NSC MEETING ON POLAND

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06902818
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-01794
• Publication Date: February 6, 1981

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t/ze
NSC Meeting on Poland
6 February 1981
Contents
Background Memorandum
SNIE on Polalid Tab A
Talking Points Tab B
Haig Memorandum Tab C
OER Paper on Economic Leverage Tab D
British List of Economic Measures Tab E
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.35eRET
(b)(3;
5 February 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary Haig, 5 Feb 81
In the course of briefing Secretary Haig this morning, he made several
points that he asked me to bring to the DCI's attention. They seemed to be
triggered both by the current intelligence I showed him and by the agenda of
tomorrow's NSC meeting.
szeftrf
�
5Feb91 - �
Mul tibia
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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SECRET
pm
SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary Haig, 5 Feb 81
SECRET
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..SEC-RET
Supplementary Talking Points
Political Situation
A. Central committee and parliament sessions and Supreme
Court decision on farmers union, all next week, will
provide indicators of results of leadership debate on
moderate policies, particularly whether to use force.
-- Moderates win: political continuation of existing
pattern of alternating periods of tension or crisis
and short periods of relative calm until Soviet
patience runs out.
-- Hardliners win: eventual Polish use of force likely to
provoke general strike and possibly uncontainable violence.
B. Soviets pressing Kania; may be considering pushing for his
replacement. Want a clear line to emerge from next week's decisions.
-- Barring large scale breakdown of order, Soviets probably
do not want to intervene before Party Congress (23 February - 4 March)
-- After Congress, maneuvering room broadens; still rather the
Poles take coercive measures themselves.
Military Situation
A. Soviet forces opposite Poland have achieved a level of
military preparedness that will permit them to react to
events in Poland with speed and flexibility.
D. We continue to believe that if the Soviets decide to intervene
in Poland with a force of some two dozen divisions, they probably
would take one to two weeks to prepare.
5EcRET
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,SEarr
E. If the Soviets decide to intervene with only a few divisions,
preparations could be accomplished in two to three days.
Economic Situation
A. In 1980, national income declined by 4 percent, agricultural
production by 12 percent, industrial production stagnated.
Hard currency debt stands at about $25 billion; the debt
service about 100 percent.
B. Outlook in 81 for the growth of national income, industry
and agriculture is again bleak.
C. Larger trade deficits expected to improve the supply of food
and assure supplies of vital raw materials.
$12 to $13 billion needed to cover repayment of principal
and interest and cover the current account deficit,
exclusive of interest.
Will require large scale aid from East and West: not only
debt relief but new funds.
Negotiations underway to obtain debt relief from Western
banks and governments; moving slowly.
Unless substantial aid forthcoming quickly, Poland could
default within the next few months.
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SEGRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
National Intelligence Officers
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA
FROM
NFAC #586-81
5 February 1981
Director of Central Intelli ence
Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director, NationaJ rjp Assessment
Robert M. Gates
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
SUBJECT : NSC on Poland
1. We understand from the NSC staff that Dick Allen will open the
discussion on Poland with a briefing on the current situation and
several of the key judgments of the SNIE published last Monday
(at Tab A). The talking points at Tab B would supplement what we
understand Allen will be presenting, should you be asked or wish
to comment.
2. Secretary Haig will then summarize the status of the
Interagency Group's work on contingency measures against the USSR
should they invade Poland, as well as the status of consultations
with the Allies on such measures. The Secretary has approved the
memorandum at Tab C which reviews the political and economic measures
already under consideration and it presumably will serve as the basis
for his briefing. In this connection, the paper you requested on
Western economic leverage is at Tab D. As you are probably aware,
there is some interest at the upper levels of State and Defense in
the development of more far-reaching economic measures than yet
identified should the Soviets intervene. The British list of
economic measures may be discussed; it is at Tab E.
3. I recommend you read the SNIE (if you have not) and
Secretary Haig's memorandum, as background for Friday's meeting.
The salient points in each are underscored.
4. Finally, in the discussion of possible contingency measures,
you may want to point out that to the extent planned sanctions are
selective and kept under wraps, their deterrent effect is significantly
diminished. Maximum deterrence would result from comprehensive,
far-reaching measures, agreed by the Allies, and well-publicized
in advance (an approach the Allies probably would not countenance).
