OSS SECRET INTELLIGENCE WAR DIARIES - VOL 6 - BOOK II - DOCUMENT 49 - LABOR DIVISION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00026664
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2022
• Case Number: F-2022-00168
• Publication Date: March 23, 1945

� .
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
OS S IARCUIVES
S
414146
)3y Euth: CO, q & q DC"
0 of Strategic By,
European T of 0, USA,
Date .V3 4,4a itr
BEST COPY
AVAILABLE
WAR DIARY
Secret Intelligence Branch
Office of Striategic Servicee
� �
London, Engfa:n d
COPY NO. I. of _2 COPIES
4./ 1,1
Os S ARCHIVES
z
9c,2 7,427O
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
411MNIft
auth: CO, Xq & Bq
� 0 of Strategic Sy,
European 1"....Pf 0, USA,
Initials n.
Date 9�13 aA.01i
Secret Intelligence Branch
2 Office of Strategic Services
�
� ,
London, Endlihd
=OM&
vc
Os S ARCHIVES
7J2ZO
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C000266641�s,
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. C Table of Contents LABOR DIVISIOI:
3.945
TABLE OF CONUNTS
Page
Labor Division - 1945 283
Labor Division - London 263
Introduction 283
Contacts with British Labor Lovement 284
Twilip.ht Project 285
OpLrations in 1945 286
Frue Germsny 1,.ovement, CALeu, end the Tool
Series 286
Sunr.Jary of th_issions 292
riamner 1.ission 293
Chisel uds6ion 293
l'ickaxe ission 293
titIZZSW bAssion 293
"...chef Mission 29$
Personnel of Labor Division 29$
Milwaukee Forward (Paris) 295
Missions Proposed 295
Twilight 297
Hofer 1.1ission 297
Trade Union Band_uet 298
Personnel 299
Intelligence Reports 300
Field Base "C" 302
Introduction 302
Intelligence for the Bach Section, London ^ � 303
Missions Planned fee, $07
Sunspot 307
Typhoon 308
Hurricane 309
Monsoon 309
The Comet Mission 309
Liaison with Other Units 311
The Twilight Program 31i
Other Special Problems 312
Intelligence Procured 312
Personsiel 314
Field Ease C Personnel 316
Intelligence 6tta1f 316
Administrative and Services 316
Transport (Motor Fool) 316
Communications $17
The Swedish Base 317
Introduction 317
Intelligence Procurement 318
Penetration of the German Legatien 320
Agent Operations from Sweden 322
Missions 325
Goethe Mission 325
Brahma Mission 325
Schiller Mission 326
Heine Mission 327
Herbert Mission 327
Carl Schurz Mission 328
Reports - January to May 1945 328
Labor Division Missions 335
Ty1 Mission 335
. Introduction 335
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 600026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6 Table of Contents. LABOR DIVISION
---------.---
Page
1945 (Cont'd)
Labor Division Missions (Cont'd)
Recruiting and Personal Background 336
Handling by OSS 337
Cover Stories and Documents 338
Relations with Melanie i 338
Communications 340
After Bobbie had been Caught 344
First News of Bobbie 347
Detailed Account of Bobbie's Activities 348
Bobbie's Arrest 353
The Story of Confused Identities 356
Comment by Melanie . 359
� Experiences with the Gestapo 360
Friends in the Trison 361
Further Contacts with the VE Plane 362
Gestapo Interrogation of Bobbie 365
Comments on Gestapo Interrogation of Bobbie . 373
Further Contacts with the VE Plane 375
Final Relations with the Gestapo 376
rownend Mission '360
Detailed Account of Down'end Mission 360
Activities up to the German Break-Through in
December 383
OrgOization of Work 386
Work in,11v45 �..�. S69
Communications 391
Recuperation $92
Final Dispositkon 394
Ruppert Mission 395
Summary - Details of the Ruppert Mission's
early Organization 395
Detailed account of Ruppert Mission 395
The Personality of Kedia 398
Employrient by the SD 401
Results of Mission 407
Hofer Mission 408
K-28 408
Other Travel Observations 413
Resistance Movement in Austria 415
Results of Lamberts Trip 416
417
419
420
420
Tactical Intelligence Produced 421
Detailed Account of the Mission 422
Eclipse Mission r., 424
Activities of [Adrian Leonard2in Germany 424
G-2 Interrogation of(Leonard. 425
0-2 Interrogation of Johann 'Johannes 426
0-2 Comments 430
� Disposition of Hofer Mission
Liaison Problems of Hofer
"Conclusion
Faro Mission
eta 7 H14 er Mission 431
ntroduction 431
3ecruiting, Biographical Information and
1I Training 431
11:T over and Equipment , 434 i
ispatch - I , 435
ommuni cations
r 436 .
,
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C000266s4
. ;222
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
LABOR DIVISION
VOL. 6
Page
1945 (Cont,d)
Labor Division Iiissions (Cont'd)
Agent Comments on Communication 439
Further Details of liarrer Yission Activities 440
Food ... 444
i r Ri1d 444
Trip to Landing Point 445
Activities in Varch and April 447
Overrun by the Russians 450
Interrogation and Treatment by the Russians 451.
Conclusions 456
Disposition 457
Pickaxe Lission 457
Introduction 457
Recruitment end Personal B ckground 457
Training 459
Cover Stories, Finances, Briefing, Dispatch 4599
Communications 45
Detailed Account of lassion 462
Preparation 463
Sequence of Events in Infiltration 463
The Beginning of Our Work 454
Traffic on the Railway 465
Traffic on the Eighways 466
Troops Stationed in Landshut 468
Passage of a Large Number of Soldiers end Of-
ficers of the Waffen-S3 469
Other Important Observations 470
The ":',efence" of Landshut and Preparations for
it 471
The Behavior cf the Population and of the
Volksstur- 473
Prisoners. of ',jar 476
Our Communications 477
Rosenheim 478
Our IapErs, Ration Coupons, etc. 479
Some Remarks on Evaluation of the German
Situation 480
Disposition of' the Agents 461
The ..allet 1.11s51on 482
The Buzzsavi idasion 483
The Chisel 1-ission 485
^^21
Approved
-
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
283
LABOR DIVISION - 1945
LABOR DIVISION - LONDON
Introduction
As the earlier sections of this volume indicate, the
Labor Division of Si had developed a more or less auton-
omoue organization within the SI Branch. It had its own
training school, Milwaukee, its own briefing and document
section, the Bach Section, and its own field of operations,
Labor and Left groups. Until late In 1.944, it was the
only section which had made any intelligent approach to
the penetration of Germany and its Faust program was the
only one actually operating agents inside Germany.
Logically, the experience and -facilities of the Labor
Division were heavily relied on in the SI German penetra-
tion program which began late in 1944.votth the absorption of
the Labor Division into the Division of Intelligence Pro-
curement and the appointment of Mr, Pratt, former heed of
the Labor Division as chief of DIP, the Labor Divieion
tended to lose its separate identity. The Milwaukee school
was taken over by Schools and Training and was for quite
some time the only SI training area in England available
for the training of Germany-bound agents. The elaborate
research organization, the Bach Section, was transferred
in early January to the Division of Intelligence Procure-
ment, The balance of the Labor Division in London became
an operating desk in DIP,
The Labor Division or Desk had a few more responsi-
bilities than most of the operating desks of DIP, Among
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
284
the extra responsibilities were supervision and
coordinatl.on of the work of Field Base C, Milwaukee
Forward, the Swedish base and the %vies base, In the
case of the Swiss base, Mr. Van Ai.kel continued to
report to the Labor Desk, but his main sphere of activity
was with Mr. George Pratt, who remained as coordinator of the
Labor Division OSS, following the virtual disappearance of
the Washington Labor office. (296)
Contacts with British Labor Movement
Another function of the London Labor Desk was the
work of Mr, Lawrence Levin. Mr. Levin was instructed to
maintain contact with the British Labor movement and write
reports on its activities. This work was done with the
knowledge and consent of the Labor Attache of the American
Embassy and did not conflict in any way with the latter's
work. Mr. Levin's background V2S such that he had a con-
siderable number.of personal friends in the British Labor
movement and his reports were based on conversEtions of
a pore or less unofficial nature with the English trade union-
lets he had known before the var. His reports went to Mr.
Pratt and to no one else, although they were available to
the Reports Division through Yr. Pratt, Mr. Levi's
principal activity was the reporting of the performance of
the American delegates to the World Trade Union Conferences
in London in February. He wrote his personal estimate of
the ability of the American delegates, as well as a running.'
account of the problems of the conference, and of the
background interplay of forces and personalities. The
reports were purely informal and were in no sense an
(296) pp. 276-262 thli volume
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
285
official function of the Labor Division.
Twiiikht ProAect
� Another extra activity of the Labor Division was.
the Twilight Project. (297) Some 150 prospective Twilight
agents were interviewed between September and December
1944, about SO of whom were selected and tentatively placed
in a pool. It was planned at various times that these
men should do varioue things. One of their functions was
to act as guides in newly captured German cities. The
function which the Labor Division wished them to under-
tae was that of undercover agents in captured cities.
The men were all German refugees of leftist persuasion.
Four or five of the original SO selected were actually
used; the rest were not used because of the difficulties
which developed, both in getting them into Germany and
in operating them,
The refugees were Germans who had left their native
country because of persecution of.the.Nazis. For the
most part they hoped to return to Germany permanently
following the collapse or Naziism. It was very diffi-
cult indeed for these men to be objective in their treat-
ment of German civilians, They were constantly tempted,
as was only human, to use their special stEtus with the
United States authorities to give special help to dis-
tressing cases they ran across in the course of their
work. It was feared that they would constantly request
special treatment in terms of food and lodging for their
friends. The second difficulty that developed was that
.(297) Intv,with Carl Devoe 24 May 45
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
:222
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 ,)
286
VOL, 6 LABOR DIVISION
the refugees who had lived in England since 193S or
before could not accustom themselves to the rigors
of living in post-collapse Germany. It was found after the
first trial that the men would have to depend on unusual
assistance from OSS in order to survive. This assistance
woad inevitably set them off from the rest of the
German civilian and thereby expose them.
A further difficulty.that developed was that despite
solemn agreements with OSS, they would engage in forbidden
political activity with any remnants of the leftist
groups that remained in their area of operations. OSS
simply could not control them. (298)
Operations In 1945
The Labor Desk in 1945 entered a period of intensive
operations, as Lieutenant Gould began to find the Free
Germany Committee contacts more and more fruitful. These
ccntacts were possibly the best single source of agents
available in England. (299) 74e missions that resulted
from the contacts were designated the Tool series.
Free Germany Yoyement. CALPO, and the Tool Series
The personnel of the SI Labor Division had always
had a strong reluctance to work directly with communists
or communist sympathizers.. There wns nothing in the
charter of the Labor Division which prohibited them from
working with communists. However, the personnel of the
Labor Division had strong feelings on the matter and pre-
ferred to work with socialists or non-political trade
unionists. An illustration of this was the care and
.(299 Intv with Carl Devoe 24 May 45
(299 Id
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 28?
