CIA AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS, 1955-1974

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05460723
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2022
• Case Number: F-2022-01173
• Publication Date: June 1, 1998

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STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
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Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of an article's factual
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Supporting the "Secret War"
CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974 (U)
William M. Leary
66
Air America, an airline
secretly owned by the
� CIA, was a vital
component in the
Agency's operations in
Laos.
99
William M. Leary is a Professor of
History at the University of Georgia.
The largest paramilitary operations
ever undertaken by the CIA took
place in the small Southeast Asian
Kingdom of Laos. For more than 13
years, the Agency directed native
forces that fought major North Viet-
namese units to a standstill. Although
the country eventually fell to the
Communists, the CIA remained
proud of its accomplishments in
Laos. As Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DCI) Richard Helms later
observed: "This was a major opera-
tion
for the Agency.... It took
manpower; it took specially qualified
manpower; it was dangerous; it was
difficult." The CIA, he contended,
did "a superb job."1
Air America, an airline secretly owned
by the CIA, was a vital component in
the Agency's operations in Laos. By
the summer of 1970, the airline had
some two dozen twin-engine trans-
ports, another two dozen short-
takeoff-and-landing (STOL) aircraft,
and some 30 helicopters dedicated to
operations in Laos. There were more
than 300 pilots, copilots, flight
mechanics, and air-freight specialists
flying out of Laos and Thailand. Dur-
ing 1970, Air America airdropped or
landed 46 million pounds of food-
stuffs�mainly rice�in Laos.
Helicopter flight time reached more
than 4,000 hours a month in the same
year. Air America crews transported
tens of thousands of troops and refu-
gees, flew emergency medevac
missions and rescued downed airmen
throughout Laos, inserted and
extracted road-watch teams, flew
nighttime airdrop missions over the
Ho Chi Minh Trail, monitored sen-
sors along infiltration routes,
conducted a highly successful photore-
connaissance program, and engaged in
numerous clandestine missions using
night-vision glasses and state-of-the-art
electronic equipment. Without Air
America's presence, the CIA's effort in
Laos could not have been sustained.
A Distorted View
Air America's public image has fared
poorly. The 1990 movie Air America
is largely responsible for this. It fea-
tured a cynical CIA officer who
arranged for the airline to fly opium
to the administrative capital of Vien-
tiane for a corrupt Asian general�
loosely modeled on Hmong leader
Vang Pao�where he manufactured it
into heroin in a factory just down the
street from the favorite bar of Air
America's pilots. The Asia general, in
return, supplied men to fight the war,
plus a financial kickback to the CIA.
Ultimately, we learn that the Com-
munist versus anti-Communist war
in Laos was merely a facade for the
real war, which was fought for con-
trol of the area's opium fields.
Air America pilots in this film are por-
trayed as skilled at landing damaged
airplanes, but basically a wildly unpro-
fessional menagerie of party animals,
including few borderline psychotics.
These ill-disciplined airmen are not
the villains of the story; they are
merely pawns in a drug game that they
either disdain or oppose outright.
A Bum Rap
The connection among Air America,
the CIA, and the drug trade in Laos
lingers in the public mind.
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66
The film, according to the credits,
was based on Christopher Robbins's
book about the airline, first pub-
lished in 1979 under the title Air
America.2 Although Robbins later
claimed that the movie distorted his
book,3 it followed closely the book's
theme if not its details. Both movie
and book contend that the CIA con-
doned a drug trade conducted by a
Laotian client, both agree that Air
America provided the essential trans-
portation for the trade, and both
portray the pilots sympathetically.
Robbins provides factual details that
the movie lacks. Citing Alfred W.
McCoy's 197/ study, The Politics of
Heroin in Southeast Asia, he relates
how Air America helicopters col-
lected the opium harvests of 1970
and 1971, then flew the crop to yang
Pao's base at Long Tieng in the
mountains of northern Laos, where it
was turned into heroin at the gen-
eral's drug laboratory.4
My nearly two decades of research
indicate that Air America was not
involved in the drug trade. As Joseph
Westermeyer, who spent the years
1965 to 1975 in Laos as a physician,
public health worker, and researcher,
wrote in Poppies, Pipes, and People:
"American-owned airlines never
knowingly transported opium in or
out of Laos, nor did their American
pilots ever profit from its transport.
Yet undoubtedly every plane in Laos
carried opium at some time,
unknown to the pilot and his superi-
ors�just as had virtually every
pedicab, every Mekong River sam-
pan, and every missionary jeep
between China and the Gulf of
Siam."5
If the CIA was not involved in the
drug trade, it did know about it. As
former DCI William Colby acknowl-
edged, the Agency did little about it
The story of the real Air
America begins in
1950, when the CIA
decided that it required
an air transport
capability to conduct
covert operations in
Asia in support of US
policy objectives.
99
during the 1960s, but later it took
action against the traders as drugs
became a problem among the troops
in Vietnam. The CIA's main focus in
Laos remained on fighting the war,
not on policing the drug trade.6
How It Began
The story of the real Air America
begins in 1950, when the CIA
decided that it required an air trans-
port capability to conduct covert
operations in Asia in support of US
policy objectives. In August 1950, the
Agency secretly purchased the assets
of Civil Air Transport (CAT), an air-
line that had been started in China
after World War II by Gen. Claire L.
