SIGNIFICANCE OF DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AFTER THE XXTH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE CPSU

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02600674
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2022
• Case Number: F-2020-01198
• Publication Date: October 25, 1956

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CI Memorandum No. 36
25 October 1956
TO: fill Area Branches
SUBJ:;ECT: Significance of Developments of International
Communism After the XXth :Party Congress
of the CPU
1. Attached you will fine copies of a sterile paper,
entitled as indicated above. The paper was orginally prepared
as a briefing and was delivered by C/Cl/ICD in mid-E'eptember
1956. The present version has been suitably edited.
2. The paper will be of interest to field station personnel,
specifically those concerned with Communist problems, as
representative of the current thinking at headquarters OA
questions which continue to preoccupy specialists on Communism
and 'oviet affairs.
3. The attachment is cleared for passage to selected
liaison services. It should b.: pointed out to recipients that
this is not an official I:BY-RIME statement nor does it claim
to be either definitive or final. It might be described as a
paper put together for our own service as a "think" piece or
as a guideline,
4. It is suggested that this paper not be handled as a
routine -transmission. It affords an opportunity to remind
recipients of the favor they enjoy with F.T.TBA RK:and, more
important, to .draw from them comments and appreciations
which might embody new insights and the results of special
skills.
5. Therefore., the reactions or comments of recipients
are solicited, including any informal-oral c on- ments which
may be received by field personnel who make use of the
paper in liaison activity.
-_'/.
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence staff
Attachment
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.The Sipnificance of Developments in International Communism
After tho Twentieth Pcrty Congress of the OPSU
The Central Committee Resolution of the Communist =arty of the
Soviet Union (30 June 1956) 1.resents the official position of the C=SU
on the Stalin -purge, or, as it is more commonly referred to, the matter
of the Stalin denigration campaiEn.
This .6:esolution shows again that the Communist Party of the 3ov1et
Union is still hidebound by Stalinist dogma and approaches and is not
yet ready to change or in anyway significantly modify the Soviet system
and the 3talinist approach to thins. hardy has there been a piece so
shallow and so hackneyed as this Cehtral Committee Resolution of 30 June
which purports to be the last word en the Stalin issue and. which is
obviously aimed at offsetting and controlliiv the debate raging in Inter-
national Communism on the significance of the e-Stalinization campaign.
This Resolution signifies Soviet concern with and about the reactions
which the Stalin deniration campaign has provoked in the Communist
Parties of Europe and elsewhere.
The de-Stalinization campaign and the forms which it has taken
and the way in which it was handled by the Russians has, for the first
time in the postwar. period, -created a definite crisis in the international
Communist Movement. It is difficult to say at this moment how deep this
crisis is and to predict its further development. On the basis of, avail-
able evidence it is fair to conclude. that the de-Stalinization campaign,
as handled by the Russians, has set in motion in the Communist movement
a process of questioning the validity of the Soviet system as a whole
Once such a process starts it is irk.ossible to determine how far it will
go. crisis, however, exists--a crisis which has touched and has affected
the very core of Cohmunist ideology. In response to this crisis, the
Soviets and their 30 June Resolution made certain alterations in their
presentation of the case. a .ainst Stalin,
For the first time in the postwar periods than, the Soviets have
been put on the defensive and. have maneuvered themselves into an un-
comfortable position insofar as the whole framework of Communism and
Communist ideolo:y- is concerned. This is, for the moment and ibr the
time being, 'good for the free world. -nd lad for the Communist Parties,
particuLarly in Western Euro. how lone will thc issue stay alive and
how long will it continue to harness and. embarrass Internatienal Com-
munism? From this vantage point, there seems to be a fair possibility
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that the issue will stay alive for some time to come and that the Soviets
will have a difficult time putting out the brushfire which the secret
Khrushchev speech caused.
The first question generaaly raised in the context of forming an
opinion on the de-Stalinization process is: "Why did Khrushchev make
his speech of 25 February 19567" There is no good and definitive answer
to this question. There are, however, several views and opinions and
it may be useful to review them. In the first place it is worth remem-
bering that the 20th Party Congress in its/ions -brought out the
de-Stalinization process, particularly in the speech given by Mikoyan.