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
and trouble with which the IS) movement wae cultivated by
the Labor Division in the summer and fall of 1944 to the
virtual exclusion of other groups.
When the problem of penetrating Germany became acute
in October and November 1944, the communists and their
sympathizers were one source of agents which had not, up
to that time, been tapped. The communists were undoubtedly
among the most active anti-Nazis in Europe. Theionly
evidence OSS had of any real resistance movement inside
Germany at that time showed very clearly that at least
some of it was communist-organized. It therefore seemed
essential to the Labor Division that the urgency of the need
for intelligence from Germany should override the personal
feelings of the staff members,/ Approval for the proposal
to recruit communists and communist-sympathizers was obtained
by the Labor DivisiOn in October 1944. Lieutenant Joseph
Gould we placed in full charge of all the agents of what
came to be known as the Tool series, and of all the nego-
tiations with the organization from which they were to come.
The organization that WES con Led to aid OSS in
obtaining agents that would be acceptable to the communist
underground in Germany wks the Free Germany Movement. This
movczent owed its inspiration to Russia but had autonomous
branches in Switzerland, Sweden, France and Great Britain,
as well as a reputed network of some strength inside Germany
itself. Lieutenant Gould particularly noted that not all the
members of the Free Germany Committee were communists. The
organization was in a sense an attempt at a united front
movement of Germans to overthrow the Nazis, The members were
communists, socialists and Middle class liberals. (300)
( Ann) intv Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
288
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
The Free Germany_Movement of Great Britain was contacted
. ,_�.
through Dr. Jurgen Kuaezyniski, an influential member of
the leadership of the movement, although without official
posLtion. The operating member of the movement who was
taken into the confidence of Lieutenant Gould and actually
placed on the OSS payroll was
It wa.4ade
extremely clear t and to the agents from the very
outset that OSS's dealings would be with individuals and
not with these IndiViduals as reoresentatives of the Free
Germany Movement. (301)
In France 'and in Switzerland the Movement was known
as CALPO or Comite Allemagne Libre pour L'Ouest. It will
be recalled from the 1944 account of the Labor Division
that in Sweden Lillian Traugott had been given the re-
sponsibility of contacting communist elements in touch with
Germany. In Switaerland G. P. Van Arkel had not neglected
coamuniet sources of information. In Paris Lieutenant Jolla
was in contact with CALPO and secured much information ott.
their activities in France. Be advised against working with
them for agent penetration purposes, and preferred not to
participate in the Free Germany plan owing to the security
risks involved in dealing with agents of conflicting
political viewpoints. (302) Early in January it was possible
to pull all these far-flung contacts together and arrive
at agreements which would do two things: 1) Provide OSS with
capable agent recruits, and 2) Provide these recruits with
cafe addresses and, it was thought at first, with communica-
tions.
(301) Political Background,Tool Series Gould 10 May 45
(302) Intv with Jolts Sep 45
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6
289
LABOR DIVISION
The agents were almost exclusively recruited from German
refugees who had reached England before the war, some of whom
had spent time in the Isle of Man under the terms of the 18B
amendment, as dangerous to the security of the British Isles.'
British SOE was not at all happy about OSS using these people
and SOE representatives more or less informally warned the
Labor Division on several occasions not to have anything to do\
with them. (303) Nevertheless OSS persisted and the British �
paw fit to facilitate the operations as far as was in their
power.
The agents supplied by CALPO had no reservations 'Attached
to their use, It was understood that the agents would be
used for all forms of information and that priority would be
given to military information, that political information
would be included where possible, and that CALPO would have an
opportunity to exchange political questions and answers with
the agents on their return. (304)
CALPO had five types of safe addresses in Germany, which
are described below in order of their security:
1) Through penetration into the Wehrmacht by its members
CALPO had created Ipoints of support" and were able to depend
on safe addresses produced by people having contact with the
Wehrmacht. These were available to OBS on the baste of a
letter written byto his repre-
sentative in Germany. The letter would serve to establish the
identity of the agent.
2) Political safe addresses operating during the period
1935 - 1940, and developed by CALPO during the war. Again a
signed paper would suffice to establish identity for OSS agents.
�
(303) Intv with Devoe 24 May.45
(304) Min Intep-Br Mtg DO 10 Jan 45
� � Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664)
VOL. 5 LABOR DIVISION
290
3) CALPO hz,d members in the foreign worker organiza-
tion of various nationalities, particularly French. They
had placed these agents during the occupation of France
and could guarantee at least eight abeolutely secure ad-
dresses in various parts of Germany.
4) Personal political safe addresses where the poli-
tical feature was not the dominant character. These were
not considered reliable by CALPO.
5) CALPO bad official liaison with the Comite des Pri-
soniers et Deportees which was also doing agent work in
Germany through various nationalities. CALPO said that
could obtain safe addresses from this organization.
CALPOle limitation on the use of these safe addresses
was as follows: They would be available only to its own
agents as employed by OSS, agents of the Free German Move-
ment of Great Britain and such operations as its representa-
tives, either in France or Great Britain, will agree may be
provided with these addresses. The actual addresses will
be placed in the hands of the Free Germany representative
for Great Britain, as they apply to operations whether now
.);
pending or subject to development. (305)
Although it seemed of vital importance at the time to
have safe addresses, last minute changes brought about by
the increased tempo of operations as in the case of the
Pickaxe Mission, made the safe addresses of lees importance
than they had seemed at first,/ The Hammer team, however,
did make full use of the safe addresses and could pot have
operated without them.
Although it was intended that the CALPO agents would
(305) Min Inter-Brlitg DO 10 Jan 45
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
291
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
be equipped with J/E or WIT there was offered to OS$ the
use of the CALPO courier chains, two of which were operat-
ing in January. One involved a Swiss representative of
CALPO; another involved the Free Germany Movement of the
Swiss which had no connection with the Soviet-inspired
organization. It Was thought that both these chains could..
be made available to OSS, although it was pointed out by the
CALPO representative that the chains were already very heavily
loaded and would certainly be limited in their usefulness by
this facto
Lieutenant Gould remarked that the training and prep-
aration of the CALPO agents presented no epecial problems.
Be personally felt strongly that the men were of much
higher quality than other agents recruited by OSS and were
more secure and more dependable because of their strong
political motivation. This judgment was supported by many
of the instructors in Schools and Training. The problem of
dealing with agents who belonged to left political groups
had always encountered widely divergent opinions. The
British had objected that there would be a major security
problem because of the connections of.the agents. Lieutenant
Gould commented that this problem did not turn up in connec-
tion with the CALPO agents. He took the precaution of
checking and found that there was no gossip in the Free
Germany Committee circles about the disappearance of the
men. There esemed to be no leaks at all. There was no
evidence that the organization had used its connection with
the Malted States Government to further Its political aims
in Great Britain. It was feared, at one time, that CALPO
might use its connections irresponsibly, but this did not
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
LABOR DIVISION
VOL. 6
292
happen.
Lieutenant Gould commented that the most satisfying
thing about the handlint; of the Tool Series Atale that there
was no waste of time In the execution of the various mis-
sions. In the earlier Faust projects there had been days
and weeks of waiting by the agents. The longest time spent
on any team of the Tool Series was ten weeks and the short-
est seven weeks. Lieutenant Gould remarked that the 'VI
training was on the whole very poor, The Pickaxe team,
for example, really used its first two or three contacts
in the field for a continuation of training. This Lieu-
tenant Gould felt was very unfortunate but was due solely
to the absence of adequate training personnel. As is
pointed out elselNhere, in February and March Lieutenant
Ancrum was practically the only J/E operator available both
for training and for operations. (306)
Lieutenant Gould remarked that opposition within 0$3
to the use of the CALPO agents sometimes embarrassed their
processing. The remaining Labor Division staff, mostly
concentrated in the Bach Section, .were not always sympa-
thetic to the agents. On one occasion de.ring the equip-
ping of Doll of the Mallet mission, the agent was confused
by the misplaced humor of the equipping staff. Certain of
the staff showed open disrespect to the agents and Lieuten-
ant Gould found it necessary to apologise after each ses-
sion (Or the attitude of the briefere, (607)
Summary of Miesions
There were five Tool series missions, involving seven
men altogether,
(306) Intv with Gould 14
ArIpp--"rov-ed for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
?lc.kax,
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664)
293
VOL. 6
Hammer Mission. Composed of
ropped 1 March into the Berlin area. Recuperated 16
June from the Ruesiane.
-Chisel Mission,
to'Essen. The plane, an A/20 based from Harrington, did
not return and two subsequent attempts to contact the agent
by J/E failed. it was therefore presumed that the agent
was lost with the plane before he could be dropped,
LABOR DIVISION
and
Plckaxe'Mission. Composed of
dropped into the area of Landehut
recovered 1 May.
Buzzsaw Mission. The agent
near Leipzig on 7 April and was to operate in Leipzig, Chem-
nitz and Dresden. J/E contacts failed but he was instructed
by BIRO to make his way to the American lines. It was
thought possibly that he might have remained in Russian
territory because his parents resided ia the Russian zone.
MAllet Mission. The agent was dPopped
near Berlin on 10 April. Two attempts to contact by J/E
failed but this was not regarded as proof that the agent was
not alive at the time. As of July 1945 he had not reported
back to OM
These missions are described in detail later. (308)
Personnel of Labor Division.
There were a number of personnel changes in 1945 di-
rected for the most part by the changing requirements of
the war. Towards the end of February, Mr, Thomas Wilson,
who had succeeded Mr. Pratt as chief of the Labor Division,
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C0002664. in Milwavlee
dispatched on 17 March
and
and
cn 4 April
was dropped
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6 LA14:dr1 DIVISION
294
Forward. Lieutenant (jg) Carl Devoe wa3 transferred from
Cairo, following the completion of thu Labor Division work
in the Meliterranean, and appointed chief of Labor DivieLf,
London. Lieutenant Devoe brought with him from Cairo Kr.
Leonard Appel, who became his executive and operations
officer. As has been previously noted, Yr. 0An Clarke,
formerly with the Seventh Army, was transferred to Switz-
erland to become Mr, Van Arkells assistant. Lieutenant
Auerbach and Lieutenant Margolies were transferred along
with Corporal Bravman and Lieutenant Searchinger to Field
Base 0 in the latter part of March to work on the Twilight
program. Lieutenant Ma,Tolies and Lieutenant Auerbach,
it will be recalled, had worked on the planning and screen-
ing of Twilight while in London, the former maintaining
relations with the Austrians in London and the latter rela-
tions with ISK and SOE. Lieutenant Lazare Teper and Yr.
Henry Sutton, together with the entire staff of the Bach
Section, were transferred to DIP. Lieutenant Gould, who
handled together with his assistant Lieutenant Levin all
of the Free Germany contacts, was towards the end of April-
transferred to U.S. Group Control Commission.