Chennault and Whiting Willauer.
CAT would continue to fly commer-
cial routes throughout Asia, acting in
every way as a privately owned com-
mercial airline. At the same time,
under the corporate guise of CAT
Incorporated, it provided airplanes
and crews for secret intelligence
operations.7
In the 1950s, the CIA's air propri-
etary, as it was known in the lexicon
of intelligence, was used for a variety
of covert missions. During the
Korean war, for example, it made
more than 100 hazardous overflights
of mainland China, airdropping
agents and supplies.
Supporting the French
CAT also became involved in the
French war against Communist
insurgents in Indochina. In April
1953, the French appealed to Presi-
dent Eisenhower for the use of US
Air Force C-119 transports and crews
to fly tanks and heavy equipment to
their hard-pressed forces in Laos.
"Having such equipment," the
French emphasized, "might mean the
difference between holding and los-
ing Laos."8
While reluctant to commit American
military personnel to the war in
Indochina, the Eisenhower adminis-
tration was anxious to assist the
French. This led to a decision to use
CAT pilots to fly an airlift in US Air
Force�supplied C-1 19s. In early
May, a group of CAT personnel
arrived at Clark Air Force Base in the
Philippines for 72 hours of concen-
trated ground and flight school on
the unfamiliar C-119s. On 5 May,
they flew six of the transports, now
bearing the tricolored roundels of the
French Air Force, to Gia Lam air-
base, outside Hanoi.
Operation SQUAW began the next
day. It continued until 16 July, with
CAT pilots making numerous air-
drops to French troops in Laos. With
the waning of the Vietminh offen-
sive, which was more due to the
weather than French resistance, the
CAT crews were withdrawn.9
The war in Indochina, however, con-
tinued to go badly for the French. In
November 1953, French paratroopers
occupied Diet Bien Phu in northwest-
ern Vietnam, 10 miles from the Laos
border, and established an airhead.
Gen. Henri Navarre, French military
commander, wanted to lure the Viet-
minh into a setpiece battle in which
superior French firepower could be
52
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66
used to good effect. Among the many
mistakes made by the French in plac-
ing their troops 220 miles from Hanoi
was their miscalculation of the air
transport resources needed to keep
their isolated forces supplied. Col.
Jean-Louis Nicot, head of the French
Air Transport Command in Indoch-
ina, lacked sufficient aircrews to meet
the Army's demands. Unless addi-
tional assistance could be obtained, the
French garrison could not be kept
10
suppliea'.
In early January 1954, Washington
alerted CAT for a possible return to
Indochina. Under a contract signed
with French authorities on 3 March,
CAT would supply 24 pilots to oper-
ate 12 C-1 19s that would be
maintained by US Air Force person-
nel. Operations from Hanoi's Cat Bi
airfield to Dien Bien Phu got under
way just as the Vietminh began their
assault on the French position.
Between 13 March and the fall of
Dien Bien Phu on 7 May, CAT pilots
flew 682 airdrop missions to the belea-
guered French troops. One plane was
shot down in early May, and the two
pilots were killed; many other C-119s
suffered heavy flak damage, and one
pilot was severely wounded.
CAT operations continued in
Indochina after the fall of Dien Bien
Phu. Between mid-May and mid-
August, C-119s dropped supplies to
isolated French outposts and deliv-
ered loads throughout the country.
CAT also supplied 12 C-46s for
Operation COGNAC, the evacua-
tion of people from North Vietnam
to South Vietnam following the sign-
ing of the Geneva Agreement on 21
July 1954. Between 22 August and 4
October, CAT flew 19,808 men,
women, and children out of North
Vietnam. It also carried members of
the CIA's Saigon Military Mission
Laotian independence
suited the policy of the
United States, so long as
the government
remained non-
Communist.
99
north of the 17th parallel. Attempts
by the CIA to establish staybehind
paramilitary networks in the north,
however, proved futile.11
Concern About Laos
The Geneva Conference of 1954, in
addition to dividing Vietnam at the
17th parallel, confirmed the status of
Laos as an independent state. The
nation would be ruled by the Royal
Lao Government from Vientiane on
the Mekong River. Members of the
pro-Communist Father Lao would
regroup in the northern provinces of
Sam Neua and Phong Saly pending
integration into the central regime.
The French were allowed to main-
tain a small military presence in the
country to train the Royal Lao Army
(FAR).
Laotian independence suited the pol-
icy of the United States, so long as
the government remained non-Com-
munist. Laos represented one of the
dominos in Southeast Asia that con-
cerned President Eisenhower and
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
Although the country had little
intrinsic value, its geographical posi-
tion placed it in the center of the
Cold War in Southeast Asia. If Laos
fell to the Communists, Thailand
might be next, according to the dom-
ino theory. And the collapse of
Thailand would lead to Communist
domination of Southeast Asia�and
perhaps beyond.12
US Aid
Under an agreement signed in 1950,
the United States had been supply- '
ing economic and military aid to
Laos. Following the Geneva Confer-
ence, Washington decided to expand
this program. In January 1955, it
established the United States Opera-
tions Mission (USOM) in Vientiane
to administer economic assistance. At
the end of the year, the Programs
Evaluation Office (PEO)�staffed by
reserve or retired military officers and
akin to a Military Assistance Advi-
sory Group�was set up within
USOM to handle military aid.13
CAT soon became involved in
USOM's aid program. In July 1955,
USOM officials learned that a rice
failure threatened famine in several
provinces in Laos. As a number of
these areas were in remote, moun-
tainous regions, airdrops would be
the only feasible means to delivering
essential supplies of rice and salt.