ilikoyan delivered the blast against Stelin while Comrade Khrushchev
kept on the sidelines. Thus, it can be assumed that the CPSU leader-
ship had already arrened to open the de-Stalinization campaign at the
20th Congress. From the point of view of the Russians.theT apparently
figured that it was to their long-term advantage both internally and
externally to demolish the myth and legend of the Stalin regime,
'Externally, they may hew,: figured that foreign governments, particularly
neutralist governments, as well as public ooinion could be favorably
impressed with a position which appeared to change the modus operandi
of the Soviet regime. � They must also have figured that it would be
a heir to Internetional Communism in its great effort to achieve unity
of action particularly with Socialist and left-wing forces to be able
to point to basic chanes in the Soviet approach to foreign policy and
ideological matters. In general, therefore, it is felt that the raising
of the de-Stalinization issue at the open session of the 20th Congress
is compatible with the general direction knicn Soviet tactics had been
taking since early 1955 and with previous indications of the downgrading
of Stalin. International Communism without the burden and onus of
Stalinism would certainly, in the eyes of the Soviets, be a more effective
instrument for the realization of the plans of the Soviet leaders. This
Soviet ierspective was re-emphasized again in the 30 June Resolution of
the CPSU Central Committee, which clearly indicated to the CP's that the
de-Stalinization process was considered to be good for them and that,
therefore, they mIlikuld stop fussing about the complications which had
arisen and, according to the Lesolution, had even been anticipated and
calculated by the Soviets when they launched the de- Stalinizetion cam-
paign in February 1956. There is, tncn, a ,cood argument fol assuming
that the de-Stalinization process was worked into the Soviet master
plan in order to further Soviet foreign policy aims and in order to
facilitate the work of the CPIs in softening. up their countries, their
eovernments, their Socialist opponents and opposition in general.
However, this argument does not fully explain why Khrushchev made his
secret speech on 25 February and particularly why he said what he said.
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This, then, draws the focus on the internal significance of the
Khrushchev speech and. on the indications that it Was made for
internal consumption, especially for the consumption of the: Party cadre
assembled at the 20th Congress An explanation given in this. context
is that the top Party echelon which had to run the country and the .
Party machinc. as a whole, could, after Stalin's death, not do so cffec-
tivelyWithout destroying the Stalin myth, because the Stalin myth
actually obstructed effecti7e leadership by the new rulers of the
Soviet Union.. In simple words thls means-, for example, a case like the
following. Lysenko, the Soviet geneticist, claimed several times after
Stalin's death that his (obvioUsly unscientific) positions had. Stalinis
personal approval and implied that these positions were therefore Cor-
rect. There are statements in the Soviet press and Soviet publications
which bear this out. It is argued then, that this cannot be an iso-
lated, case; there must have been many other Soviet Party leaders,
Soviet technicians, Soviet scientists, etc., whose justification in
life and in their profession, however erroneous their position or their-
actions�was the fact that. they had enjoyed 'Stalin's support and blessings.
Such an attitude clearly obstructed the current leadership, and it be-
came therefore necessary to indicate to the cadre- in unmistakable terms'
that the new regime stood. on its own feet, that the old regime was
thoroughly discredited, wrong, evil and. vile, and that the shots would
be called from now on by the top men and no. backtalking would be tolerated.
In other Words, it has been argued that the. Khrushchev speech was
necessary from the .point of view-of effective leadership, The ghost of
Stalin,. i.e,,tho attitudes. developed under Stalin's regime, were
ob-
stacles in-the way of the Khrushchev clique and obstructA their efforts
to rule the .artyand. country. This thesis has certain merits but still
does not explain fully the intensity of Khrush-chev's attck on Stalin.
There is another theory which has been advanced. It is the
theory that the secret spech by Khrushchev could be well interpreted
as a blackmail instrument to be used aainst-actua] or potential op-
ponents. This theory has acq ircd some. wet ht in the 14 ht of the
30 June C,:SU aesolution, which came out with the rnther suririsins
statement th_t already durine Stalin's lifetime a I,ninist nucleus
existed among the CC members and ranking army officers--a nucleus which
t various periods, for instnce during !the war years, eurtail,d the
power of Stalin. From the reference to the eXistence of such a -.Leninist
nucleus, it is possible to,nrgue that the peofle outside of this
Leninist nucleus are int,nded to be identified more distinctly with
the Stalin era and, further, ale sind out to be attacked or destroyed
as traitors when the need :rises. The theory, tihn, is that by lyving
his speech acceptcd by the Central Committee, larushchev obtain_d
"leal" basis for movin: in on his actual or pot(.ntial opposition and
that, in h ving obtained this "1,:gal" basis; he has strengthenLd his
power position. By the same token he has also alerted. the "non-
Leninists" to his intentions. Thus, the question aris,s of the rela-
tive stren-:th of Khrushchev and of the opposition, as well as the
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question of the possibility that a power struggle in thc CPSU loadership
may b2Lak out.