Towards the end Lieutenant Devoe was transferred to
Paris to carry out the liquidation of the Paris office and
later returned to Washington. Mr. Leonard Appel was left
in charge of the Labor office in London from early June until
the end of July, when Mrs. Lillian Traugott arrived from
Sweden.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 295
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
yILWAUKEE FORWARD (-FARIS)
Introduction (09)
The main activity of the Labor Division, Paris office
in the January-May period 1945, was the collection of in-
telligence reports from sources in and around Paris, chiefly
political refugee groups. The Labor Division of the SI
Branch in Paris was specially commended by the Reports
Board as a consistently large producer of valuable intelli-
gence. During January 1945, for instance, the Labor Divi-
sion alone turned in almost half of the total SI production. (310)
Again in March the Labor Division was commended for its
activities in obtaining reports on German emigr; group,
Luxembourg affairs and domestic French affairs. fan)
In addition to the intelligence reports obtf-v0_ in
the Paris area, the Labor Division attempted t4 .J7:unt sev-
eral long range intelligence missions 1Z',, Ge:. One
of the most successful of these missions s jrpatched in in February to Vienna, which retum.a -,fely in.
March. (31P.) The Paris Labor Division , consider-
able amount of time on preparing the TwIF_ght program. (313�
Missions Proposed
There were two missions propcseJ y i.e Labor Desk,
Paris, during the January-May period: the Gogol Mission
and the Wheaties.
The Gogol Mission wee composed of one man, whose name
does not appear in the records, who was intended to contact
a group of Russian worker & located in the region of Frei-
Antivities of Milwaukee For-
(Z09) For accov-
. __Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
296
VOL. 6 LA40R DIVISION
burg, Bavaria. It was known that this group was active,
because they had already sent an emissary to Switzerland
asking for help in building a resistance group, and indicat-
ing that the nucleus of an organization already existed. -
The purpose of the mission was to contact the group and '
report back after a short visit of approximately two weeks.
The Gogol agent was briefed on the technique of organizing
a reception and dropping operation. He was to explore the
possibilities of developing intelligence potentialities of
this group. He was to be infiltrated via Switzerland.
On 26 February the agent was dispatched to Switzerland,
arriving safely in that country on 1 )arch, He made four
unsuccessful attempts to cross into Germany through the -
months of Xarch and April e.nd was eventually returned to
Paris without having gone into Germany.
The Wheaties mission was composed of two agents, an
observer and a WIT, who were to be dispatched from England
to report on troop movements, rail traffic and functioning
of German government agencies in-the Nurnberg, Augsburg
and-Regensberg areas. They were sent to England by Lieu-
tenant Jails on 1 Harch to receive jump training and to
be dispatched in the Yarch/April moon period.
The two men, Helineki anE Shoenburger, were German
nationals who had deserted from the German Army in France
and had fought with the FFI, They arrived in London on I
Xardh and were turned over to Captain Gercke of the German
Desk for processing. After they had spent a short time in
training, the DIP staff began receiving a large number of
complaints about their conduct. The school reported that
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
LABOR DIVISION
297
they were insubordinate and lacked discipline. It was felt
that they were not sincere in their purpose. After con-
siderable discussion, they were removed from the school and
sent to a prisoner of war camp, where they joined Griesert.
In the opinion of Captain Alden,Seaoenburger was the trouble-
maker. All three men were eventually ,eleased in Germany
in June, 1945, to remain under the surveillance of CIO.
In March 1945, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel
Verrill, liaison officer with FAAA, Lieutenant Jolts sent
two WIT Operators to complete an OSS team accompanying
airborne troops. These two men, one of whom was Frofant,
a Luxembourger, returned safely within a month after com-
pleting their mission. It was reported that they did ex-
cellent wort.
Twilight.
In January Lieutenant Jolts became interested in the
Twilight program and for this purpose contacted German
refugee groups in Faris to obtain addresses, curricula
vitae, possible contacts and other information of value,- as
well as recruits. On 7 March Lieutenant (then Corporal)
Margolis arrived in Faris from London to make the final
preparations for the mission to Cologne. It was subse-
quently passed over to Field ease 0, from which it operated.
Eofer Mission.
Jean Lambert's mission to Vienna, which was successfully
accomplished in March, was one of the most interesting mis-
sions of the Paris office of the Labor Division. Besides
the success of the mission itself, the arrangements for
the mission resulted In close contacts between the Labor
Division and the., Soviet repreientatives in Paris. This
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
LABOR DIVISION
298
enabled Lieutenant Jolts to do much valuable reporting on
Russian emigrl groups in France. (314)
Lieutenant Jolts was also concerned with the administra-
tion of the. Ruppert mission. Upon Ruppertse return late
in March Lieutenant Jolts accompanied the agent to Switzer-
land for the purpose of making contact with officials of the
SD whom Ruppert had contacted in Berlin. However, the con-
tacts were not made in Switzerland owing to difficulties
in getting the men out of Swiss internment camps, and it
was not until later that the information which they possessed
was available to OSS. (315)
Trade Union Banquet
On 28 February the Labor Division introduced the CIO
delegates to the World Trade Union Conference and the Bureau
Confederale of the BOT at St. Germain, the Labor Division
Paris area. According to Lieutenant Jolts, reporting the
dinner and the conversations thereafter were of great assis-
tance in maintaining good relations, not only between the
CGT and the CIO, but also between the Labor Division and
both groups. (316)
For the three months December, January and February
19.1 the Paris Labor Division was concerned with an attempt
on the part of a certain Yves Rameau to expose the activi-
ties of OSS agents in Switzerland. The activities of Rameau
were extremely complicated and were followed with consider-
able interest by Lieutenant Jolts. The details of his in-
vestigations were turned over to X-2 for action. Rameau
was actually of little danger to Mr. Van Arkel, the Labor
(3141 .See full account of Hofer Mission page
(315 Bee Report Mission page this volume.
(316 Memo Jolts to Pratt 9 Mar 45.
this volume,
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664)
299
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
Division's representative in Bern, but at one time Lieu-
tenant Jolts thought that he might well be a danger. Out
of it all came an interesting report on the activities of
the Swiss Surete and their relationships with the ISK group
in Switzerland with which Yr. Van Arkel was working. (317)
Personnel
The personnel of the Labor Division, Faris, for the
January-May period was as follows:
Lieutenant A. E. Jolts
Captain K. A. Lehto
Max Lippman
Leo Sanders
Jack GourevitCh
Chief.
Administrative Officer.
Responsible for the bulk
of political reporting on
German Social Democrats
and the movements of the
Saar emigrade.
Responsible for political
reporting on assistant
emigrade groups.
Engaged in political re-
porting on Russian emigrade
circles and to a limited
extent on the Soviet
Union.
Gourevitchls reports were termed extremely valuable by
Lieutenant Jolts,.
Mr. Thomas S. Wilson, formerly Chief Labor Division,
London, engaged in Luxembourg political reporting and was
In Charge of processing and editing other reports.
Staff Sergeant Mary Heron, WAG, secretary, and Corporal
Caroline Heller, WAC, secretary.
Administratively the Labor Division St, Paris, was
under Commander Thomas G. Cassady, chief of SI, but it
maintained close relationships with the London Labor Divi-
sion and particularly with Mr. George Pratt as coordinator
� (17) Memo Jolts to.Pratt Dec 29 44
Memo Jolts to Holcomb Feb 16 45
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
'
�Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664M
300
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
of Labor Division OSS.
Lieutenant. Jolts noted that there were no particularly
pressing administrative problems in the Paris office with '
one exception. He said he felt that the enlisted promotions
situation was extremely badly handled. It was a constant
source of irritation and continuing injustice to individ-
uals.' (318)
Intelligence Reports
During the period January to Kay 1945 the following
intelligence reports were accessioned by the SI Registry
An Paris and credited to the Paris Labor Division:
ianuar/
a Dornier Factory at Bregenz.
b Voiksturm in Bregenz, Austria.
i
0 German War Plants on Swiss-Austrian Border.
d German Communist Party in France.
e) Report on Three German Suspecte Living in Paris.
0 Sira Who's Who Biographical Sketches on French
Trade Unioniste.
g) Central Committee for the Struggle for Polish
Independence.
h) Secret Document on French Foreign Policy.
I) Report on the German Social-Democratic Party
In France.
j) Organization of Calpo in Southern France.
k) Organization among Emigres of the Saar Territory.
1) German and French Socialist Youth Kovement. Dis-
cusslons between leaders of both groups.
m) Quai D'Orsay proposals for unifying Austrian Repre-
sentation in France preparatory to French recognition.
n) Interview with members of the Soviet Trade Union
Delegation,
o) Report of Discussion between Soviet Trade Union
Delegation and the Bureau Confederale of the COT.
P) Russian Army of Liberation and White Russian
Propaganda.
q) France-Germany. Social Democrats convene at Toulouse.
r) France-Germany. Separatist Movement among Saar
Emigres.
s) Germany. Nazi and Anti-Nazilfersonalities in
Pforzheim (Baden).
(310 Intv with Jolts 15 Kay 45.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
301
VOL. S LABOR DIVISION
February
a) Saar Separatist Movement.
b) German Social Democrats in France.
e) Austria. Material issued by Paris Group ANF.
d) USSR/Georgian Social Democracy.
C) France/Political. "Volontaires de la Libertell.
f) France/Germany. Activities of Saar Emigres.
g) Reactions of Luxemburgoie to their present gov-
ernment.
h) Anti-American propaganda from Luxembourg.
1) France/Austria. Hapsburg Activities in France.
3) Austrian Emigre Activities in France,
X) Pamphlet on RLondon Information of Austrian Social-
ists in Great Britain.m
I) Pamphlet on Information of the Social Democratic
Party in France.
m) Interview between Director of l'Association de la
Sarre and General Secretary of German Social-Democratic
Party in France.
n) New Efforts to create a Unified Austrian Repre-
sentation.
Mardh
a) France/Germany. Recent Events among the Saar Refu-
gees. Meeting of Association Sarrois.
b) Preparations of German Social Democrats and Trade
Unionists in Case of Collapse of Hitler.
0) Report re Association Francaise de la Sarre and
Monsieur Theobold.
d, Memorandum on post-war tasks and problems (Economic
Study).
e) European Commodity Clearing through European Leon-
omic .Corporation (Economic Study).
f) Freedom of the Press in Luxembourg.
g Political Situation in Luxembourg.
List of Anti-Nazis in Pirmesens.
1 Luxembourg Newspaper.
j) French Interest in Luxembourg.
1) List of Anti-Nazis in Kaiserslautern.
) Organization of German Social Democratic Party in
France.
m) Meeting between German Social Democratic Party and
German Communist Party Representatives in Paris.
n) Pamphlet of Association Francaise de la Saure.
o) Calpo Agents being trained by French.
p) Report on actions and personalities in the Associa-
tion Francalse de la Sarre.
q) Report on German Communists In France infiltrating
their agents into Germany.
