BIWEEKLY DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06929976
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2022
• Case Number: F-2018-02251
• Publication Date: August 27, 2002

�
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
27 August 2002
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT:
(U) Biweekly Developments in Iraq
1. No summer doldrums. August has been anything but
slow and September will be even busier as the Administration
rolls out its case for attacking Iraq with our assessment of
Iraq's WMD programs as its centerpiece.
� We are eager to help the policy community make this
case�one that from an intelligence perspective is quite
strong.
� As part of our support and to help policymakers prepare
for the types of challenges our case will face in the
region and at the UN Security Council, we offer a
reminder here of the issues raised by Allies and
regional states when the United States has made these
types of arguments before.
� Keeping these challenges in mind, I offer a suggestion
for bolstering the case.
2. Did& vu all over again. We faced a similar
situation in 1998 when the United States pushed the Security
Council to continue to support intrusive inspections in
order to force Baghdad to live up to its obligations.
� We had physical evidence that nailed the Iraqis in a
big lie: Scud missile warhead fragments unearthed by
UN inspectors in June tested positive for degradation
products from the nerve agent VX, contradicting a long-
standing Iraqi claim that it never weaponized VX.
� The French and the Russians�already skeptical of then
UNSCOM Chairman Butler and frustrated by US insistence
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
ii
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
on maintaining sanctions�tried to discredit the test
results by seizing on the fact that a US lab conducted
them. A subsequent test in a French lab came back
positive, but Paris dismissed the results as
inconclusive. A Swiss test of a much smaller sample
came back negative.
� This issue dragged on for over a year. After
inspectors departed in 1998, Iraq accused UNSCOM of
tainting warhead fragments with VX samples contained in
its Baghdad laboratory. Our good friends the Russians,
French, and Chinese piled onto those accusations in
Security Council sessions in order to undermine the
original test results.
� This episode illustrates how politicized the issue of
Iraq was by the end of UNSCOM. Some of my analysts
joke that inspectors would have had to bring a Scud
missile into Security Council chambers to reverse
French, Russian, and Chinese resistance to US policy
goals on Iraq. That resistance still exists.
3. Body of evidence. The entire Iraq analytic
community is convinced that intelligence reporting firmly
supports the judgment that Saddam is working hard on his WMD
programs. Making this case in the court of public opinion
would be straightforward if the world consisted of
intelligence analysts trained to weigh evidence and make
reasoned inferences about the unknown. Unfortunately (at
least in this circumstance), the world is a more colorful
place.
� Our WMD case is circumstantial: we have a defector who
has described mobile BW labs, but we've never seen one;
there are facilities and pieces of equipment indicative
of long-range missile development, but no nice image of
a Scud; we know Iraq has rebuilt dual-use facilities
capable of producing CW and BW, but we don't know what
is going on inside; Saddam is procuring aluminum tubes
and exhorting his nuclear mujahedin, but we don't have
a centrifuge.
� Faced with a jury full of skeptics, we would be hard
pressed to get a conviction let alone a death sentence
_,SEGREIr/
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
for Saddam, especially if some jury members thought his
conviction would not make the neighborhood safer.
4. Going the extra mile. There is obvious utility
in laying out Baghdad's track record of lying and cheating
in order to pursue�and again use�weapons of mass
destruction. It is essential to remind people that Saddam
is ruthless and dangerous even though they already know he
is. But the key from this observer's vantage point is to
couple the WMD case with a convincing US game plan for the
military campaign and for handling the regional
repercussions of Saddam's overthrow.
� A new round of WMD briefings�even combined with the
case linking Saddam to terrorism�would not alone
convince skeptics to endorse regime change.
� The real task is to convince international partners
that the potential threat of WMD in Saddam's hands is
worth taking actions that could spark regional turmoil.
As in 1998, the skeptics will hide their suspicions of
US policy behind their potshots at our WMD case.
�
5. Convincing regional players that the United
States is aware of the regional risks�and, most importantly,
prepared to deal with them�is a tough task, but the
Administration already has part of its case prepared,
judging from the tasks it has levied on us�we have analyzed
everything from what could go terribly wrong with respect to
an attack on Iraq (the "perfect storm" paper) to what could
go unbelievably right (the "democracy in Iraq" paper).
� It is time for the Administration�with our help�to take
those intelligence assessments and prepare a detailed
regional plan of action�and if Washington really want
to win the support of the Europeans, the action plan
.5.F.rettErl
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
should make it clear that they will share in the
lucrative opportunities presented by a far more stable�
and more unified�Iraq and Gulf region.
