date that had
been set for the coup. The decision to stage the coup
on the night of 30 September had just been made the
night before (on the 28th). According to Dani, he told
the President "that there was a group within the army
which was dissatisfied with the Army leadership which
intended to make some changes." The thing that Sukarno
must have been waiting to hear--and the thing that Dani
probably told him--was when "the group within the army
that was dissatisfied with the army leadership intended
to make some changes."
One thing that is clear that Sukarno learned from
the meeting with Dani was that Supardjo had arrived in
Djakarta from West Borneo--which was a secret from the
Army. In his speech of 12 February 1967 indicting Sukarno
for his role in the coup, General Nasution made quite a
point --)f the fact that Sukarno was one of the few people
who knew that Supardjo was in Djakarta. In the Army's
eyes, Sukarno was definitely guilty of conspiring to keep
this a secret from the Army. Sukarno must have known
that Supardjo was away from his command in West Borneo
*It will be remembered that Supardjo would have had
absolutely no reason to report to Dani as Minister/Com-
mander of the Air Force, except in connection with the
coup. As a gBneral in the Army, he would have reported
to Yani or Suharto or some other commanding officer in
the Army.
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without the knowledge or permission of his superiors in
the Army. It seems almost unbelievable that tie should
not have known the real reason for Supardjo's being in
Djakarta. Certainly, he does not seem to have expressed
the least surprise when Dani told him of seeing Supardjo
that morning. He even made plans to receive Supardjo at
the palace on 3 October. Obviously. he expected Supzrdjo
to be in Djakarta for several days. at least until 3
October. As it is highly unlikely that Supardjo could
have come to the palace in Boor wit:;out being noticed,
the fact that Sukarno made pinn to receive him there
3 October would seem to indica-L.) that he expected Supardjo'
presence in Djakarta to become known by then. This sug-
gests that he expected the coup to.be a fait accompli by
then. He could hardly have known this if Dani had not
told him. After all, the decision on D-Day had only been
made the night before, by Aidit himself apparently;
Sukarno could not have learned of it much in advance of
his meeting with Danl.. It appears that Dani must have
been the one to communicate Aidit's decision on the tim-
ing of tne coup to the President. In short, Dani's meet-
ing with Sukarno on the morning of 29 September is strong.
though circumstantial, evidence that Sukarno nad fore-
knowledge of the coup, that he had very precise kuowiedge.
in fact, of the date that the coup was planneo for.
There were other ways, of course, that Aidit and
Sjam could have communicated their decision on the timing
of the coup to Sukarno, although Dani does seem col have
been the obvious choice of an intermediary. Of all the
people directly involved in the coup, he was the only
one high enough in rank to have ready access to the Presi-
dent who was not openly associated with the PKI. The
fact of his meeting with Sukarno would not seem in the
least unusual; there would be no reason to attach any
particular significance to it. Furthermore, there would
be no reason to suspect PKI involvement on the part of
Dani. It would have been out of the question for Sukarno
to have had any contact with the military officers who
were to lead the movement, such as General Supardjo or
Untung, as this would have compromised the President com-
pletely. The same arOment would apply to Sjam and Pono,
the deep-cover PKI agents who were on the Central Command
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of the coup. That leaves Aidit. Unquestionably, there
would have been plenty of opportunity for Aidit to have
discussed the coup with Sukarno; they saw each other re-
gularly. During that last week in September, they were
reported to have been together on several occasions.
Even on those occasions when other people were present,
there was usually an opportunity for private conversa-
tion. The last time that Aidit saw Sukarno before the
coup (which was to prove to be the last time that the
two men saw each other before Aidit's death) was on the
evening of 29 September when they both addressed a meet-
ing of the national association of university students
-(the CGMI) at the Sports Stadium in Djakarta. Aidit was
not scheduled to speak, but Sukarno is reported to have
closed his speech with the words "Now.We must hear from
Aidit." In a'.shOrt extemporaneous speech, the PKI chair-
man explained that "the PKI had become great, precisely
because it dared to act." We will probably never know
whether Aidit and Sukarno had the opportunity for any
private communication that evening.
One thing happened during Sukarno's speech that
evening that should be mentioned, mainly because of the
attention it has received in connection with the coup.
After he had been speaking about five minutes, Sukarno
quite abruptly left the stage and disappeared from sight.
Some observers say he seemed to falter. After a period
of time--and there is disagreement over the length of
time, with estim4tes ranging from 5 minutes to an hour--
he reappeared and continued to give a normal rousing
Sukarno speech, It was speculated at the time that he
had gone into a private room to get an injection or other
medicine from his accompanying doctor; but there is noth-
ing to substantiate such speculation. The only report
we have from someone who claims to have seen Sukarno
during the time that he disappeared from public view
stated that he was seen conferring with military officers.
One of the most persistent theories about the coup
is that it was a premature move on the part of the Com-
munists that was triggered Vy the President's faltering
during his speech to the CGMI Congress. According to this
theory, word of Sukarno's "collapse" at the Sports Stadium
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was flashed to the Communists. who, acting on the mistaken
assumption that he was dying, made a hasty decision to
seize control. fearing otherwise that the army would move
against the PKI as soon as Sukarno died. In support of
this theory, it was reported that Aidit was seen leaving
the Sports Stadium early, almost as soon as he finished
his speech, presumably, on his way to brief the Politburo
on the evening's happening.
In the light of later evidence, this theory simply
does not stand up. By the evening of 29 September, the
coup preparations were much too far advanced to have been
triggered by anything that happened then. There is good
evidence that the decision to stage the coup had been
taken at least twenty-four hours earlier. It is unlikely
that the party would have moved on the assumption that
Sukarno was dying, anyway. Acting too soon on the belief
that Sukarno was not going to last long had been fatal
to many another political group in Indonesia. The Com-
munists would not have been likely to move until they knew
for sure that the President was in extremis.
Since Sukarno has not died and there are no signs
that he suffered a collapse (other than a political one)
in the immediate postcoup period, there is absolutely
nothing to substantiate the speculation that he suffered
a collapse at the CGMI Congress on the night of 29 September.
What is quite possible is that he was called off the stage,
either to be given some message or to be asked for instruc-
tions, possibly in connection with the events of the comin
day. We have no further information as to who the mili-
tary officers he was seen conferring with might have been.
The possibility must also be 'considered that 'Sukarno
staged the whole incident to make it look as though he
had suddenly been taken sick. We know that on the night
of 29 September. Sjam and Pono were meeting with Untung
and the other military leaders of the coup. It had already
been decided by Aidit that the coup would begin the fol-
lowing evening, though as yet the decision had not been
communicated to the military leaders. Supardjo had been
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summoned to Djakarta from West Borneo; everything was in
readiness�as far as the PKI was concerned. But not as
far as Untung and Latief were concerned. They were not
prepared to consider going on with the plans for the coup,
until the matter of the Cavalry was definitely settled.
At this point, Sjam and Pono undoubtedly realized that
there would be no armored support. They were not prepared
to let this, or any other matter, stand in the way of the
coup, however, which Aidit had ordered to begin the fol-
lowing night. They would naturally look for some new
compelling reason to present to the military officers for
going on with the oup. It may well have occurred to
_them that if Sukarno were suddenly to be taken sick again,
they could use this as a pretext for moving immediately
against the Army, before it could move-against the PKI.
Assuming that Sukarno.knew of the coup plans, he. tight
well have cooperated with the PKI in providing this os-
tensible excuse for the PKI to move against the Army.
Since Sjam's meeting with the military leaders was later
in the evening than Sukarno's address to the CGMI Con-
gress, Sjam could easily have brought the news of Sukarno's
faltering in the middle of his speech to the military
officers. It would have had a dramatic effect on Untung
and Latief and the others.
The next day, 30 September, Sukarno had a conver-
sation with Brig. Gen. Sugandhi which, because it is well
documented, is one of the most convincing pieces of evid-
ence that (1) Sukarno knew in advance that a PKI coup
would take place, (2) that he was given some understand-
ing of what the coup involved, and (3) that he agreed
to the plan. In order to appreciate the significance of
the Sugandhi-Sukarno conversation, it is necessary to know
something of its background, in the nature of two earlier
conversations of Gen. Sugandhi on 27 September, one with
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PKI Politburo member Sudisman and the other with PKI Chair-
man Aidit.
On 27 September, Sugandhi had the following con-
versation with Sudisman:
Sugandhi: Man (abbreviation for Sudisman),
what is going on with all these
preparations and digging of wells
in the villages?
Sudisman: Why don't you just join us?
Sugandhi: That is impossible:, Man. I
cannot possibly join the PKI,
because I am a religious person.
Sudisman: If you do not want to, it is
because you have been listening
too much to Nasution.
Sugandhi: No, it is not a matter of listen-
ing too much to him, it is a matter
of ideology. If you continue
with your plan, you will be crushed
and destroyed.
Sudisman: No, that is impossible. We will
have the initiative. Whoever
begins and strikes the first blow
will win. Have trust in us. We
have made thorough calculations.
Shortly afterward, on the same day, Sugandhi had
this conversation with Aidit:
Aidit:
Have you talked with Sudisman.
We will start in a short time,
in two or three days. Bung
Karno [Sukarno] knows all this.
It would be better for you if
you join us.
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Sugandhi: Sudisman already talked to me,
but I do not want to join the
PKI. The PKI wants to stage a
coup. I have my own doctrine,
the Soldier's Oath.
Aidit: Bung, do not say 'coup.' That
is an evil word. The PKI is
going to improve the revolution
which is being subverted by the
council of generals. We will
start within two to three days.
Will you join us or not? I have
already informed Bung Karno about
all this.
Three days later, on 30 September, Sugandhi is
reported to have had the following conversation with
Sukarno in the President's bedroom in the palace.
Sugandhi: The PKI is going to stage a coup.
Do you know about this? I have
been contacted by Sudisman and
Aidit themselves.
Sukarno: Don't be a communist-phobe. Don't
you know about the existence of
the council of generals? Don't you
know that these generals are hope-
less? Be careful when you talk.
Sugandhi: If there are hopeless generals,
why don't you just dismiss them?
Isn't that your authority? There
is no council of generals. There
is a Rank and Post Review Council.
It is an evaluation council to
assist the army minister/commander
to evaluate colonels who are to be
promoted to generals, and not for
any other purpose.
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Sukarno:
Sugandhi:
Sukarno:
Sugandhi:
Sukarno:
Don't you interfere. Shut up.
you must have been listening too
much to Nasution.
It is true, Bapak. There is no
council of generals. Pak Yani said
so himself and declared to Bapak
that there was no Council of
Generals. Isn't Yani a man who
is loyal to you, somebody who may
be called your right hand? .