April
a) Reaction of french Prisoners to General Eiseahower's
Appeal.
b) R.C.A. - General Vlassov's Army - German Anti-Russian
propaganda.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14.000026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
302
VOL s 6
LABOR DIVISION
c) Calpo Director's Meeting.
d) Documents on Association Francaise de la Sarre
and La Ligue des Militants Sarrois.
e) Bulletins on "Volontaires de la Liberte"..
f) Letter of French Military to Calpo.
g) Report on "Union dee Refugies Sarroie en France."
h) Report on "Committee for the Liberation of the Saar".
i) Report on "Equipe Catholique Militante".
.1) Bulletins on German Social Democrats in France. .
k) Report on Russian Emigre Group in France known as
"Union of the Soviet Patriots."
1) Proclamation of General Denikin to Group of "White
Russians."
m) Saar Political Personalities.
n) Report on the German Question by former member of
Reichstag.
o) Report on Messerschmidt now a Prisoner of War,
p) Luxemburg Newspaper.
a) Comments on Joint Leaflet of German Communists and
German Social Democrats purportedly found in Saar.
b) Secret Decree of French Government re Saar Regiment
Formation.
� Col. Passy taking Soustellels place as head of BCRA.
d Discussions between representatives of German So-
cial Democratic Party and German Communist Party re Division
of Germanys etc.
e) German Social Democrat-German Communist Party dis-
cussions re Trade Union problems.
/
I Information on Luxembourg Resistance organizations.
f Luxembourg - "Epuration Trial" of head of ARBED.
h Activities of Intergovernmental Refugee ComaAttee.
i Views of Soviet Citizens re U.S,S.R. Regime,
FIELD BASE "C"
Introduction
The work of the Belgium-based Labor Division for the
period January through May 1945 consisted of three main
activities.
, 1) The best and most up-to-date Bach intelligence was
(319)
obtained from Field Base Ovroduced for the most part
by Lieutenant (then Tee 5) Siegfried Baxter. Operating
very closely with Lieutenant Lazare Teper, chief of the
Bach Section, London, Hoxter turned in dozens of important
briefing intelligence reports.
(319),Intv with Teper, May 45
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
VOL. 6 LABOR DIvISI(,N
303
2) Field Base C was responsible for the recruitIng
and planning of six intelligence missions. Two of the
missions were despatched, one of which, Faro, was highly
successful. Four others reached an advanced stage of pre-
paration but had to be cancelled. The misr ons were Sun-
spot, Comet, Typhoon, Hurricane, Monsoon, and Faro. They
will be described below.
In the latter part of the activities of Field Base
G, Captain Richard Watt became responsible for the opera-
tions of the Twilight mission and participated in develop-
ing post-war SI plane for Germany. He effected the intro-
duction of the SI Twilight team into Bonn and Cologne.
It will be recalled from the 1944 Diary of Captain Watt's
activities that procuring direct intelligence reports was
not considered the main function of Field Base C. (320)
However, a considerable flow of intelligence reports was
sent to Paris to be accessioned by the SI Registry there.
Intellicence for the Bach Section. London.
By the end of 1944 Captain Watt had arranged for fre-
quent directives fro the Bach Section,.London, describing
precisely whet types of documentary and cover story intelli-
gence were needed for SI operations. These directives con-
tinued throughout his operations in 1945, the work increas-
ing in volume until April, when Watt commented that most .
of the Bach intelligence available in Belgium had been col-
lected.
in January 1945 Lieutenant Baxter, as chief of the Bach
Intelligence Section of Field Base 0, had six men working
with him: Private First Class Pfister, Lieutenant Muller,
(320) Pp. 191-206 this volume.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
'Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
304
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
Lieutenant Profant, Lieutenant Casali, Corporal Metal and
Lieutenant De Geynst. Watt commented that the difficulties
caused by the German offensive ih December greatly reduced
the flow of Bach intelligence at first, bat later increeeed
itADecause of the availability of German prisoners.
The Bach intelligence was obtained primarily from the
interrogation of foreign workers recently returned from
Germany, from PW interrogation, and from brief forays
into occupied portions of the Rhineland, partirly
the AaChen area. The staff was always ovorstrained but did
as much as it could in the time available. From among the
prisoners resulting from the German offensive in December Lieutens
Hoxter was able to select several men who had been company
clerks and administrative officers in the army and was able
to obtain from them invaluable information on procedures,
particularly those concerning furloughs, travelling, etc.
The large PW cage at Jambes was combed for prisoners
with interesting Bach backgrounds. Captain Watt was able
to arrange to have the regular screeners at the PW center
indicate to him the prisoners who appeared to have informa-
tion, of the type desired for Bach purposes. The screeners �
were told to look for the following types of PWe:
0a. Any PW who has served in or has information regard-
ing: Geetapo, Kripo, Geheime Feldpolizel, Schutzpolizei.
1b. Hauptfeldwebel and Schreiber having information
about filling out and use of military documents, especially
Wehrmachtreieeschein, and Wehrmachtmarschausweis. Hen
recently returned from furlough may have information on
these.
00. Any PW Who worked in a Wehrbezirkekommando or
Wehrmeldeamt or anyone else having information about the
filling out of the Wehrpass.
'd, Any PW who worked at one of the economic services
such as Wirtschaftskammer, Wirtschaftsamt, Ernahrungeamt,
Arbeitsamt.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
U
VOL, 6
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
LABOR DIVISION
305
"e, PWs previously discharged and .then reinducted.
"f, rWs with recent knowledge of living conditions in
Koln, Dusselsoft, Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt, Hannover,
Perlin, Kassel,. Mainz, Huneter, Mannheim, Ludwigshafen
Koblenz, Karlsruhe, Stuttgart Freiburg, Lorrach, Schaffhausem, Cities of the Rr�
lg. PWs with information regarding: Foreign workers,
especially with respect to Verbindungsmanner; OT; Arbeits-
battaillon L; draft deferment; railroad travel restric-
tions; restricted areas near the front (Rotezone); Nazi
preparations for underground activity after defeat; special
Nazi organizations such as Einsatzstaffeln and Einsatz-
sturme.
PWs recently inducted from the following civilian
occupations; Civil Service, Farming, Skilled Handicrafts.
0i. Former members of German Trade Unions "Preis und
Christliche Gewerkschaften).
"J. Any PW who fought on the Republican side in the
Spanish Civil War," (321)
�
Sixteen Bach reports of the most useful type were ob-
tained during this period. The reports included informa-
tion on changes in living conditions of foreign workers
in Germany, priority codes in German production and freight
traffic, ease histories of Belgian, Dutch and French work-
ers in Germany, living conditions and controls in various
large German cities, Wehrmacht furlough and service Pro-
cedures, and a report on special control by Wehrmacht per-
sonnel operating in civilian clothes on trains.
By the beginning of February Watt had more Bach material
In note form than he had time to process. In early Febru-
ary three reports were considered unusually important: An
analysis or the German eoldbuch and an analysis of the
German military travel papers which at that time had only
recently been changed. A third report on the Sipo and Ges-
tapo was pronounced by Horton of the Reports Division as
�the most comprehensive he has yet seen on the subject.' (322)
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
VOL. 6 LABDR DIVISION
306
February produced more Bach reports than any other
month Watt had been operating, 41 in all. These included
reports on living conditions in 15 major German cities.
Information on the.Wehrmacht foreign workers, trade defer-
ments from military service, military service, documenta-
tion and case stories
trols. The Bach work
March.
In April the entire Bach
dispatching the eight agents
missions. They did not have
of German civilians and labor con-
continued along the same lines during
personnel were occupied in
included in the five planned
time therefore to do a great
deal of Bach work and furthermore, it seemed increasingly
clear that the bulk of the job was substantially accomplished.
Captain Watt commented that as the front line moved rapidly
forward, it became almost impossible to perform Bach intel-
ligence work from a "very rear area'. Captain Watt wrote
Mr. Pratt that the WiT and J/E teams at that time operating
could turn in.the best Bach intelligence.
In summary, during the period the detachment was actually
engaged in obtaining Bach intelligence, 174 individual reports
averaging 31 pages each were prepared and submitted. The
bulk of these were prepared during the four months from 1
December 1944 through 31 March 1945, In addition a very
large ,quantity of documents, both blanks and filled in
samples, were obtained and sent to London, along with a
considerable number of text books, collections of laws,
official codes, etc.1. having to do with conditions and
regulations of all kinds in Nazi Germany, (323)
Watt's general conclusion on Bach work was that a
� (323) Memo Watt to Pratt 28 Hay 45.
, Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
LABOR DIVISION
307
detachment.such as his could not possibly cover all the
available Bach intelligence, Dimply because the number of
the personnel was too small. He suggested that a Bach
intelligence man be assigned to each of: the OSS army detachments, after having been trained for about two weeks Under
a Bach speoialist. He felt that coverage over a wide front
was essential to really efficient operations. While his ,
detachment was always occupied full-time, it was never able
to exhaust all possibilities, even while it was close to
the front.
Missions Planned.
The Field Base "C" Detachment had three missions which
actually got into Germany: the Faro mission, which was
parachuted near Plauen and which was an outstanding success;
the Eclipse mission, which was infiltrated from Switzerland
and which unfortunately was not a success owing to the
personal failure of the agent; and the Comet mission, which
crossed the lines into occupied Holland but found that
conditions were such that the agent had to turn back. (324)
In addition to the missions that were actually infil-
trated Captain Watt developed four other missions which,
owing partly to bad luck and partly to the lateness with
which they were begun, were never used, These were Sunspot,
TyThoon, Hurricane and Yonsoon.
Sunspot. The Ounspot agent was student .
name Etat), 51, a German born resident of Brussels, Belgium,
whose motivation seemed to be that of obtaining Belgian
citizenship. He was initially contacted by Lieutenant
Henry De Geynet. This agent was supposed to be infiltrated
(324) Details of the Faro and Eclipse missions will be
� ' found on pp.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664)
LABOR DIVISION
VOL. 6
308
into Holland and from there to make his way to the Ruhr.
He was to report intelligence by returning.at the end of
two months to Belgium. He had been completely security
cleared by 18 March but unfortunately, owing to radical
change in the military circumatances'and a liberal supply
of bad luck, the mission was cancelled early in April The
British offensive in the Dutch area was at that time just
getting under way and it was felt that any agent who had
been living in the rear areas of the armies would know too
much to be risked in enemy territory. The plan had been
fOr him to infiltrate on 20 March but the mission was re-
fused for security reasons. Furthermore the Ruhr area
was by that time very nearly cut off and there seemed no
point in sending the man in. The agent however, was offered
to the Twilight program late in April. He subsequently
produced outstanding reports under the post-hostilitiee
program. (325)
Tvohoon. The Typhoon agents were, �p - 30, a
Luxembourger, born in Esch on Alsett, Luxembourg, whose
student name was John,
whose student
name was Walter, was born in Mainz, Germany, and was re:-
cruited by Lieutenant Hoxter and Hauser during a visit to
AaChen in February. He was a communist and was therefore
anti-Nazi on ideological grounds. His motivation was
political.
