REPORT ON CIA CHILEAN TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES, 15 SEPTEMBER TO 3 NOVEMBER 1970

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 01310814
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2022
• Case Number: F-2019-02353
• Publication Date: November 18, 1970

WA'
�
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
� ' .
� .
� � ��� .. � �
� 4.
_
�
�
EYE:: ;�:LY
18 November 1970
� .
SUBJECT: Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,
� 15 September to 3 November 1970
1. : General ,
a. On 15 September 1970, CIA. was directed to try to prevent
�
Marxist Salvador Allende's assent to the Chilean presidency on
�
3 November. This effort was to be independent of concurrent endeavors
being undertaken through, or with the knowledge of, the 40 Committee,
Department of State, and Ambassador Korry.
b. Briefly, the situation at that time was the following:
�
'Allende had attained a plurality of only some 40,000 .
in the Chilean popular vote for president. Jorge
Alessandri, a conservative and the runner-up, would
face 'Allende in a Congressional run-off on 24 October.
The run-off winner would be invested as president on
3 November.
�
SECRET!:
EY S ONLY
FULL TEXT COPY-DO NOT P.E 2SE
41:373
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
,SECRET/S:NMVE
EYES ONLY
Allende's designation as president by Congress was
very probable given all known factors in the Chilean
political equation.
�
��� �
Given the dismal prospects of apolitical formula
being worked out to prevent Allende's designation
as. president by Congress, remaining alternatives
. centered around overcoming the apolitical, constitu-
� tional-oriented inertia of the Chilean�military.
U.S. Government intentions were 'highly suspect,
particularly in Allende and certain government
sectors. Suspicions extended to all Americans in
Chile for whatever declared purpose. In addition,
the Chilean military werp being monitored quite
closely by the Allende forces for warning signals
of any interventionist proclivities.
2. Special Organization
a. ' A Chilean Task Force was assembled and functioning thr&e-
days after CIA was assigned the mission. It was headed by two.s.enior
and highly-qualified CIA Chiefs of Station recalled from their Latin
�
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
41,373-
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
t�
� SECRET/SENSITIVE .
EYES ONLY
- 3 -
American posts specifically for this purpose. A special communi-
cations channel was s.et up simultaneously to Santiago, Chile, and
Buenos Aires, Argentina, to handle sensitive cable traffic for the
Task Force.
b. Subsequently, an "illegal" team started filtering into
Santiago. It consisted of four CIA officers with the appearance,
language, and experience to sustain the fiction of various foreign
nationalities. They were recalled from� their overseas posts to
. Washington, briefed, and inserted individually into Chile
(b)(1)
(b)(3)�
nationals. In Santiago, their only U.S. contact was a CIA officer who
had resided in Santiago for some time
These "illegals" rapidly established contact with
Chilean intermediaries or principals interested in promoting a
military coup.
c. By a special (and unique) arrangement requested by CIA.,
�
the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago was placed under operational
� .
direction of the CIA Chief of Station there. His assistance and
Chilean military contacts were invaluable in this program.
�
4-1.3.75
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C0.1310814
� . ........
EYES ONLY
-4
3. The Dual "Annroach: Constitutional and Coun
a. Prospects for inducing Congress to vote for Alessandri
rather than Allende were never bright and, they all focused on
inspiring a reluctant, indecisive President Frei to assume an out-
of-character role: dynamic leadership within his own party, with
the "persuadables" in Congress, and with the military. Frei was
under no illusions about Chile's fate under an Allende regime.
"Chile has a very short future," he said, and after 4 November it
will only have a past."
b. Initially, Frei was willing to consider and even advocate a
constitutional solution: the so-called Frei re-election gambit. The,
question was whether he would be willing to commit his prestige�
completely in following through on such a difficult political maneuver
with the outcome, at best, unassurcd. The basic gambit consisted
of marshalling enough Congressional votes to elect AlCssandri over
Allende with the understanding Alessandri would resign immediately
after inauguration and pave the way for a special election in which
Frei could legally become a candidate. As a preliminary step, Frei
coordinated Alessandri's post-'clection statement that if he �i-ere
41:376
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
a I � S. J. � "
EYES ONLY
�
selected for the presidency by Congress, he (Ales...andri) would
resign. � The thrust of CIA's endeavors, then, was to use every
plausible pressure combined with inducements to move Frei down
� this path. To this end, virtually overnight CIA mobilized an inter-
locking political action and propaganda: campaign designed both to
� goad and entice Frei into following through on the re-election
gambit.
