RUSSIAN PRESIDENT PUTIN'S MEDIA POLICY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06877062
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2022
• Case Number: F-2020-00968
• Publication Date: November 2, 2001

Approved for Release: 2022/04/27 C06877062
TOP CRET//HCS//ORCON/NOFORN
Classified By: UNSPECIFIED
Classification Reason: UNSPECIFIED
Declassify On: X1
11Sti14GS/10CALEISUBJ: RUSSIAN PRESIDENT PUTIN'S MEDIA
POLICY
Identifiers:
Dates:
Date Acquired:
Date Published: 02-Nov-2001 19:10:00
Date Received: 03-Nov-2001 00:10:29
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: RUS
Region: EURASIA, RUSSIA
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: CIA
Office Name NCS
Contact For:
COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.
Warningce (1-81/HC8/10C/NF) CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE
(U) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(U) INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS T
OPS RE T--HANDLE VIA HUMINT CHANNELS ONLY--NOFORN--ORCON
(U) EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT
(U) REPORT CLASS T O8R E T--HANDLE VIA HUMINT CHANNELS ONLY--NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--DISSEIV1INATION AND EXTRACTION OF
INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION
AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. END OF MESSAGE TOP SECRET.
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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----Trsrmes*e�44F4 1.
(b)(1)
PRESIDENT PUTIN AND HIS KEY ADVISERS ON MEDIA ISSUES UNDERSTOOD THAT
(b)(3)
RUSSIA WOULD NEVER BE RECEIVED IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD AS AN EQUAL
(b)(1)
PARTNER NOR PERMITTED TO RISE ABOVE NOMINAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE G-8 UNTIL
(b)(3)
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RUSSIA WAS ACCEPTED AS A TRULY DEMOCRATIC STATE. BEING ACCEPTED AS A
DEMOCRATIC STATE REQUIRED THE EXISTENCE OF A FREE PRESS WHICH CAN
PERFORM THE ROLE OF A "WATCHDOG OF DEMOCRACY." PUTIN UNDERSTOOD THE
IMPORTANCE OF LETTING THE PRESS PLAY SUCH A ROLE, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE
THIS INCLUDED PERMITTING IMPORTANT MEDIA OUTLETS TO BECOME TOOLS OF
PARTICULAR OPPOSITION POLITICIANS OR ALLOWING THEM TO CRITICIZE FOR THE
SAKE OF CRITICISM.
(TS//HCS//0C/NF) 2
THE 12 OCTOBER RESIGNATION OF GAZPROM-MEDIA CEO
ALFRED ((KOKH)) WAS FORCED BY PRESIDENT PUTIN AND HIS ADMINISTRATION. THE
RESIGNATION WAS NOT DRIVEN BY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KOKH AND GAZPROM
MANAGEMENT AS WAS PORTRAYED IN SOME RUSSIAN MEDIA OUTLETS. KREMLIN
OFFICIALS VIEWED KOKH AS HOPELESSLY TAINTED BY SCANDAL AND CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY. IN SUPPORT OF THIS, KOKH'S BOOK HONORARIUM SCANDAL AND
INVOLVEMENT IN DUBIOUS PRIVATIZATION ACTIVITIES WERE CITED. FURTHERMORE,
OFFICIALS IN THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION RECOGNIZED THAT NTV
WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS AN INDEPENDENT STATION AS LONG AS KOKH WAS
INVOLVED IN ITS ACTIVITIES. COMMENT: KOKH WAS A KEY FIGURE IN (b)(1)
A 1997 SCANDAL INVOLVING EXCESSIVE PREPUBLICATION ROYALTIES FOR A BOOK ON (b)(3)
RUSSIAN PRIVATIZATION.)
(TS//HCS//0C/NF) 3.
PRESS MINISTER MIKHAIL
((LESIN)) WOULD BE REMOVED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. KREMLIN OFFICIALS BELIEVED
THAT LESIN WAS TOO ETHICALLY COMPROMISED AND THAT THIS HINDERED THE
KREMLIN'S GOAL OF ACQUIRING INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION THAT RUSSIA HAS A
FREE PRESS. COMMENT:
LESIN'S OWNERSHIP OF THE ADVERTISING FIRM
((VIDEO INTERNATIONAL)) HAS RESULTED IN SOME ACCUSATIONS OF A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST BETWEEN HIS PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR ACTIVITIES.)
(TS//HCS//0C/NF) 4.
