REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06913620
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-02281
• Publication Date: June 26, 1952

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WATCH COMMITTEE
of the
GENCE ADVLSORY COMMITTEE
Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions
No. 99
From; 19 lune 1952
To : 25 lune 1952
Washington 25, D. C.
26 June 1952
SUMMAR,Y OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD
CONFIDENTIAL'
IQUECIET
SECURITY 'INFORMATION
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7. USSR: In a note to Sweden, the USSR has publicly announced that its air
defense policy is to intercept all foreign aircraft violating the Soviet frontier
and in case of resistance to open fire. Although the several recent attacks
on aircraft which are not known to have violated Soviet territory or Soviet
territorial waters indicate that this policy may be very liberally interpreted,
the failure of Soviet aircraft to fire on some reconnaissance aircraft inter-
cepted near the Soviet coast suggests that the USSR applies some undeter- --
mined criteria of what constitutes a "violation" before an attack is made.
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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS
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2. Indications of Intentions in Europe.
a. SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY.
(1) Baltic Area. The announcement by the East German Government
of the establishment of a restricted zone, three miles in depth, along the Baltic
coast tends to substantiate previous suggestions that a principal reason for the
deployment of Soviet troops to this area is for security purposes. It appears
likely that the elements
hich have moved to the Baltic coast are participating in the establish-
ment of border controls--maimed by East Germans but supervised and rein-
forced by Sdirlet troops. A similar arrangement has been in existence along
the border opposite the Western Zones for several years. There continue to
be reports of amphibious or coastal defense training along the Baltic coast,
however, and it is possible that some of the Soviet troops in the area are there
for such training.
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naval amphibious exercises on
a rather small scale have been held in this area in former years.
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There has been no information, other than from press sources, con-
cerning large-scale Soviet exercises in the Baltic, ancrit remains uncertain
whether the shooting down of the Swedish plane or planes over the Baltic was
connected with these alleged maneuvers (see Watch Committee Report No. 98).
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3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.
SOVIET AIR, INTERCEPTIONS. As previously reported, the reeent in-
crease in Soviet interceptions of, and attacks on, non-Communist aircraft
approaching Soviet-controlled territory points to the adoption of a more aggres-
sive air defense policy (see Watch Committee Report No. 98). This week, in
replying to a Swedish inquiry as to whether Soviet aircraft had fired on the
Swedish DC-3 which disappeared over the Baltic on 13 June, the USSR for the
first time publicly announced its policy with respect to air violations of its
territory. After asserting that Soviet aircraft "never violate the frontiers
of other states," the Soviet note stated that instructions in force in the USSR
provide that, in case of a violation of the state frontier by a foreign aircraft,
Soviet airmen "must force it to land at a local airfield, and in case of resis-
tance to open fire at it." Although the several recent attacks on reconnaissance
and other aircraft which have not actually violated Soviet territory or Soviet
territorial waters indicate that these instructions may be very liberally in-
terpreted, it still appears that the Soviets have some undetermined criteria
of what constitutes a "violation" and apply it before an attack is made.
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Brigadier General, GS
Chairman, Watch Committee
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