Three CAT C-46s arrived at the
northeastern railhead of Udorn,
Thailand, on 11 September to begin
the airlift. By the end of the month,
CAT had flown more than 200 mis-
sions to 25 reception areas, delivering
1,000 tons of emergency food. Con-
ducted smoothly and efficiently, this
airdrop relief operation marked the
beginning of CAT's�and, later, Air
America's�support of US assistance
programs in Laos.14
CAT's permanent presence in Laos
began on 1 July 1957, when Bruce B.
Blevins brought C-47 B-817 to Vien-
tiane to service a new contract with
the US Embassy. Blevins found flying
conditions primitive in Laos. At least
Vientiane had a pierced steel plank
runway and the only control tower in
Laos. Elsewhere, he usually landed on
dirt strips that had been built to
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support Japanese fighters during
World War II. There were no aero-
nautical charts available, so he had to
use French topographical maps. The
only radio aid to navigation in the
country was a 25-watt nondirectional
beacon at Vientiane that was operated
by employees of Air Laos, the coun-
try's commercial airline, who turned it
on when it suited them.I5
Between 1957 and 1959, the unsta-
ble political situation in Laos led to a
growing American presence in the
country as the United States
increased its support of the FAR. Air
America�the name changed on 26
March 1959, primarily to avoid con-
fusion about the air proprietary's
operations in Japan l'�provided
essential transportation for the
expanding American effort in Laos.
The airline's C-47s and C-46s passed
more frequently through Vientiane to
fulfill urgent airdrop requests. Blevins
also was kept busy, landing through-
out the country and making
numerous airdrops to isolated FAR
posts. He developed an especially
close relationship with a CIA case
officer who had arrived in October
1958 and who was assigned to sup-
port Capt. Kong Le's parachute
battalion. The case officer frequently
called on Blevins to carry personnel
and supplies.
The summer of 1959 saw the intro-
duction into Laos of a US Special
Forces Group, codenamed Hotfoot,
under the command of Lt. Col.
Arthur "Bull" Simons. Twelve
Mobile Training Teams took up
duties at Vientiane, Luang Prabang,
Savannekhet, and Pakse.I/ The
appearance of the Americans coin-
cided with the outbreak of fighting
between the FAR and Pathet Lao. In
light of these developments, CIA
By June 1960, it had
become clear that
helicopters would form
a permanent part of Air
America's operations
in Laos.
99
officials in Laos requested additional
air transport resources.
Increasing Air Support
In August 1959, CIA headquarters
ordered its air proprietary to send two
pilots to Japan for helicopter training.
Robert E. Rousselot, vice president for
operations, remembers being called
into President Hugh L. Grundy's
office in Taipei and shown the mes-
sage. The requirement had "come out
of the blue." He assumed that the CIA
had a special operation in mind that
called for the use of a helicopter and
that it would be "a one-time deal." Lit-
tle did Rousselot realize that this would
be the beginning of a mior rotary-
wing operation in Laos.'
Eventually, four CAT pilots were
trained on US Air Force H-19A heli-
copters in Japan and the Philippines.
The CAT contingent did not reach
Laos until March 1960. Due to the
operating limitations of the H-19s,
the underpowered helicopters could
fly only at lower elevations in the
country. Generally, they were used to
carry CIA case officers to meetings in
outlying areas and to distribute leaf-
lets during elections.I9
By June 1960, it had become clear
that helicopters would form a perma-
nent part of Air America's operations
in Laos. It was equally apparent that
neither the underpowered H-19s nor
the inexperienced Air America rotary-
wing pilots could do the job. Both
Rousselot and the CIA recognized
that better equipment and properly
trained pilots were needed to accom-
plish the mission. Rousselot hired
four experienced US Marine Corps
helicopter pilots who obtained their
discharges in Okinawa to fly the
H-19s. Later in the year, the CIA
arranged for the Marine Corps to
transfer four UH-34 helicopters to
Air America to replace the H-19s.20
The Helio Courier
At the same time that Air America
was trying to develop a rotary-wing
capability in Laos, the company also
was taking steps to introduce STOL
aircraft into the country. Maj. Harry
C. Aderholt, a US Air Force detailee
with the CIA, had supervised the
development of the Helio Courier
while serving with the Agency's air
branch. Convinced that the aircraft
could survive the short, rugged air-
strips often found in remote areas, he
became the foremost advocate for Air
America's adoption of the Helio
Courier.2I
Air America obtained a Helio for tri-
als in Laos in the fall of 1959. The
STOL program got off to a poor
start. The Helio's engines proved
temperamental, frequently develop-
ing vapor locks on starting. Mud,
rocks, and gravel tended to block the
aircraft's crosswind landing gear. The
rudder needed modification so that it
would not jam. Also, the first pilots
who flew the airplane were used to
multiengine transports and did not
receive adequate training on an air-
plane that demanded special handling
techniques.