Don't talk too much. Don't meddle.
Don't you know that according to
Thomas Tonly in a revolution a
father can eat his own children?
Don't you know?
If that is the case, you must have
joined the PKI.
Shut up, or I will slap you till
you faint. Go home, and be careful.
On the basis of Gen. Sugandhi's reported conversations
with Sudisman, Aidit, and Sukarno, Nasution stated un-
equivocably, in public, on 13 February 1967 that "the
President gave the coup his blessing and assistance." He
cited a 19 January 1967 central investigation team report
stressing "the importance and the validity of the Sukarno-
Sugandhi conversation of 30 September as proof of the
President's advance knowledge and involvement in the 30
September affair."
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Conclusions
Although the Indonesian coup, as it was carried
out, was in every respect the planning of the PKI,
other people besides the Communists were involved in the
plot to eliminate the top Army ),eadership. The evidence
in the case of all but one or two of the people involved
in the coup is sufficiently clear-cut to justify a rather
definite judgment of their respective roles in the coup.
The most important question about the Indonesian coup
that remains open to some doubt on the basis of the
evidence that is available is the question of Sukarno's
role in the coup. Our judgment of his role and that of
Subandrio must necessarily remain somewhat tentative,
until there is more evidence on the subject.
The PKI -- The central role of the PKI in planning
the coup has been well established. The evidence is over-
whelming that the PKI made all the major decisions, in-
cluding who would lead the movement, what military units
would be involved in the operatkon, when the coup would
take place, how the political campaign in support of the
coup would be managed, and what changes in the government
would be made as a result of the coltp. Aidit himself
made the more important decisions, such as when the coup
would take place and who would be on the Revolutionary
Council, which was intended to replace the Dwikora Cabinet.
Sjam, the chief of the PKI Special Bureau, to whom Aidit
entrusted the detailed planning for the coup, seems to
have made most of the other decisions, subject, of course,
to Aiditts approval.
After securing Politburo approval for the PKI to
begin making preparations for a coup in late August 1965,
Aidit turned the whole matter of the planning and execu-
tion of the coup over to the Special Bureau, the secret
organization within the PKI that had been established in
late 1964 to direct PKI covert activities. Apparently,
only a very few people in the Politburo even knew of the
existence of the Special Bureau; it is not at all clear
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whether anyone besides Aidit knew the identity of the man
who headed the organization. He had been one of Aidit's
closest personal friends before Aidit persuaded him to
join the PKI in 1948. Aidit probably trusted Sjam as much
or more than any other PKI leader. There is no doubt
that Sjam's loyalties were, first and foremost, to Aidit.
In the Special Bureau, with Sjam as its chief, Aidit had,
in effect, his own special apparatus within the party for
handling "sensitive matters." Completely free of the
control of the central committee and the Politburo, the
Bureau operated as a completely autonomous organization
within the PKI, answerable only to Aidit.
According to Sjam, the Special Bureau was "charged
with the task of preparing for armed struggle," which was
not the official policy of the PKI at the time. As long
as things were going well for the PKI under Sukarno's
protection, Aidit believed that the best policy fort the
PKI was one of strong ::-.i.nuncia-
tion of force as the way to gain power in Indonesia, and
the espousal of the peaceful, parliamentary road to "social-
ism." Yet, because he could not definitely rule out the
possibility of the PKI's having to resort to armed force
some time in the future, if things suddenly changed for
the worse, he seems to have been concerned to develop,
some kind of covert apparatus, distinct from the overt
apparatus of the party, which could be assigned the task
of preparing for armed struggle, should that ever become
necessary. Because of the risks involved in arming and
training PKI party members--which, if it became known,
would have vitiated Aidit's whole effort over the years
to create just the opposite image of the PKI as a. party
that operated entirely within the legal political system
of the country--Aidit preferred a policy of PKI infiltra-
tion and subversion of the Indonesian armed forces.
Rather than train and arm a PKI armed force, pretty much
from the beginning, the Special Bureau would concentrate
its efforts on subverting the Indonesian military.
The extent of PKI penetration of the military waz:
.-certainly never realized by the army leadership before
the coup; it clearly came as a surprise and a shock to
Nasution ard Suharto and the other army generals aftrr
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the coup when they learned about the operations of the
PKI and the Special Bureau from the confessions of the
military officers involved in the coup. The extent of
the penetration was shockingly evident in one fact that
was revealed--that Sjam himself had acted as a double
agent in pretending to be an informer for the Djakarta
Military Command. By the time of the coup, the Special
Bureau had established a pattern of regular contacts
with perhaps a hundred or more military officers who,
because they were well placed in positions of command
over a much larger number of troops, put the PKI in the
position of being able to command a sizeable military
force. Although it could not have hoped to withstand an
all-out attack from the military, the PKI was in a posi-
tion where it could at least contemplate carrying out
a limited military operation--such as the kidnapping of
a number of Army generals and the seizure of a few key
installations in Djakarta. A practical measure of tile
military strength of the PKI in late 1965 would actually
be the 30 September Movement. It seems that all or almost
all the resources of the Special Bureau were involved in
the coup. We know that Aidit was concerned to commit the
maximum number of troops at his disposal to the coup
action, even to the point of rushing the training of
some 4,000 Communist volunteers as an auxiliary force. �
In short, the coup was the supreme military effort that
the PKI was capable of at the time.
The Special Bureau was the obvious organization
within the PKI to plan an action like the 30 September
Movement. First of all, it had "contacts" in the mili-
tary who could be counted on to carry out the party's
will in staging a coup. Secondly, and just as important,
the military officers who were under the control of the
Special Bureau were not openly identified with the PKI,
which meant that the role of the PKI in the coup could
be obscured and the coup made to appear an internal Army
affair. Aidit seems to have felt strongly that the coup
should be handled entirely within the Indonesian military.
Unfortunately for the PKI, a last-minute decision to use
the Communist volunteers, who had been armed and trained
by the coup leaders as an auxiliary force, compromised
-Aidit's and Sjam's planning to avoid direct PKI involvement
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in the coup. It was never intended that these volunteers
play a role in the military operation of the coup; they
were thought of as a "reserve force" in the defense of
Halim Air Force Base, which was selected to serve as the
command center for the coup. However, in the late hours
of the coup, when the coup was all but lost, they were
sent into Djakarta in a last desperate move by the coup
leaders. They staged a dramatic--but pointless and totally
disorganized--entry into Djakarta, only to be promptly
disarmed by Suharto's forces. Except for the presence
of these armed Communist volunteers and the failure of
the PKI to stop publication of an editorial, which had
obviously been written in advance of the coup for publi-
cation the morning after the coup, the PKI might well
have concealed its involvement in the coup, at least at
the time. As it was, the arrival of armed Communist ele-
ments on the scene in the late hours of the coup created
the false impression that armed Communist civiliansLhad
been involved in the raids on the generals' homes, a
false impression that contributed significantly to the
immediate, violent reaction against the PKI. The 2 October
Harlan Rakjat editorial endorsing the coup was another
disaster for the PKI; it provided the documentary justi-
fication for the PKI's own obliteration after the coup.
As for the PKI, the fact that it got others to
execute the deed does not change the fact that it was in
every way responsible for the planning of the Indonesian
coup. After the coup, Aidit was attacked by the militant
wing of the surviving PKI organization for having bypassed
the PKI party organization in his planning of the coup.
This is not completely true, in that he got Politburo
approval for the PKI to begin making plans for a coup
and top party leaders were given specific roles to play
in the coup--for instance, Njono, the Chief of the Greater
Djakarta Committee of the PKI, was in charge of the
"operational-technical" preparations for the coup, includ-
ing the recruiting of the PKI volunteer troops, and Lnkman,
Sakirman, Pardede, Sanusi, and Narsukud were given the
assignment of coordinating party activities in different
parts of the country after the coup. Because of the need
for secrecy, even these top officials of the PKI were not
briefed on their assignments more than a day or so in
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advance of the coup. Except for these top leaders, the
PKI as an organization was not informed about the coup
ahead of time. In this sense, Aidit's critics within the
party were right in accusing him of bypassing the party.
The coup was essentially an operation of the Special
Bureau. The PKI was no less responsible because the
Special Bureau planned the coup, of course, than it would
have been if the overt party organization had managed the
whole affair.
The military leaders: Untung, Sujono, Latief,
and Supardjo -- The military was only the executive arm
of a coup that was masterminded by the PKI. Untung and
the other military leaders were little more than dupes
of the PKI. Long accustomed to following the PKI line
on political matters, they were easily convinced by the
PKI of the necessity of taking action against the Army
leadership.
None of the military leaders of the coup were
Communist, in the sense of being Communist party members.
Some were known to be pro-Communist; a few, like Untung,
had openly supported Communist causes in the past. But,
in the main, they were not known for their political
views; most often, they were described as "apolitical"
or "politically naive." They seemed much more interested
in their military careers than in politics, and, in every
case, they had promising careers ahead of them. Untung
was actually something of a national hero after the West
Irian Campaign; te had been decorated by President Sukarno
himself. In 1965, his career was definitely on the way
up, after the temporary setback it had suffered as a re-
sult of his involvement in the Communist uprising of 1948.
Only a few months before the coup he had been promoted
from Battalion Commander in the Central Java Division of
the Army to Commander of the 1st Battalion of the Tjak-
rabirawa Honor Guard that guarded the President.
The military leaders of the coup do not seem to
have been personally acquainted with one another before
September 1965. They had one thing in common, however,
.that was to bring them together in a fateful alliance.
For some time each had been having regular contacts with
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highly-placed PKI agents. In the case of Untung, his
PKI contact was a man called Walujo; in the case of
Latief and Sujono, it was a certain Pono; in the case
of Supardjo, it was Sjam himself. Although Untung and
the other military leaders did not know the true identit-
ties of the men they called Sjam, Pono, and Walujo and
certainly did not appreciate the fact that they were the
three top men in the PKI Special Bureau, they all seem
to have accepted the fact that they spoke for the PKI.
Actually, they seem to have had some idea that they re-
presented Aidit personally.
Untung, Sujono, and Latief were introduced to one
another by Sjam and Pono at a meeting on 6 September 1965.
During the month of September, the group of five men met
together a total of eight times, usually late at night
at the homes of either Col. Latief or Sjam. The planning
for the Indonesian coup was started and finished ii the
one month of September, in the course of these eight meet-
ings.
Sjam presided at every meeting. There is no ques-
tion that he was always in charge. At the early meetings,
he presented the PKI's analysis of the political situa-
tion and cited the need for action. The military leaders
seem to have accepted his word on the existence of a Gen-
erals' Council in the Army and its alleged planning for
a coup to overthrow Sukarno. Convinced that they were
acting to protect Sukarno, they allowed themselves to be
used by the PKI in carrying out a coup of the PKI's making.
