MEETING WITH MARGUERITE HIGGINS IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR ON 5 NOVEMBER 1963
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06288687
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
September 12, 2023
Document Release Date:
June 26, 2023
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2020-00509
Publication Date:
November 6, 1963
File:
Attachment | Size |
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MEETING WITH MARGUERITE H[16190545].pdf | 120.09 KB |
Body:
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
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SUBJECT: Meeting with Marguerite Higgins in the Office of the Director
on 5 November 1963
1. Marguerite Higgins had been attempting for some time, since my
return to Washington on 5 October, to arrange an interview. Alter several
delays arid cancellations, Higgins and I met with the Director in his office
on 5 November for a conversation lasting approximately forty-five minutes.
2. Higgins first question to me was whether I had talked to
David Haiberstam, New York Times correspondent in Saigon, prior to my
departure from. Vietnam and whether I had said to Halberstam that Ambassador
Lodge was attempting to achieve my recall. Higgins added that she had been
provided this information by a senior White House aide. I denied the allega-
tion flatly and pointed out that I had had no conversation whatsoever with
Halberstam or any other reporter along these lines.
3. Thereafter, the conversation ranged generally over aspects of the
successful 1 November coup d'etat, and the problem of where we go from here.
Higgins took the initiative throughout and it became quickly apparent that she
finds herself entirely out of sympathy with the coup d'etat: and with the killing
Of Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu. She feels that the achievement of a
democratic government in South Vietnam is impossible at this time and expressed
the hope that the U.S. Government would not attempt to proceed in an unrealistic
manner in an effort to achieve an unattainable political objective in South Vietnam.
It seems clear also that Higgins is skeptical about the capabilities of the new
Vietnamese leadership to proceed in a united way with determined and effective
prosecution of the war. She was interested in an appraisal of various leading
personalities in the new government and Mr. McCone provided her with his
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impressions of some of the more prominent figures. Higgins expressed the
view that the chances of the new government might be about 50-50 in terms
of carrying out the programs and reforms we hope for. However, from the
tenor of her conversation I would estimate that she rates these chances lower.
She said she plans to leave for Saigon on 6 November and to spend some time
in the provinces she had previously visited as well as in Saigon itself.
4. Higgins said that she felt the 1 November coup d'etat had been
caused by the American Government, primarily through the curtailment of
economic aid. It was her view that, because of U.S. measures and public
postures, we had left the Generals no alternative but to overthrow the Diem
administration. She did not approve of this course of action taken against an
allied government.
3. Higgins expressed a very adverse opinion about Tri Quang. She
said that she had talked with him personally and that he had threatened to
carry out further immolations and "to blackmail the U.S. Government",
(Higgins reaction) unless our Government worked toward Diem's overthrow. .
She thought that Tri Quang's political intransigence had been clearly demonstrated',
by recent events. On the whole she considered him a ruthless and unscrupulous
personality who was willing to sacrifice the lives of his credulous followers
in the name of religion but actually for the accomplishment of his own strongly
held political purposes.
6. Higgins said that she had talked to Roger Hilsman at least twice
since the 1 November coup detat and had expressed her criticism of the
- coup as well as her adverse view with respect to American involvement. She
had asked Hilsman to provide Madame Nhu with some information on the fate
of the family's children. She said that she now felt she had become persona
non grata with Hils-man.
� 7. Mr. McCbne conducted his part of the discussion along the general
'line of our Government's attempting to do the best we can to help make the new
Vietnamese administration work out satisfactorily. He admitted that potential
serious difficulties could loom ahead and said he felt confident that our
government would not impose unrealistic demands on the new Vietnamese
Administration. Nevertheless, we would press for some reforms similar to
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those we had sought from Ngo Dinh Diem. Mr. McCone made it clear �
that responsible American officials would not expect an easy or swift solution
in South Vietnam from the country's new government. He recommended that
Higgins, during her forthcoming trip to South Vietnam, pay particular �
attention to the emerging form and substance of the new government and to.
important civil and military programs such as the strategic hamlet program. �
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 *- DDP
1 - ADDP .
1 - CFE
John H. Richardson
Approved for Release: 2023/02/17 C06288687