All Portions of this
Memorandum are Classified
SECRET
_SFX-firr
DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
REVIEW ON FEB87
Derived from Multiple
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NFAC #586-81
5 February 1981
SUBJECT: NSC on Poland
Also, the NSC should know that the Soviets almost certainly believe
that any sanctions would last no more than a year or two and that
there would be at least some loopholes -- a view reinforced by their
experience after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and with the post-
Afghanistan sanctions. This assessment is in fact probably realistic
and will weaken the impact of any planned sanctions as a deterrent.
Robert M. Gylis:4-1
Attachments:
As Stated
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ES SENSITIVE
� 8102706
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM
� vs.,
SECRET/SENSITIVE
TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Newsom
FROM: EUR - George S. Vest Q)Ir
SUBJECT: Polish Contingency Planning: Allied
Consultations
30 JAN 1981
Issue
Approval of contingency political and economic
measures to be decided by NATO Foreign Ministers in
the event of Soviet intervention in Poland.
Discussion
At Tabs A & B are lists of political and economic
measures which could be taken in elm event of Soviet
intervention in Poland.
The list of political measures (Tab A) was forwarded
to capitals by NATO permreps on December
of a Soviet intervention NATO ministers are to meet in
emergency session and decide which ones are to be
implemented in the light of the actual circumstances of
Soviet action. The 1131 of oolitical MeASures hak hpean
subsequently discussed with the British, French and Oermans
with relevant comments indicated in indented paragraphs.
The list of economic measures (Tab B) are the product
of ad referendum work among the Four which refines the
list of possible economic measures submitted by the
britis oliowing the December NATO ministerlal. You already
agreed that we can continue discussing this list with the Four.
At the January 30 interagancv meeting on Poland
chaired by David News= there was unanimous agreement
that this Administratian g.hoillti_pruinrsp this oar/ipr
contingency planning as a basis for further allied
wnsultation and for eventual action by NATO
ministers in the event of Soviet intervention. We
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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-2-
would like to be in a position to have Walt Stoessel convey
this to the British, French and German Ambassadors when he
meets with them on February 9. arly next week Bob Rormats
and Mike Rashish will be discussing the economic program
with economic Cabinet members not involved in David Newsom's
meeting.
Recommendation
That, assuming that the talks with the economic agencies
go well, you authorize us to inform the British, French and
Germans that the new Administration endorses the.politicak
and economic contingency planning which has gone on to date
on Poland as abasis for further consultations and action in
the event of Soviet intervention. We may also subsequently
wish to inform other allies, but that depends upon the tactics
we work out with the British, French and Germans.
Approve
Attachments:
Disapprove
�
� Tab A List of PoliLical measures
Tab B List of Economic measures
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F.mtst &Latta
E:GStreeb Ole
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E,..:RET/SENSLTIVE
Possib1i2 Political Measures
Since December 23, 1980 discussions in the Alliance, in smaller
groups, and bilaterally have drawn on the list circulated by
the NATO International Stai:f and which NATO PermReos agreed
should form the essential elements for a menu to be studied
further in capitals and then decided by Foreign ministers at an
emergency Ministerial following soon after any intervention.
Wording of and the numbering of measures below follows the form
in that NATO document. Indented comments reflect the
conclusions on meetings of the Washington group the French,
Aritiah and German AtOmssillors plus the Under Secretary oi
ptAte for Political Affairs).
1. liake protest demarches where and as appropriate.
2. Call for emergency UN Security Council Meeting and, if
appropriate, a meeting of the General Assembly.
This measure has been discUssed among Allied UN
PermReps in New York.
3. Conduct intensive campaign of public condemnation
4. Recall Ambassadors from Moscow and, perhaps other Warsaw
Pact capitals for consultations.
From Moscow
A) Ambassadors should be recalled at as close to the
same time as possible so that a signal of unity is
preserved and it does not appear that any Allies are
dragging their feet
� ...lab.
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SECkET/SENSITIVE
B) Make clear that they are recalled for consultations
rather than as a permanent measure.
C) Before they are sent back to Moscow there should be
consultations among the interested countries so that
the return does not signal disarray.
From Other Warsaw Pact Capitals
A) As with other measures involving the other Eastern
European5, including the GDR, whether and how to act
will depend upon the actual nature of the governments'
participation. (It is understood that the FRG has
special interests where the GDR is concerned.)