Three pin-points were worked out for the Typhon mis-
sion: Mainz, Giessen and Magdeburg. A combination of
diabolical timing, of 'dad weather and rapid military ad-
vances, Made it necessary to discard all three, despite
(325) Memo Watt to Shepardson Att. Brooks, 1 Sep 45
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
LABOR DIVISION
309
VOL. 6
the fact that the agents were ready for a period of weeks.
The WIT operator, John, was returned to his home in Luxem-
bourg, and the agents Walter, originally scheduled for Twi-
light; committed so many breaches of security that he was
disqualified and finally turned over to Area 0V" for safe
keeping.
Hurricane. The Hurricane mission was originally planned
as a series of coordinated tourist type missions. _The men
1
were Jean Artur
Andrew Peter, a fourth man,
'whose name does not appear in the records, was 'dropped .
early in the program. The idea was for Jean and.Artur to
follow one route, Andrew a second and Peter a third. The
plan of the mission, was drawn up with the cooperation of the
12th Army Group. The area involved was to be east and
north of Kassel. However weather during the last half of
the moon period prevented dispatch, which was to be by air
from Dijon. The agents, with the exception of Peter,
arrived in Dijon but were never dispatched although two
of them, Jean and Artur, were flown over the pin-point.
These two were subsequently returned to their homes.
Monsoon. Agent Andrew of the Hurricane mission was
alerted late in April to go on a mission into the redout
area with JIE equipment. The mission was cancelled at the
same time as the Hurricane project. The agent Andrew was
turned over to the Twilight group.
The Comet Mission. The Comet mission was submitted
to Mr. George Pratt for approval in a memo dated 12 March
1945, and involve
(student name Jack), 52,
born in Hamburg. The .original plan for the Comet mission
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 ) �
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
310
called for sending this former German labor leader into
Bremen and Hamburg for the purpose of obtaining intelligence.
The particular type of intelligence he was to get was, it
was thought, to be of a long range character. He was to .
concentrate on obtaining information on Nazi personnel and
post collapse organizaticna plans for the occupation period,
particularly such information as Would assist.in the smash-
ing of all post-war Nazi activities in the Hamburg area.
Arrangements were made with Melanie to have the agent in-
filtrated into occupied Holland through a Dutch resistance
chain,. and the departure date was set for 5 April. The
agent was successfully infiltrated on 6 April. However,
once on the other side he discovered that the railway line
runring east into Germany was cut, that military motor
traffic was virtually non-existent and that eince the begin-
ning of the Allied offensive German military personnel no
longer travelled singly but always by units. These fact,
which were apparently unknown to the Dutch intelligence.
officers on the Allied side, made it appear very unlikely
to the agent that he could get through to Bremen success-
fully. He felt that he stood a good chance of being bottled
up with the German units in western Holland. The agent re-
porled that his underground contact on the other side of
the line advised him to return. Captain Watt commented
that in view of the very possible interpretation that the
agent backed down for no good reason at the last minute,
the entire operation would be investigated. However, the
war advanced at such a speed that the entire question be-
came academic. The agent was finally used in the Twilight
program.
1_
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
311
14alson with Other Units
During the January-May period, Captain Watt maintained
very close relationships with the HO field detachment, the
9th Army Detachment, and the 12th Army Group Detachments
of O$S. He furthermore maintained cordial relationships
with the Espinette and the Melanie missions of OSS. In
the middle of February, Colonel Colby at 12th Army Group
Forward called a meeting to coordinate the activities of
the various OSS detachments. Resultihg from this meeting
was an agreement that all Bach intelligence should be
shared with the various detachments interested. This had
been done informally before but it now became a more regu-
lar practice. Captain Watt was able to assist the 9th Army
OSS Detachment by helping to screen PWs for possible short-
range line infiltration. Captain Watt's detachment also
made available to the 9th Army Detachment facilities for
forging documents for 9th Army missions without utilizing
the London facilities, -which ordinarily involved a consider-
able delay. The technical problem of entries on the docu-
ments was solved for the 9th Army Detachment by constant
consultation with Hoxter.
The Twilight Program.
In February the Field Base C personnel were concerned
with special problems of the Potomac-Twilight project. It
devolved on Captain Watt to arrange and clear the intro-
duction of the Twilight personnel into territory In Which
they could operate. This was an extremely difficult matter
because no clear directive or approval had ever been given
for the Twilight project as a whole. It was thought at
first by Captain Watt that he Could attach the Twilight '
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
)
VOL. 6
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
LABOR DIVISION
a12
personnel to the T-forces which were in early Xarch await-
ing to ga into Cologne and Bonn whenever those cities were
captured. Unfortunately according to Captain Watt the T-
forces were something of a political football themselves-
and it was found necessary later on for Captain Watt to
disassociate the Twilight personnel from the T-forces and
forward them on their own with their own communications
and their own transportation. This involved long periods
of waiting on the part of the personnel and long and seem-
ingly pointless conferences on the part of Captain Watt with
various authorities, in order to get permission for the
Twilight personnel to operate. Captain Watt discovered
that the Twilight program had no clear agreement with CIC
and military government as to what the limitations of au-
thority and functions were to be. This led to endless
trouble but the trouble was finally overcome and by 10
April the Twilight personnel were operating in Bonn and
Cologne. Full details of the Twilight operation will be
found below. 026)
Other SoecAal Problems.
Captain Watt had problems with respect to personnel
sirLilpa to those Lieutenant Jolts had in Paris. He spent
considerable time and energy attempting to obtain promo-
tions for his enlisted personnel, but largely without suc-
cess.
Intelligence Procured.
Despite the fact that Field Base C was not set up
primarily to obtain intelligence, a number of reports were
forwarded to Paris. Many of the Bach reports which were
(326) P this volume.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
,
'Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
313
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
prepared primarily for briefing and cover story purposes
were found to have value as general intelligence reports.
A list of all Field Base C reports accessioned by the SI
Regiatry, Paris follows:
January
a) Hitler Youth Training School.
b A report on Koln.
c The Reichsarbeitedienst.
d German Army Discharges.
C Financial relief for German war veterans.
f City of Leipzig - A cafe for foreigners.
g) German Inland Waterways - the use of Belgian Seamen.
1;) Information On Transporteflotte Speer.
) Organization of the Interpreters Service in the
German Army.
j) Report on Arbeits Battaillon "L".
k) Priority Codes in German War Production and Freight
Traffic.
1) Recent changes in living conditions of Foreign
Workers in Germany.
m) Case History of a Belgian Worker in Karlsruhe.
n) Case History of a Belgian Worker in Arbeits
Battaillon "L".
0) Gestapo Arrest Statistics.
p) Living Conditions and Controls in Dusseldorf.
(1) Classification of Casualties -- Germany.
r) Germany -- Case History of a Luftwaffe Techniches
Personnel stationed at Fligerhorst Kohlberg.
s) Germany - Wehrmaoht Furlough and Service Trips.
t) Germany - Living Conditions in Hamburg.
u) Germany - Fahndungsdienst, Character and Purpose,
v) Germany - Living conditions in Koln during Dec. 14.
w) Germany - Case History of an OT man in the medical
service.
s) Germany - Report re change to Gauarbeitsamter.
y) Controls in Germany - 4 page report.
February
a) Living Conditions in Hamburg.
b) Living Conditions in Essen.
c) Case History of a Belgian OT man.
d) Germany. Consolidated and comprehensive report
on structure, personalities and activities of the Sicher-
heitspolizei and the Gestapo in Belgium.
e) Germany. German Army Soldbuch - complete detailed
report from documentation standpoint.
f) Belgium/Germany. Legion Speer, Case History of
a Belgian Worker.
After February the Bach intelligence reports became
more and more technical and were not thought by the SI
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
14
Reports Division in Paris to be of general enough interest
to be accessioned and disseminated by Paris.
personnel �
� Following is a-liet of the personnel who participated
in the activities of Field Base C during the period 1 Jan-
uary through 12 May 1945. All of these men were not there
at one time and there was a considerable turnover in per-
sonnel. The average else of the detachment was between
twelve and twenty.
Lieutenant Gould was with the detachment for about a
month in April and participated in the trips to Central
Germany for the purpose of setting up worth while contacts.
Lieutenant Margolies came to Field Base C in March to
initiate the Potomac project in Bonn and Cologne. He re-
mained after the completion of this project, to work on the
first stages of the occupation Twilight plan for Germany.
Lieutenant Auerbach came in April and worked on the
first stages of the Twilight project.
Lieutenant Hoxter directed Bach work and carried a
large share of the agent handling burden throughout this
period, He.did an excellent job and was finally commis-
sioned in April.
Lieutenants Ebeling, Sohonfeld and Hollstein came in
March as Potomac project agents. They remained and became
valuable staff officere in carrying out the occupation.
Lieutenant Saerchinger came in March and participated '
in the. Potomac project with Lieutenant Margolies and worked
on the opening stages of the Niught program.
Lieutenant (jg) Schocken served as one of the Potomac
project agents.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
315
Lieutenant Rancourt came in February and worked prin-
cipally on developing a number of missions during the last
stagEs of the war. He also assisted in Bach work.
�.Lieutenants Profant, Casali and .Muller were with the -
detachment throughout this period and did valuable work .
in recruiting and handling agent personnel and in carrying .
on Bach activities.
Mr. Gottesmann came in February and remained until
April. During this period he assisted waterially in de-
veloping four or five missions which the sudden end to
hostilities, together with a supply of bad luck and bad
weather, rendered inoperative.
. Corporal Bravmann came in April and assisted in the
beginnings of the Twilight project.
Corporal Metal was with the detachment throughout the
period and did valuable Bach, documents, and agent training
work,
Corporal Rawle came in February and remained until
the end of hostilities. He performed some very valuable
Bach work and proved to be very adept at handling agent
personnel.
Private First Class Pfister was with the detachment
throughOut the period and worked chiefly on Bach activities.
Lieutenant Lewis was Administrative Officer until
April. When he left he was succeeded by Captain Lehto.
Private_ First Class Scattoreggie served as clerk-
typist and detachment clerk throughout the period.
The Motor Pool was handled throughout this period
by Teo 3 Cooper assisted by Private First Cia'ss MegiiI,
The balance of the personnel listed under the Motor Pool
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
316
served as drivers.
Communications were handled by Lieutenant Kelso, He.
was succeeded in April by Technical Sergeant Jamison. The
other personnel in the communications section served at
various times during this period as radio operators.
Captain Watt noted: In assessing the work of these
men during this period, it is fair to say that the great
majority of them did an excellent job, but I ahould par-
ticularly like to commend Lieutenant Hoxter and Corporal
Rawle for their outstanding work during the months from
January to May. (327)
FIELD BASE C PERSONNEL
Intelligence Staff
Captain Richard F. Watt, ORD
First Lieutenant Joseph Gould, Inf.