In tho mLantim, the answer to tho question of why Khrushchov
m-dc his socrcot speech of 25 Fobruary is not roadily available in one
neat package. So much is clear, that the de-Stalinization campaign
fits very well into the ,Fioneral design of Soviet foreign policy and
th, tactics of rho broad united front and united action program of the
international Communist -.movement, It is also clear that it fits neatly
into the internal program of the _Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Lastly, as pointed out before, it may also fit into the porsonal designs
and plans of hhrushchev and company.
Another question of interest is how the Soviets planned to
handle tho de-Stalinization campaign and what timing they had in mind.
In this connection one may also ask to what extent their timing was
upset by the publication of the hhrushchov speech and, by virtu o of
that upsot, how they adjusted to the new situation. It is fair to
conclude that the. Soviets had in mind a rather slow process of do-
Stalinization, hhrushcbov himself, in his socrot spocch, said that
there was no need for haste. Generally, it is felt that thcoSoviots
had two treatments in mind; one for the Soviet public rici the Com-
munist ..rartis outside the Bloc, and another for the intornal cadre
of thoCPSU and the Hoc Partios. The fact that they planned a slow
tempo of do-Stalinizotion may be deduced from facts indicating that
only relatively few select Communist leaders had direct and/or detailed
access to the secret Khrushchev speech prioroto the release of the
s000ch by the Unitod States State Department.. There are indications
that Ulbricht in Germany bad: access; there ore indic tions that
Togliatti had access; there ore indications that other leaders in
the Satollitos had access to the speech, or at least to materials
contained in it.
In tho first phase, then, the Soviets had planned to effect
de-Stalinization, particularly outside of the Soviet Union, vory
slowly through curtain key leaders abroad. Thus, they intended to
minimiz0 the shock which they undoubtedly knew would ensue if the
whole cadaver of Stalin and Stalinism worc thrown up to the Communist
movement at onco. In this connection it is highly significant that
th, 2royde. editorial uf 28 Fiarch, which was the first roforo.nco to
appear publicly in the Soviet Union on the dc-Stalinizotion campaign,
was concoivod on a vary lofty and academic ideological level, taking
up oniy the question of why tho cult of tho individual wLs alien to
tho spirit of Aorxism ond Leninism and why, at the same time, the
spirit of Aarxism and Leninism did not rule out or obviate the need
for strong leadership. Held against the hhrushchov speech of
25 February, the 'arch 28 oditorial of 4avda concealed the depth
and intensity of the charges against Stalin brought forward by
Khrushchov. This is pointed, out to underline tho thesis that origi-
nally tho Soviet loaders had planned a gradual tompo in the de-
Stalinization procoss.
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Hewev%r, thk: tempo and the timing of the de-Stalinization
camp ign were upset by the fact that, first of all ,.the contnts of
the se�crt s-peech of hhrushchev Laked out to the Western press in
March .-nd finally were published by the United States State Depart,.
ment. ThLre is no good evidence or argument showing that this was
foreseen by the Communist leaders in the.Sovict Union. Nor is there
any good. evidence to show that the Soviet leaders had planted "leaks"
of the Khrushchcv speech. It is impossible to see. what advant.Lge
they would have gained frJm doinq so. The stench of the speech must
have been eVident to the author himself, who admonished his audience
to keep the speech inside the Party.
We are often inclinLd to ovcam_stimLL Soviet capabilities for �
complicated and subtle plottin The de-Stalinization process can
be construed as such a "plot"--but only in a stiategic sense. In
simple terms it is a "plot" to make Communism and the Soviet leaders
look good. To assume that the Khrushchev speech with its obvious
omissi-,ns and falsificatims could have boon considered by the Soviets
capable Of achieving or contributing to their objective, seems far-
fetched; as does the assumption that the speech was leaked for this
purpose.
The only possible arum_nt in favor of c,he assmpti)n that the
speech was deliborAcly 'ileakedr! is that eith,r a faction within the
C2SU or cc Satellite CP desired to nail Khrushchev down to the record
to make absolutely sure that no retr_at from the position taken was
possible, Such on argument, however, excludes again any possibility
that the speech was leaked in order to deceive the West.
The publication of the speech was a genuine shock to P%rty
leaders kAld especially to the rank and file abroad, In this country
the ComMunist Party went through a scrics of convulsions as a result
of the public .tin. It is, of course, impossible to state whether
all the other Communist Parties r-acted with the same. intensity.
