CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT AGAINST INDIA FROM TIBET AND SINKIANG

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02777301
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2022
• Case Number: F-2022-01480
• Publication Date: May 28, 1963

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TROLLED DISSEM
CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT
AGAINST INDIA FROM TIBET AND SINKIANG
USIB MEMORANDUM
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
17 April 1963 Memorandum, as revised 28 May 1963
Nt
CO OILED DISSEM
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the inteiligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 28 May 1963. Concurring were the Director of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Direc-
tor, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director
for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National
Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre-
Sentative to the USW and the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside
of their jurisdiction.
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WHEN USED SEPARATELY
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTQMAT4CDOVINGRADINC
AND )ECLASSIFICATION
RelThi":11494
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28 May 1963
SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUND THREAT AGAINST INDIA FROM TIBET
AND SINKIANG
THE PROBLEM
The Object of this study is to examine the offensive capabilities
during 1963 of Communist China's ground forces against India and the
Himalayan border states. This study does not consider attacks that might
be launchedby Chinese forces through Burma. It does not estimate Chinese
Communist intentions.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Chinese Communist forces presently in the Sino-Indian border
area consist of 4 divisions, 11 separate combat regiments, 5 border
defense regiments, and administrative and support troops totaling about
120,000 men. A major offensive effort against India, as specified in El
would require the redeployment of additional divisions from elsewhere,
which the Chinese could do without seriously jeopardizing their ,overall
military posture. (Para. 2)
GROUP 1
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B. Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces in southwest
Sinkiang and Tibet are transported by road from rail-served base depots
at Chengtu in Szechwan; Lanchou, and Hsiatung in Kansu; and in the
vicinity of Urumchi in Sinkiang. From these railheads supplies are
moved into the frontier area by motor transport over long and difficult
routes, ranging from 500 to 1,800 miles, thus limiting the quantities
of supplies which can be delivered. (Paras. 3-4)
C. We estimate that the Chinese could deliver an average of 1,600
tons per day to Tibet and southwest Sinkiang; this operation would require
about 40,0o0 trucks. This rate of delivery, assuming the establishment
of substantial reserves in the forward areas, would be sufficient on a
continuing basis to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of about
225,000 combat and service troops. Of these a maximum of approximately
175,000 could be supported logistically in simultaneous attacks. The
tonnage of 1,600 tons per day also could support air operations consum-
ing approximately 450 tons daily. This maximum support effort would
tax China's motor transport capabilities and would result in a heavy
drain on POL supplies. (Pares. 5-6)
D. We believe that the maximum threat to India and the Himalayan
border states would be limited to simultaneous attacks in Ladakh,
through the border passes between Ladakh and Nepal, into Nepal, either
into northern Assam across Bhutan or into the Siliguri area across
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Sikkim, and into the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA). We believe the
maximum Chinese force could be as large as 175,000 men, consisting of
7 light infantry divisions, 2 standard infantry divisions, and 15
independent infantry regiments.
E. We estimate that the Chinese, should they launch the attacks
described above, would have the following military objectives:
a. In Ladakh, to extend Chinese control to include the
capture of the important center of Leh.
b. In the border area between Ladakh and Nepal, to seize
the Chinese territorial claim north of Joshimath.
c. In Nepal, to seize the major valley approaches and the
city of Katmandu.
d. In the east, to occupy NEPA and to interdict Indian
communications and control of Assam. (Pares. 14-32)
F. The next favorable periods for offensive operations begin in
Nay for the avenues of approach on the frontier west of Katmandu and in
September for the avenues east of Katmandu. (Pares. 7-9)
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I. GENERAL
DISCUSSION
1. With 2.6 million men the Chinese Communist Army is the largest
in the world, and has been able, under certain circumstances, to field
an effective fighting force. There are several factors, however, which
we believe are causing the Chinese Communist leaders concern as to the
ability of their armed forces adequately to support China's foreign
policies. Now virtually without supply and support from the USSR,
obsolescence and wear and tear have caused a decline in the effectiveness
of the armed forces' equipment and weapons. We believe that China's
industry cannot produce enough of the heavier and more complex equip-
ment -- notably aircraft and naval ships and possibly armored fighting
vehicles -- to maintain present equipment levels. Peiping also probably
sees several situations, in addition to the border dispute with India,
which may require the commitment of military forces: the situations in
Laos, Vietnam, the Taiwan Strait, and North Korea. Even the Sino-Soviet
dispute will probably place additional limitations on Chinese military
capabilities through further restriction of supply of essential materials
and the possible need to watch over the long Sino-Soviet border more
closely than to date.