Air America came close to abandoning
the Helio. It was saved by Aderholt,
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counts most in the sad Laos
situation."22
As Phoumi prepared to march on
Vientiane from his base in Savanna-
khet, US assistance to the rightwing
general increased sharply. Special
Forces personnel conducted inten-
sive training of Phoumi's troops,
while Air America transport flew in
supplies from Bangkok. Phoumi also
obtained support from his close
friend, Thai Prime Minister Marshal
Sarit Thanarat, who sent teams from
the elite Police Aerial Reinforcement
Unit to work with Phoumi's soldiers.
Heavy fighting took place in Decem-
ber as General Phoumi drove Kong
Le out of Vientiane. By the end of
the year, Kong Le�who was now
receiving support from a Soviet air-
lift�had retreated north to the
Plaine des Jarres (PDJ), securing the
vital airfield complex in that area.23
The appearance of the Soviets
alarmed American military authori-
ties. Admiral Felt cabled the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on 29 December:
"With full realization of the serious-
ness of the decision to intervene, I
believe strongly that we must inter-
vene now or give up northern Laos."
Chief of Naval Operations Adm.
Arleigh Burke agreed. "If we lose
Laos," he told the Joint Chiefs on 31
December, "we will probably lose
Thailand and the rest of Southeast
Asia. We will have demonstrated to
the world that we cannot or will not
stand when challenged." The effect,
Burke warned, would soon be felt
throughout Asia, Latin America, and
Africa. 24
In preparation for possible US mili-
tary intervention in Laos, the Joint
Chiefs ordered the emergency mobili-
zation of a task force at Subic Bay in
the Philippines. On New Year's day,
the American warships left port and
headed north. At the same time, Pres-
ident Eisenhower was looking for
ways to stabilize the situation in Laos
without the need to introduce Ameri-
can troops into the conflict. He
therefore viewed with favor a pro-
posal by the CIA to arm and train
Hmong tribesmen.
The PARU Program
The Hmong project was primarily
the work of CIA paramilitary special-
ist James W. (Bill) Lair. A veteran of
World War II, Lair had joined the
CIA at the outbreak of the Korean
war. Assigned to Thailand, he had
worked as a civilian instructor with
the Thai Police Department in a
CIA-sponsored program to enhance
the organization's ability to deal with
threats from Communist insurgents.
Attached to the Border Police, Lair
soon encountered the problem of
assisting remote border outposts.
When police units in outlying areas
of Thailand were attacked by Com-
munist guerrillas, it often took a week
to get reinforcements to the stations.
He argued that it would be better to
have a parachute-trained unit for
such emergencies. Although the Thai
Army was not happy about the
appearance of a paramilitary police
organization, the Thai Government
approved its creation. Aware of the
Army's sensitivity, Lair selected an
innocuous name for the new organi-
zation: Police Aerial Reinforcement
Unit (PARU).25
Lair was proud of his role in develop-
ing the PARU program. He selected a
training camp in south Thailand and
initiated a rigorous program to create
an elite paramilitary force. At one
point, the PARU program was in
danger of losing CIA support. It was
saved through the intervention of
Desmond FitzGerald, chief of the Far
East Division in the Clandestine Ser-
vice. By 1960, the PARU force
numbered more than 400 highly
trained individuals.
Enter Vang Pao
The key to the Hmong program was
Vang Pao, a Hmong military leader
who commanded the FAR's 10th
Infantry Battalion on the PDJ. A tal-
ented and ambitious officer, Vang
Pao early had come to the attention
of Americans in Laos. In April 1957,
the PEO had selected him to attend a
six-month counterinsurgency train-
ing program at the Scout Ranger Base
in Manila.
When fighting broke out in Laos at
the end of 1959, Vang Pao had
grown concerned that the Hmong
were likely to suffer reprisals from the
Communists because of the Hmongs'
previous close association with the
French. Encouraged by General
Phoumi and assisted by a US Special
Forces team, he began to organize a
Hmong staybehind force on the
southeastern edge of the PDJ. If the
Communists occupied the Plaine,
Vang Pao intended to relocate the
Hmong to seven strategic mountain-
tops surrounding the PDJ and carry
on the fight.26
Aware that Vang Pao was seeking
General Phoumi's assistance, Lair
decided to look into the possibility of
an expanded program with the
Hmong commander. In late Decem-
ber 1959, Lair met with Vang Pao.
VP, as he was known to the Ameri-
cans, said that he either had to fight
the Communists or leave the coun-
try; if the United States supplied the
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weapons, Vang Pao said that he
would fight and that he could easily
raise an army of 10,000.
Impressed with the Hmong com-
mander, Lair returned to Vientiane
and reported the contact to station
chief Gordon L. Jorgensen. As it hap-
pened, Desmond FitzGerald was
passing through Vientiane en route to
Vietnam. Jorgensen suggested that he
and Lair get together with FitzGer-
ald for dinner. FitzGerald told Lair
that the PARU's assistance to Gen-
eral Phoumi during his campaign
against Kong Le had been worth
everything that the CIA had spent on
the program. Lair then outlined a
program to support the Hmong.