Nev,rthelss the shock and confusi.n effect were fairly general.'
What was and still is the nature of the shock? The shack was so
severe beaUse the revelLtien8 made questionable Communist doctrine
,rac:1 the Soviet system as a whale, since proof was offered that the;
man who had rLpresented Communism as we know it _1-1(1 had creat,ed it
as we know it, was a psychopath, a tyrant, a murderer, .and an in-
capable leader So for as the.'affairs of his wn country were concerned.
This revelation struck at :the core ef the loyalty of the Communists
to their cause, -doctrine and oronizational center. Anoth,r factor
was that the revelatin evidently undermined the wisdem and thi:
efficiency of the Communist leaders abroad who far sc pviny years had ,
unquestioningly accepted the Soviet regime, the wisdim of Stalin, his
integrity and his infallibility. The 1D.siti n of the Communist
leaders abroad was placed in jeopardy by Khrushchevls revelations.
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An article written by the Chairman of the Communist Party of
the United States already before the publication of the Khrushchev
speech first pointed up the uncomfortable position of the leader-
ship abroad. The artiale also pointed out that the de-Stalinization
process had placed in jeopardy gommunist discipline, and thus put .
the finger on a situatien which b-ecame fairly- general. When the
positi-n of the Communist loader is shaken or in question, his
command relations to the rank and file, to the :ordinary member and
tc the subordinate Party organization are also endangered. In
general terms it is therefore quite understandable why the reaction
of the foreign leaders outside the bloc was one of dismay. Dis-
crientatin among the rank and.file was.actually greater than the
confusion on leadership level. This is natural, too, for the
Communist rank and file is used-te.living in a semi-military
structure where the decisions arc made. at the top and the "soldiers",
as it wore, simply execute. orders..
Perhaps it is not necessary to emphasize our belief that the
shock effect was genuine. However, it has been said that the Communist
Parties reacted the Way they did in order to fool the non-Communists,
and that this was all pro-arranged with the Soviets.
Again, this is an over-simplification of the problem. It is
an axiom that personnel or policy changes on the top level of
the CFSU almost automatically produce parallel changes in the leader-
ship of foreign Communist Parties. And it is fair te state that the
"new look" policies formulated by the 20th Congress rquired an
eventual shake-up of the leadership of Bloc and Free Werld Fartius.
After all de-jtolinization represents a dezymbolization and re-
symbolization of the movement. Personnel changes as well as policy
changes were there:ten.: built into the 20th CP3U Cengress design and,
in this sense, it is permissible to speak of a "plot". Nevertheless,
it is questionale whether the U;ovicts desired a shako-up on a time
schedule and on terms beyond their control, i.e., as a result of
disenchantment On the part of the rank and file or as a result of
anti-Communist propaganda. Shakc-ups effected under pressure TAnuld
certainly not look like a genuine reorientati-.n. Such would result
only from an orderly and controlled process of "criticism and self-
The ruvelati ns of the hhrushehev speech, then, must have upset
whatever plans existed concerning. the demotion of Communist leaders
outside the USSR. We feel that the debate raing in the Communist
movement exceeded whit we wuld expect to be a controlled process of
self-criticism, thus interfering with prior Soviet plans for personnel
changes. We feel, e.g., that the CPSU was forced to keep the Thorez_
,Duclos leadership'in power in order to avoid: serious ideological dis-
locations in C., France. We are net sure thA maintaining a French
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leadership well-known for its Stalinist oriontatien was originally
en the books. Similarly, the replacement of the _Stalinist Rakosi
by another Stalinist, Garcia, indicates a change in plans. Ric feel
that Soviet plans on personnel changes were upset, and that they
wore forced to keep in place ,or.premote men who would keep the
Parties toðer rather than set up new figureheads who would -look
ore respectabl.
The. reactiAas of the various C mmunist rtios were ebvieusly
not identical. So far as We can sec, the PaIties that are close to
the Anglo-Saxon cultural stream were the ones that were more per-
ceptibly affected than ethers. One may maintain speculatively that
concepts of democracy and justice have left a mark oven Jia the
Communist brethren.' and that it may. be no cc incidence that the
Communist Parties of the United States and Great Eritain and the
Communist. Parties in culturally related countries wore more out-
spoken than ethers.
