CSHP 339 VOL I - (DRAFT PART 2) INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY OF AGENTS IN NORTH KOREA, 1952-1953

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 16051829
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2022
• Case Number: F-2018-00932
• Publication Date: December 1, 1972

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L33
INFILTRATION AND RESUPPLY OF AGENTS
1-4
AirForCe/Haas/iorean War 51-53
HS [Mar 95/1CaRuffner]
Doc. #__; page / of _1_61W.
IN NORTH KOREA, 1952-1953
',MOM
00-t-Q-1714-g-1 `14 71
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3. Evasion and Escape Activities
a. Background
The first/E-vasion andiRcape (E&E)
program in Korea was initiated on 7 September 1950 at
the request of General Partridge, Fifth Air Force.
For that program agents were trained in E&E
techniques
and on 22 October
1950, 4.0four-man teams were ready for launching into
North: Korea, The E&E program was cancelled on 27
October 1950 by the Joint Planning Committee, composed
of four representatives from G-2 and one each from
��t-_ gd
Far East Air Force (FEAF), :USN', and CIA eigglimm
A -
upon the recommendation of FEAF
"in view of the fact that neither time nor space
was at the time available to place the program into
operation." General Charles A. Willoughby froze all
E&E assets by directivevdated 4 November 1950. CIA
offered to turn over the E&E assets to General Partridge
in a letter dated 1 December 195Q, submitted to
Colonel Svensson, Chief, JSOB. At a meeting of the
JSOB on 3 December 1950, it was decided that all CIA
g
E&E assets would be made available to General Partridge--
c.
and a new E&E program would be established. The Agency
sent 111. new agents for Ma
training. Remaining assets from the initial program
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were also reassembled. All teams already trained
were transferred to Korea for launching Preparations.
On 5 December confirmation was received that alateams
were operating in the Pyongyang area.
By 1 February 1951, under the second program,
of al men available, 4111 were operating as teams in
the field, 4. were awaiting launching from Pusan, and
4011were in training �The men who had
been launched were dropped in the teeth of the unex-
pected Chinese invasion and retieat of the UN forces.
They were dropped without reception committees and
sufficient operational data
pr kbuit 40x,/
were made during the second
A
except one
or exfiltrated.
� iNINIMINOMM rescues
program, but all the teams
were either lost
By March 1954instead of using four-man teams,
the Agency developed an E&E program based on general
resistance warfare groups with greater ability to
receive local support and to stay behind the lines
indefinitely. The first large resistance/guerrilla
program,
was therefore expanded
to include E&E as an objective. A case officer was
provided on the west coast of Korea for the specific
purpose of briefing the G-3, EUSAK guerrilla teams on
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the principles of E&E. As of 28 January 195203the
first E&E program was credited with 15 rescues--
Seven British and eight American.
�Ated 28 January 1952 stated the
based on those rescues that could
A cable 41111111111110
above number was
4.V4,
be proved.
4111111110informed Headquarters on 8 May 1952
that Major Walter F. Keating, Chief, E&E Division,
FEAF, had requested permission through G-2 to implement
FEAF E&E behind-the-lines facilities. The Air Force's
reasons for its intentions were given as the failure
of other agencies in Korea to produce satisfactory
results, FEAF's belief it could direct the formation
of E&E facilities and produce satisfactory results,
and the denial that E&E activities could work as a
secondary mission to resistance teams or intelligence
�46(
collection.
On 17 May 19529 informed Headquarters
that General Everest, Commanding General of the Fifth
Air Force (FAF), was:behind Air Force's intentions.
The Air Force wanted to purchase fishing vessels,
equipped with radios and manned by Koreans, to ply
the west coast of North Korea to exfiltrate downed
pilots. General Banf ill, A-2, FEAF, told
that he had taken it up with Washington and that the
*That claim was later disputed. See page-arr.-
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Air Force was going into business by default. AIM)
noted that CCRAK had assumed full responsibility for
direction and control of E&E activities in Korea but
depended upon the Agency's Korea Mission for experienced
personnel which the/Mission lacked. It was MM.
'position that CCRAK had been established on orders of
the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) and applied
alike to FEAF, FAF, and the Agency's Korea Mission.
If FEAF had funds and personnel to take over control,
then those assets should be made available and coordi-
nated by CCRAK as long as the CINCFE directive was in
47/
effect.
e � - /
A memorandum to the DCI from theAMP)stated that
the failure of CGRAK to coordinate E&E adequately
could have prompted the Air Force's concern. CCRAK
had so far been purely a paper organization with
respect to E&E and had been mistrusted from the begin-
ning by the Air Force which regarded the organization
as an attempted encroachment on its jurisdiction by
FECOM. The Air Force was aware that CIA had to
coordinate all its E&E activities through CCRAK. The
Air Force was also probably responding to pressures
from increasingly substantial losses, from decreased
E&E assets which had resulted from intensified enemy
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countermeasures in the winter months, and from the danger
of a renewed and enlarged conflict. The action by
the Air Force resulted in additional Agency personnel
48/
being sent to assist CCRAK.