� It is equally important to show regional players�as
well as our NATO Allies�that the United States has a
plan to go all-out in order to get the military
campaign over with as quickly as possible, that the
target of the military campaign is Saddam and the
linchpins of his regime, and that collateral damage and
the overall impact on the Iraqi people will be kept as
limited as possible.
� These efforts should happen simultaneously with the
presentation of our case against Saddam.
_suetirr'r7
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
_SECRET
OREA 1424/02
28 August 2002
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Developments in Europe
DI/OREA
1. What Worries Me. This week three European-related
developments bear watching:
(b)(3)
� Some Europeans�most notably France and the Netherlands�
are calling for a common EU position on Iraq, a
development that could limit the flexibility of the US
to reach bilateral arrangements with key Allies on
forming a "coalition of the willing" or on working
through the UNSC.
� Nascent signs of a warming trend between some European
governments and Libya are likely to spell trouble for US
policy down the road. Libya is eager to encourage the
overtures and, among other things, is lobbying hard for�
and looks set to win�the next chairmanship of the UN
Commission on Human Rights (CHR).
� UN Secretary General Annan will try to give talks on a
Cyprus settlement a "shot in the arm" when he meets with
Clerides and Denktash in Paris next week. Things could
go south if the issue gets wrapped up in election
campaigning in Turkey over the next couple of months.
2. Iraqnophobia. European critics of US action
against Iraq have been coming out of the woodwork in response to
Vice President Cheney's speech on Monday�which has been widely
interpreted as a US decision for war. Various press commentaries
are calling on the EU to dump "passive Alliance loyalty" and to
form an antiwar consensus as a means of bucking up US critics and
dissuading the Administration from pursuing the military option.
� After a meeting with his French counterpart today, Dutch
Foreign Minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared that
France and the Netherlands "are in complete agreement"
..sszerrgY
�Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
_smelt:ET
(b)(3)
SUBJECT:
Developments in Europe
on the importance of the EU arriving at a joint position
on Iraq. (Scheffer is due in Washington in a couple
weeks for meetings with US officials.)
� Earlier this month, Belgian Prime Minister Guy
Verhofstadt sent a letter to Chirac and Schroeder urging
a more independent EU security and defense policy now
that the US seems bent on war.
3. Despite the hoopla, we remain convinced that key
European governments will support the US if it decides to go to
war with Iraq. US friends aill,
however, try to persuade Washington to work through the UN in the
interim and to do a better job in making the case for war by
sharing credible evidence of Saddam's WMD programs.
�
�
�
�
(b)(3)
(b
(b
4. Europe, the UN, and Libya. Libya, having garnered
the backing of the African Union, appears on its way to assuming
the post of chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights. The CHR
chair rotates between five regional groups; normally the consensus
candidate of the group whose turn it is to hold the chair receives
the automatic endorsement of the other Commission members. While
the post carries little real authority, the symbolism of Libya
chairing an important human rights forum is disconcerting, and, we
may face a series of unhelpful interventions�especially on the
Middle East�when the Commission reconvenes next spring.
2
(b)(3)
)(1)
)(3)
JSEGRET
�Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
_areC-NET
(b)(3)
SUBJECT:
�
�
Developments in Europe
� The Europeans, although proceeding cautiously, appear
inclined to step up contacts and boost trade relations
with Tripoli. A British Junior Foreign Minister visited
Libya earlier this month�the first such visit by a UK
minister in 19 years. At least one commentator has
suggested that the timing of the visit�and the UK
message urging Libya to support the international war on
terrorism�was designed to signal that former "pariah"
regimes can be rehabilitated without resort to force.
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
5. Cyprus...On Again, Off Again. Greek Cypriot leader (b)(3)
Clerides promised a "give and take" approach to reach a deal with
the Turkish Cypriots on reunifying the island as settlement talks
resumed yesterday after a three-week respite. Resumption of the
talks was marked by silence in Ankara and a defiant rejoinder by
Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, who, once again, demanded a
priori recognition of "TRNC" sovereignty.
�
�
�
b)(1)
b)(3)
3
_srbe7
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
_snextg'r
(b)(3)
SUBJECT:
Developments in Europe
� We judge that little�if any�progress will take place
until the murky Turkish leadership picture is clarified
after the 3 November elections in Turkey and Ankara
receives a clearer reading from the EU about its
accession prospects in December.
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
4
Approved for Release: 2022/09/20 C06929976
(b)(3)