FitzGerald asked him to write up the
proposal and send it to
Washington.27
Although Lair "never thought they
would do it," he quickly dispatched
an 18-page cable. A positive answer,
he recalled, came back "surprisingly
soon." Lair's proposal also gained the
.support of Admiral Felt and the State
Department. President Eisenhower,
looking for ways to avoid direct
American involvement in Laos, was
willing to go along with the CIA's
scheme.28
Backing the Resistance
With authorization to arm and train
1,000 Hmong as a test of the con-
cept, Lair again visited Vang Pao and
arranged for an arms drop at Pa
Dong, a mountaintop base south of
the PDJ. In January 1961, Air Amer-
ica delivered weapons to the first 300
trainees. The program nearly got off
to a disastrous start when an Air
America helicopter, carrying Lair and
the PARU training team, crashed
As the Hmong force
grew, so did Air
America's presence in
Laos.
99
after failing to clear a ridgeline when
approaching the Hmong camp. For-
tunately, there were no injuries.29
The PARU team conducted a three-
day training program for the Hmong,
involving the use of their weapons
and basic ambush techniques. Lair
also asked Vang Pao to select 20 men
out of the 300 for training as radio
operators. These individuals were
sent to the PARU training camp in
south Thailand for instruction.
With the Hmong scattered on moun-
tainous terrain surrounding the PDJ,
Lair recognized from the beginning
that good communications would be
crucial for effective operations, and
he turned to Air America. In the early
months of 1961, Air America had
only a handful of helicopters and
STOL aircraft available to support
CIA operations in Laos. This
changed in early March, when the
new administration of' President
Kennedy became alarmed after Kong
Le and the Pathet Lao captured a key
road junction and threatened Vien-
tiane and the royal capital at Luang
Prabang. Kennedy again placed US
military forces in the region on alert,
and he also authorized the transfer of
14 UH-34 helicopters from the
Marine Corps to Air America to be
flown by Marine, Army, and Navy
"volunteers."30
On 29 March 1961, Clarence J.
Abadie led a flight of 16 UH-34s
from Bangkok to Air America's new
forward operating base at Udorn in
northeastern Thailand, 40 miles
south of Vientiane. The helicopter
forces soon became involved in sup-
porting Hmong forces engaged in a
fierce battle with the Pathet Lao at Pa
Dong. On 30 May, the first Air
America helicopter pilots died in
Laos, when Charles Mateer and
Walter Wizbowski crashed in bad
weather while trying to land supplies
to the besieged Hmong.31
Driven from Pa Dong, Vang Pao
moved his headquarters to Pha Khao,
10 miles to the southwest. In July,
Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale
reported to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor,
President Kennedy's military adviser,
that 13 PARU teams (99 men) were
working with the Hmong, assisted by
nine US Special Forces personnel.
Nine CIA case officers were assigned
to the Hmong program, with two
backups in Vientiane. More than
9,000 Hmong had been equipped for
guerrilla operations, with the possibil-
ity of securing 4,000 additional
recruits.32
As the Hmong force grew, so did Air
America's presence in Laos. To con-
nect the scattered Hmong outposts
that were separated by mountainous
terrain, Lair ordered the construc-
tion of a chain of airstrips, labeled
Victor Sites (later called Lima Sites),
that could be used by Air America's
STOL airplanes. In April 1961, Wil-
liam R. Andersevic had arrived in
Vientiane to take charge of Air
America's Helio program. Under his
direction, the number of STOL sites
expanded rapidly. Andersevic would
locate suitable areas, then arrange for
local people to cut down trees and
level the ground as best they could
with their primitive equipment. By
the summer of 1961, Andersevic had
given Lair a firm foundation upon
which to build what would become
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an extensive network of STOL fields
throughout northern Laos.33
Air America transports also were the
key to feeding the people in the
Hmong villages where the men had
gone off to fight. Lair had enlisted
the assistance of Edgar M. ("Pop")
Buell to deal with this program. An
Indiana farmer who had arrived in
Laos in June 1960 to work with the
International volunteer Service, Buell
proved an inspired choice for the
task. After a two-month trek around
the perimeter of the PDJ, Buell
arranged through Lair for Air Amer-
ica to make scheduled airdrops of rice
to the Hmong villages.34
The Diplomatic Track
While the Hmong program was
expanding, President Kennedy had
been seeking a diplomatic solution to
the situation in Laos. At a meeting in
Vienna in June 1961, Kennedy and
Soviet Prime Minister Nikita
Khrushchev issued a joint statement
of support for "a neutral and inde-
pendent Laos." At the same time,
negotiators met in Geneva to try to
work out a settlement to the
problem.
On 23 July 1962, a formal "Declara-
tion on the Neutrality of Laos" was
signed in Geneva. It provided for a
coalition government and the with-
drawal of all foreign troops from the
country by 7 October. The United
States pulled out its 666 military
advisers and support staff, and Air
America stopped dropping weapons
to the Hmong. Assistant Secretary of
State Avcrill Harriman, who was
intent on ensuring US compliance
with the Geneva accords, allowed the
CIA to retain only two men in Laos
While the Hmong
program was
expanding, President
Kennedy had been
seeking a diplomatic
solution to the
situation in Laos.