As the month wore on and the discussions centered more
and more on the military planning for the coup, Sjam re-
treated somewhat from the center of the stage and allowed
the military officers to make some of the purely military
decisions--in preparation for the final moment, when he
would withdraw altogether to the sidelines and leave the
military leaders to face the shock of the coup.
During the course of the meetings, Sjam had men-
tioned that one other person would be joining the coup
group at a later date. He was Gen. Supardjo, Commander
of the 4th Combat Command in West Borneo. The reason
that Supardjo became involved in the coup was precisely
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the same reason that Untung, Latief, Sujono, and the
others became involved; he was a PKI sympathizer who was
being 'managed" by the Special Bureau and could be counted
on to carry out the will of the party. Supardjo was
actually the prize "asset" of the PKI in the Indonesian
military. Probably because of his rank, he was personally
"managed" by the chief of the PKI Special Bureau--Sjam
himself. He was in and out of Djakarta often enough,
in connection with his assignment as Commander of the
4th Combat Command, that he could have managed to see
Sjam fairly regularly. Presumably, he was kept informed
of the coup planning during those last weeks before the
coup when he was still in West Borneo. On 28 September
he received a prearranged signal that he should come to
Djakarta immediately; he arrived late in the afternoon
that same day and went immediately to Sjam's house. During
theinext two days, he was actively involved in all the
last-minute preparations for the coup. He joined thet.
other military leaders at the last meeting of the coup
group on 29 September. On the day of the coup, he acted
as the chief liaison between the coup leaders and Presi-
dent Sukarno.
Dani -- Omar Dani, the Minister/Commander of the
Air Force, who was obviously involved along with the Com-
munists in the plot to eliminate the top Army leadership,
is a special case among the military officers who were
involved in the coup. Like Untung and the others, he had
for some time been having secret contacts with representa-
tives of the PKI Special Bureau. His contact man was
Walujo, the same man who "managed" Untung and Gen. Pranoto,
the latter of whom Sukarno appointed "caretaker" commander
of the Army, vice Gen. Yani, who was one of the victims
of the coup. As Commander of the Air Force, Dani �was the
highest-placed "contact" of the PKI in the military. He
was far too senior to be considered in the same group
with Untung and Lntief, or even Supardjo. He never met
together with them in the planning sessions for the coup.
Thus, he was not a member of the so-called Central Command
of the coup, as the five-man group (plus Supardjo) was
called.
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Although he had assumed an increasingly leftist
position after 1962, when he was appointed Minister/Com-
mander of the Air Force, Dani was not a Communist. It
would not even be accurate to describe him as of leftist
conviction. Apparently he had no strong political con- �
victions of his own. After a year of pilot training at
Bakersfield in California during 1950-51, he was regarded
as an anti-Communist with a strongly expressed preference
for U.S. technology and equipment over Soviet technology.
Yet-, within a few years, he was espousing the Communist
line and setting up Marxism study courses within the Air
Force. Dani was, above all else, an opportunist, as
Ruth McVey described him, "a man out for the main chance...
which he perceived not unbrightly to lie with Sukarno
and the PKI." Slim, handsome, sporting a clipped mustache
and wearing his cap at a dashing angle, he looked more
like the matinee idol than the air force chief. He was
vain, ambitious, completely pliable, and, most of all,
susceptible to flattery. Needless to say, he did not
lack for the latter from the Communists. They knew well
how'to exploit an ambitious man like Dani.
It was to Sukarno, not the Communists, that Dnni
owed his appointment as Commander of the Air Force. He
had been hand-picked by the President to lead the Air
Force in 1962, when the former Commander of the Air Force
was r9lieved, under pressure from the Army and Navy, for
supposed Air Force "negligence" in an incident involving
the death of a Navy Admiral. The succession of Dani to
the post of Air Force Commander scarcely improved the
situation from the point of view of the Army and Navy.
Although intelligent' and well trained for the operational
leadership of the Air Force, Dani was obviously given the
job for other reasons. With his weak character and lack
of a strong personal following in the Air Force, he would
be totally dependent on the President for his position
and therefore amenable to Sukarno's wishes. Under
his leadership, the Air Force made a series of advances
to the "left," always on Sukarno's initiative. At the
time of the coup, it was the only one of the four services
that was prepared to accept the idea of Nasakom Councils
within the Armed Forces; it was giving strong public approval
to the idea of the fifth force, at a time when both the
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Army and the Navy were fighting it determinedly. The
contrast between the Army and Navy's reaction to Presi-
dential pushing on these matters and Dani's ready acquiesc-
ence on all matters could hardly have been more striking.
It was no secret that Nasution and Yani and the other Army
leaders had little use for Dani, but that mattered little
to Dani so long as he had the backing and protection of
Sukarno. He was receiving all that he wanted--in the way
of a gorgeous lakeside home, luxury automobiles, and
access to the palace social life--from Sukarno. Certainly,
Sukarno was happy with Danl.. He referred to the Air Force,
under Dani's leadership. as "his sweetheart."
It is true that the Air Force had some reason to
be jealous of the Army, which got nearly two-thirds of
the annual military budget while the Air Force ranked
last among the four services in receiving less than 10%
of all military expenditures. Apparently, the Air Force
considered itself discriminated against in the matter of
promotions, as well as the allocation of foreign aid.
Many of its officers are reported to have resented the
superior position and prestige of the army. However,
Dani himself, as we have seen, had no personal cause for
grievance along these lines. It is highly unlikely that
he would have joined a conspiracy against the Army generals
because of inter-service rivalry of this kind. Nor is
it likely that he would have acted out of any strong poli-
tical mdtivation of his own. There would seem to be only
one good reason why Dani would have become involved in
anything as dangerous as a coup--namely, that he kLe.., tha'
Sukarno knew and approved of the coup plans. It wouA
have been totally out of character for him to have risked
his life and his career, otherwise. As long as the coup
had Sukarno's blessing, there was no risk for him. In
fact, not to have supported the coup, in those circumst-
ances, would have been more risky. Dani's involvement
in the coup, as much as anything else, argues for Sukarno's
having been involved; it is one of the most convincing
reasons for thinking that Sukarno must have known and ap-
proved of the coup plans. Dani was not someone who would
in any event have been expected to act without the Presi-
dent.
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Whereas it can be argued that the PKI could easily
have convinced Untung and Latief and the other military
leaders of the coup that Sukarno knew about the coup plans,,
whether he did or not. Dani is not likely to have taken
anyone's word--either Sjam's or Aidit's--when he could
so easily have checked the matter out with Sukarno him-
self. He was in constant contact with Sukarno all during
the period just before the coup. In fact, he seems to
have been in the very select company of Subandrio and
Aidit as one of Sukarno's most trusted confidants. Only
two weeks before the coup, he made a secret trip to Com-
munist China on the direct orders of Sukarno. Besides
the President and Dani, only two other people in the In-
donesian government knew about Dani's secret mission
--Subandrio and Aidit. Although he could have gone to
China for a number of reasons, the timing of the trip
suggests that it was in connection with the coup. Appar-
ently, Sukarno was in the process of negotiating a secret
arms deal with the Chinese. Assuming that he knew about
the coup planning, he may have sent Dani to China to ar-
range for an immediate shipment of arms, with the thought
that they would be used in the coup. (This is not to sug-
gest that he informed the Chinese of his reason for want-
ing the arms immediately.) It is interesting to note that
soon after he returned to Indonesia, Dani had a meeting
with Air Force Major Sujono, who was deeply involved in
the soup planning; among other things, he was in charge
of the secret military training that the Air Force was
giving the Communist volunteers at Lubang Buaja. On the
day of the coup, it was Sujono who procured the arms from
the Air Force depots; they happened to be Chinese arms.
Dani is implicated in the planning of the coup by
one other important piece of evidence. On the morning of
29 September, he is known to have conferred with Gen.
Supardjo, one of the PKI's contacts in the military who
was to play a major role in the coup. Actually, he saw
Supardjo twice that morning, once before and once after
he talked with Sukarno. Supardjo is reported to have given
Dani "news from Sjam." After the meeting with Supardjo,
Dani went to the palace, where he conferred in private
with the President for several minutes. The circumstances
of the meeting leave no doubt that it was a matter of
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great urgency and secrecy. After this brief meeting with
Sukarno, Dani hurried from the palace to report to Gen..
Supardjo on the conversation with the President. We know
that the decision to stage the coup on the night of 30
September was taken by Aidit on the night of the 28th,
the very evening before Sjam told Supardjo the news that
Supardjo obviously thought important enough to tell Dani
right away and Dani felt obliged to tell Sukarno immediately.
It appears that Dani must have been the one to communicate
Aidite_s decision on the timing of the coup to Sukarno.
Although there were other ways that Aidit and Sjam could
have communicated with the President, Dani does seem to
have been the obvious choice of an intermediary. Of all
the people directly involved in the coup, he was the only
one high enough in rank to have ready access to the Presi-
dent who was not openly associated with the PKI.
Dani's actions on the day of the coup leave abso-
lutely no doubt that he had foreknowledge of the event and
lent it his full support from the beginning. He left his
home soon after midnight on the night of the 30th to go to
Halim Air Force Base, where arrangements had already been
made for his and Aidit's "safe protection" during the
critical hours of the coup. He was at the Operations
Command Center there when Sukarno arrived the next morn-
ing and was the first to report to the President on the
progress. of the coup. Early in the morning, he drafted
an orderiof-the-day pledging the support of the air force
to the coup. With the broadcast of the order later that
day, Dani's fate was all but sealed. His complicity in
the coup, like that of the PKI, was now documented. He
could never hope to disclaim any involvement in the coup,
as Sukarno was to leave himself the option of doing.
Subandrio--- Subandrio's role in the coup is, in
many respects, the most surprising and the most difficult
to explain. It seems that he definitely knew about
the coup planning, that he had precise knowledge, in fact,
of the details of the planning such as when the coup would
take place. However, he does not seem to have been in-
volved in the actual planning and he was not even in Djakarta
on the day of the coup to participate in the events of
the coup.
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Apparently, the military leaders of the coup got
the definite impression from Sjam that Sukarno, Subandrio,
and Dani all knew about the coup planning. There is goo0
reason to thihk that Subandrio did. First of all, we knOw
that he knew about Dani's secret trip to China in mid-
September, which is presumed to have involved the prepara-
tions for the coup. After the coup, Gen. Sukendro remembered
a discussion he had with Subandrio on 17 September which,
in hindsight, convinced him that Subandrio knew about the
coup.- Subandrio asked his opinion of a number of top
Indonesian army generals, most of whom were later killed
in the coup. Subandrio said that he thought all these
generals were much too'interested in politics and could
no longer be relied upon as good army officers. He des-
cribed only one general--Gen. Mursjid--as a general who
"did his job as a military man and didn't get involved in
politics." Gen. Mursjid was not a victim of the coup.