Second Lieutenant Daniel Margolies, AUS
Second Lieutenant Carl Auerbach, AUS
Second Lieutenant Siegfried Hoxter, AUS
Second Lieutenant Hermann Ebeling, AUS
Second Lieutenant Otto Schonfeld, AUS
Second Lieutenant Hans Hollstein, AUS
Second Lieutenant Eugene Saerdhinger, AUS
Lieutenant (jg) Thomas Schocken, USNR
Second Lieutenant Philip I. Rancourt, AUS
Second Lieutenant Henri De Geynst.(French Army)
Second Lieutenant Wenzel Profant (Belgian Army
Second Lieutenant Armand Casali (Belgian Army
Second Lieutenant Robert Muller (Belgian Army)
Mr. Gustaw Gottesmann (civilian)
Corporal Julius Bravemann
Corporal Nicholas Metal
Corporal David Rawle
Private First Class Otto Pfister
Administrative and Services
Captain Kauno Lebto, CAC
First Lieutenant Raymond Lewis, AG
Private First Class John Ocatoreggio
Transport (Motor Pool)
Teo 3 William Cooper
Plc William T. Megill
(327) Memo Watt to Ohenardson, 1 Sep 45
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
'
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
317
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
Private First Class Lawrence Dergheimer
Private First Class Leeland Farwon
Private First Class Donald Obenshain
Private First Class Everett Eller
Private First Class Charles Thompson
Private First Class Johnnie Montgomery
Private First Class Edgar Leveillee
' Communications
First Lieutenant Andrew Melso, Sig 0
Technical Sergeant Theodore Jamison
Tee 4 Paul Jarvela
Tee 4 John Guba
Tee 6 William Patterson
Private First Class John Stelling
Private Wallace De Ponio
THE SWEDISH BASE
Introduction
The January-May 1945 period of the Swedish Base of
the Labor Divition was one of intense activity as the earl-
ier groundwork began to bear fruit in every direction,
From the point of view of the production of intelligence
the work of the Labor Division in contacting Left political
and Trade Union groups for information was the most signi-
ficant. Although the missions planned for the penetration -
of Germany did not produce intelligence they established
the Important fact that left and labor groups could be used
in Sweden to operate agents inside Germany. The outstanding
achievement of the Swedish Labor Division in 1945 was a
penetration of the German Legation in Stockholm by Mr.
Dorfman as a result of which he obtained copies of cables
between the German Minister and the German Foreign Office,
sometimes before these cables were actually sent. The
background and beginnings of the Labor mission in Stock-
holm have -already been described, (320
(32.8) Pp 224-231 this volume.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
318
;ntelligence Procurement
. The intelligence potential of the left and labor
groups in Sweden was on the whole a disappointment to Mr.
Dorfman and Xiss Traugott. This was because the expecta-
tions of the Labor Division were too.bigh, in the opinion '
of Miss Traugott. They had the impression that communists
and trade unionists in Sweden had direct and continuing
contact with Germany. This was not true. Jr 1941 the
left and labor groups had voluntarily broken off all con-
nections of any kind with Germany in order to forestall
Government pressure in that direction. They felt that
contacts of German refugees with Germany might provoke
hostile military action on the part of the Nazis against
Sweden. But although the left and labor groups did not
have contacts with Germany, or with any other part of Europe
for that matter, they were extremely cooperative. The men
who worked closely with Miss Traugott and Mr. Dorfman did
so mainly out of political conviction. In addition they
frankly hoped that working with Americans would enable them
later to return to Germany and carry on their political .
activities. They were made to realize at an early drAe,
however, that Mr. Dorfman and Miss Traugott had no author-
ity whatever to promise any sort of post-war aid. Never-
theless they continued to cooperate.
The intelligence the Labor Division gathered in Stock-
holm came mainly from Norwegian and German seamen travel-
ling to Sweden Who had contacts in the Swedish labor move-
ment, The Swedish Trade Unionieto with Whom Mr. Dorfman
worked would hear of the arrival of these men and report
their presence. A further source was the not inconsiderable
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
VOL. 6 LA3OR DIVISION
319
stream of refugees escaping from Germany through Denmark.
Another source of intelligence was the Norwegian Trade
Unionists who could be counted upon to produce reliable
intelligence on Norway.
German refugees were useful as sources of background.
material. It will be recalled that Mr. Pratt in 1943 had
found the German refugees in England a useful source of
background material on political developments in Germany.
Like Mr. Pratt in England, Mr. Dorfman and Miss Traugott
could go to the refugees in Sweden with a news story and
ask the opinion of the refugees as to what ameant in
terms of conditions in Germany. A complete list of the
intelligence accessioned by the London SI Registry from
Stockholm labor sources will be found below. Miss Traugott
made the statement that the reports obtained from left
sourcea proved to be on the Whole thoroughly reliable. (329)
An important contribution was made by the Labor Divi-
sion .Stockholm to the Each briefing section In London.
Stockholm, as has been noted before, vas the source'of
up-to-date German newspapers, so essential to the detailed
research the Each Section was doing. Lieutenant Teper
sent frequent directives to Stockholm requesting special-
ized information for Each purposes.
As in all neutral countries, Mr. Dorfman and Miss
Traugott experienced difficulties In operating necessitated
by the conditions of security under which they had worked,
It was just as neceosary to use cut-oute in Sweden as it
was in enemy occupied and enemy countries. For one thing,
all Germane who came to Sweden were followed by members
(529) Intv with Traugott 27 Jul 45
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 ) 320 ,
VOL. 6
LA30R DIVISION
of the Gestapo wherever they went. It was therefore nec-,
essary for Mr. Dorfman to make certain that there was never
any visible contact between himself and his sources of
information. He used about four or five regular contacts.
who were on the payroll of 055, and several others who
worked as cut-outs occasionally. When Mr. Dorfman and ,
Miss Traugott first arrived in Stockholl in July 1944,
they had to contend with the Swedish police,, who had been
penetrated by the Germans and were working against the
Allied governments. (330) Later as the war progressed this
swung around until the Swedish Secret Police cooperated
fairly fully with the Allied governments. Hceiever, Mr.
Dorfman commented that the Swedish police could never be
trusZed and only cooperated on a strictly gui pro quo
basis. In actual practice the sources of information. would
be seen and interviewed by Mr. Dorfmanfs cut-outs, who
would in turn report the information to Mr. Dorfman.
Penetration of the German Legation. (331) .
In the latter part of March 1945, through 'a Sudeten-
German trade unionist and.socialist, Mr. Dorfman made con-
tact with (he
of the German Legation. The third time Mr. Dorfman and
met (about 15 April) Mr. Dorfman obtained from
him detailed drawings of the code machine then in use in
his office, together with a roll of the code strip.
Mr. Dorfman was advised by Mr. Tikander that there
was a directive prohibiting OSS personnel from obtaining
codes of foreign powers. It was, however, finally deter-
mined to send the material to X-2 in Washington.
(330) Intv with Dorfman Jun 45
(331) Memo Dorfman to Donovan 23 May 45.
. Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 CO0026664
VOL. 6
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
LABOR DIVISION
321
In the latter part of April Mr. Dorfman obtained from
he substance or exact wordlng of several cablee,
sent and received by the Legation. One of them vas from
Admiral Doenits to the German Minister asking that they
meet in Lubeck. The Minister replied in effect that he
lacked the means to do so. Some of the other cables were
between the German authorities in Denmark and Norway and
the Military Attache of the Legation In Stockholm, telling
of plans and attitudes about the then certain surrender.
.There were two especially important items. One was
a cable about 3 May from the German Minister to the Gee-
tapo chief in Norway stating that the two and others would
meet at noon the following day in Charlottenburg (near the
Norwegian-Swedish border) to discuss the capitulation of
German troops in Norway. The cable named the German repre-
sentative participating in the capitulation and etated
that the negotiations were almost completed. Mr. Dorfman
received this cable about one hour after it was dictated
and about two hous before it was transmitted to Norway..'
He was also advised that the German Minister had just left
to keep the appointment.
The second important piece of intelligence was the
report of a telephone conversation between the commanding
officer of the German troops In Norway and the German Mili-
tary Attache in Stockholm on capitulation day, in which the'''.
former heatedly stated in effect that he would surrender '
to Allied troops only, and that if the Norwegian police'
(trained in Sweden) or members of the Norwegian underground
should attempt to take control in Norway he would order his
men, to resist by forte of arms.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
)
VOL.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
LABOR DIVISION
322
The motivation of the Sudeten-German� Mr, .Dorfman
said, was chiefly that he wanted to save his own Skin.. Also
later it developed that he had no love for the Nazis. The
procedure of delivering the information was somewhat compli-
cated.
would call Mr. Dorfman's home from
outside the German. Legation and arrange a meeting at Mx.
Dorfman's cover apartment. At the meeting copies of the
telegrams would be handed over or the telegrams would be
repeated from memory. In this case Mr. Dorfman handled
all contacts personally.
The intelligence obtained through this channel was
not disseminated to OSS. Mr; Tikander, the chief of the
OSS mission, told Mr. Dorfman that the Minister was per-
sonally handling all matters relating to the capitulation
negotiations in Sweden and was reporting directly to Presi-
dent Truman. The two main items noted above were trans-
mitted to the President. OSS London had no, know/edge of
the intelligence resulting from Mr. Dorfman's work. (332)
Agent Ooerations from Sweden
According to the estimates of both Mr. George Pratt
and Mr. Dorfman the SI staff in Stockholm was not opera-
tionally minded vis-a-vis Germany. This stemmed from the
same psychological impediment that for a long time in part
delayed agent operations into Germany from London. ,When .
the Labor Division representatives arrived in Stockholm.,
virtually nothing had been done by SI to infiltrate agents
into Germany. At that time Swedish Ships were plying to
German ports and it seemed logical to Mr. Dorfman they
were and always had been an obvioui means of smuggling
(332) Intv with Dorfman 3 .Jun 45
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 600026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
az3
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
people into Germany. There were no facilities for forg-
ing documents or training or equipping agents in OSS Stock-
holm, MEE Traugott remarked tnet the penetration of
Germany if it had been begun earlier could have been on
quite a large scale./ She noted that she had come across
evidence that the Russian government had established an
excellent system of getting people into Germany. Agents
would return to Stockholm and be completely reequipped
with a new set of papers and return to Germany within 24
hours. Miss Traugott said she could see no reason why
OSS could not have achieved an equal volume.
The British were successful in building an excellent
network into Denmark, but they attached conditions to the
use of their lines by OBS agents. The main condition was
that any agents that were sent into Germany along their
lines either must be their own agents or must be developed
under joint British-American projects. This was agreed to
by Mr..Tikander. However, Miss Traugott and Mr. Dorfman
felt that operating with the British in this way would not
be satisfactory. The reason for this was that there was
a basic policy difference between the Labor Division and
the British organizations. The British did not want to
use, and in fact would not use, communists and other left
groups. Mies Traugott and Mr. Dorfman therefore felt that
if they attempted to build missions around leftists they
would find it difficult to get cooperation. They there-
;ore preferred to carry on their own missions. Their dif-
ficulties were increased by a ruling Which it first was
laid down by the chief of mission forbidding any OSS opera-
tions In Denmark, except those that went through Britieh hands.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
324
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
Toward the end of 1944 Mr. Dorfman had made contacts
with socialists, social democrats and trade unionists,
and Miss Traugott had made similar contacts with left
groups leading toward building a channel through Denmark
into Germany. The main idea, as mentioned above, had been
to use Swedish ships. This was unfortunately knocked out
very shortly after Mr. Dorfman arrived when the Swedes
removed all insurance guarantees on their ships going to
Germany. This stopped all Swedish traffic. Mr. Dorfman
thereafter concentrated on Norwegian ships and on Denmark.