� c. At the same time, recognizing the fallibilities of Frei, CIA.
focused on provoking a military coup. This undertaking was segre-
gated from that of the Frei re-election gambit with the intention that
it be pursued independently of Frei if necessary, but with his acqui-
escence if possible. Pursuit of the military solution 'was assigned
� as the
task of the team
in recognition of the need
for fast action combined with the best protection for the U.S. Govern-
� merit against the inherent vulnerabilities to being uncovered.
� ..
�
4. Propaganda Campaign
a. The propaganda campaign was tailored to generating concern
about Chile's future in terms which would condition the thinking and
actions of the three key elements in the Chilean political equation:
�
'SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
ai.377
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
:���
�
EYES ONLY
- 6 -
Frei himself, the Chilean political elite, and the Chilean military
(the 1p.tter two of which could well bring collateral influence to bear
� on Frei). Each of these elements had hastened to rationalize its
. acceptance of an Allende presidency.. Their palliative was the built-
�
in checks and balance of Chile's demonstrated reverence for democ-
racy and c9nstitutionality, sweetened by Allende's promise to honor
�
these traditions. �
b. After the 4 September popular vote, the World press had
�
tended to treat the prospect of witnessing the first freely-elected
Marxist head of state take office as a curious aberration of dernoc-
racy rather than a politically significant event. Press interest and
coverage was relatively light until the Allende forces tfortuitously
provided an attractive issue which could be exploited. By
15 September, it became apparent that Allende was conducting a
rather blatant campaign to intimidate the Chilean information media
through threats of assassination and violence takeovers by so-called
� �
worker organizations, and ultimatums to the management of news-
papers and radio stations. Allende's purpose wa.s to smother any
opposition to his election by Congress and to take advantage of that.
:SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
e
������......".�������������������� �
�
�
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
et(
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Or
�
�
SECRET/SEN:.ITNEi
EYES ONLY
Or
peculiarly Latin, and pronounced Chilean, propensity to jump on an
accelerating bandwagon -- ideals and the country's welfare to the
contrary. A major target of Allende was "El Mercurio", the most
prestigious newspaper in Chile and the major opposition voice to
Allende up to that time. CIA mounted a propaganda campaign
centered around "El Mercurio" and the issue of Allende brazenly
� taking his first step in "communizing" Chile by attacking freedom
of the press and, worse, with the election still unsettled. Covert
. action resources were used to launch:
�
Cables of support/protest from leading newspapers
throughout Latin America to "El Mercurio".
A protest statement from the International Press
Association
�
(The state- �
ment was issued as a press release on 19 September
and began: "Freedom of' the press in Chile is being
strangled by. Communist and Marxist forces and
their allies.")
. .
World press coverage of the International Press
Association protest and on the details of the
. �
SECRET/SENSITIVE
.rvr f1.411
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
EYES ONLY,
-8
�
Communist efforts to seize control of the Chilean
press.
A program of journalists -- actual agents and other-
wise -- travelling to Chile for on-the-scene reporting.
.(By 28 September, CIA had in place in, or enroute to,
Chile 15 journalist agents from 10 different countries.
This cadre was supplemented by 8 more journalists
from 5 countries under the direction of high level
agents who were, for the most part, in managerial
� capacities in the media field.)
As a result of the ensuing furore, Allende -- sensitive to world
-opinion and attempting to project the image of a moderate, non-
dogmatic socialist -- decided tO become more circumspect. By
25 September, heavy'-handed intimidation of the press had virtually
�
ceased.
.c. Allende's show of strength had made its point howeveri.-the
Chilean press, including ."El Mercurio", never did regain its
resiliency and remained thoroughly muted from thereon out. �Lac.k.
ing the usual forum's for spontaneous generation and replay of
r
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
�
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814--
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
�
SE CF. ET/SEW:IT WE
EYES ONLY
['propaganda inside Chile, CIA had to rely increasingly on its own
resources:
.�
�
an underground 'press depndent upon direct mail
� -
distribution; 1
placement of individual news items through agents
�against the resistance of a cowed management;
�
financing of a new, albeit small, newspaper;
subsidy of an anti-Allende political group and its
radio programs, political advertisements, and
political rallies; and,
direct mailing of foreign hews articles to Presi-
dent Frei, Mrs. Frei, selected military tleaders,
and the Chilean domestic press.