The Communist Party of the United. States was one of the first
to go on record as criticizing the Soviet leaders for their co-respon-
sibility in the crimes perpetrated by Stalin and in demanding a fuller
explanation from the SQViOS
In the course of the groat and violent debate which ensued in
the C-ZUSA, twe trends developed. One wing criticized CI-USA and CPSU
loaders heavily and urgently demanded fuller explanations. Another
wing, which was somewhat more moderate, tried to strike a balanced
position, criticizing the CPSU Mildly and asking questions about co-
responsibility of the CPSU leaders, while at the same time emphasizing
the merits ef Stalin and the good that he had done for the working
class internationally and nationally, Eugene Dennis, Secretary General
of the CPUSA, represented this moderate wing, and it is for this
reason, We believe, that Pravda reprinted his article prior to the
Central Committee Resoluti_n oi 30 June. The fact that Dennis'
article was reprinted showed the sensitivity of the CPSU to the more
poignant attacks from abroad questioning the prAives and integrity
of the current CPSU leaders. This sensitivity of the CZSU is further
expressed. in the editing and. cens-ring of foreign CF reacti:ms.
Dennis' article, c.g� as reprinted in Pravda, did not cAatain his
original questions pertaining to anti-Semitism in the USSR. The
Central Committee Resolution of 30 June quoted only terms favorable
to the CPSU position on Stalin. (See, e.g., pertinent quotes from
the Chinese and the French Communist Party psitions in the Resolution.)
The sensitivity ef the CPSU expressed itself further in the
irritation with which the 30 June Resolution tn_ated Togliatti's now
famous interview in NuoviArpnmenti, The Soviet Resolution states
that Trgliattils posAta:, acc.. r(ling to which the qtalin system led, to
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degoneratien, was absolutely unfunded. It is worth noting that the
original Togliatti position included a reference in qualification
ef his position which attacked the CiSU leadership, and it is probable
that it was for this reference, rather than fr suggestion that
degeneration had taken place; that Togliatti was censored. In other
words, we believe that the irritation cf the CPSU with the reaction
of the CPs and the CF leaders abroad was genuine and that the Central
Committee Resolution was designed to put the lid back on the Pandorals
box which the release of the secret Khrushchev speech had opened. In
our opinion, the intent was to return to the original schedule and
pattern of a gradual de-Stalinization process which would have the
appearance of a genuine re-orientation and not of a mere tactic or
crisis.
In uro E - pe it is., of curse, Togliatti who commands attention,
Togliatti is an outstanding Marxist theorist and practician. He is
the leader ef the strongest party .utside ..f the Bloc. He led his
Party faithfully to a point from which it c..uld seriously consider
the various forces which could effect the acquisition of power. Some
observers maintain that ho, although always having toed the Party line,
and although having always deferred to the decisions of the Soviets,
is and has been in a way anti-Soviet, partly because his experiences
in Moscow and. the USSR before and during the war were humiliating and
unsatisfactory. Not too much can be_ made of this, particularly be-
cause adequate evidence to bear out those reports is lacking, Togliatti
was the first in 'Europe outside the. Communist Eloc* to react to the
rivolations about Stalin--on 14 March, several days before the Western
press began to leak the story of the secret speech. Terms later re-
vealed in the secret Khrushchev speech were woven into Togliatti/3
first reaction, thus indicating familiarity with at least some of the
material of the secret Khrushchev speech. Togliatti led the chorus
of the European Communistsafter the release of the secret Khrushchev
speech by the United States State Department. For these and other
reasns, then, the question arose whether or not his position of
criticism was ther:ughly coordinated with the Western Communist Parties
and perhaps with the Soviets as well. It was inferred that T:tliatti
may have coordinatecl with Tito, whom he visited before public tion of
his interview in Nu-Jvi Argomenti. However, there is no evidence
available showing that Togliatti coordinated his positions with the
rest _;f. the Western Communist Parties. Further, there were certain
definite differences between his and the positin of other Parties.
Faul de Groet of the C2 ActhLrlands actually opposed the. Tegliatti.
line,
The Ulbricht statement ef 4 :March and the Trvbuna Ludu editorial
if 10 March foreshad wed the campaign.
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Thus, we do net believe. that Togliatti coerdimtLd his position
with the rest of the CPs. C_ncerning the:possibility that his criti-
cism was c ordinoted with the Soviets, tho following may be said.
Obviuzly :me cannot rule it out comfletely. Obvi usly also, the
"new lek f the 20th Congross and its ,-"o-Stalinizatien program
permit and invite criticism and, in this sense, are a "plot" to dis-
establish the fact of 21escow's hegemony over the Communist movement,
Nevertheless, we feel that Togliatti crossed the line of permissible
general criticism into the area ef specific criticism of the CPSU
leaders which, as the Resolution indicates, is not permissible.