From Warsaw
A) If the Soviets put in a puppet government hen
Ambassadors should probably be recalled for
consultations.
B) If the Kania government survives and its role in
the intervention is unclear then the question of
recall would need to be studied further in the light
of all the facts.
C) If the Polish Government ioins the people in
resisting then Ambassadors should probably not be
recalled since the Poles will need Western moral
support and because Ambassadors could be vital in
helping with refugee needs.
5. ,Suspend 15- ticioation in the CSCE Madrid meeting following
condemnation of Soviet actions on the basis of the Helsinki
Final Act.
Further consultation is required to agree upon a
scenario that would make clear that the NATO Allies
left the Madrid moeting because of a most serious
Soviet violation of the Final Act and that a
resumption of these talks would require actions by the
Soviet Union to rostore confidence.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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In addition to making clear that the Soviets are to
blame, the Allies should reaffirm their support for
the Helsinki Final Act, the continuation of the CSC?,
process, and try to make it possible for the neutrals
to support our position.
6. Suspend participation arms control aim disarmament
negotiations such as MBFR; CTB, CD, CDE4
(See Note under #7)
... ..1111.
7. Review with the United States SALT and LRTNF negotiations.
The Ft_ench Lamaism was that a.U._ of_ the above should
be suspended eouallv because the Soviets would have
shown they were not trustworthy partners.
Nonetheless, for any talks that were not actually in
sessiczn. the French could agree that they would not
need to be formally broken off so long as there was
Western agreement not to resume them while the Polish
problem continued.
The German Ambassador stressed that his government
yould not want to nave suspended CTB, SALT or LRTNF.
The US suggested that the record show that there had
been no consensus regarding the public 'suspension of
the following control
CTB and TN?.
It was agreed that further work was requireo on these
measures, and it was noted that the new US
administration is presently reviewing these issues.
8. Impose Additional riaqtrirtinng Or Rnvicat, and possibly other
Warsaw Pact Embassies, incluaing limits on travel and staff at
bll levels.
Needs further work on what agreed measures would be.
9. Suspend all exchanges !Ugh-level visit g with Warsaw Pact
States participating in the intervention.
It was agreed that such a measure should be
immediately implemented and that consultations would
be undertaken before any high-level visits were
subsequently undertaken.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRZT/SENSITIVE
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10. Suspend major cultural, academic, scientific and athletic
,exclianoes and, if applicable, the execution of cultural
agreements.
In general there are very serious problems with
formally announcing the non-implementation of
bilateral governmental agreements -- including in the
cultural field.
Perhaps a distinction can be drawn between those
culture, art and sporting exhanges that can be stopped
at little cost, and those in the educational and
scientific fields that enhance Western influence in
the East.
Further refinement required.
11. Urge like-minded and other countries to emulate 411ie4
measures.
�����������������������
It was agreed that it is very important to have
nations like Japan, Australia, hew Zealand, -no Spain
take similar measures and that this required
consultation -- which for now it was agree� shoulo be
bilateral. This topic is unoer active oiscussion at
NATO.
rev 1-27-81
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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11111.0,1
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S'e.CkETZSENSITIVE
Possible Economic Measures
1. Al]. exports from our countries to the Soviet Union not
covered by existing contracts are embargoed.
2. Asjney official credit:.. credit guarantees, or credit
�insurance shall be issued in support of trade with the soviet
Union. We further recommend that private banks exercise strong
restraint in providing new financial facilities, loans and
credits to the USSR.
3. We will curtail, to the extent Possible under existing
agreements, air, land. and sea transPort services with the
USSR, ,and Soviet fishery in waters under our Llrisdiction.
4. We gall upon our companies to take note of the new
political situation and.to exercise restraint in their
commercial dealings with the Soviet Union, and we ask them to
establish no� new commercial representation.in the Soviet Union.
5. We will examine, jointly and urgently, possibilities for
further restraints particularly on the transfer of advanced
technology.
�
6. In addition, economic advisors shall continue to examine
All the possibilities suggested in the British list and those
raised in their previous discussions.
7. The Question of whether to apply similar measures against
Other members of the Wars P;sct will be considereg_in the
iisht of thoir artual participation. (Regarding the GDR, it is
understood that the FRG has special concerns.) How Poland
itself will be treated would depend, inter alia, on whether the
Polish Government invited in and cooperated with Soviet
military activities.