� �
This, effort did not, and could not, replace a Chilean:press, fully
operative and free of restraint. Virtually alone, it did keep the
voice of public opposition alive inside Chile for coup purposes
during the final weeks of this period.
. ,
d. The magnitude of the propaganda campaign mounted during
this six week period in the Latin American and European media
�
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO13.10814
�
.EYES ONLY
- 10 -
aside from the U.S., the two "outside" areas with, by far, the
greatest influence on Chile
OOP OW
is evident from the fact that only
partial returns show 726 articles, broadcasts editorials, and
similar items as a direct result of agent activity. Just how many
Of these items were replayed is not known
Nor, has CIA any idea of the scope of the
immeasurable multiplier effect -- that is, how much its "induced"
news focused media interest on the Chilean issues and stimulated
additional coverage -- except that, even by conservative standards,
this contribution must have been both substantial and significant.
e. Special intelligence and "inside" briefings were given to
U.S. journalists in deference to the international influence of the
U.S. 'media. Particularly noteworthy in this connection was the
Tirne cover story which owed a great deal to written materials and
briefings provided by CIA. The Time .correspondent in Chile who
was providing much of the background material for the story
apparently accepted Allende's protestations of moderation and
constitutionality at face value.. CIA briefings in Washington plus
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
.� _
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
SECRET/SENSITiVE .
EYES ONLY
�
�
changed the
basic thrust of the story in the final stages according to another
Time correspondent. It provoked Allende to complain on
.13 October, ';We are suffering the most brutal and horrible pres-�
�
sure, both domestic and international," singling out Time in
particular as having "openly caU.cd"�for an invasion of Chile.
5. Political Action
� it. The political action program had only one purpose: to
induce President Frei to prevent Allende's election by the Congress
on 24 October and, failing that, to support -- by benevolent neutralitY
at the least a,id conspiratorial benediction at the most -- a military
coup which would prevent Allende from taking office on 3 November. .
_Realistically, the task was one of attempting to recast Frei, as a
political personality, in a role demanding decisiveness and
: "Machismo" to a degree that, thus far, had eluded him. Pressures
horn those whose opinion and/or approval he valued -- in combination
with adequate propaganda orchestrations -- represented the only hope
of converting Frei.
. SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO1310814
EYES ONLY
- 12 -
�
b. As an initial step, an American agent who had handled CIA's
coyert funding of Fret's presidential campaign in 1964 was dis-
patched to Santiago to recontact Frei. � His discussions with Frei
conveyed the following points (which were.under.stobd to emanate
from the U.S. Government):
�
�
11.
���
'Allende as president would be an unparalleled .
disaster for Chile (Frei agreed).
Frei had both the power and obligation to prevent
this.
Should Frei need assistance in resettling in another
country, a generous resettlement and cost of living
stipend would be forthcoming. (The clear implication
being this would be Fret's recompense should he try
and fail to prevent Allendels.inauguration;)
�
In the event of a military coup, the successor
government would enjoy U.S. support and quiet
applause.
In the event Fret's re-election gambit succeeded,
the U.S. GovernMent would be prepared to provide
substantial support for Frci's presidential campaign.
�
�
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
1..
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
I EYES ONLY
- 13 -
�
Though delicately stated, Frei understood clearly the subtleties
�
and implications of the foregoing
Frei�vms gracioits,
� �
understanding, and frank as always, and, as always with him,
nothing happened.
c. In Europe and Latin America, prominent and influential
members of the Christian Democratic movement as well as the
�
Catholic Church were prompted to visit Frci or send personal
messages to him urging that he save Chile. Some of these endeavors
were the following:
� ��
�
-^
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
�
41 Z.1 85
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
.�����
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
�
�
�
�
�
� � ;;
EYES ONLY
- 14 -
-�- The West German Christian Democratic Party --
which enjoyed special equities with Frei by virtue
�
of generous support to the Christian Democrats in
Chile over a range of many years -- dispa.tched
several top-level emissaries to Chile', They con-
tacted Frei and other Christian Democratic leaders
In Chile as well as President Caldera.of Venezuela.
-- Ex-President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela sent
Frei a. strong personal message on opposing
Communism and Allende. as did the President of the
Venezuelan Christian Democratic Party through a
press statement.'