THE KREMLIN, NOT GAZPROM, WAS MANAGING THE SALE. AT
THE KREMLIN'S DIRECTION, GAZPROM MADE A COMMITMENT TO THE NTV LABOR
COLLECTIVE THAT IT WOULD SELL NTV NO LATER THAN 15 JANUARY 2002. GAZPROM
CEO ALEKSEY ((MILLER)) PROMISED NTV PERSONNEL THAT GAZPROM'S PREFERENCE
WAS TO SEE THAT NTV PERSONNEL OBTAIN A CONTROLLING PERCENTAGE OF
SHARES. MILLER ALSO SAID GAZPROM WAS LOOKING FOR A SUITABLE FOREIGN
INVESTOR. COMMENT: GAZPROM REJECTED AN OFFER BY A WESTERN MEDIA (b)(1)
COMPANY TO PURCHASE A LARGE SHARE OF NTV STOCK IN THE SPRING OF 2001 (b)(3)
BECAUSE THE WESTERN COMPANY DEMANDED A WRITTEN PRESIDENTIAL GUARANTEE
THAT NTV WOULD REMAIN FREE FROM KREMLIN INFLUENCE. PRESUMABLY GAZPROM
WOULD REJECT ANY SIMILAR DEMANDS BY WESTERN SUITORS FOR EXPLICIT KREMLIN
GUARANTEES.)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(TS//HCS//0C/NF) 5. NTV NEWS EXECUTIVES CLAIMED (b)(1)
THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS ABOUT NEWS COVERAGE FROM (b)(3)
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS SINCE GAZPROM'S HOSTILE TAKEOVER OF THE STATION, BUT
AS OF OCTOBER THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY BLATANT ATTEMPTS TO USE GAZPROM'S
OWNERSHIP TO INFLUENCE NEWS COVERAGE. SOVIET ERA (b)(1)
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAD "PHONE RIGHTS" IN WHICH THEY COULD TELEPHONE (b)(3)
NEWS ORGANIZATIONS TO COMPLAIN ABOUT PERCEIVED SHORTCOMINGS IN
COVERAGE, PRESENT DAY RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT (b)(1)
(b)(3)
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OFFICIALS STILL MADE SUCH CALLS. MOST OF THESE GOVERNMENT COMPLAINTS HAD
BEEN ABOUT NTV'S COVERAGE OF CHECHNYA AND THE KURSK RAISING. BUT, NTV
MANAGEMENT DID NOT ACCEPT ANY OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS THE COMPLAINTS. THE
MAIN CRITERIA FOR NTV MANAGEMENT IN DETERMINING WHICH STORIES TO RUN
CENTERED AROUND EXPECTED RATINGS, NOT WHETHER THEY PLEASE OR DISPLEASE
THE GOVERNMENT.
(TS//HCS//0C/NF) 6
RUSSIAN STATE TELEVISION
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
AND RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANY (VGTRK) CHAIRMAN OLEG ((DOBRODEYEV)) HAD
BECOME A KEY PUBLIC IMAGE-MAKER FOR PRESIDENT PUTIN. ALL OF PUTIN'S
SPEECHES AND PUBLIC APPEARANCES THAT WERE COVERED BY THE STATE
TELEVISION NETWORK RTR, PARTICULARLY THOSE ON "CRISIS TOPICS," SUCH AS THE
KURSK RAISING, CHECHNYA, AND THE YAKUTIA FLOODING, WERE STAGE-MANAGED BY
DOBRODEYEV. THIS, IN EFFECT, MADE DOBRODEYEV A KEY PUTIN ADVISER ON "CRISIS
COMMUNICATIONS." IN A SIMILAR VEIN, KREMLIN MEDIA ADVISER GLEB ((PAVLOVSKIY))
WIELDED ENORMOUS INFLUENCE WITH PRESIDENT PUTIN. HIS INFLUENCE WENT FAR
BEYOND MEDIA ISSUES AS HIS ((EFFECTIVE POLICY FOUNDATION)) HAD EVOLVED INTO
AN OVERALL POLICY "THINK TANK" WHICH HAD A CONTRACT WITH THE KREMLIN TO
PROVIDE INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A RANGE OF POLICY-RELEVANT
ISSUES. LASTLY, PRESIDENTIAL AIDE SERGEY ((YAZTRZHEMBSKIY)) HAD ALSO
EVOLVED INTO MUCH MORE THAN A MERE PRESS SPOKESMAN. YAZTRZHEMBSKIY HAS
A LARGE STAFF AND OPERATED MUCH LIKE A NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER IN THE
SENSE THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN POLICY DELIBERATIONS, NOT MERELY
COMMUNICATIONS AFTER-THE-FACT. COMMENT: PUTIN SEEMED TO HAVE (b)(1)
GREATER PLANS FOR YAZTRZHEMBSKIY--A POSITION HIGHER THAN THE FOREIGN (b)(3)
MINISTER.) TEAR LINE
(TS//HCS//0C/NF) TEAR LINE
Collection: HT
Creator:
Agency Acronym: CIA
Office Name: NCS
Contact For:
COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.
Description: (U) NONE.
nictrihtatinn I int.
Language: en
Precedence: R
(b)(3)
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Source:
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Subject: None
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