The validity of the last question in this respect, i.e., -
whether or not Togliatti and Tito got together and worked out certain
views and a common position, cannot be r,jocted out of hand. In his
report' to the Central Committee ..A1 24 Juno T gliatti stated that he �
had refused. Stalin's offer to: become Secretary General of the Cominform
in 1951, This statement can bc interpreted as a gesture towards Tito,
to show that. Tegliattilz heart was always in the right place. In our
mind there is the thought that Tito and Togliatti May wish to assume
the leadership of .the Communist movement in huropu along the lines of
national Communism and tivt the two men may have much in common. Tito's
- ambition and. Tugliattils proved ability to mold a "nati:nal" Communist
Party may, if we permit ourselves the luxury of a perspective, make a
combination leading te a new type of Communist thrcat in Lurope, where
Stalinist. Communism has been on the decline and where the reaction of
Socialists to� the "united front' offer has net boon satisfactry to the
Communists. The question, howovor, is whether such a perspective--if,
indeed it should over materialize--is a Soviet perspective as well.
We dC not think so, We do n-t think that the- CPSU has relinquished its
leadership role and is r. hey to accept the Tito-Togliatti idea of poly-
contrism. .
In this respect, it is interesting to study a 12 July -Moscow
broaddast in Italian which represents the first clarification by the
Soviets of what they mean when they speak about new forms of inter-
national Communist co-ordination. In essence, the breadcast commentary
states that there was a time when the Cominform took the place of the
CommuniSt international and that the Cominform was dissolved when new
circumstances arose, And then it goes on and stresses that the dis-
solution of the Cominform does not mean that "the Communist Party
would be isolated and the workers' unity weakened." Since the 12 July
statement, the Communist,Party of the Soviet -Union has further clarified
its position on international coordinction, particularly on 16 July,
The trend observed on 12 July continued to the effect that the leadership
role of the .Communist Party of the. Soviet Union is not to be questioned
and that the dissolution of the Cominform is not to be construed as
indicating that truly independent positi,ns can be takon, .Pravda went
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even so far as to attack publicly the concept of national CommuniSm.
And Pravda, also indicated that the United front with the Socialists
should be understood to mean that the supreme role of the Communist
Party in this united front should be -relinquished. In other words,
the Soviet position is again asAt.always� has been, that the united
front can be only on Communist termSand under Communist hegemony.
These statements in Pravda have been very helpful in clarifying this
talk about nati_nal independence of Communist Parties and their
various roads to socialism. The statements show that the position of
the 20th Congress is merely for public consumption and for propaganda
purposes, but that the underlying- basic concepts have hot been changed.
As a matter of. fact, since the 20th Party Congress the CPSU has been
quite busy coordinating the InternatL.Lnal Communist 'Movement. In the
first place, the 20th Congress itself is binding not only for the CPSU
but for all Communist Parties abroad. The resolutions of the 20th
Congrusahave boon se understood by the International Communist Movement,
which is in fact implementing them, although against various odds and
in face of van, us intrnal expl sim.s. The CFSU has been busy talking
to the delegates from France, Italy, Belgium and Great Britain among
ethers. Thu CPSU sent Suslov, once identified as the chief of the
Foreign Section of the. CPSU, to the French Communist Party Congress in
order to solidify the position of the leaders. Bulganin, Mikoyan and
others have gene to Satellite areas, obviously for coordination pur-
poses, and Satellite leaders, notably the East Germans, have been going
to Moscow. All this activity and all those statements flashed through
the smokescreen of the 20th Congress verbiage to bring home once again
the fact that the CPSU loaders or, possibly, a lcadinc, faction or
group in the Presidium of the CPSU, still cling to the concept that the
movement is one,.and one that must be centrally coordinated from Moscow.
The independence talk and the theses of the various roads to
socialism sound good and are obviously conceived as propaganda assets.