Ex-President Carlos Lleras of Colombia made a
special trip to Chile and met privately with Frei
twice, each time urging courageous action to save
Chile.
�
ai'286
� SECRET/SENSITIVE
� EYES ONLY
+.6-4.Z�Vrrfs:t 14:�.*z2c.topratuvia.-4,-�maus.�;.;:w_gru.,..z.;,�,,r4,�vt
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
4110
SECP.ET/S24.11TIVE
EYES ONLY
- 15 -
Jacques Maritain, one of the international figures
in Catholicism most respected by Frei, sent a
personal message indicating that Frei and his
party must oppose Marxism.
Ex-
of the Italian
Christian Democratic Party -- which had good
fraternal relations with Frei and his party -
����
refused to intervene. (Ha said it was a hopeless
situation and he saw no point in risking his reputa-
tion in a lost cause.)
Collateral efforts were made to influence Frei or those close to
Frei, such
Influential lay Catholics sent messages to or
visited the Vatican.
���
OWN MD
OEN
�
�
through a series of lay
and clerical pressures from other countries, was
dissuaded from ceding an Allende victory prior to
his Congressional election actually tz!.king place.
Telegrams were Aent Mrs. Frei from won-Ian's.
Troups in other Latin American countries,(
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
� (b)(1)
� (b)(3)
41%187 - �
� b)(1)
b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
�
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
SECr.ET/LENS:TWE
EYES ONLY
- 26 -
Foreign press items were mailed directly to Frei,
Mrs. Frei, and Christian Democratic Congressmen
in Chile.
. Intelligence was surfaced indicating that, once in
power, the Communists intended to denigrate Frei
as the first step in the dissolution of his party-.
d. In spite of everything, Frei never asserted himself. Indeed,
. �
he failed to attend or to influence otherwise the 3-4 October Congress
of his party at which time it was decided by a subitantial margin to
� make a deal. with Allende. With that decision, the Frei re-election
gambit died rind constitutional alternatives had been exhausted. Sub-
sequently, "Frei did manage to confide to several top-ranking military
officers that he would not oppose a co.u.p, with a guarded implication
he might even welcome one. Yet, when a coup opportunity and
situation presented itself upon the assassination of Army Commander
�
In Chief Schneider, Frei moved quickly away from it.
6. Military Coup
a. After early October
OR 00
absent any evidence that Frei was
responding, politically speaking, to artificial respiration -- a /
412 83
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES' ONLY
�
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
ECET/I1tVE
EYES ONLY
military coup increasingly suggested itself as the only possible
solution to the Allende problem. Anti-Allende currents did exist
in the military and the Carabineros, but were immobilized by:
�
���
11�11, �M,
O. � 01.
the tradition of military re t:for,thc Constitution;
the public and private stance of General Schneider,.
Commander in Chief of. the Army, who advocated
strict adherence to the Constitution;
fear of the reaction of non-commissioned officers
who tended to harbor pro-Allende sympathies; and,
�
a strong propensity to accept Allende blandishments
to the effect that the military had little to fear from
him.
- [Although individual officers among the top leadership of the military
and Carabincros were pre-disposed to tai:e action, they felt the Army
�
�
was central to a successful coup, and, as long as General Schneider
remained the head of the Army, the Army could not be counted upon.
General Schneider's attitude could only be changed through the '�
personal intervention and forceful advocacy of a coup by President
Frei; something, it became obvious, the latter was most unlikely to
bring himself to do.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
41.289
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO1310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
EYES ONLY ;
- 18 -
� .
�
b. LThe�U. S. Army Attache in Santiago had a wide range of
excellent contacts airtong the military with whom he enjoyed
unusually close, frank, and confidential relationships.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
When, as .noted previously, the U.S. Army Attache was
placed under the operational control of the CIA Chief of Station, the
two worked in tandem on the coup endeavor. As a general rule,
members of the "illegal" team initiated and picked up those contacts
with.the .highest risk potential, that is, those individuals whose
credentials, reliability, and security quotient were unproven and
�
unknown.
P. Between 5 Octbber and 20 October, the CIA Station and the
U.S. Army Attache -- for the most part, the latter --/mad____
contacts with key military and Carabincro officials. These contacts
required a high degree of overt plausibility or clanclestinity since,
by that time, Allende was acutely aware that only the military
�
remained between himself and the presidency, and, accordingly;
�
monitored the activities of key military figures quite closely.