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2. China's troop dispositions are directed toward coastal and border
defense. A secondary mission for all units is internal security, and, in
some areas such as Tibet, this function has been the main occupation of the
units stationed there. The Chinese now have a force of 120,000 men in Tibet
and southwest Sinkiang including L. infantry divisions, 11 separate combat
regiments, and 5 border defense regiments. A major offensive effort
against India would require the employment of additional divisions. These
1/
could, under present circumstances, be drawn from the estimated 11 armies
in reserve in north, east, and central China to reinforce the frontier area
without seriously jeopardizing China's overall defense posture.
II. LOGISTICS
3. Supplies for Chinese Communist military forces in southwest
Sinkiang and Tibet are transported by road over distances ranging from
500 to 1,800 miles from rail-served base depots at Chengtu in Szechwan;
Lanchou, and Hsiatmg in Kansu; and in the vicinity of Urumchi in
Sinkiang. The facilities at these railheads are capable of handling the
supply requirement of the maximum forces deployable in the Sino-Indian
border area.
24/ The Chinese Communist "army" resembles in size a US corps, its
basic tactical components consisting of three infantry divisions.
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4. From the Chengtu transshipment point supplies are delivered to
the Changtu-PnuEta area via the Szechwan-Tibet highway for distribution
to forces located in eastern Tibet and along the frontier from Lima west
to Milin. From Lanchou and Hsiatung supplies are moved over the Tsinghai--
Tibet road to the Nagchhu Dzong and Yangpaching distribution depots serving
west, central, and southern Tibet. From the Urumchi railhead goods move
by road to a supply base at Kashgar and from there to units in the Yarkand
and Ladakh areas. The Kashgar base probably also gives some support to
troops located in extreme western Tibet.
5. Under optimum conditions a total of 2,000 tons per day could be
delivered to the military subdistricts in southwest Sinkiang and Tibet.
This tonnage, however; is unlikely to be achieved during all periods of
the year because of climatic factors. Therefore, it is estimated that
the maximum sustained tonnage deliverable to supply distribution points
in Tibet and southwest Sinkiang is an average of 1,600 tons per day. The
attacks described in this study would tax China's motor transport capa-
bilities and would result in a heavy, although not insupportable, drain on
POL supplies. The delivery of tonnages to support these operations over
the period of a year would require about 40,000 trucks and approximately
60ol000 tons of motor gasoline, about 40 percent of the total motor
gasoline available in all of China in 1962. An effort of this size prob-
ably could not be supported if China were involved in significant mili-
tary activity elsewhere.
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6. This rate of delivery, assuming the establishment of substantial
coMbat reserves in the forward areas, is sufficient on a continuing basis
to satisfy the daily resupply requirements of about 225,000 combat and
service troops. Of these a maximum of approximately 175,000 men could be
supported logistically in simultaneous attacks. In addition to meeting
the above ground force needs, the tonnage of 1,600 tons per day also could
support air operations consuming approximately 450 tons daily.
III. CLIMATE
7. Although severe winter weather is an important factor in the
conduct of military operations along the Sino-Indian border, low tempera-
ture and snow in themselves are unlikely completely to prohibit activity.
More serious problems arise from melting snow and ice and heavier precipita-
tion in spring and summer. Mid-October to mid-December is the most favor-
able period for operations all along the border and road conditions will
be at their maximum capacity during this time of the year, although in the
western segment of the frontier as far east as Nepal, favorable conditions
may begin as early as May, but usually later.
8. In the western half of the frontier, which encompasses Ladakh,
the high central Tibetan plateau and most of Nepal, April and May is a
difficult season because melting snows make streams unfordable and flat-
floored valleys are often flooded. The summer in this sector is generally
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favorable for operations except in Nepal, where heavy rains from the
southwest monsoon cause landslides and swollen streams particu)arly along
the access routes from India. From December to March temperatures are
severely low and winds, occasionally reaching gale force, not only make
the cold difficult to endure but also fill the air with fine penetrating
dust. Snowstorms and blizzards are frequent, especially in the mountains.
9. In the eastern segment of the frontier, extending from eastern
Nepal through Sikkim, Bhutan, and the Northeast Frontier Agency (FA)
and including Lhasa to the north and a narrow belt of the Brahmaputra
River Valley to the south, road conditions during the spring months of
April and May will be only fair. Flooding, unfordable streams, and land-
slides may obstruct routes for short periods. June to September are the
worst months for operations in the eastern segment of the frontier; roads
in the Brahmaputra River Valley and in the Lhasa area may be flooded. In
NEFA., particularly in the eastern part, road capacities are reduced to a
minimum during the southwest monsoon season.
IV. MILITARY OPERATIONS
10. In the Himalayan region the physiographic effects on military
operations are enormous, and the harsh environment requires modifications
in organization, equipment, and tactics. The use of trucks, armor, and
artillery is limited by the inadequate road network. Maintenance problems
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a.,!e also increased. Troops tire easily, combat loads must be reduced, and
daily march times and distances must be shortened. Animal transport and
porters are relied upon heavily.