On the morning of 29 September, the same morning
that Dani saw Sukarno on a matter of great urgency, which
is thought to have been the occasion of Dani's telling
Sukarno of Aidit's decision on the timing of the coup,
Aidit is reported to have met with Subandrio. There is
no information as to what was discussed, but it is a good
bet that Aidit told Subandrio of the final decision he had
made the night before to stage the coup on the 30th. After
his meeting with Aidit, Subandrio is reported to have be-
come ve/J31 busy, meeting with several other cabinet ministers.
Later that day, he left on a speaking tour of North Sumatra.
When the official announcement of his planned visit
to Sumatra was made on 25 September, it seemed that Suban-
drio was at pains to give specific reasons for his trip
and to point out that it had been ordered by President
Sukarno. It had not been normal practice in the past for
ministers at Subandrio's level to go into a long expana-
tion of the reasons for making a routine visit anywhere
in Indonesia; it was almost as if Subandrio was preparing
an alibi.
Just why Subandrio, who obviously knew about the
coup plans, should have planned to be away from Djakarta
on the day of the coup is not exactly clear. One somehow
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gets the feeling that he was not as enthusiastic about
the idea of the coup or perhaps not as confident of its
success as Aidit, and presumably Sukarno. Certainly,
Subandrio was a much more cautious man, by nature, than
Sukarno; he may well have had some premonition that the
coup might fail. Aside from its chances for success, he
may not have been altogether happy about the whole idea
of eliminating the top leadership of the Army, which
represented the main balanting.force to the PKI. He
didn't have tie backing of any political party, the way
Sukarno had the PNI, Aidit had the PKI, and Nasution and
Yani had the Army. is power derived solely from Sukarno.
He may well have figured that his own power position was
better served by a continuation Of the status quo than by
any sudden upset of the balance between the PKI and the
Army, which the coup would have accomplished, in favor of
the PKI.
In any case, Subandrio was obviously not considered
essential to the coup plans, apparently either by Sukarno
or the PKI. One would not have expected the PKI to give
Subandrio a majorrole to play in any coup of PKI making.
He was, after all, Aidit's chief rival for influence with
Sukarno and a major contender for power after Sukarno. The
PKI could hardly exert the control over him that it could
over Dani and the other military leaders involved in the
coup.
1
As for Sukarno's feelings about Subandrio's par-
ticipation in the coup, assuming of course that the Presi-
dent knew about the coup plans, it should be mentioned
that Subandrio's stock with the President was reported to
be at a low ebb during the summer and fall of 1965, as
a result of the Afro-Asian Conference fiasco. Apparently,
Subandrio's intelligence organization had painted A glow-
ing picture of the prospects of the Afro-Asian Copierence,
from Indonesia's point of view, particularly th9..prospects
for Indonesia's keeping Malaysia out of the conference
and the prospects for Indonesia's emerging as one of the
leading nations at the conference. After the postpone-
ment of the conference, Sukarno was reported to be very
unhappy about the poor intelligence assessment he had
hePn c:ivn. There were r.lther t!.-i hn1:1Z" hc,(:mtri;
c?ry nS.1:7:117]o wt: rivcr.76
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his own power base. Whatever truth there may have been
to these reports, Sukarno was obviously anxious to have
the benefit of Subandrio's counsel when things suddenly
began to go badly for the coup on the afternoon of 1
October. He sent an urgent message to Subandrio: "Objec-
tive not achieved. Return immediately." He even sent his
Presidential plane to Medan to bring Subandrio home.
Subandrio had not seemed in the least surprised
when he first received the news of the coup on 1 October.
According to a member in his entourage, he acted "as if
nothing had happened." Obviously, he was in no hurry to
return to Djakarta. He was quoted as saying that "nothing
urgent" called him, so he would "wait to see how events
turned out." He manifested no particular worry or anxiety.
In response to Sukarno's urgent summons home, he calmly
decided to continue his tour of Sumatra. On 2 October,
he is reported to have received a message from Deputy
Prime Minister Leimena also requesting him to return to
Djakarta. Again, he is reported to have commented: "Why
must I go? Let Leimena settle this mess himself: The
President is still there." Finally, on 3 October, he
returned to Djakarta, going straight from the airport to
Bogor to see the President.
At his trial, Subandrio repeatedly stated his in-
nocence of any complicity in the coup. The trial certainly
cannot be said to have established his guilt. He was con-
victed of other crimes against the state, having nothing
to do with the coup. Thus, his involvement in the coup
must be considered unproven. It seems clear that he knew
about the planning for the coup, but he does not seem to
have played any part, either in its planning or execution.
In fact, he seems to have taken great pains to avoid be-
coming involved, no doubt because he knew that it would be
assumed that he had been involved and he seems to have had
some fears that it might not succeed.
Sukarno -- Probably the most crucial question about
the Indonesian coup concerns the role of Sukarno in the
coup. It is one question about which there will probably
always be a certain amount of doubt. But it has always
been the history of conspiracies, especially those
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involving persons in high office, that certain facts have
never been known for sure. The Indonesian coup is no
exception.
It is quite clear, first of all, that Sukarno's
sympathies were with the coup, if only from his actions
after the coup. Everything that he did or said after the
coup was in the interest of quieting the national furor
raised over the generals' deaths, protecting those in-
volved in the coup, and restoring the political situation
to that existing before the coup. In the years since the
coup, Sukarno has never sought to change the initial im-
pression that he gave of his attitude towards the coup.
He has never said that the coup was counter-revolution-
ary; in fact, he has never suggested that the 30 September
Movement was carrying out a coup at all. Although the
guilt of the PKI in planning the coup has long since been
established, he has refused to place the blame on the PKI.
For many months after the coup, he tried to resist the
efforts to crush the PKI, which he continued to praise
as the party that had suffered the most casualities and
displayed the most merit in the Indonesian revolution.
From his actions on the day of the coup it seems
clear that Sukarno at least knew about the coup plans
ahead of time. There is the well established fact that he
left a note for his wife Devi when he left her home early
on the illorning of the coup. He had already left Devi's
house and was on his way to the palace when he was first
notified by the Tjakrabirawa Palace Guard of the attack
on the generals' homes. He would have had no way of know-
ing of the coup events before he left, unless he had prior
knowledge of the coup. In the note, he explained that
"the men who were carrying out this so-called revolution
intended to safeguard Bapak (Sukarno) and did not intend
to oppose him." He assured Devi that "Bapak was safe."
Sukarno does not seem to have been either shocked
or surprised by the news of the coup. He is not known
to have asked any questions about the kidnapping of the
generals, a most abnormal reaction to hearing such news
for the first time. The only thing that seemed to interest
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him was the report that Gen. Nasution had escaped. He
was obviously very much concerned to learn the truth
about Nasution. His first comment upon hearing of Nasu-
tion's escape had been: "This comes as an absolute sur-
prise. What will you do with me?" Sukarno was not in
the habit of asking other people "What will you do with
me?" It suggests that he suddenly felt very much on the
defensive, as though he %assumed that the Army would know
that he had been involved in the generals' kidnapping.
It-could hardly have been a coincidence that Sukarno
decided to go to Halim Air Force Base, which was serving
as the coup headquarters. We know that the coup leaders
were expecting him to arrive there around 0800-0900 hours;
Sujono had made arrangements for the President to spend
the day at Commodore Susanto's house on the airbase.
Sukarno did not disappoint them. He arrived there around
0930 hours--at his own initiative and of his own free will.
He spent the entire day of the coup at Halim, along with
Aidit and Dani and Untung and Sjam and the others. Al-
though he did not see Aidit or Sjam or Untung, who were
at different locations on the airbase, he conferred often
with Supardjo, who acted as courier between Aidit and the
Central Command and Sukarno and Dani. He was with Dani at
the Operations Command Center all morning; in the afternoon,
he was at Commodore Susanto's house, where he is reported
to haNe spent most of the afternoon "resting and sleeping,"
amazing as that might seem under the circumstances. He
did not leave the airbase until late in the evening, after
all hope for the coup was gone.
In no sense was Sukarno a prisoner of the coup group
while he was at Halim. On the contrary, he seems to have
been very much his own free agent from the time that he
went to Halim at his own initiative to the moment that:he
decided to leave for Bogor. His complete independence of
action was clear from the fact that he sent his own emis-
saries back and forth from Halim into Djakarta all day long.
He was also free to use the coup-controlled radio to broad-
cast a Presidential statement to the nation.
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The success of the whole coup depended on the public
statement that Sukarno was expected to make. There is abso-
lutely no question that the coup leaders fully expected the -
President to make a statement in support of the coup. His
endorsement of the coup was the one strategic calculation
that made sense of the coup. The military odds against the
success of Untung's move on 1 October were overwhelming.
Aidit, with his relatively good sense of the military, would
never have risked such odds. Clearly, the President was
the essential factor in the calculation; his endorsement
would have been enough to guarantee the success of the coup.
If the coup leaders made one serious miscalculation,
it was in thinking that they could count on Sukarno, in a
critis, if anything went wrong. Actually, they seem never
to have considered the possibility of anything going wrong,
such as their failing to capture all the generals, and the
effect that it would have on Sukarno. At other times of
national crisis, such as at the time of Indonesia's Inde-
pendence, Sukarno had displayed a conspicuous lack of
courage. The coup leaders had failed to plan for just
such a thing happening again.
It is difficult to know just what influenced Sukarno
to back out on the coup on the afternoon of 1 October.
Certainly, Nasution's escape was one factor. Sukarno was
alertedlto the possibility that Nasution had escaped very
early in the morning, several hours before the coup leaders
at Halim Air Force Base received information that led them
to suspect the reports they had received that all the gen-
erals had been captured. Sukarno spent the entire morning
trying to check out the reports that Nasution had escaped.
He kept receiving conflicting information. Thus, he was
forced to make many of the major decisions Of the day in
a state of uncertainty, not knowing for sure whether Nasu-
tion had escaped or not. The whole effect seems to have
been to throw him off-balance. It was not that Nasution's
escape was all that disastrous for the coup. It is doubt-
ful that Sukarno would have considered it a major disaster
and that he would have decided to call off the coup simply
because of it.