9
to monitor Communist compliance
with the agreement.35
Air America's operations declined
sharply in 1963. Restricted to food
resupply to the Hmong, which aver-
aged 40 tons a month by summer,
the airline laid off people and moth-
balled airplanes. By May 1963, the
number of UH-34s assigned to
Udorn had dropped from 18 to 6.
Flight hours, which had averaged
2,000 per month before the Geneva
accords, dropped to 600. As helicop-
ter pilot Harry Casterlin wrote to his
parents: "There are 37 of us over here
and not enough work.... We are
doing virtually no flying in Laos
anymore."36
A Broken Agreement
Reports reaching CIA Headquarters
from its two officers in Laos suggested
that the apparent quiet was deceptive.
It soon became clear that 7,000 North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops had
not left the country. In fact, the NVA
was expanding its areas of control,
attacking both neutralist and Hmong
positions throughout Laos. As Hmong
ammunition stores dwindled, William
Colby, who was head of the CIA's Far
East Division, pleaded to Harriman to
allow the resumption of air shipments.
"My arguments became more force-
ful," Colby recalled, "reflecting the
intense cables I was receiving from the
two CIA officers who were still up in
the hills observing and reporting on
what was happening." Harriman reluc-
tantly approved an Air America arms
drop�along with instructions that it
be used for purely defense purposes.
Further shipments followed. As Colby
pointed out, however, Harriman per-
sonally approved "each and every
clandestine supply flight and its
cargo."37
Increasing Conflict
As Hanoi sent additional troops into
Laos during 1963, the Kennedy
administration authorized the CIA to
increase the size of the Hmong army,
now headquartered in the valley of
Long Tieng. By the end of the year, a
reported 20,000 Hmong were armed.
They acted as guerrillas, blowing up
NVA supply depots, ambushing
trucks, mining roads, and generally
harassing the stronger enemy force.
Air America again took a greater role
in the slowly expanding conflict.
"The war is going great guns now,"
helicopter pilot Casterlin informed
his parents in November 1963.
"Don't be misled [by new reports]
that I am only carrying rice on my
missions as wars aren't won by
rice."38
Full-scale fighting broke out in Laos
in March 1964, when North Viet-
namese and Pathet Lao forces
attacked across the PDJ. By mid-
May, the Communists had taken
control of the strategic region, bring-
ing an end to the already shaky
coalition government.
Search and Rescue
While contemplating direct Ameri-
can military intervention, President
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Johnson ordered Navy and Air Force
reconnaissance flights over the PDJ to
provide intelligence and to send
Hanoi "a message of American
resolve." On 6 June, a naval recon-
naissance aircraft was shot down over
the PDJ. As the military services
lacked a search-and-rescue capability
in Laos, Air America undertook the
responsibility.39
The unsuccessful attempt to rescue Lt.
Charles E. Klusmann�who later
escaped from his captors40�marked
the beginning of what was perhaps the
most demanding and hazardous of Air
America's operations in Laos. The air-
line's pilots were neither trained nor
properly equipped for the dangerous
search-and-rescue task, but there was
no one else to do the job. This mis-
sion became even more difficult
during the first half of 1965, when the
air war expanded into the northwest-
ern portion of North Vietnam.
As Air America crews in helicopters,
transports, and T-28s risked their
lives to save downed US airmen,
rumors grew that the civilian pilots
were receiving a bounty of $1,500 for
each rescue. This story apparently
originated with a US Air Force cap-
tain in the air attache's office in
Vientiane. Charged with briefing mil-
itary pilots on rescue capabilities in
Laos, he visited Air Force bases and
US Navy carriers, spreading the word
that airmen who were shot down over
Laos did not have to worry about
being picked up: Air America's pilots
would be there to get them out, com-
peting for the $1,500 bonus.41
When the story reached Air America,
it created a good deal of resentment.
In June 1965, after an especially haz-
ardous long-range mission into North
Vietnam in which two helicopters
were badly shot up and a local Lao
The CIA was largely
responsible for
conducting military
operations in Laos, but
the US Ambassador was
the man in charge.
99
commander killed in what turned out
to be a successful rescue of two Air
Force officers from a downed F-4C,
one of the Air America helicopter
pilots wrote: "The AF doesn't, I'm
sure, appreciate what we are doing for
them at great risk to ourselves....
What makes us mad is that the AF
thinks we get $1,500 for a pickup.
We get nothing�but ulcers."42
Not Very Secret
The year 1965 marked the beginning
of major military activity in what
became known as the secret war in
Laos. Although the full extent of the
conflict was not revealed to the
American people until 1969-70, the
war was not all that secret. News of
the fighting frequently found its way
into the pages of The Bangkok Post,
The New York Times, and other news-
papers. Congress certainly was kept
well informed. As former CIA Direc-
tor Richard Helms has pointed out,
the Appropriations subcommittees
that provided the funds for the war
were briefed regularly. Also, Senator
Stuart Symington and other Con-
gressmen visited Laos and gave every
indication of approving what was
happening. They believed, Helms
noted, that "It was a much cheaper
and better way to fight a war in
Southeast Asia than to commit Amer-
ican troops."43
The CIA was largely responsible for
conducting military operations in
Laos, but the US Ambassador was the
man in charge. The secret war in Laos,
author Charles Stevenson has empha-
sized, "was William Sullivan's war."