11. Tactical movements require more detailed preparations than those
at lower altitudes. Reconnaissance and security on the march require
special attention. Tactical operations will rarely take place at an echelon
above that of the regiment. The regiment and the battalion are the units
usually employed along a single axis against a single tactical objective.
Operations are characterized by infiltration, ambushes, and envelopments.
12. We believe the standard organization of the Chinese Communist
infantry division has been modified to conform to the decentralized opera-
tional requirements of mountain operations. During the recent fighting on
the border the Chinese used 120-mm mortars, 76.2-mm mountain guns, and
recoilless rifles. The largest artillery piece likely to be employed
south of the Himalayas
reported in Ladakh and
the Chinese have large
is the 122-mm howitzer. Although tanks have been
in the Chumbi Valley, there is no evidence that
numbers of tanks in Tibet. We believe that only in
southern Sikkim could tanks be employed in other than an assault gun and
artillery role. It would be extremely difficult for the Chinese to move
more than a few tanks on to the Indian plain.
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13. The Chinese have a limited capability to employ airborne forces.
We estimate that not more than two battalions could be dropped in support
of the actions described below at a given time. Airborne troops could be
staged at airfields at Kashgar, Hotien (Khotan), Soche, Kaerhmu, Chengtu,
and Kunming.
V. AVENUES OF ATTACK
14. We believe that in the feasible avenues of attack a maximum
force of 175,000 men, consisting of 7 light infantry divisions, 2 standard
infantry divisions, 15 independent infantry regiments, and 2 airborne
battalions could be employed. Difficulties of logistics and restrictions
of terrain, we believe, would limit the Chinese to the following major
military objectives:
a. In Ladakh, an extension of Chinese control to include the
capture of the important communications center and airbase at Leh.
b. In the border area between Ladakh and Nepal, to seize the
Chinese territorial claim north of Joshimath which would be a psychologi-
cal threat to New Delhi.
c. In Nepal, to facilitate the eventual occupation of the coun-
try by seizure of the major valley approaches and the capture of the city
of Katmandu in order to forestall Indian intervention.
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d. In the East, to occupy UEFA and to interdict Indian
communications and control of Assam.
Ladakh
15. In Ladakh the Chinese Communists completed a road from Sinkiang
in 1957. From this road, they
including one in the west that
mit the movement of troops and
have constructed a number of feeder roads,
roughly parallels the main road, which per-
supplies to outposts. Generally the valleys
provide natural roadbeds that require little construction or maintenance
to be made usable for motor transport. The approach routes from Ladakh
converge on Leh across the Karakoram and Ladakh Ranges; through the easer
Pass (17,480 feet) to Panamik from the north and via Chushul and Shyok
from the southeast. Of these, the latter, a motorable route, is by far
the more favorable avenue of approach. From Leh the road twists acrose
two great mountain ranges to Srinagar, the major Indian military base in
Kashmir.
16. The road network leading from Sinkiang and western Tibet into
Ladakh will support an estimated seven light infantry divisions. This
capability exists for operations within northern and eastern Ladakh and
north of the frontier; for operations further south, however, this support
capability drops as motorable roads give way to pack trails.
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17. The Chinese covi launch the following attacks in the Ladakh area:
a. One infantry regiment could move from Daulat Beg Oldi through
the Saser Pass to Panamik (120 miles), but since the pass is closed from
December to May, the resupply of this regiment during the winter months
would have to be accomplished by airdrop or by road from Chushul.
b. Given sufficient engineer support for road improvement, 1 light
infantry division could be supported from the Chushul area, with 2 regiments
advancing to Leh (100 miles) and 1 regiment supporting the thrust from the
north on Panamik by advancing up the Shyok River Valley to the area of
Tint (100 miles).
c. Because of logistic limitations and the need to improve road
systems as they advance, Chinese military objectives would probably be
limited to an extension of their control of the Ladakh area to include the
capture of the key communications center of Leh.
The Border Passes Between Ladakh and Nepal
18. Along the border between the Chushul area in southern Ladakh and
Nepal there are several passes through which Chinese forces could attack.
Of these, the best avenues of approach, although they are narrow defiles
subject to blockage by snow during the winter months, are through Shipki
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Pass (15,400 feet), Mane Pass (17,890 feet), Niti Pass (16,600 feet),
and Lipulek Pass (16,750 feet).
19. After May, two infantry regiments could be supported in an
advance through Shipki Pass to the vicinity of Chini (45 miles). Not
more than three regiments could be moved through Mena and Niti Pas' ee to
Joshimath (approximately 45 miles); and two regiments through Lipulek Pass
to the general area of Dharchula (20 miles). Advances beyond Chini,
Joshimath, and Dharchula could not be logistically supported until the
Chinese had improved the existing trails to accommodate one-quarter-ton
vehicles. Further, we believe that the Chinese would be unable to re-
supply by air during the winter months, and the regiments would be forced
to withdraw north of the passes.