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According to one theory, it was the murder of the
generals that caused Sukarno to pull back. There is a
great difference of opinion as to whether or not Sukarno
knew that the generals would be killed, assuming of course
that he knew and approved of the plans to arrest the gen-
erals. The main reason for thinking that he would never
have approved the murder of the generals is that it was
not his style of dealing with political opponents. The
prisons in Indonesia were full of Sukarno's political
opponents, but he had never executed anyone for political
reasons, and that included several people convicted of
trying to assassinate him. If Sukarno was-surprised and/or
shocked by. the murder of the generals, he certainly never
showed it, either on the day of the coup or afterwards.
In fact, his whole attitude towards the murder of the gen-
erals was one of unbelievable callousness. That, as much
as anything else he did or said after the coup, turned the
Army and the nation against him.
Probably the main factor influencing Sukarno to call
off the movement was the unexpected recovery of the Army from
the stunning loss of six of its top generals. Here again,
Nasution's escape was not the crucial factor. It was Gen.
Suharto, not Nasution, who was the hero of the day, in
rallying the armed forces against the coup. It could never
have been foreseen that Suharto, known as a strong and
capable officer but obviously underestimated as a leader,
would so quickly and effectively take command of the Army
in a crisis situation. It was his rallying of the Army
against the coup that seems to have frightened Sukarno most.
As mentioned above, the President had never been known for
his physical courage. When it looked as though the Army
was about to attack Halim Air Force Base, Sukarno appar-
ently lost his nerve. He decided against making the public
statement in support of the coup that he had obviously
intended to make; he finally decided to stop the movement
altogether; he called in Supardjo to tell him of his deci-
sion.
It is quite clear now that the coup leaders felt them-
selves betrayed by the President. It is debatable whether
the coup would have succeeded or failed if Sukarno had not
backed out on the coup. Quite clearly, the coup leaders
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had miscalculated on one thing: the reaction of the Army
to the loss of its top command. That miscalculation was
not necessarily a fatal one, however. If Sukarno had not
deserted the coup but had spoken out in defense of the
action taken against the generals, as was planned, it is
not at all certain that Suharto would have Stood up to
the President. Sukarno could probably have carried the
day for the coup, even though the Army was not in the
leaderless, paralyzed state that the coup planners had
figured it would be. Thus, it seems that the coup was
probably a good bet to succeed--if everything had gone
according to plan. Actually, not everything had to go
according to plan. Neither the mistake in not capturing
Nasution nor the miscalculation of the Army's response
were crucial. The crucial factor was Sukarno. The suc-
cess of the coup depended on him. When the cow leaders
failed to get his support, their cause suddenly became hope-
less. Their fatal mistake had been to trust everything
to Sukarno.
It is interesting to speculate just why the PKI
should have risked everything on a coup of PKI making
which, in the last analysis, depended on Sukarno, not
the PKI. Almost certainly, Aidit would not have risked
an action like the 30 September Movement without Sukarno's
express approval beforehand. As we have seen, there is
good evidence that the President was informed about the
coup plans ahead of time. Although he may not have known
all the details (for instance, he seems to have beeli
surprised that Untung was chosen to lead the movement),
he obviously knew a lot about the plans, including what
was expected of him. He had a specific role to play in
the coup, which had been planned well in advance; the PKI
seems to have been in no doubt that he would do exactly
what was expected of him.
Aidit's supreme confidence in Sukarno's commitment
to the coup may well have been based on more than Sukarno's
approval of PKI plans for a coup; Aidit may actually have
been convinced that he was carrying out a coup on Sukarno's
behalf. A purge of the Army leadership, which is what the
Indonesian coup intended, was absolutely in keeping with
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the direction of Sukarno's policies in 1965. In a series
of bold moves against the opposition in late 1964 and early
1965, he had succeeded in eliminating all effective centers
of opposition, except the Army. In April 1965, he had
begun to move against the Army; in the spring and summer, .
he was able to push through several reforms that had the
effect of undermining the Army as an independent political
force. However, the Army had stood firm against two pro-
posals that would all but have destroyed it as an
independent power in Indonesia; the "fifth force" concept
and the political commissar system, which both Sukarno and
the PKI were pressing on the Army. Sukarno may well have
decided that unless there was a change in the Army leader-
ship the Army was not likely to give in on the matter of
the "fifth force" and the even more controversial matter
of introducing Nasakom councils in the command structure
of the Army. In other words, he may have begun to think
of purging the Army leadership, as he had purged the PNI
leadership.
There is some evidence that Sukarno actually went
to the lengths of fabricating evidence that could be used
against the Army in justifying a move against the generals.
It has never been proved who forged the Gilchrist Letter,
which was used by Sukarno as evidence of Army plotting
against the government and Army intrigue with foreign
enemies of the Indonesian state. However, the weight of
the evidence points to Subandrio and his intelligence
organization, the BPI, as having been responsible for the
forgery; almost certainly, such an operation would have
had Sukarno's approval. It is possible that Sukarno and
the BPI were also responsible for the stories about a
Generals' Council and its alleged plotting for a coup.
The original report about the Generals' Council originated
with the BPI.
There was enough truth to the reports about a Gen-
erals' Council, however, that one must also leave open
the possibility that Sukarno really believed the reports
that the generals were plotting his overthrow. Since
January 1965, Gen. Yani and four of his most trusted
advisers in the Army had been meeting together in secret
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to discuss ways of resisting Sukarno's moves to destroy
the Army as a political force opposed to the radical
movement to the left. Thus, the reports about the
existence of a Generals' Council were true. However,
there seems to have been no truth to the reports that
the generals were planning a coup; there is no evidence
that they were planning anything more than defensive
measures to resist the efforts of Sukarno and the PKI
to neutralize the Army as a political factor.
As one might expect, there is little in the way of
concrete evidence to link Sukarno with the planning of
the coup. About the only evidence that there is consists
of (1) a conversation of Sukarno with Gen. Adjie in July
1965 in which Sukarno in reported to have promised Adjie
that he could have Yani's job as Commander of the Army if
he helped preserve order "during the trying period after
Yani and the other generals in the Army were arrested,"
(2) the secret meeting of Sukarno with Dani on the morn-
ing of 29 September, which is thought to have been the
occasion of Dani's telling Sukarno of Aidit's decision to
stage the coup on 30 September, (3) several meetings of
Sukarno with Aidit the last week in September, and (4) a
conversation of Sukarno with Gen. Sugandhi on 30 September,
in which Sugandhi asked the President directly if it was
true, as Aidit had told him, that Sukarno knew about the
plans of the PKI to stage a coup; Sukarno told Sugandhi
not to interfere too much, to "go home and be careful."
On the basis of Gen. Sugandhi's conversation with Sukarno,
Nasution stated unequivocably, in public, on 13 February
1967 that "the President gave the coup his blessing and
assistance." Because the conversation is well documented,
it is probably the most convincing piece of evidence that
(1) Sukarno knew in advance that a PKI coup would take
place, (2) that he was given some understanding of what
the coup involved, and (3) that he agreed to the Plan.
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Chinese Involvement -- At the time of the coup, many
people--including most of the Communist leaders around the
world--leaped to the conclusion that the Chinese must have
been directly involved in the planning of the Indonesian
coup. After years of patient tactics, owing little to
Maoist precept, the PKI had seemed close to taking power;
suddenly, its leaders had apparently been persuaded by
Mao to risk all and lose all in a return to violence.
There are certain inescapable facts that suggest
that the Chinese were at least aware of PKI planning for
a coup, though the evidence is all circumstantial. There
is the fact that the decision to stage the coup was taken
within a few days of Aidit's having talked with the Chinese
leaders in Peking and Sukarno's having talked with the
Chinese Foreign Minister (Chen Yi) in Djakarta. There is
the fact that Sukarno sent Air Force Commander Dani on a
secret mission to Communist China in mid-September to ar-
range for the immediate shipment of a quantity of small
arms that the Chinese had promised to send Sukarno. Whether
or mot the Chinese were informed of the reason for Sukarno's
wanting the arms immediately is uncertain. Whether or not
any of the arms shipments that Dani discussed with the
Chinese officials arrived in Indonesia before the coup is
also uncertain. However, the Chinese are known to have
sent arms to Indonesia prior to September. Some Chinese
arms, whether they were those sent before or during the
months of September, were used in the coup--by the PKI
volunteer troops that had received a quick course in mili-
tary training for the specific purpose of the coup.
There is one other fact that suggests that the
Chinese were informed about the coup planning in Indonesia.
Normally, the PKI would be expected to send an impressive
delegation, including someone of Politburo rank, to the
National Day Celebrations in China on 1 October. On the
occasion of National Day 1965, however, Aidit sent a 10-man
delegation, the highest-ranking member of which was Sidik
Kertapati, a not very well known member of the Central
Committee. He was obviously influenced by considerations
arising from the coup in wanting to have all PKI Politburo
members in Indonesia around the end of September. Presumably,
the PKI gave the Chinese some explanation for their sending
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such a low level delegation. They could probably have
come up with a satisfactory explanation without telling
the Chinese about the coup, but it does suggest that the
Chinese were informed about it.
There is no doubt that the Chinese encouraged the
PKI in the direction which finally led to the Indonesian
coup. We know that they were privately urging other Asian
Communist parties in the fall of 1965 to undertake certain
preparations for armed struggle, such as the establishment
of a covert .apparatus that would be trained and ready to
engage in specific acts of violence at any time. It seems
likely that the Chinese had influenced Aidit to set up the
Special Bureau in November 1964; they probably had a fairly
good idea of the capabilities of the Special Bureau for
organizing an action like the 30 September movement. The
Chinese would almost certainly have approved the PKI plans
for the coup, especially as it was planned to have Sukarno's
endorsement. It may be argued that the coup was more of
an urban putsch than the kind of rural-based armed take-
over of power that the Chinese advocate, and that consequ-
ently it was not the kind of action that the CCP would have
recommended to the PKI. Actually, however, the coup was
never thought of as a move to seize power from Sukarno.
It was a purge of the top Army leadership, with which the
Chinese presumably would be very much in sympathy. If the
CCP had had any qualms at all, it might have been on the
questiodlof how far Sukarno was to be trusted by the PKI.
Chinese support of the coup was, of course, made
very clear after the coup. The Chinese leaders are reported
to have received the news of the coup with "obvious glee;"
they were reportedly "very smug" in reporting the news to
the various Indonesian delegations visiting in Peking at
the time. (The fact that they mentioned the names of the
generals who had been "captured"--and included Nasution
among them--before the identities of the missing generals
had been clearly established and announced over the Indo-
nesian radio has been cited as an indication that the Chi-
nese were aware of the plot in advance and thought from
early reports that it had been completely successful.)