At the turn of the year, however, an administrative
decision was made by Mr. Mender that all communications
into Germany would be centered in the hands of Mr. Erichsen
in the SO Branch. Mr. Dorfman was told to drop the contacts
that he had begun to make. He received an assurance from
SO that transportation would be provided for his agents
as soon as his agents were ready. However, when the test
came in early 1945, the transportation channels which SO
had promised to develop did not materialize and Mr. Dorf-
man had to go back and pick up his contacts again in order
to get his agents in. This delayed.Yr. Dorfman's entire
agent program considerably. (333)
Mr. Dorfman had no major difficulties building up a
channel through the Danish underground. He found that,
reduced to essentials, it was simply a matter of paying
enough money. Each Dane he contacted would sag that he
could take full responsibility all down the line, and Mr.
Dorfman would pay him for this. It would then develop
after the payment had been made that there were at least
� (333) Intv with Dorfman 3 IT= 45 .
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
an�
. .
325
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
two other jurisdictions through which the agents would have
to pass who also needed to be paid substantial sums; but
despite the fact that they cost a lot, the Danes did the
job they were asked to do extremely competently. (334)
missions..
There were six agent infiltration missions planned by
the Stockholm Labor Division in 1945. Four of the missions
were dispatched, three of them unfortunately too late to
produce intelligence. One of the missions was for the Twi-
light project and was dispatched in good time.
Goethe Mission. The background of this mission is to
be found elsewhere in the War Diary. (335) Goethe, whose
real name was was one of the agents
who did not get off. Her papers were ordered from the Bach
Section in London. They arrived after two months delay and
when they did arrive it was discovered that they were com-'
pletely unusable. One document showed the agentss birth
date to be in a certain month, another document showed the
birth date to be in another month. Dues stamps in 0. third
document were put in in the wrong place so that they com-
pletely invalidated the cover story. In the end,. however,
the Goethe agent :,became very ill, and the mission bad to
be cancelled. (336)
Brahma Mission. The background of the Brahma mission
is described elsewhere. (337) It will be recalled that the
Brahma' agent was to go to Hamburg and was actually dis-
patched safely in a German ship, His real name weal.",
He was 26, born in Sweden and a member of a
Swedish trade union. He was expected to return to Stock-
(334) Intv. wiVh.Dorfman 3 Jun 45
($39 Pp 270-271, this volume
(336 Intv with Dorfman 3 Jun 45 .
�(337) pp Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
two other iteogysove_d_for,Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664ent s would have
to pass who also needed to be paid substantial sums; but
despite the fact that they cost a lot, the Dance did the
job they were asked to do extremely competently. (334)
Missions
There were six agent infiltration missions planned by
the Stockholm Labor Division in 1945. Four of the missions
were dispatched, three of them unfortunately too late to
produce intelligence. One of the missions was for the Twi-
light project and.was dispatched in good time.
Goethe Mission. The background of this mission IS to
be found elsewhere in the War Diary. (335) Goethe, whose
real name was was one of the agents
who did not get off. Her papers were ordered from the Bach
Section in London. They arrived after two months delay and
when they did arrive it was discovered that they were com-
pletely unusable. One document showed the agent's birth
date to be in a certain month, another document showed the
birth date to be in another month. Dues stamps in a third
document were put in in the wrong place so that they com-
pletely invalidated the cover story. In the endj however,
the Goethe agent:bccame very ill, and the mission had to
be cancelled, (336)
Brahma Mission. The background of the Brahma mission
is described elsewhere. (337) It will be recalled that the
Brahma' agent was to go to Hamburg and. was actually dis-
patched saely in a German ship. His real name waseat
He was 26, born in Sweden and a member of a
Swedish trade union. He was expected to return to Stock-
(334) Intv.with.Dorfman 3 Jun 45
(33q Pp 270-2710 this volume
(336 Intv with Dorfman 3 Jun 45
'(37) Pp 272-273, this volume
___Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664�
VOL. 6
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664)
LABOR DIVISION
�
326
holm in person with reports of left wing organizations' In
Hamburg. By the end of July 1945 he had not returned and
despite investigation in the Hamburg area no news of him
had been received.
Schiller Mission. The background of the Schiller
mission is told briefly elsewhere, (338) The Schiller
agent was
born in Dresden in 1913,
stateless but formerly German. He was briefed in Stock-
holm by Mr. Dorfman and dispatched 27. March via Denmark
for Leipzig. He was by profession and his
'objective was to contact trade unions, social democrats
and other Socialist groups in Berlin or Leipzig for intelli-
gence purposes. He reported once en route to Germany on.
10 April from Padborg, which is on the Danish side of the
Danish-German frontier. He was to communicate by courier
via Denmark and by courier direct from Berlin to Stockholm.
His student name was Kurt Kreibich.
Unfortunately Schiller went too late. He reached the
Danish-German border and, after waiting a couple of days,
was put across the border by Danish underground contacts.
He actually did get into Germany, but when in Germany he -
found himself mixed up with a large number of Danish col-
laborators escaping the vengeance of the Danish underground.
The British, who had reached the Flensberg border by the
time he got there; simply took all the Danish collaborator,
ncluded, and put them back across the Danish bor- �
der, He managed, however, to contact the Danes who had
originally put him across the German border and returned
to Copenhagen with them. He never gave his identity away
(33a)P 272 this volume. '
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
� Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 '
� 327'' �
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
to the British or to the Germans and he subsequently re-
turned to Stockholm safely.
Heine Hisei9n. An extremely interesting mission was
the Heine mission. The agent was
essentially. a refugee. from the 20 July putsch. He had
been deeply involved in it and was to have
If the putsch had been successful. He saw many.
of his friends arrested before the putsch but stayed in
his residence until after the attempt had failed, more or
less, expecting the Gestapo at any moment. They finally
came to his house to arrest him. He fooled them, however,:
with one of the,, oldest stunts In the espionage game,. He
asked them to wait while he went to the toilet. He escaped
out of the window of the toilet, jumped on 'his. bicycle and
rode off to a place where he had previously hidden his car,
and drove up to Denmark. When he ran out of gas he ditched
his car and made an attempt to contact socialists. He was
a business man but a former trade unionist. He got to
Copenhagen and was first directed to the office of the
National Socialists, but later managed to contact, without
any previous knowledge of any Danish underground members,
the resistance movement. These people got him to Sweden
where Swedish trade unionists notified Mr. Dorfman. He
gave Hr. Dorfman one of the most complete accounts of the
20 July putsch received by CBS.
He was to have returned but he became extremely ill
just before he left and the project had to be cancelled. '
Herbert Nieelon.
serted
was
s born in Hamburg '
in 1914. He was a German social democrat.- who de-
in,Sweden in September 1944. He was
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 ) '
328
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
recruited with the aid of the ITF. Hia objective was to.
contact trade union and social democratic groups .in Hamburg
for intelligence purposes. He was dispatched via Denmark on
18 February and Mr. Dorfman was informed that he arrived
safely. He was to report back by courier via Denmark. He
was specially briefed by an intelligence directive re Ham- -
burg, received in Stockholm 18 January.
When the British entered Hamburg they found
in prison awaiting execution by the Germans as a spy.
told them that he had worked with the American
government in Stockholm and the British sent a cable to
Stockholm to check his statement. Unfortunately, the
Stockholm Legation replied that they had never heard of
despite the fact that Miss Traugott had left com-
plete information about him in her files. However, luckily-
Captain Watt heard about the case and managed to.rescue
�
Carl Sehurz Mission. This consisted of four German
refugee trade unionists who were dispatched to Captain
Watt in Belgium for use in the Twilight project.,.. The names'
of these agents are not available in the London files.
They were never dispatched.
Reports - January to May 1945
Germany. Attitude of higher officials in Germany
toward the war and Allied relations; management, direction,
production, and subsidiaries of A/S Nordag in Oslo; loca-
tion and description of powder and explosive factory in
Sweden; creation of Deutsche DemAratische Verelinigung and
National Kommittee Freies Deutschland In Sweden, Effect
of German sabotage on Norwegian and Swedish morale; four
copies of Alt For Norge.
Sweden, Germany. German groups in Slieden. Transla-
tion of article in the March issue cf oSocialistieche
Tribune" which Is a good description of the political align-
ments in the German refugee colony Stockholm.' Batch of
newspapers and one periodical.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C000266.64
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
329
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
Germany/Denmark. Various subjects, concerning ships
in Halsingborg and information concerning Germany from
crew and reports on maritime traffic in Norwegian ports
and letter for German deeerter showing mentality.
Germany/Norway/Sweden. 8 reports in original by.
Trade Unionists.
Germany/Sweden. Communism in post-War Sweden, wage
policy, circumstances re resignation of Dr. Hodann of the
Free German Kulturbund, Sweden.
Germany/Saleden. Various reports on location of muni-
tions, morale among workers in Hamburg, underground poison
gas factory at Krummel nr. Hamburg.
permany/Norway. Military, Naval, and industrial infor-
mation on Hamburg, Kiel, and German "Storm-boats" moved
to Norway.
Garmanv/Norway. Miscellaneous reports on ships in
Hammerfest, machinery shipped to Kiel and Hamburg, report
from Mr. Oeldenbroek, copies of Seefahrtsbuah.
Germany/Denmark. Miscellaneous reports on Stettin,
Kiel, Braunschweig, Chemnitz, and Essen-Nahlhelm.
Germany. Situation In Germany, political and economic.
Sweden. Possible military intervention by Sweden
against the German army of occupation in Norway; Sweden
"does not wish to kick Germany when it is down", but con-
sidera liberating Norway if asked to do so via SHAEF.
VOky&Y. List of certain German Nazis In Norway,
certain Norwegian Nazis in Norway, certain Berlin Nazis.
Germany. Location and description of underground
V-2 factory, railway repair shop, North Germanys largest
freight station, important point for trans-shipment of
freight involving inland waterway ships and motorboats,
rail and truck transport, companies engaged In this trans-
shipment business or in tha servicing thereof, and their
equipment; factory for electrical motors, accumulators
and Naval equipment. Document in German. Map of Hamburg
with legend attached.
Germany. Berlin bomb damage, its effect upon admin-
istration and transport; morale.
Germany. Sea and land plane base near Travemunde;
landing boats and other ships in harbor. Powder factory
at Herrenvik. Loading piers. Shipyards at Lubeck. Ar-
rival of material. Naval vessels in Warnemunde. No German
boats arrived at Swedish ports in February.
porway. Anti-Nazi placards in Oslo; transfer of Lt.