E&E efforts in Korea had been hampered by the
rugged terrain 04.-tha-caumtaly.'which had possibly the
highest security density of any country. Planes that
had been downed were mostly in areas of the greatest
security concentration--,main supply routes, front
lines, and MIG Alley near the Yalu (between Sinanju
and the Manchurian border). There had been a lack
of coordination among the US services in Korea
49/
responsible for E&E activities.
At a cCRAK Meeting on 19 May 1952 to discuss
Korean E&E'matters, CIA representative,
briefed the group on CIA E&E assets, projects, and
potential and proposed that the Air Force contribute
to an expansion of existing assets through CCRAK
rather than implement an additional operation in an
already overcrowded area. Colonel Dougherty, A-2 FAF,
replied that the Air Force did not plan to bypass
CCRAK and would implement its own program through
CCRAK if CIA
CRAK continued to fail to produce. 41111,
proposed incorporating Dougherty's plan, that of using
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fishing boats as permanent floating island bases,
with CIA assets. It was agreed that the group would
50/
study the proposition for joint operations:
-
The Agency proposed a plan using 411111smaller
faster craft with two alternates, for which it would
-recruit the crews and indigenous radio operators & and
provide signal plans, equipment, and a 50-ton mother
ship. The Agency would also be responsible for, fishing
cover in Inchon and for land contacts. FAF was to
provide personnel who might be needed and technical
assistance. Air and Navy were also responsible for
51/
protection in cases of air or sea attack. . It was
estimated that the program would require a minimum
52/
of 11111111111,- Headquarters approved the plan on
Project
27 May 1952, under the scope of4111011, The field
1
was authorized to make necessary expenditures to initiate
53/
the program if it was approved by the other services.
On 24 May 1952Q Headquarters informed the field
that the British tAl9was considering the possibility
of moving allofficers and men to Korea to devote full
time to E&E operations. Their proposal to drop
British officers behind enemy lines was considered
54
rather unrealistic/r--There were more than 1,000 British
prisoners of war in North Korea at the time.
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USAF submitted informally to CIA for comment a.
draft prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated
24 May 1952, of a proposed plan for establishing a
USAF Evasion and Escape Unit in Korea*?), which included
active participation by British officers. The paper
recommended the formation of the proposed E&E unit
to overcome the serious lack of E&E effectiveness in
the Korean theater. .Little had been achieved to aid
UN personnel who had been shot down or cut off from
their units. Only a small number had been assisted
by clandestine organizations, and no contact had yet
been made with prisoner of war camps and no persons
were known to have escaped. E&E responsibilities
in Korea lay with the military services for training
and briefing combat personnel and providing them with
suitable equipment, and with CIA for creating and
operating agent mechanisms, contacting prisoner of
war camps and making clandestine attempts to effect
evasions and escape. The paper maintained that the
clandestine guerrilla operations had not been successful,
mainly because the clandestine potential in North Korea
was also expended on tasks which were operationally
more important, such as intelligence gathering, sub-
version and sabotage, which by their nature attracted
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substantial enemy counterreactions not conducive to
55/
E&E activities.
A memorandum was issued by CCRAK on 31 May 1952)
outlining the E&E planning responsibilities. The
responsibility for planning and coordinating E&E
operations was delegated within CCRAK to the Deputy
Commander, CCRAK, effective that date. It was pointed
out that in implementing specific E&E operations the
primary consideration was rescue, using a combination
of overt and covert means. The CCRAK E&E staff,
A
through the Operations Officer, CCRAK, was to coordi-
nate E&E efforts and capabilities within the various
,7
CCRAK agencies. All cover E&E activities were to be
exclusively CIA's field of responsibility, and all
covert E&E activities of other agencies were to be
phased out. Existing CCRAK E&E assets whether covert
or overt were to be made available for E&E missions
56/
as required by the Deputy Commander, CCRAK.
An interim E&E 96mmittee was activated on 14
June 1952 by Chief of Mission, Korea, in his capacity
as Deputy, CCRAK. The committee had three regular
members, one from Army G-2, one from FEAF, and one
from the Agency. The Deputy, CCRAK, was primarily
responsible for E&E within CCRAK and delegated that
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responsibility under his supervision to the Agency's
CCRAK representative, who
was named chairman of the committee. There were
three invitational members: the Navy CCRAK repre-
sentative, the FAF E&E officer, and the G-2, EUSAK
representative. Seven proposals on the conduct of
E&E operations were submitted to the committee members
t4gr. 57/
'�de for approval.
' On 27 June 1952, the E&E proposals of the
Interim E&E Committee were accepted and were acted
58/
upon immediatelyz�On 5 July 1952, Headquarters cabled
the field that the Mission's accomplishments under
pressure and with limited assets were commendable
but warned against overextending its personnel and
assets to the detriment of other higher priority
59/
Korea Mission programs.
A memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans) from
Acting Assistant Director for Policy
Coordination, dated 31 July 1952, recommended that
the E&E unit proposed by USAF (a third draft of which
had been submitted by Air Force, dated 23 June 1952)
be concurred in, provided that:
(1) It is understood that this action
applies only to E&E activities in North
Korea.