In formulating them, however, the Soviets have created another dilemma
for themselves as well as for the international movement. If the Soviets
cannot relinquish their claim to leadership -and the prerogative of be-
ing at the head of the movement, their true role is bound to Obtrude and
show itself, as it has recently under the stress situation created by
the de-Staliniz,tion campaign. And as this basic position of the Soviets
reveals itself almost automatically, it becomes counterproductive and
hampers the effort b which the Communist Parties are supposed to make,
i0G, to appear more independent and free of Moscow control.. It is
the old story of having: your cake and Gating it too It is in this
light that we return once more to the Tito/Togliatti situation and ask
ourselves whether these two leaders can be used by the Soviets to
reorient the Communist movement. We should like to say this: if the
C:SU had ever planned to use them as a vanguard in the molding of a
new and more independent-looking movement in Eur,Te, they have by now
been forced to modify this notion. One cannot condemn "National Com-
munism" in one breath and preach "independence" in the other. These
things do not go togeth:.ro
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In brief, it appears to us that the Soviets' "peacetime com-
munism", .as against Stalin's "wartime communism", has brought on no
significant reorientation of the fundamental political aims and methods
of International Communism. The so-calJed "changes" pertain largely
to Soviet foreign policy tactics and the handline of, internal bloc
problems. Whether it hurts or not, the leaderships of foreign
Communist Parties must fall in line--as always.
The 30 June Resolution of the CPSU called off the great .debate*
which was raging in the communist movement throughout the world under
the flimsy pretext that the "enemy" has seized the issue and is em-
barraSsing, or trying to split the entire Communist movement. In the
course of calling off the debate, the CPSU has tampered with historical
facts, Watered down its case against Stalin, and implicitly invited
further criticism for being dishonest and'eot revealing all the facts
about both Stalin and the Soviet system, end the co-resonsibility of
current leadership. .The poSition of the 30 June Resolution is a
defensive one and a'direct result of the situation developing under
the impact Of the release of the Khrushchev speech.
The specific points in the 30 June Resolution showing a dif-
ference in position-between the Resolution and the secret Khrushchev
speech can be summed-up as follows:
First, Khrushchev painted a dramatic .nd horrifying picture
of the damage done by Stalin to what may be summarized as the Soviet
system. Ho. himself talked about perversions, flowering of bureaucracy,
the atmosphere of mistrust and general patholo4cal suspicion pre-
vailing throughout the apparatus, the sterility and stagnancy of the
Party, of Soviet science, of Soviet economy', etc. The Leselution,
however, flatly states in a dogmatic and unsupported fashion that
Stalin has not affected the system, that the system was such that
no one man could -ever change it. This shift reveals of couiso the
A very 2ood. indication that the leading Communists abroad
correctly interpreted the Lesolution es a signal to end the
debate has been shown by the Canadian leader, Tim Luck, 'who
has written that "the statement issued by the Central Com-
mittee of the CPSU on June 30 marked the stage at Which we
as a party should,. turn from rctrospe'ctive preoccupation
with the revelations concerning the cult' of the individual
and its consequences, back to Canada and the tasks involved
in the struggle to unite the working class movement..."
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great sensitivity of the Seviets to attacks which show that it was
the system which gave rise to Stalin and not just historical accident,
as they now would have it.
The second major shift pertains to the co-responsibility question.
In his "secret" speech, Khrushchev pointed out that it was impossible
to oppose Stalin, that nothing could be done because opposition simply
meant death. In the Resolution, hoWeVer, there is now reference to a
so-called Leninist nucleus which is alleged to have existed at some
unspecified period and. is alleged to have taken on the leadership of
the new course after Stalin's death. It is now stated that it was
indeed possible to take counteraction_ during Stalin's lifetime, and
it is alleged by implication that this Leninist nucleus took such
counteraction, particularly during the war years when Stalin had given
up the leadership as described in the Khrushchev speech. This is a
new perspective on the co-responsibility question. Apparently dis-
tinction is made between members of this nucleus and the other leaders
of the Soviet Union. The members of the nucleus have done all that
could be done, even at the risk of being liquidated, although it is -
not stated how, all of a sudden, it was possible to take such risks.
Conversely, those not in the Leninist nucleus are burdened. with some
responsibility for Stalin's grimes. If this position is meant to
provide some answer to the Communists abroad, in order to caim them
down and cut off their criticism of the current leadership, it is
indeed a weak one.
Another shift pertains to the presentation of the Stalin case
itself. In the Lesolution the personal responsibility of Stalin was
still mentioned and given fairly large proportions. But these per-
sonal features have now been linked up with the historical, objective
circumstances justifying to a certain extent the restrictions imposed
on the Soviet People. By bringing out these objective factors, the
leadership obviously attempted to water down the case against Stalin.