Col. Ritter von 008s from Oelo to Berlin; storage of auto
tires in silver mines; location of gasmask warehouse.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
aao
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
Vorway. A/5 Vordag Oslo: names of men in charge,number
and nationality of workers; location and production of
branches, transport used by company.
Germany. Attitude of German workers; complete passiv-
ity, lack of interest of most workers in continuing the war.
Germany. List of Germans in Zuchteus, Hamburg-Fuhls-
buttel, who were particularly brutal; list of men in the
same category in Halle, list of men who had helped or
been decent to the Norwegian prisoners.
Norway. Mobilization of men whose fathers were born
in Germany. German call-up of these men quoted.
germanyl Berlin Mariendorf. People resigned to work-
ing on trenches; morale of troops growing worse; bigh
mortality among refugees, especially the children; commu-
nist group distributing literature; copy of notice sent
out in Mariendorf by Ortsgruppenleiter to all men, women,
and children over 14 for essential work.
Aermany. People less frightened of Soviets, expect
war to be over soon. Rumors of Partisan fighting in Tyrol.
New Communist paper about to appear.
rorway. Troop movements and traffic on Nordland RR,
no troops moved North in period Feb. 4-1? but about 200
motor cars were sent for transport of troops. Description
Of difficulties of civilian travel in Norway.
Germany. Photostatic copy of leaflet issued in Ber-
lin end Feb. by "Flichte" groups, formerly a sports club,
now left wing social democratic groups which believed in
working closely with USSR.
Germany. Berlin: morale attitude towards war and .
USSR; estimate of number of deserters in Berlin; Volkssturm
attitude and activity.
Germany. Legend for DAin-Luebeck Map. AA defences,
factories, storehouses, and depots; underground submarine
base; airfield.
Denmark. Legend for Autokarte, AA defences, Troops,
and installations West Coast.
Germany,. Legent for Map A. Lubeck, section of.
Norway. Location of new underground tunnel construc-
tions in Oslo. Food shortage and morale conditions among
German troops. Plundering by Germans in North Norway.
Germany.. Reaction or German workers to Norwegian
prisoners; attitude of Germans towards the war; factory
workers. Bomb damage in Halle, Resistance passive.
Germany. Location of German cruiser near Bremen.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 600026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 )
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
331
Sweden. Report on organizational activitiet among
German seamen on behalf of ITF.
Norway. Activity of several German troop transports;
3/5/45 and 3/6/45. Germans moving supplies from their
warehouses; seizure of private cars in Bergen; bunker
construction in Oslo; description of German anti-Nati lit-
erature being circulated among German soldiers in Norway.
Germany: Berlin. Resistance groupe, morale, attitude
towards USSR and probable occupation of Berlin; barricades
built by Volkssturm; lack of visible defences on motor
roads between Berlin and Dresden and Lubeck; controls on
recent trip between Denmark and Sweden.
Germany. Location of following industrial establish-
ments in Berlin area and bomb damage as of 3/1/45: Siem-
enswerks, Verinigten Eisenbahn-Signalwerke, Osramwerke,
Firms Klusseldorf, Machinenfabrik Wilhelm Strasse, Das
Heereszeugamt Spandau, Luftfahrtgeratwerk, Shellwerke,
ALG-Werke in Friesack, Deutsche Werke, Spandau, Alkett.
Germany. Experiences of a German technician on trip
from Berlin through Denmark and Sweden. Absence of docu-
mentary controls between Berlin and Warnemunde; refugees
in Mecklenberg area; bomb damage in Rostock; use of soldiers
having only four weeks training in Denmark; appropriation
of coal in Denmark for use of Germans only; stringent bor-
der control at Helsinger.
Germany.. Description of operation of air mast on
U-boats.
Germany. Explanation of use of "Panzerfaust 604 an
anti-tank weapon. "Der Angriff", 24 March 1945.
Germany, Article describing so-called mistreatment
of German population In allied occupied areas.
Germany. SS terror against the people of Konigeberg.
Raa14. Free Germany reports that inhabitants of toun de-
manded surrender. Mass arrests were made. People living
in cellars.
Germany. What do reparations in kind mean? Broadcast
to the German people by Radio Free Germany giving informa-
tion on commission in Moscow and its decision on repara-
tions to be made by Germany after the war. Report from Max
to the ITF. BatCh.of newspapers.
Poland/Germany. The reconstruction of Warsaw. Broad-
cast by radio Free Germany, speaker; Leopold Achilles,
appeal to all Germany to end the war and so stop the further
destruction of German cities.
Sweden. Description of attempt in Sweden to whitewash
and gain sympathy for German professional and intellectual
groups who collaborated with the Nazis.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/1.1/14 C00026664 )
332
VOL. 6
LABOR DIVISION
Germany/Sweden. Arrests of German Communists in con-
nection with July 20th attempt on Eltleres life.
porway. Allied air attacks against Alesund, Egereund,
Sanford; rumor of sabotage by German soldiers In Laksevag;
shipping information.
Denmark. Observations concerning conditions in Copen-
hagen Apr. 5, 145. German refugees and wounded soldiers
in Laisevag; shipping information.
Germany. Oranienburg Concentration Camp. Lengthy
report on conditions in this and other concentration camps
by German seaman who was an inmate of Oranienburg C. C.
Names of camp. (In German). 19 pp. Photostatic copy
(negative attached) of a Reisepass used by a German working
in Norway.
�
Germany,. Lubeck: Description of blast furnaces; the
Dornier airplane and speed boat wharf; location of a pro-
vision shore house, Lubeck wharf handling U-boat repairs.
Rostock: Heinkel airplane works, Naptun Whart, Warnemunde;
Warships in harbor; description and location of A.A. guns.
Stralsund; Location of grain sheds and Marine Barracks.
NorwaY. Translation of a circular which the Norwegian
State. Railways have had to send to all personnel, by order
of the Germans.
Aermanari To the German soldiers. Summary and original
text of broadcast made by shoe-maker Xax Emmendorfer, Vice
President, Committee Free Germany.
Garmanyi Armed combat groups against Hitler. Sammary
and original text of broadcast made by Major Lewerenz,
member Free Germany Movement.
Germany. The way to secure peace. Summary and origi-
nal text of broadcast made by Capt. Gunther Kertscher Leip-
zig, member of the Naticnal Committee, Free Germany, threugh
Free Germany Radio.
Germany. Appeal to Berliners. Summary of broadcast
by Germany Radio, Feb. 23, 145.
Germany. To the mayors and minicipal employees, sum-
mary and original broadcast made by Capt. Stegner, acting
mayor, member of the National Committee Free Germany.
Germany. To the rank and file of the NSDAP. Summary
and original broadcast made by Lt. Abell Free Germany,Radio,
Feb, 20, 45, to all members of the NSDAP.
Norway,. Saiviot prisoners of war supposed to have
"gone overm being trained and armed in Norway by the Germans.
�
Germany. Information concerning German ships or ships
available to the Germans.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
3%55
VOL. 6 LABOR DIVISION
Germany. Territory occupied by Soviets. Summary and
original text of broadcast made by Max Emmendorfer, vice
president of the National Committee.
aermany.' Life in German territory occupied by USSR..
Schwerin a.d. rthe, Landberg a.d. Warthe. S.1mmary of
broadcast by Free Germany Radio.
Germany. How must an officer now act l Summary and
original text of broadcast made by Col. Steidle, member
of the national committee, Free Germany.
Germany. Part 1 of a factual study concerning German
National Socialist Economic Organization. 2 copies of
"Sozialaistische Tribune", Apr. $45. A copy a pamphlet
issued by the German Trade Union Group i e0.4n entitled
"Vorschlage zu Problemen des WiederaufL5u in Deutschland",
Some German newspapers.
Germany/Sweden. Letter to ITF, ..ondon, from Irmegaard
Enderle, Concerning Jewish youth anicus to get to Pales-
tine. (German text.)
Germany. Rebuilding of German Educational System.
Suggestions made by former German Rector of High School
Hambkirg (German Text).
Germany. Names and descriptions of those who were in
charge of the concentration camps in Sachsenhausen and
lieuengamme.
Sweden. Text of certain telegram, received In and
sent from the German Legation in Stockholm.
Sweden. People in Halsingborg, suspected of helping
Germans to smuggle property from Germany and Norway into
Sweden. Geri.-an consul in Malmo attempting to control
activities of Swedish citizens. Rumors of German short-
wave radio transmitters in Northern Finland and in Sweden.
Sweden/Germanv. Statement endorsed by the German
Social Democratic Party, the German Trade Union Organiza-
tion, the German Communist Party in Sweden, and the Free
German Kulturbund in Sweden, addressed to Germans freed
from German concentration camps.
germanv. Requested transmission of D.A.F. property
to trustee for future free trade union organizations in
Germany,
Sweden. Description of certain personnel in military
and air attaches offices In the German Legation In Stock-
Sweden. Arrivals in Halsingborg during the month of
April of Norwegians, Danes, Poles and Russians recently
freed from concentration camps in Germany; description of
their condition. Return of certain Swedish nationals from
Germany.
�Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 600026664 -1).
VOL. 6
Norway. Location of wre6.
Names and descriptions of
In certain German concentratlo:
may be named as war criminals.
Names and description of
Names and descriptions of
may be named as war criminals.
. DIVISION
334
.und Oslofjord.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664
o were engaged
ding some who
criminals.
f persons who
.�
,
r ,
t
r:
AT:te IV �
40>
S�';;I;":
4t;
c-
t.;;4
441,4."-1,1
--41.9at
liAftft
VOL.
Approved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664 ) 335
LA130:4 DIVISION
LABOR DIVISION MISSIONS
TYL MISION
Introduction
1,fter the Labor Division's dispatch of the Doonena
mission to the Ruhr, an attempt was made to create an under-
ground railroad along which OSS agents would be infiltrated
into Germany from Holland. This was the Tyl mission of one
agent who was dropped near Ulrum, Holland, on the night of
10 November 1944. (339) The agent was known to everyone as
Bobbie and had one of the most colorful careers of any OSS
agent.
The significance of his mission was twofold. He was to
be the pathfinder for a series of agents penetrating Germany.
But perhaps most important he was a pioneer of the new com-
munications system Joan and Eleinor. It was a critical mis-
sion. Without the proof that Bobble provided that the J/E
system was workable, no further development of it would have
been authorized. (540).
Bobbie operated successfully from 10 rovemter, making
altogether 16 successful J/E contacts between 21 Yoaember and
50 March 1945.
Or 10 February 1945 Bobbie was arrested by the 3estapo
and from thall on operated under duress, until he was finally
' recuperated. Ee was able to warn the base that he was oper-
ating under duress however, and was furthermore able to escape
without being killed.
OSS received a copy of the interrogation of Bobbie by
the Gestapo which made it clear that he had given away to the
Gestapo very little of any importance.
i339 See p. 232 this volume
340 Intv witAPproved for Release: 2022/11/14 C00026664