When later news was received that the coup was a failure,
Peking's short-lived exuberance quickly turned to gloom
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and the Chinese maintained a discreet silence on the subject
of the Indonesian coup for many days. In all of their
actions after the coup--such as the famous flag incident,
in which the Chinese refused to honor �the Indonesian govern-
ment's request that all foreign embassies in Djakarta fly
their flags at half mast in honor of the dead generals--the
Chinese were absolutely unequivocal in their support of
the coup, even though it was by then a hopeless cause and
their continued support of it only contributed to the
worsening of Chinese relations with the new Indonesian
government.
In summary, although the Chinese may have been aware
of the coup plans and certainly very much in sympathy with
them, there is no evidence that the Chinese masterminded
the Indonesian coup. On the contrary, the evidence is that
the planning of the coup was done by Aidit and Sjam. It
would seem unlikely, in fact, that the Chinese were informed
of specific details of the coup planning, such as the timing
of the coup. There probably was not the time or the op-
portunity to inform the Chinese of the date set for the coup
without risk to the secrecy of the plans. The final deci-
sion on the timing seems to have been made by Aidit on the
evening of the 28th and communicated to the military lead-
ers of the coup the next day, only a little more than 24
hours before the start of the coup. It is questionable
that Aidit would have told the Chinese the exact timing
of thelcoup, anyway, for security and other reasons. There
is some indication that the Chinese were actually caught
by surprise on the day of the coup. Mao made some remarks
to a group of visiting Indonesian officials on 30 September
that it seems he would not have made if he had known that
the coup would be staged that very might, since, under the
circumstances, his remarks could be taken to imply Chinese
foreknowledge of the coup.
On the matter of Chinese involvement, the evidence
is simply not conclusive, much less so than it is on other
aspects of the coup. This ambiguity is unlikely to change
unless and until information is obtained on Aidit's conver-
sations with the Chinese in Peking in early August 1965
or on Dani's secret negotiations with the Chinese in Septem-
ber.
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APPENDIX I
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
Fall 1964 - Early 1965
Sukarno steps up campaign to eliminate all effective
opposition to him in I.donesia. Banning of BPS...
Banning of Murba Party...Banning of Opposition
Newspapers... .Retooling of '45 Generation...Purging
of PNI.
November 1964
PKI Special Bureau founded by Aidit. Sjam appointed
as Chief.
January 1965
General Yani and 4 other senior generals in the
Army begin to meet together in secret to discuss
deteriorating political situation. Within the
Army, the group is known as "General Yani's
braintrust"; it is referred to by the PKI as the
"Generals' Council."
Chou En-lai first presents the idea of the "fifth
force" (training and arming peasants and workers)
to Subandrio in Peking. Aidit begins to pressure
Sukarno on the idea of the "fifth force."
25 March 1965
Sukarno first speaks of Indonesia's entry into the
"socialist stage."
April 1965
Sukarno orders the Army to "get into step with
the revolution."
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May 1965
6ukarno proposes Nasakom advisory councils in the
Army and mentions idea of "fifth force" for the
first time in a speech to the National Defense
Institute. He orders the Defense Institute to
be placed under civilian control and pro-Communist
courses added to the curriculum.
Aidit asks Sjam to develop a plan of operations
against the Generals' Council.
Mid-May 1965
Aidit mentions the reports about the Generals'
Council to a meeting of the Politburo. Tells
Politburo that the discovery of the Gilchrist
Letter tends to confirm the existence of the
Generals' Council.
23-26 May 1965
Celebration of PKI 45th anniversary. Sukarno lends
his full prestige to the event and pays great
tribute to the PKI in a speech on the occasion.
26 May 1965
'Sukarno confronts the Army with the "discovery"
of the Gilchrist Letter and the existence of
the Generals' Council.
26 June 1965
Aidit leaves Indonesia on six-week trip to USSR
and Communist China.
30 June 1965
Air Force Minister/Commander Dani endorses idea
of "fifth force."
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July 1965
Sukarno reported to have conversation with General
Adjie, Commander of the West Java Division of the
Army, in which he promises Adjie he can have Yani's
job as Commander of the Army after "Yani and the
other generals are arrested."
Early July 1965
Subandrio makes 1st public announcement of "dis-
covery" of Gilchrist Letter at press conference
in Cairo.
7-29 July 1965
Aidit in Moscow for talks with Kosyg'm and Suslov.
26 July 1965
Sukarno speaks again of Indonesia's entry into
' the "socialist stage" in a speech at the PNI
-anniversary celebration.
29 July - 6 August 1965
Aidit in Communist China for talks with Chinese
lfaders.
Early August 1965
Chen Yi presses subject of "fifth force" on Sukarno.
3 August 1965
Sukarno taken sick. Summons Aidit to return home
immediately.
6 August 1965
Sukarno still in bed.
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7 August 1965
Aidit arrives in Djakarta, in the company of
two Chinese doctors brought along to treat
Sukarno.
9 August 1965
Sukarno out of bed. Visited by Aidit and two
Chinese doctors. Chinese doctors of opinion that
another attack of Sukarno's kidney disease would
"paralyze or kill him."
13 August 1965
Aidit discusses Sukarno's illness at Politburo
meeting. Raises subject of Generals' Council
again.
Greater Djakarta Committee of PKI issues in-
structions on "preparations to be made in anti-
cipation of possible death or incapacitation of
Sukarno."
17 August 1965
Sukarno mentions idea of "fifth force" for first
time in public in speech on National Day. Attacks
Army generals.
28 August 1965
Aidit convinces Politburo of need for prompt action.
Decision is made to launch a military movement
against the Generals' Council. The planning for
the coup is entrusted to the Special Bureau.
Late August 1965
Sukarno cancels plans for a trip to Vienna in early
September for medical treatment. Claims "internal
political developments will not permit him to be
absent from the country."
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1 September 1965
Sukarno speech at the Police "Revolutionary
Doctrine" Rally, in which he tells Yani that
"the people will crush you (the Army)."
Early September 1965
Sukarno speech to PSII Congress in which he
identifies himself with 1926 PKI revolt.
2 September 1965
Subandrio attacks Army in speech in Menado.
4 September 1965
Untung is contacted by PKI Special Bureau and
told to attend meeting on 6 September. Sjam
and Pono of PKI Special Bureau contact Latief,
who is also told to attend meeting on 6 September.
6 September 1965
First "get-acquainted" meeting of military officers
involved in coup, including Untung, Latief, Sujono,
Sjam, Pono, Sigit, and Wahjudi.
'1
7 September 1965
Untung recruits Dul Arief for coup activities.
8 September 1965
PKI party organizations in Djakarta told to provide
certain number of volunteers for rush military
training course at Lubang Buaja, to be conducted
by officers of the Air Force.
9 September 1965
Second meeting of coup group, including Untung,
Latief, Sujono, Sjam, Pono, Sigit, and Wahjudi.
Sjam discusses PKI plans for Revolutionary Council.
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9 September 1965 (con't)
Subandrio attacks Army in speech to a student
gathering.
Aidit refers to "child who will definitely be
born" (apparent allusion to birth of socialism
in Indonesia) in speech to women volunteers of
Ministry of Information.
11-18 September 1965
Communist volunteers receive one-week military
training course at Lubang Buaja. Sujono in charge
of training.
13 September 1965
Third meeting of coup group, including Untung,
Latief, Sujono, Sjam, Pono, and Sigit. Discus-
sion of troops and the role of Sukarno in the
coup. Sjam tells the military officers that
"the great leader of the revolution (Sukarno)
has his own role to play."
Sukarno presents Aidit with order of Mahaputra
Star in ceremony at the palace.
15 September 1965
Untung meets with Major Sukirno, Commander of
454th Battal_ion of Central Java Division of
Army, who assures Untung of the use of his
troops in the coup.
Aidit refers to the coup in speech to National
Council of All-Indonesia Federation of Labor
Organizations (SOBSI).
16-19 September 1965
Air Force Minister/Commander Dani in Communist
China on secret mission for President Sukarno.
Only Aidit and Subandrio informed of trip.
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18-25 September 1965
Second course in military training given at
Lubang Buaja to another 1500 Communist
volunteers.
19 September 1965
Fourth meeting of coup group, including Untung,
Latief, Sujono, Sjam, and Pono. Sjam names
_Generals who are to be victims of coup. Appoints
Untung as leader of the coup.
20 September 1965
Sukarno summons Nasution and Yani to ask them once
again about the reports about the Generals'
Council. Yani evades the issue.
21 September 1965
Tani reports to Sukarno on his secret trip to
Communist China.
Subandrio attacks army again in speech. He
says some former "heroes (in the Army) have
turned into traitors."
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23 September 1965
Fifth meeting of coup group, including Untung,
Latief, Sjam, and Pono. Discussion of troops.
Sjam mentions that General Supardjo, Commander
of 4th Combat Command in West Borneo, will soon
be joining group. Sujono not present at meeting
because of an appointment at same time to see
Dani. Matter of business between Dani and Sujono
unknown but thought to concern matter of arms
for the coup.
25 September 1965
Subandrio announces that an operation to eliminate
"capitalist bureaucrats- is imminent.
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25 September 1965 (con't)
Sixth meeting of coup group, including Untung, Latief,
Sujono, Sjam and Pono. Sujono reports on the
military training of Communist volunteers at Lubang
Buaja. There is also a discussion about the Cavalry.
After the meeting, Untung goes to Gambir Railroad Station
to check on the arrival of the 454th and 530th
battalions from Central Java.
26 September 1965
Untung meets with Capt. Kuntjoro, Deputy Commander
of the 454th Battalion.
27 September 1965
Aidit addresses meeting of IPPI. Again calls
for crushing of "city devils." Aidit cancels
plans to go to Communist China for National Day
Celebrations.
PKI leader Sudisman and Aidit have separate
conversations with Gen. Sugandhi, in which they
refer to the coup preparations.
Untung and Lt. Dul Arief meet with Capt. Kuntjoro
and Lt. Ngadino of the 454th Battalion and Capt.
Suradi of the 530th Battalion. Afterwards, Dul
Arief takes Capt. Kuntjoro, Lt. Ngadino, and Capt.
Suradi on a review tour of Lubang Buaja.
Seventh meeting of coup group, including Untung,
Sujono, Latief,Sjam, and Pono. Untung discusses
the review of Lubang Buaja that Kuntjoro,
Ngadino, and Suradi made that afternoon. Another
discussion about the Cavalry.
28 September 1965
Third group of Communist volunteers begins military
training at Lubang Buaja.
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28 September - afternoon
Aidit meets with PKI leaders Lukman and Sakirman
for five hours. Decision on D-Day is reached.
Later that night, Lukman and Sakirman leave for
Central Java.
Late afternoon
Gen. Supardjo, in West Borneo, receives signal
that the coup is about to begin. He flies to
Djakarta, arriving there in late afternoon.
He goes immediately to Sjam's house. _
Evening
On the eve of his departure for Sumatra, Subandrio
confers with Sukarno.