8. While not a post-intervention measure, the important
Question of immediate economic assistance for Poland, incluoing
debt relief, is'also on the agenda as it relates to chances for
deterring an intervention.
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8102706
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM
IS/1.7
11)U
SECRET/SENSITIVE
TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Mr. Newsom
FROM: EUR - George S. Vest SUBJECT: Polish Polish Contingency Planning: Allied
Consultations
30 JAN 1981
Issue
Approval of contingency political and economic
measures to be decided by NATO Foreign-Ministers in
the event of Soviet intervention in Poland.
Discussion
At Tabs A & B are lists of Political and economic
measures which could be taken .1,71 t'le event of Soviet
intervention in Poland,
The list of political measures (Tab A) was forwarded
to capitals by NATO permreps on December 41w In thp pvpnt
of a Soviet intervention, NATO ministers are to meet in
emergency session and decide Whips ones au to be
implemented in the li ht of the actual circumstances
soviet action. The list of DO Ltical measures has bppn
subsequently discussed with the British., French and Germans
with relevant comments indicated in indented paragraphs_
The list of economic measures (Tab B.) are the prqcluct
of ad referendum work among the Four which refines the
list of possible economic measures submitted by the.
British following the December NATO ministerial. Yotzalnmdy
agreed that we can continue discussing this list with the Four.
At the January 30 interacency meetino on Poland
chaired by David Newsom there was unanimous Agreement
.that this Administration qhou1t1 pnAerqp this parlior
contingency planning as a basis for further allied
consultation and for eventual action by NATO
ministers in the event of Soviet intervention. We
SECRET/SENSITIVE
RDS-3 1/30/2001
_
- _ � �: � � �
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
'would like to be in a position to have Walt Stoessel convey
this to the British, French and German Ambassadors when hp
Me ts witn them on February �. iarly next week Bob Rormats
and Mike Rashish will be discussing the economic program
with economic Cabinet members not involved in David Newsom's
meeting.
Recommendation
That, assuming that the talks with the economic agencies
go well, you authorize us to inform the British, French and
Germans that the new Administration endorses the.politicaA
and economic contingeney.plannina which has gone on to date
on Poland as aiesiz for further consultations and action in
the event of Soviet intervention. We may also subsequently
wish to inform other allies, but that depends upon the tactics
we work out with the British, French and Germans.
,Approve
Attachments:
Disapprove
� Tab A List of Political Measures
Tab B List of Economic. Measures �
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
Clearance:EB:E.7ohnston
ban ku.,,a0
E G5treeb
�
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SLZRET/SENSITIVE
Possible Political Measures
Since December 23, 1980 discussions in the Alliance, in smaller
groups, and bilaterally have drawn on the list circulated by
the NATO International StaEl and which NATO PermReps agreed
should form the essential elements for a menu to be studied
further in capitals and then decided by Foreign Ministers at an
emergency Ministerial following soon a ter any intervention.
Wording of and the numbering of measures below follows the form
in that NATO document. Indented comments reflect the
conclusions on meetings of the Washington group the French,
Pritish and German Ambassalorsolus the Under Secretary of
ptate for Political Affairs).
1. Hake protest demarches where and as appropriate.
2. Call for emergency UN Security Council Meeting and, if
appropriate, a meeting of the General Assembly.
This measure has been discUssed among Allied UN
PermReps in New York.
3. Conduct intensive campaign of public condemnation
4. Recall Ambassadors frcm Moscow and perhaps other Warsaw
Pact capitals for consultations.
From Moscow
A) Ambassadors should be recalled at as close to the
same time as possible so that a signal of unity is
preserved and it does not appear that any Allies are
dragging their feet
_
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� � �
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 2 -
.B) Make clear that they are recalled for consultations
rather than as a permanent measure.
C) Before they are sent back to Moscow there should be
consultations among the interested countries so that
the return does not signal disarray.
From Other Warsaw Pact Capitals
A) As with other measures involving the other Eastern
European*, including the GDR, whether and how to act
,will depend upon the actual nature of the governments'
participation. (It is understood that the FRG has
special interests where the GDR is concerned.)
From Warsaw
�' A) If the soviets put in a puppet government then
Ambassadors should probably be recalled for
consultations.
B) If the Kania government survives and its role in
the intervention is unclear then the question of
gecall would need to be studied further in the light
of all the facts.
