CIA'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAM IN CHILE SINCE 1970

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02873812
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
July 13, 2023
Document Release Date: 
March 3, 2022
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2019-02353
File: 
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PDF icon CIAS COVERT ACTION PROGRA[16032134].pdf199.77 KB
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� � .. r.Y Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 7- \vioNTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGFZNOihneir WASHINGTON D.C. 20505 MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs SUBJECT: CIA's Covert Action Program in Chile Since 1970 1. This Agency did not conduct covert action operations in support of either of the two democratic candidates who oppo.sed Salvador Allende in the 1970 presidential election. Out' role in the election was limited to an effort to denigrate Allende and his Popular Unity (UP) coalition during the cam- paign. Since Allende's inauguration, U.S. policy has been to maintain maximum covert pressure to prevent the Allende regime's consolidation. Under this policy the 40 Committee has approved since January 1971 fina*ial support for Chilean political patties, media, and private sector organizations opposed to the Allende regime. (b)(3) (b)(3) 2. Funds and guidance channeled to opposition forces in Chile through our Santiago Station enabled the three opposition political parties -- Christian Democratic Party (PDC), National Party (PN) and Democratic Radical Party (PDR) -- to improve their internal organizations, acquire new media outlets, and to compete successfully in a number of congressional by-elec- tions. The Station also succeeded in inducing another party -- Radical Party of the Left (PIR) -- to pull out of the UP government and to join the opposition coalition prior to the 4 March 1973 congressional elections. These congressional elections were considered by both the UP and the opposition as a form of plebiscite to determine whether or not the govern- ment had a popular mandate to continue the implementation cf its revolutionary program. Our support of the opposition con- federation in these congressional elections was described by opposition leaders as having been of vital importance in WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. Classified by Signer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption Category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification. C 5Ecn- Nsnirt pi� Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 rr.-.6577/Ta7: Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 Cl- %AVIA -2- enabling them to campaign strongly and to win Funds authorized by the 40 Committee were also - (b)(3) used to insure the continued existence of El Mercurio, Chile's " largest and most important newspaper, whicH�acted as an effective rallying-point for opposition forces. Limited support was also made available to private sector organiza- tions, but because some of these groups began to try to provoke a military coup, our funding was confined to specific activities in support of the opposition cqalition in the March congressional elections. 3. After the March 1973 elections, it became increasingly apparent that three years of political polarization had strained the fabric of Chilean society to the breaking point. Various U.S. policy options were considered, and on 20 August 1973 the i40 Committee approved an additional to support 0:0(3) opposition political parties and private sector organizations through June 1974; support to the private sector, however, was made contingent on the concurrence of Ambassador Davis and the Department of State. Since this cpcurrence was not given, no support was provided to the privatector, whose initiative in launching and maintaining a series'of crippling strikes was instrumental in provoking the military coup of 11 September 1973. Thus, while the Agency was instrumental in enabling opposition political parties and media to survive and to maintain their dynamic resistance to the Allende regime, the CIA played no direct role in the events which led to the establishment of the new military government. eW. E. Colby Director Attachment: Summary of 40 Committee Approvals ,SECilEi/SLNSITiVE EYES ONLY Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATE 3 Sept 75 TO: John Waller /DDO ROOM NO. BUILDING REMARKS: Per our conversation. B. C. Evans FROM: ROOM NO, I BUILDING I EXTENSION FIONIV5.241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 I I ( MEMORAN DIN FOR: Dr. Approviry ed for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812�� .tAwrussinger You may also recall discussion of a Track Two in late 1970 � which has not been included in this summary. W. E. Colby 13 September 1973 (DATE) -0R�4 110. 101 REFL Ace5 FORM 10.101 AUG 54 WI-110E)), MAY BE USED. S w.") c �-;\ S (47) v-; -e_ se \-�D C0.2%�19 --�c k s \-C \-"`�"\ N.-0-CA- � v, A_ ctr�kr-e� Nr1 . r�-\ CP-4cts,-- Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 D UNCLASSIFIED Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812,.'lENTIAL 1---1 'SE ONLY 1110.0�1 pri SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD� SHEET SUBJECT: (Optional) CIA's Covert Action Program in Chile Since 1970 FROM: David A. Phillips#INI Chief Western Hemisphere Division EXTENSION 1366 NO. DATE 13 September 1973 TO: ,(Officer designation, room number, and building) DATE namo movAmm OFFICER'S INITIALS COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.1 ADDO DDO DCI 5. 6. 7. 8. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. (b)(3) FORM 3-62 MOIMMINI10111�110.111, 6 1 0 usIDMS/a US INTERNAL n SECRET fl CONFIDENTIAL 'ISE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED Approved for Release: 2022/03/01 CO2873812 or