29 September - early morning
.Lukman and Sakirman arrive in Semarang.
0900 hours
Gen. Supardjo reports some "news from Sjam" to
Air Force Minister/Commander Dani. Dani im-
mediately rushes to the palace, where he confers
with Sukarno in private. Then Dani reports to
Supardjo on his conversation with the President.
Morning
Aidit sees Subandrio at latter's office. A few
hours later Subandrio and 12 other cabinet
members leave on inspection tour of Sumatra.
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29 September (con't)
Evening
Sukarno gives speech to CGMI Congress at Senajan
Sports Stadium. Rumored that he seemed to falter
in the midst of delivering speech, but no good
evidence of this. For whatever reason, he sud-
denly leaves the stage and is seen conferring with
military officers in a side room. Then he goes
back and finishes his speech.
Evening
Communist volunteer troops who have completed
military training at Lubang Buaja are picked up at
PKI centers throughout Djakarta and driven to
Lubang Buaja.
Late evening
Eighth meeting of coup group. Gen. Supardjo
and Walujo and two unidentified women join the
regular group of Untung, Sujono, Latief, Sjam
and Pono. The military leaders are informed
that there will be no armored support. Sjam
announces decision on D-Day and explains that
the movement will be called the 30 September
'Movement.
30 September 1965
PKI leader Sanusi, addressing a meeting of the
State Bank of Indonesia uses the metaphor of the
"baby" about to be born. Harlan Rakjat editorial
calls for the execution of the "city devils."
Gen. Sughandi tells President Sukarno about his
conversationswith Aidit and Sudisman on 27 September.
He asks Sukarno if he knows about the coup prepara-
tions that are being made by the PKI. Sukarno
tells him "to go home and shut up."
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30 September (con't)
Communist volunteer troops at Lubang Buaja are
given small arms.
Mid-day
Lt. Dul Arief gives military briefing to com-
manders of various units involved in the coup.
Afternoon
Sujono arranges accommodations for Danl. and
Aidit at Halim Air Force Base on the day of
the cOup. Then he goes to Aerial Survey
Office to arrange use of the office as the
Command headquarters of the coup the next
morning.
Gen. Suharto reviews military drill of troops
scheduled to participate in military parade on
Armed Forces Day (5 October). Some of these
same units along with others, begin to assemble
at Lubang Buaja in early evening, on orders of
military officers involved in the coup.
Evening
StIkarno gives speech at the National Conference
of Technicians at Senajan Sports Stadium. Returns
to the palace but soon leaves again to spend
the night at his wife Dewi's house.
2230 hours
Untung, Latief, Sujono, Sjam, Pono, and Supardjo
review troops at Lubang Buaja.
1 October - 0130 hours
Lt. Dul Arief gives final briefing to troops
involved in the coup.
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1 October (con't)
0130-0200 hours
Sujono escorts Aidit to Halim; at the same
time, Dani leaves his home to spend the night
at Halim.
0200 hours
Untung, Latief, Sjam, Pono, and Supardjo arrive
at the Aerial Survey Office.
0400-0500 hours
Coup forces launch surprise attack on the homes
of seven top Army generals. Generals Harjono,
Pandjaitan, Yani are killed resisting capture.
Generals Suprapto, Sutojo, and Parman are
captured alive, put aboard a bus, and taken
back to Lubang Buaja. Gen. Nasution escapes
capture. His aide Lt Tendean is mistaken
for Nasution and taken back to Lubang Buaja.
0515 hours
Nasution's aide alerts Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumah,
Djakarta garrison commander. of the attack on
Gen. Nasution's home.
0530 hours
Gen. Umar arrives at Nasution's house. Nasution
comes out of hiding and is taken to safety.
Gen. Suharto learns about the kidnapping raids
on the generals' homes.
Chief of police phones palace about the kidnappings.
Security guards on duty at the palace can not
locate Sukarno.
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1 October (con't)
0530 hours (con't)
Sujono makes arrangements for Sukarno to spend
the day at Commodore Susanto's house on Halim
Air Force Base. Informs Dani at Operations
Command Center at Halim that Sukarno will arrive
at Halim between 0800-0900 hours and will be
housed in Commodore Susanto's home.
0600 hours
Sukarno en route to the palace from Dewi's house.
Col. Saelan and Capt. Suwarno contact him on car
radio and advise him not to enter the palace,
which is surrounded, but to proceed to his wife
Harjati's home in Grogol.
0630 hours
'Sujono arrives at Aerial Survey Office. Just
as he is arriving, Gen. Supardjo, Major Bambang
and Major Sukirno are leaving to go to the palace.
0630-0700 hours
Gln. Suharto arrives at KOSTRAD headquarters.
Assumes command of the Army.
0630-0915 hours
Sukarno at Harjati's house. Col. Saelan tells
him of Nasution's escape. Sukarno orders Col.
Ebram to check out the report that Nasution has
escaped, but Ebram is unable to verify the
report.
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1 October (cont)
0700 hours
Major Sukrisno reports to the Central Command
from Lubang Buaja that all seven generals
(supposing Lt. Tendean to be Nasution) have
been captured. He asks for instructions as
to what should be done with the ones remaining
alive. Sujono, at the Aerial Survey Office,
issues written instructions that the "ones
remaining alive should be done away with."
Lt. Dul Arief supervises the murder of the
generals and the hasty burial of the bodies
in a well at Lubang Buaja.
The coup forces take over Radio Indonesia
and make the first public announcement of
the coup.
0800 hours
Dani drafts his order-of-the-day pledging the
support of the air force to the coup. The
final copy of the order is dated 0930 hours.
Lt. Dul Arief arrives at Aerial Survey Office
and reports on the "success" of the kidnapping
missions.
0900 hours
Untung, Latief, Sujono, Sjam, and Pono leave
the Aerial Survey Office and go to Sgt.
Sujatno's home on Halim Air Force Base, where
they spend the rest of the day.
0915 hours
Gen. Supardjo arrives by helicopter at Operations
Command Center at Halim, having been unable to
locate Sukarno at the palace. Dani welcomes
Supardjo with exclamation "Success:" Supardjo
goes immediately to Sgt. Sujatno's home on the
air base to report to Untung and Sjam and the
others.
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1 October (con't)
0930 hours
Sukarno arrives at Operations Command Center
at Halim. Dani reports to him on progress
of the coup.
0930-1015 hours
- Gen. Supardjo is with Untung, Sujono, Latief,
Sjam,.and Pono at Sgt. Sujatno's house. Untung
and Supardjo sign Decree No. I, setting up the
Revolutionary Council.
About 1000 hours
Subandrio in Medan receives news of the coup.
1015 hours
.Supardjo returns to Operations Command Center
from Sgt. Sujatno's house.
1030 hours
Supardjo reports to President Sukarno. Sukarno
congratulates Supardjo on the success of the
conp. Supardjo assures the President that
Nasution was captured and explains why Untung
was chosen to lead the movement.
1100 hours
Untung signs Decision No. 1 and 2 at Sgt.
Sujatno's house.
1115 hours
Supardjo returns to Sgt. Sujatno's house to brief
Untung, Latief, Sujono, Sjam, and Pono on his
meeting with Sukarno. They decide to recommend
to Sukarno that he appoint Gen. Pranoto as "care-
taker commander" of the Army.
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1 October (con't)
1145 hours
Supardjo returns to Operations Command Center
to tell Sukarno of the Central Command's decision
re Gen. Pranoto. Sukarno and Supardjo discuss
the possibility that Nasution may have escaped.
Around noon
Sukarno tells Supardjo to stop the moverent.
The President leaves the Operations Command
Center and moves to the nearby home of Air
Commodore Susanto, where he spends the rest
of the day.
Couriers sent by Sukarno at Halim arrive at
KOSTRAD headquarters in Djakarta. Suharto refuses
to allow Gen. Umar, Gen. Pranoto, or Admiral
Martadinato to go to Halim as Sukarno requested.
He sends Deputy Prime Minister Leimena to Halim
with an ultimatum for Sukarno.
1200 hours
Decree No. 1 is broadcast over �the radio. It
is repeated at intervals throughout the after-
noon.
Shortly after noon
In Semarang, Col. Suherman seizes control of
the Divisional Army headquarters and broadcasts
two announcements over the radio: (1) that
he has taken over command of the division and
(2) that a Revolutionary Council has been formed
in Semarang, as called for in Untung's first
announcement of the coup.
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1 October (con't)
1300 hours
Decisions No. 1 and 2 broadcast over the radio.
1330 hours
Announcement is made over the radio that Sukarno
is "alive, safe, in good health, and still in
control of the state and the revolution."
-Announcement is made on authority of Gen. Sabur,
Commander of Tjakrabirawa Presidential Guard.
Afternoon
Sukarno sends his personal airplane to Medan to
bring Subandrio to Djakarta.
Suharto negotiates with the coup forces sur-
rounding the palace and radio station. The
'530th Battalion agrees to surrender. Suharto
issues ultimatum to the 454th Battalion.
1530 hours
Dani's Order-of-the-Day is broadcast over the
radio.
1800 hours
In Solo, the Communist Mayor Utomo Ramelan
issues a statement, which is read over the
radio, announcing the formation of a Revolutionary
Council in Solo.
454th Battalion withdraws from Djakarta to Halim.
Communist volunteers stage disorganized march
into Djakarta from Lubang Buaja.
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1 October (con't)
2000 hours
Radio Indonesia in Jogjakarta begins broadcasting
support for Untung's coup in Djakarta, which is
itself in last stages of collapse. By 2000 hours
Suharto is in full control of Djakarta. An
official Army announcement over the radio brands
the coup "a counterrevolutionary action."
Around 2000 hours
Suharto receives second communication from
Sukarno, asking for "clarification of the
situation." Suharto tells him to go to Bogor
immediately.
2030 hours
Sukarno leaves Halim and drives to Bogor Palace.
2200 hours
Suharto receives report that Sukarno has arrived
at Bogor. He orders RPKAD paracommandos to
infiltrtate Halim Air Force Base.
Around midnight
Sukarno's airplane returns to Halim from Medan,
but without Subandrio, who chooses to continue
his tour of Sumatra rather than go back to
Djakarta.
2 October - 0130 hours
Aidit flies out of Halim on Air Force plane. Lands
in Jogjakarta around 0400 hours, leaving immediately
for Semarang (by car).
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2 October (con't)
Around 0200 hours
Dani leaves Halim and flies to Madiun in Central
Java. Lands at Iswahjudi Air Force Base in
Madiun at 0600 hours. Briefs officers on duty
there.
-Early morning
Sjam and Gen. Supardjo leave Halim on_foot. They
spend the day and night of 2 October at home of
PKI member in Djakarta. On 3 October, they go
their separate ways.