If there was any historical necessity for some of the things he did,
then his personal responsibility cannot be as great as originally
featured. Thus, the Soviet leaders maneuvered themselves into a
rather paradoxical position. By calling ulon historical necessity
as justification, they have admitted that in princijAx the Soviet
system is wedded to restrictive and reressive measures. The CPSU
reaction to the Poznan riots bears out their basic attitude; dis-
satisfied workers equals foreign agent activity equals repression,
It would seem to us that such weaknesses in the Soviet position should
be apparent also to the Communist rank and file and some of the leaders
abroad. And we arc inclined to think the process 'of questioning, which
has been going on for some time now, _is not going to be stopped by -
self-contradictory cliche's.
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In sum, what we have seen luring the past months was a definite
crisis in the de-Stalinization program. More or less explosive re-
actions on the part of the Communist Parties abroad brought about a
modification in the position of the CPSU, designed to reduce to a
minimum the fermentation which the releas3 of the secret Khrushchev
speech accelerated. If tlrat can be done, the Soviets will achieve
the major objective which they originally had in mind. Obviously,
they had in mind a whitewash of the Co/in-mist movement and the
Communist Parties abroad for purposes of furthering the Communist
cause throughout the world, by making it more respectable, making
it more acceptable to the socialists and liberals, engulfing as it
were the current political scone and absorbing all "progressive,
liberal, socialist, leftist" forces into the Communist stream.
Nevertheless, the crisis will make it more difficult for Communist
Parties toLachiLeve their broad united front aims, because what has
boon saidraMi'igAillPbeen done cannot be undone. The stink
raised by the Khrushchev speech can not evaporate overnight. The
crisis has also nroduced incr asing factionalism within many
Communist Parties. TUssatidfantion vith Party leaders is developing:
If Stalin was wrong, why must the little Stalins be right? A
fairly resnectable Austrian Communist l-ader as well as a prominent
Swiss l-ader have resigned from the Party. The British Communist
Party has generated a small splinter group of intra-Party oppositionists.
The Swedish communist Party has suffered from a splinter movement.
The Communist Pnrty of Indonesia seems to be in the throes of a crisis
at this moment the current Secretary Genera 3 is under fire by the
former secretary general and his associates, who wore previously
ousted. Dissatisfaction with the lenders of CPUSA is ovident. Some
defections have occurred.
the Soviets lot the process work itself out without
interference? In our opinion tho Soviets will favor any process
which anionsrs as a "genuine" de-Stalinization effort on the local
scone, but will make sure that key positions are hold by loaders
whose loyalty to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is un-
questionable and/or can be ensured.
Obviously the-0 are a Fr-at many more things to be said. The
Soviets h-vo launched on eyneriment involving strenuous tactical re-
orientation of the movement along the lines of the 20th Congress, It
is obvious that things have not been going according to Plan and that
there must be disagroomont on the top level in the OPSU concerning
the questions of how far this reorientation is to PO and what the
limits of such a reorientation arc. The zig-zag occurring between
25 February and 30 Juno indicates such a debate.
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The figure of Stalin was a symhol for tho Communists, a
svmhol of Communism and the Soviet system. Such a symbol is not
easily replaced, or for that matter obliterated. The drastic
reorientation demanded by tho CPSU in regard to the socialists is
thing that has cnusod other Parties and otherfunctionaries to
give voice to resentment and criticism, In some countries there
has been talk about the dissolution of the Communist Party and.
merging it with socialist and liberal goups. We often wonder
Whether such a development is on the books in order to coate a
more viable and loss obvious Communist group that will be able to
manipulate the socialists. We do not know as yet how seriously
to take the "dissolution" talks. The Communists are sure to
develop certain unrcalistic ideas today in their groping for new
forms of Party work. The dissolution of the Communist Party and
its re-emergence as a "Socialist" group may be one of these un-
realistic ideas. The feeling that the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union has lost face and is no longer the infallible source of
direction is shared by many Parties. It corld hardly be otherwise
in view of the poor handling of the de-Stalinization issue which we
all witnessed.
Many wise observers of the Communist movement claim that tho
factions that may exist on the CPSU level roach into the international
movement, and that certain foreign loaders abroad are tied up with
factions existing at the CPSU level. This may offer an interesting
yardstick against which to measure the various reactions and positions
of OP leaders throughout the world.
More than ever will it he necessary to investigate penetratingly
the relations of overt and conspiratorial OP leaders abroad with Moscow.
The7 are the leverage for the implementation of. the "new course."
More than ever will it be necessary to compare the local OP
positions with the ideological line of the CPSU, in order to gauge
exactly what this talk al-out national independence amounts to. More
than ever will it he necessary to clarify the conspiratorial aspects
of Party work in order to determine the true direction of International
Communism.
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