Ambassador from December 1964 to
March 1969, Sullivan insisted on an
efficient, closely controlled country
team. "There wasn't a bag of rice
dropped in Laos that he didn't know
about," observed Assistant Secretary
of State William Bundy. Sullivan
imposed two conditions upon his
subordinates. First, the thin fiction of
the Geneva accords had to be main-
tained to avoid possible embarrass-
ment to the Lao and Soviet Govern-
ments; military operations, therefore,
had to be carried out in relative
secrecy. Second, no regular US
ground troops were to become
involved. In general, Ambassador
Sullivan, and his successor,
G. McMurtrie Godley, successfully
carried out this policy.44
Activity at Udorn
The Ambassador in Vientiane dele-
gated responsibility for the tactical
conduct of the war to his CIA sta-
tion chief. The primary headquarters
for supervising the war, however, was
in Udorn, Thailand. Located adja-
cent to the Air America parking ramp
at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base,
the 4802nd Joint Liaison Detach-
ment was the CIA's command center
for military operations in Laos. Lair
was in charge of the 4802nd until the
summer of 1968, when he was
replaced by his longtime deputy,
Lloyd ("Pat") Landry.
Both Lair and Landry had excellent
rapport with Gen. Vitoon Yasawatdi,
commander of "Headquarters 333" at
Udorn, the Thai organization in charge
of their forces in Laos. The Thai gen-
eral, who had direct, private access to
both the Lao and Thai prime
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Air Ooerations
"tisk
*Am
Air A trience Ci 1.23 on tamp Long Ikrn
and the War
The early ),ears or the war wok on a
r�.crothar asitcer, Durtng, till(' kin,
62
,,r4W4
rorri ","
pcooki, which iarhci.1 trom Octobil
Nit)', the Not h Vietnamese.
Pi-libel Lao wen on die offensive,
applying presiiiiire on t1,1C I tiongin
northern 1�10,i. Arid on
(woes throughout the cott rrt
Dining the inoinioon,isdt
rur utSeptember, the anti ,Conhnii-
tok advantage Of th inobiliry
d kw Air America tinii ruck
enetny-o(�eupicti territory.
rrir irriii
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Air Operations
during 1965, 1966, and 1967. Despite
a rapid growth in personnel, Air Amer-
ica lost only 11 crew members in Laos
during these three years, five of which
were due to enemy action.
North Vietnamese Pressure
The character of the war began to
change in 1968. The North Vietnam-
ese, impatient with the progress of
the Pathet Lao, introduced major
new combat forces into Laos and
took control of the year's dry season
offensive. By mid-March, they had
captured a strategic valley north of
Luang Prabang, successfully assaulted
a key navigational facility that was
used by the US Air Force for bomb-
ing North Vietnam, and threatened
to push the Hmong out of their
mountaintop strongholds surround-
ing the PDJ.
On 21 March 1968, CIA Headquar-
ters issued a Special National
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) to top-
level policymakers in Washington on
Communist Intentions in Laos.
Despite the presence of 35,000 NVA
troops in the country, CIA analysts
concluded that Hanoi was mainly
interested in protecting its supply
routes to South Vietnam and did not
wish to destroy the general frame-
work of the 1962 Geneva
settlement."
Events soon proved the SNIE to be
correct. The NVA offensive ended
with the onset of the monsoon in
May. The Hmong, however, had suf-
fered heavy casualties, losing more
than 1,000 men since January,
including many top commanders. A
recruitment drive turned up only 300
replacements: 30 percent were
between the ages of 10 and 14, 30
percent were 15 and 16, while the
remaining 40 percent were all over
35. According to "Pop" Buell, those
between those ages were all dead.47
Offensive and
Counteroffensive
As the strength of the Hmong waned,
the United States tried to redress the
growing imbalance of forces in the
field through increased use of air-
power. Between 1965 and 1968, the
rate of sorties in Laos had remained
fairly constant at 10 to 20 a day. In
1969, the rate reached 300 per day.48
During the rainy season of 1969,
Vang Pao abandoned the use of guer-
rilla tactics and launched a major
offensive against the NVA/Pathet Lao
forces, using the increased airpower
to support a drive against enemy
positions on the PDJ. Operation
About Face was a huge success. The
Hmong reclaimed the entire PDJ for
the first time since 1960, capturing
1,700 tons of food, 2,500 tons of
ammunition, 640 heavy weapons,
and 25 Soviet PT-76 tanks.4'
But the victory was short-lived. In
January 1970, the NVA brought in
two divisions that quickly regained all
the lost ground and threatened the
major Hmong base at Long Tieng.
For the first time, B-52s were used to
blunt the enemy drive.
NVA strength in Laos had reached
67,000 men, but CIA analysts contin-
ued to argue that the enemy did not
want to risk a decisive action. "The
Communists believe that when they
obtain their objectives in South Viet-
nam," the CIA's Office of National
Estimates predicted in April 1970,
"Laos will fall into their hands."50
Losing Ground
The monsoon season of 1971 saw the
last major offensive operations by the
Hmong, now assisted by growing
numbers of Thai volunteer battal-
ions, trained and paid by the CIA.