Nepal
20. The Chinese have good lateral communications along the entire
frontier on the Shigatse (Zhikatse)-Gartok road. They have built feeder
roads toward the major passes and trails lead from these roads through
all the passes, many of which are open for much of the winter.
21. If the Chinese could seize the Katmandu airfield, they could
then airland up to 1 lightly-equipped infantry division within 5 to 7
days. We estimate that by extensive utilization of pack animals and
porters the Chinese could support attacks by one infantry regiment through
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each of of the following passes: through. Naralagna Pass to Bajang; through
Kore Pass to Dana; through Kyirong Pass to Nawakot; through Kodari Pass
to Dhulikhel; and through Rakha Pass to Dingla.
22. The tenure of even limited Chinese forces in northern Nepal
would be largely dependent on stockpiling and their ability to sustain
porterage operations through the northern passes in winter. We estimate
that they could not attack India through Nepal.
The Sikkim. Area
23. There are two converging avenues of approach from the Chumbi
Valley through Sikkim to Siliguri. One, a motorable road, leads through
Natu Pass (14,500 feet) via Gangtok; the other, an unim2roved road,
crosses the frontier through Jelep Pass joining the former road near
Kalimpong.
24. We estimate that the Chinese could attack through the Natu and
Jelep Passes with two light infantry divisions and advance to Gangtok
(34 miles) without improving the roads. If the road capacities between
the frontier and Gangtok were increased, which would require an estimated
6 to 10 weeks, a total of 3 light infantry divisions and 2 standard in-
fantry divisions with armor could be supported in an advance to Siliguri
(100 miles from the frontier). The Chinese could make an envelopipg
movement around the established Indian defensive positions in Sikkim
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by making an initial attack in not more than regimental strength down the
difficult Torsa River Valley which generally parallels the Bhutan-Sikkim
border.
25. Logistic support of larger Chinese forces required to hold the
exposed Siliguri position during the winter months would be extremely
difficult. Unless stocks of supplies were captured or airfields secured
to support airlift operations, a reduction in strength to not more than
one division would be necessary and its withdrawal to the Darjeeling
area would be required.
26. Western Bhutan. An undeveloped trail goes from Pan i Dzong in
Tibet through western Bhutan and joins the road connecting Faro Dzong to
Hasimara. We estimate that the Chinese could advance to Pero Dzong with
one division without improving the trail. If the trail were improved to
permit the movement of vehicles, this division could be supported in an
advance to Hasimara. Overland logistic support of this division in the
Hasimara area during the winter would be possible provided stockpiling
were carried out promptly.
27. Eastern Bhutan and Western UEFA. There are two converging
routes which cross Bhutan and form an approach to Assam: one from
Lhakhang Dzong to Gauhati via Lhuntsi Dzong and Dewangiri; the other
from Bum La to GaUhati via Towang, Tashigang Dzong, and Dewangiri.
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28. In an advance through Bhutan the Chinese initially could support
2 infantry regiments at Tashigang Dzong (50 Miles), and 2 infantry regiments
at Lhuntsi Dzong (30 miles)* After road improvements, the Chinese could
maintain 3 light infantry divisions within Bhutan, or could advance to
Gathati (145 miles) with at least 2 divisions. We believe these forces
could be supported throughout the winter months. The Chinese could not
support simultaneously this attack against Gauhati and an attack against
Siliguri as described in paragraphs 24-25.
29. In northwest NEFA there is a motorable road which connects Bum La
with Tezpur and which passes through Towang and Bomdi La. We estimate that,
if the Chinese were to attack from Bum La to Bomdi La (90 miles) they could
support two light infantry divisions at Bomdi La and advance with one of
these divisions to Tezpur.
30. Central and Eastern NEFA. There are two avenues of approach
across the McMahon Line into NEFA: in central NEFA from the border village
of Longju south through the Subansiri River Valley; and in eastern NEFA
from Lima through the Luhit River Valley via Walong.
31. A penetration from Longiu would be restricted to a distance over
which porter supply lines could be operated. We estimate that, at a
maximum, the Chinese could support two regiments via tracks in the Subansiri
River Valley up to 30 or ko miles south of the border. In an attack from
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Lima the Chinese could initially support an attack by one light infantry
division in the Whit River Valley as far west as Tepang. Subsequent to
the development of a road to Tepang, which would require an estimated
8 to 10 weeks, the Chinese could support up to 3 light infantry divisions
in this area and advance to Balamaghani, approximately 10 miles west of
Tepang with 1 of these divisions.
DICTE: The tables and maps are not included in this text as they are the
same as those contained in the 17 April USIB Memorandum.
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