C) If the Polish Government 'loins the people in
resisting then Ambassadors should probably not be
� 'recalled, since the Poles will need Western moral
'support and because Ambassadors could be vital in
� helping with refugee needs.
5. ,Suspend participation in the CSCE Madrid meeting following
condemnation of Soviet actions on the basis of the Helsinki
Final Act.
Further consultation is requited to agree upon a
� scenario that would make clear that the NATO Allies
. left the Madrid meeting because of a most serious
Soviet violation of the Final Act and that a
resumption of these tAlks would require actions by the
Soviet Union to restore confidence.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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���
�����01. �in %In ...vim.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
- 3 -
In addition to making clear that the Soviets are to
blame, the Allies should reaffirm their support for
the Helsinki Final Act, the continuation of the CSCI1
process, and try to make it possible for the neutrals
to support our position.
6. Suspend participation it arms control ana oisarmament
neQotiations such as MBFR, CTB, CD, CDE.
(See Note under 17)
ao.
7. Review with the United States SALT and LRTNF negotiations.
The French goaltion was that all of the above shoula
pe Suspended eouallv because the Soviets would have
shown they were not trustworthy partners.
Nonetheless, .for any talks that were not actually in
session4 the French could agree that they would not
need to be formally broken off so long as there was
Western agreement not to resume them while the Palish
problem continued. �
The German Ambassador stressed that his government
yould not want to have suspended CT, SALT or LRTNF.
The US suggested that the record show that there had
been no consensus regardina the Public suspension of
the following arms control negotiations: MEFILAIUT,
CTS and TN?.
It was agreed that further work was requirea on these
measures, and it was notea that the new US
administration is presently reviewing these issues.
8. Impose additional restrirtinni nn snvtpro and possibly other
Warsaw Pact Epbassies, incluaing limits on travel and staff at,
ill levels.
Needs further work on what agreed measures would be.
9. Eyspend all exchanges high-level visits with Warsaw Fact
States participating in the intervention.
It was agreed that such a measure should be
immediatelyiimplemented and that consultations would
be undertaken before any high-level visits were
subsequently undertaken.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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� I.
moor
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
-4-.
10. Auspend major cultural, academic, scientific and athletic
,exchanges and, if applicable, the execution of cultural
agreements.
In general there are very serious problems with
formally announcing the non-implementation of
bilateral governmental agreements -- including in the
cultural field.
Perhaps a distinction can be drawn between those
culture, art and sporting exhanges that can be stopped
at little cost, and those in the educational and
scientific fields that enhance Western influence in
the East.
Further refinement required.
����
11. Urge like-minded and other countries.to emulate Allied
measures.
It was agreed that it is very important to have
nations like Japan, Australia, New Zealano, ano Spain
take similar measures and that this required
consultation -- which for now it was agree� shoulo be
bilateral. This topic is unaer active discussion at
NATO.
rev 1-27-61
� _SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECkET/SENSITIVE
Possible Economic Measures
1. All exports from our countries to the Soviet Union not
Covered by existing contracts are embargoed.
2. No new official credits. credit-guarantees. or credit
insurance shall be issued in support of trade with the Soviet
Union. We further recommend that private banks exercise strong
restraint in providing new financial facilities, loans and
credits to the USSR.
3. We will curtail, to the extent Possible under existing
agreements, air, land, and sea transport services with the
USSR, oand Soviet fishery in waters under our jurisdiction.
4. We gall upop our companies to take note of the new
political situation ano,to exercise restraint in their
- commercial dealings with the Soviet Union, and we ask them to
7,10- establish no. new commercial representation.in the Soviet Union.
-
S. We will examine, jointly and urgently, possibilities. for
further restraints particularly on the transfer of advanced
technology.
6. In addition,- economic advisors shall continue to examine
all the possibilities- sugnested in the British list and those
raised in their previous discussions.
7. The Question of whether to apply similar measures against
other members of the WarsAi. ?act will be considereg in the
light of their ant-nal participation. (Regarding the GDR, it is
understood that the FRG has special concerns.) How Poland
itself will be treated would depend, inter alia, on whether the
Polish Government invited in and cooperated with Soviet
military activities.
8. While not a post-intervention measure, the important
Question of immediate economic assistance for Poland, including
debt relief, is'also on the agenda as it relates to chances for
deterring an intervention.
rev 1-27-81
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