168.
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(2) The Military Services form a Joint
Services Unit, in which CIA will parti-
cipate, to assume the primary responsi-
bility for E&E.
(3) The activities of the Joint
Services Unit are subject to appropriate
supervision and coordination (presumably
by CCRAK) to the end that there shall be
no conflict with other behind-the-lines
activities in North Korea.
Certain operational concepts outlined in the document
were also to be specified as responsibilities which,
by their very nature, must be centralized in CIA
60/
Headquarters, Washington.
In a cable to the fieldif dated 29 August 1952,
Headquarters noted that Chief of Mission, Korea, had
assigned the E&E responsibility to the Chief, Intel-
ligence,instead of to the Chief, Paramilitary, where
Headquarters felt the jurisdiction lay because of
extensive :practical and theoretical justifications.
Headquarters added that the E&E assignment should be
a temporary one under intelligence operations until
conditions permitted the responsibility to be properly
61/
assigned.
A conference was held on 13 and 15 October A962,12./
;S1,6 ero; imt
iCf
eler.
in Tokyo by representatives of(FEC/14 ANIWNAVFE, FEAF, tal
1
A
FAF, and CCRAK,4111111111111111, to discuss a covert
boat program under CCRAK. The responsibility for
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procurement, maintenance, and operational supervision
of the program was placed on COMNAVFE, which in turn
established Task Force 96.8 for compliance, mg,
teId-tbe-corerence-that the Agency's covert boat re-
quirements were estimated in May 1952 when the Agency
was given the responsibility for ME for air. All
vessels that were required had been purchased, fitted,
and placed into operation during the previous four
months, and there was no current or foreseeable need
for additional covert boats. All Agency assets were
purchased from its own funds and represented an
investment of about...Ma The boats did not come
under the control of the Navy since they had not been
purchased through the Navy E&E fund of $2,500,000.
The Agency expected, however, to use Navy maintenance
facilities on a reimbursable basis. It was agreed
that during hostilities vessels would use military
cover rather than civilianecommercial cover, since
the vessels would be used under military and/or naval
control. At the end of hostilitiesN the vessels
would become the Agency's responsibility. They would
be placed on public sale as surplus and the Agency
could obtain those it wanted
Captain C. J.
170
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ET
Zonderak, COMNAVFE, said that the $2,500,000 for the
program originated from Defense Department's funds
and carried the stipulation that all remaining assets
would revert to CIA upon cessation of hostilities.
The actual procurement, disposition, and operational
use of the vessels during hostilities would be the
responsibility of the Navy and Commander in Chief,
FECOM,- during which time CIA would have no respon-
sibility over the program. 62/
Headquarters cabled the field on 4 November
1952, criticizing Korea Mission's role in E&E opera-
tions in northwest Korea. Headquarters was concerned
that the gission was engaging too much in semiovert
activities, such as directing indigenous craft for
sea rescue and coastal pickgiips, and using paraescorts
4 instead of limiting the E&E effort to CIA's charter
responsibility of covert E&E. The field was requested
to review CIA's E&E position in Korea and discuss
E&E responsibilities with CINCFE and commanders of "
the appropriate services. CIA's position was that
Korea Mission had primary responsibility for only
covert E&E. 63/
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StECTRY....v.r.
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3. Evasion and Escape Activities
a. Foreword_
The cease-fire of 27 July 1953
forced a complete reassessment and reorganization of
E&E operations and personnel. The goal was to re-
organize into a security-tight efficient functioning
project capable of producing a higher level intelli-
gence product as its secondary mission. The primary
effort was directed toward the development of additional
net*S in the geographic areas into which the largest
number of aircraft went down during the three years
of hostilities in North Korea. In the event of the
resumption of hostilities the project would be ready
to continue its covert pilot recovery program.
The cessation of military air operations and
the initiation of exchange of prisoners of war removed
the immediate E&E requirement. UN withdrawal from
North Korean coastal waters and from islands along
the coast resulted in immediate evidence of increased
enemy coastal patrol, specifically high-speed boats.
Although the Branch had made only limited use
of air as an infiltration means prohibition of all
overflights because of the cease-fire suspended air
operations indefinitely and forced the use of overland
routes through enemy lines for E&E operations. By
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The following comment on the E&E program was
made by NAC in December 1953:
The E&E program in Korea was of such
magnitude and scope that it could only
have been best accomplished by a truly
joint effort by all the services and CIA.
At no time during the period of the
Korean war was there a truly concerted
effort by all the services and CIA in
ERN. activity. 88/
In an analysis of study of Korean
operations dated 14 December l95 it was stated
that it was doubtful that CIA could take credit
even in small part for the rescue of the 15 airmen.*
At best, the Agency's contributions were that of
developing awareness on the part of the persons
concerned of opportunities for rescuing airmen and
the means of survival in enemy territory. 89/
The Korea Mission's E&E program was terminated
as of 30 September 1954. A critique of the E&E effort
in Korea from August 1950 through August 1954 was
prepared who was the case officer
when the E&E project was terminated. (See Attach-
ment lielmat4igstgab-Z
*See prage=362-: e1Lo74, -
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