Untung and Latief leave Halim on foot. They
travel around the environs of Djakarta together
for at least a week, before they split up.
Sujono spends night of 1 October at Sgt. Sujatno's
home at Halim.
0600 hours
Suharto in full control of Halim.
ospo hours
Aidit arrives in Semarang, where he meets Lukman
and Sakirman. Together, they leave for Solo.
Later in the day, Aidit writes a letter to
Sukarno, which the President receives on 6 October.
Morning
The PKI endorses the coup in an editorial in
Harlan Rakjat.
Sukarno meets with Col. Sarwo Edhy at the
palace in Bogor.
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2 October (con't)
Afternoon
Dani flies back to Bogor. He and his family
live in the palace at Bogor until 19 October,
when Sukarno arranges an official excuse for
them to go to Cambodia.
Meeting of armed forces commanders with Sukarno
at Bogor Palace. Sukarno, Leimena, Dani, Suharto,
Adjie, Pranoto, Sabur, Sutjipto, and Martadinata,
present at meeting.
Rebels still hold Jogjakarta and Solo. Semarang
is re-occupied by forces loyal to Suharto.
3 October - 0130 hours
Sukarno's radio broadcast to the nation.
5 October 1965
State funeral for the slain generals. A day of
official mourning. Sukarno does not attend funeral
services.
1 Jogjakarta and Solo back in the hands of forces
loyal to Suharto.
PKI leader Njono is arrested in Djakarta.
PKI issues statement denying any involvement in
the 30 September Movement.
6 October - 1000 hours
Plenary session of the Cabinet at Bogor Palace.
Sukarno, Subandrio, Dani, Njoto and Lukman among
those attending.
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11 October 1965
Latief is arrested in Djakarta.
13 October 1965
Untung is arrested in Tegal.
15 October 1965
Sujono is arrested.
19 October 1965
Dani and his family fly to Phnom Penh.
22 November 1965
Aidit is captured and summarily execvted by
Army in Sambeng Gede.
April 1966
Dani returns to Indonesia and is arrested by the
Army.
February 1967
Sdpardjo is arrested.
March 1967
Sjam is arrested.
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APPENDIX II
SOME COMMENTS ON THE INTERROGATION REPORTS
Since our knowledge of the coup preparations that
were being made in late August and September 1965 comes
mainly from the confessions and interrogation reports of
those involved, it seems appropriate to say a few words
regarding the validity of such evidence. We have been
able to see a good number of the interrogation reports,
but by no means all of them. In most cases, we have the
reports of several days of interrogation of a certain
individual, but not his whole interrogation report; in
the case of a few important people, we have no report at
all of their interrogation. In both cases, however, we
have the public testimony of the individual in question,
either as a witness or the defendent in a case in court.
The importance of the fact that the interrogation
reports are the official reports of the Army and not a
specibl version of the reports prepared for release out-
side the Indonesian Government is that the Army is not
suspected of having edited or otherwise changed them in
any way for any special purpose of its own. (It is inter-
esting to compare the interrogation reports with later
statements made by the Army about the confessions of cer-
tain key figures in the coup; naturally, the Army choose
to emphasize certain points made in the course of the
interrogation and play down others). The interrogation
reports themselves are convincing proof that they have
not been fabricated, in part or in whole. There are dif-
ferences on a number of points--such as dates of meetings,
persons attending, matters discussed, and precise wording
of quotes from Aidit, etc. If these were fabricated state-
ments, put in the mouths of the accused, one would expect
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much less disagreement between them than actually exists;
certainly, the more troubling discrepancies would have
been reconciled. Moreover, if one assumed that the army
was primarily interested in implicating the PKI (which
was obvious in its selection of certain points from the
interrogation reports for public circulation), one would
expect much stronger evidence of PKI involvement than is
presented in some instances. A few witnesses were less
than positive about PKI participation. They "believed"
certain people who were at meetings and directing discus-
sions were PKI members; they were not sure. If the army
was out to build an airtight case against the PKI, it is
not likely that such loopholes would have been left. Fin-
ally, there.is the fact that some persons implicated in
the coup were interrogated by the police and others by
naval and air force personnel; the army was not in charge
of all the interrogation. For instance, PKI leader Njono
was interrogated by a colonel of the Indonesian Army in
Djakarta, but Paris Pardede, another important PKI leader,
was interrogated by an officer of the regional police in
Medati; North Sumatra, where he was captured and, after
interrogation, executed. Air Force Major Sujono was
interrogated in Djakarta by a team of police, army, navy,
and air force representatives. It does not seem likely
that interviews by different interrogators and services
could have been carried out as part of a carefullyccon-
structed fabrication.
A
If we accept the fact that the interrogation reports
are verbatim transcripts of the actual interrogation of
various people in connection with the 30 September Move-
ment, there is still the question of the validity of such
evidence. It is certainly true that evidence obtained from
men under duress, either physical or mental, as these men
certainly were, must be accepted with some reservation.
It is always possible that the person under interrogation
will sometimes say whatever he thinks the interrogators
want him to say in order to end the ordeal of interroga-
tion. This could not possibly have accounted for the
striking similarity in the stories told by Untung, Latief,
Sujono, and Supardjo, however. They all told basically
the same story of regular meetings (beginning around 6
September 1965 and continuing right up to the night before
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the coup) with a mysterious figure "Sjam", who started
the discussions with an explanation of the Generals' Coun-
cil and its plans for a military coup and, consequently,
the urgent need to prepare for a countercoup. Sjam is
always reported to have led the discussions, which in- �
creasingly centered on military preparations for the count-
ercoup; he is consistently reported to have told the group
not to be concerned with the political ramifications of
their action, as that had been taken care of by others.
It would have been all but impossible for the Indonesian
Army to have included Sjam as a significant figure in a
fictitious account of the coup preparations, when his
identity and function were not even known within the PKI,
much less to the army, prior to his arrest in March 1967
on the basis of descriptions of him in the interrogation
reports.
There is always the possthility that the major
participants in the coup might have agreed ahead of time
on a cover story to be used later in the event that the
coup failed. However, everything indicates that the plan-
ning for theocoup was not as thorough as all that. Other,
much more important things were not well prepared for.
There are a number of facts that suggest that the plotters
were remarkably confident of success; apparently, they
never considered the possibility of'failure--witness the
obvious lack of advance planning as to what to do (not just
say) 1if the coup failed. Untung, Latief, Sujono, and
Supardjo have all stated that there was no contingency
planning for a second attack in case the first move was
less than successful; they have all remarked that Sjam
only kept assuring them of success. Furthermore, if their
stories about the September meetings with Sjam and the
last minute preparations at Halim had all been made up,
they could never have been so detailed. Even in the de-
tails, they reinforce one another; the differences are
not so much contradictions as inconsistencies due to per-
sonal differences in sensitivity to detail, ability to
recollect, and, probably in some measure, to willingness
to be completely forthright.
To be sure, one has to be discriminating in choosing
what to believe and what not to believe in the testimony
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of each individual and whamto believe and whomnot to believe
when their testimony differs. After a while, one gets a
definite feeling for the people being interrogated and the
reliability of certain testimony vs. other testimony; for
instance, Untung's testimony vs. that of Dani or Sujono..
The latter two were obviously devious in answering some
questions; their testimony is sometimes illogical. Sujono
again and again tries to put the blame on someone else for
decisions he clearly seems to have made himself. At Untung's
trial, Untung directly challenged parts of his testimony.
Where there As no other supporting evidence we would defini-
tely tend to accept Untung's version over Sujono's. Most
often, Untung seems to have the clearest memory of events
and to have paid the closest attention to detail, for in-
stance, the exact time that he issued a certain order or
signed the various Decrees. His account usually checks out
well with other facts that are known to be true--for in-
stance, the time that the decrees were first read over the
radio or the timing of the attacks on the generals' homes,
etc. And then there is the difference in motivation (other
than coercion) of the different men in confessing to their
activities in the coup. After the coup, Untung seems gen-
uinely to have regretted his actions on behalf of the 30
September Movement and to have been willing to confess the
whole truth as best he remembered it. At the end of his
interrogation, he had the following words to say:
Everything that I have stated is true and
if necessary I am willing to swear to the
truth of my statements. Everything that I
have said to this interrogator is all that
I can remember; perhaps I have forgotten
some things, but this is not due to any
deliberate deviation on my part but rather
it is due exclusively to a lapse of memory
of the matter. I would like to state from
my heart that I truly regret everything
that occurred on 1 October because I had no
knowledge at all nor was I informed either
by the military which took part in the move-
ment or by the PKI which planned the entire
movement the cruel tragedy that would occur
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and thus this was beyond my humanity. I once
again state that I truly regret what has hap-
pened.
None of the other coup leaders expressed any such feelings
of remorse over what they had done. As we shall see later,
Untung seems really to have believed in the existence of
the Generals' Council and its plans to stage a coup against
Sukarno. After the coup, he apparently realized that the
generals never had any such plans to overthrow Sukarno
and that he had been tricked by the PKI into believing
this. Apparently, he also felt that he had been let down
by Sjam and the others who planned the coup; all the as-
surances he had received of adequate military strength,
of support from certain army and air force units that
never materialized, and of logistical preparations had
proved to be false. In the interrogation reports of some
PKI members one can detect a similar distinct feeling of
betrayal by the party leaders, particularly Aidit. It
is perhaps understandable that out of deep bitterness these
people should tell the whole story of the coup as they
remembered it. Other people would obviously have quite
different feelings and motivation. Some--like Dani or
Subandrio and possibly Sjam--who presumably knew more than
Untung or Latief or Sujono about who was really behind the
coup and who would presumably still want to protect those
persons, would obviously be less forthcoming than Untung
in teiling all that they knew. Their answers to questions
regarding Sukarno's involvement, for instance, might ne
deliberately misleading, while on other matters their testi
mony might be more reliable. Where interrogation reports
are the main source of information, there will obviously
be matters of judgment such as these, in accepting one
person's testimony over another's or a certain part of the
testimony but not all of it.
In conclusion, although there are certain difficul-
ties in piecing together the whole story of the conspiracy
that lay behind the events of 1 October--considering the
fact that the coup preparations were a well kept secret
all during the time they were in progress and there is no
independent reporting to confirm or deny what is really
the only important source of our information on the subject,
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the word of the conspirators themselves--there is good rea-
son to think that we do now know the essential truth about
those preparations. Although it is not and never will be
a matter of proven fact--in the way that the events of
1 October and the days following can be established as
fact--the true story of the conspiracy behind the coup
seems to us to have been established beyond any reasonable
doubt in the confessions of those involved in the con-
spiracy.
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