Through diropt contact, the
SECREY/SENSMVE
EYES ONLY
�
41230
(b)(3)
b)(1)
b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
EYES Ot:LY
- 19 -
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
the
Materiel, the Army Director of the War Academy, and the Army
Director of the Non-Commissioned Officers School were advised
.of the U.S. Government desire to deny Allende the presidency and
its willingness to support a coup attempt. The
land the
were made
privy to the U.S. position through trusted high-level military inter-
mediaries.
d. During this same period in October, the "illegals estab-
lished direct contact and conducted negotiations with the leadership
of the two incipient coup "movements" involving the greatest risk:
�
claiined to
have 4,000 then organized in the greater Santiago
area. He requested arms and ammunition from his
"illegal" contact. When it developed that
was somewhat eccentric and had little, if any,
organization of the scope claimed, contact was
dropped.
SiCRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY
44.1
� - (b)(1 )
(b)(1)
� (b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
�
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
5:Cr.ETi.f.LN:�:;;YE
EYES ONLY
- 20 -
All activities, of retired A.rmy General Viaux
were being carefully scrutinized by both Allende
and General Schneider during this period because --
� �
having led the unsuccessfuL,T.icna x:e.gfrnent revolt
�
� in October 1969 -- he was a known dissident with
" some residue of influence in the Army. Via.ux
was contacted by several "illegals" at different
� points of negotiation with him. He requested a
sizeable aiidrop of arms and ammunition in�the
:countryside (which was denied as unrealistic under
the circumstances), substantial financial support
. �
jlife insurance policies for his princi-
pals (up to $250,000 in coverage was agreed upon),.
and paralyzing gas grenades (which were not
immediately available), Finally, it became evident
that Viaux did not have the organization or support
to carry out a successful coup, but might trigger
prematurely an action that would spoil the betttir
chances of doing so from.within the active duty
�
SECRET/SEN.SITIVE
EYES ONLY
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
�!.SECRET/SENLiTIVE [
EYES ONLY
- 21.
military itself. Direct contact was suspended
and an alternate channel of emergency cornmuni-
�
cation was established. �
e. Eventually, the best prospects for a successful coup were
developed irnong the high-level military contacts. On 18 October,
General Valenzuela, who was in command of the Santiaga Garrison,
advised that he,
o t-t t..--c"( �
c'eN
were prepared to sponsor a coup& The plan was to:
06 Oro
kidnap General Schneider;
have the command of the Army pass to the ne-xt
� �
1 .
in line, General Pratts wh.o at least was not
dogmatically opposed to a cotip
most of Frci's cabinet would resign and be replaced
by military and Carabinero members;
Frei would renounce the presidency and leave the
country; and,
-- a military junta would be installed.
� SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY -
�
4.13 3
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
OOP
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C013.10814
�
� SECr.ET/S1.149.,111VEi
� EYES ONLY I
s.
lIndications were that Frei was aware of the main elements of this
plan as were a few cabinet members./ The only assistance requested
by Valenzuela(to set the plan in motiori.,through Schneider's abduction
. .
�was several sub-machineguns, ammtinition, a few tear gas grenades,
��and gas masks_1(all of which were provided)iplus $50,000 for expenses
�
(which was ready to be passed upon demand).
f. On 22 October, General Schneider was mortally wounded on
� �
his way to work. General Pratt s was appointed to command the
Army in place of Schneider. Frei made a strong stztement denouncing
the assassination and declared a state of emergency; as a result
thereof, General Valenzuela assumed control of the Santiago area.
�
In effect,�the military were in control.of Chile and in an excellent
position to follow through with a sucCessful coup irrespective of Frei's
actions or inactions. They did not -- probably because of the strong
reaction of Frei and the public to the Schneider affair and lack of any
positive encouragement from Frei. Their rationale is not certain at
this stage, nor, for that matter, is it certain who or what group was
ultimately responsible for Schneider's assassination. The Valen.zue.la
group claimed that it was not and that all materiel passed to it is still(
� SECRET/SENSITIVF.
EYES ONLY
413
�
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
-I.
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814
�
Tin its possessiOn.unusec_1;1 In any t-fent, the opportunity for a co
.
soon passed; and, Allen d,:: was elected by Congress on
24 October and quietly inavg.lratt�-:.on .3 November.
�
�
�
I:LT/SENSITIVE/
� I YI.S ONLY
413
Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 C01310814