Vang Pao again captured the PDJ in
July and established a network of
artillery strongpoints, manned by
Thai gunners. Vang Pao's hope of
retaining the PDJ during the dry sea-
son proved abortive. In December
1971, the North Vietnamese
launched a coordinated assault
against the artillery bases. Using tanks
and 130-mm guns that outranged the
Thai artillery, the NVA quickly
recaptured the PDJ.51
The last days of 1971 and early
months of 1972 saw increased enemy
pressure on the main Hmong base at
Long Tieng. Air America suffered
heavy losses during this period. In
December alone, 24 aircraft were hit
by ground fire and three were shot
down. Between December and April,
six Air America crew members died
in Laos.52
The war also went badly in southern
Laos, where the CIA recruited,
trained, advised, and paid indigenous
personnel that were organized into
Special Guerrilla Units. Heavy fight-
ing took place in 1971 for control of
the strategic Bolovens Plateau, with
Air America providing the essential
air transport for the CIA-led forces.
By the end of the year, however, the
NVA clearly held the upper hand fol-
lowing the capture of Paksong, 25
miles east of the Mekong River town
of Palcse, on 28 December.53
On 24 April 1972, Air America's vice
president for flight operations sent a
telex message addressed to all crew
members. Noting that "the past few
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control of Air America and related
companies. Air America would be
retained only until the end of the war
in Southeast Asia.55
On 27 January 1973, the Paris agree-
ment on Vietnam was concluded,
providing for the withdrawal of Amer-
ican troops. The following month, a
ceasc-fire agrccmcnt was signed in
Vientiane, leading to the formation of
a coalition government for Laos.
Although the end of the war was
clearly in sight, Air America contin-
ued to lose people. Indeed, it is
somewhat ironic that Air America suf-
fered its heaviest losses in the two years
following the CIA's decision to termi-
nate the company. Between April
1972, when Helms issued his orders,
and June 1974, when Air America left
the country, 23 crew members died in
flight operations in Laos.
On 3 June 1974, the last Air Amer-
ica aircraft crossed the border from
Laos into Thailand. The end went
well, Air America's operations office
in Vientiane informed
Washington . . . "and the departure
of AAM from Laos was without inci-
dent, although some lumps are visible
in the throats of those who put so
much of themselves into the opera-
tion over the years.... We grieve for
those missing and dead in Laos and
regret that they too could not have
enjoyed today." In all, 100 Air Amer-
ica personnel had died in Laos.56
The base at Udorn shut down at the
end of June. Operations in Vietnam
continued until the fall of Saigon in
April 1975. When plans for a new
staybehind company in Thailand,
staffed by a contingent of select heli-
copter and transport pilots fell
through, all Air America personnel
were discharged. The company finally
closed its doors on 30 June 1976,
returning over $20 million to the US
Treasury.57
A Distinguished Record
CAT/Air America performed
superbly for the CIA. The skilled air-
crews and ground personnel of the air
proprietary had given CIA the air
transport capability that it required
for a variety of covert operations in
Asia. Although the air complex had
caused legal problems for the CIA's
Directorate of Administration, there
is no question that personnel in the
Directorate of Operations considered
CAT/Air America as an essential tool
for their work.
During the war in Laos, Air America
was called upon to perform paramili-
tary tasks at great risks to the aircrews
involved. Although lacking the disci-
pline found in a military
organization, the personnel of the air
proprietary nonetheless continued to
place their lives at hazard for years.
Some Air America pilots flew in Laos
for more than a decade, braving
enemy fire and surmounting chal-
lenging operational conditions with
rare skill and determination. As
pointed out by a senior Agency offi-
cial during the dedication of a plaque
to Air America personnel at CIA
Headquarters in May 1988: "The air-
crew, maintenance, and other
professional aviation skills they
applied on our behalf were extraordi-
nary. But, above all, they brought a
dedication to our mission and the
highest standards of personal courage
in the conduct of that mission."58
The exploits of CAT/Air America
form a unique chapter in the history
of air transport, one that deserves bet-
ter than a misleading, mediocre
movie.
NOTES
1. Ted Gittinger, interview with Rich-
ard Helms, 16 September 1981, Oral
History Program, Lyndon Baines
Johnson Presidential Library, Austin,
TX. For recent studies of the war in
Laos, see Timothy N. Castle, At War
in the Shadow of Vietnam: US. Mili-
tary Aid to the Royal Lao Government
(New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993); Jan Hamilton-Merritt,
Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, The
Americans, and Secret Wars for Laos,
1942-1992 (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993); Kenneth
Conboy and James Morrison, Shadow
War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos
(Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995);
and Roger Warner, Shooting at the
Moon: The Story of America's Clandes-
tine War in Laos (South Royalton,
VT: Steerforth Press, 1996), which is
the revised edition of Back Fire: The
CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Links
to the War in Vietnam (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1995).
2. Christopher Robbins, Air America:
The Story of the CIA's Secret Airlines
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1979).
3. See Robbins, "Air America' Doesn't
Fly Right," The New York Times, 28
August 1990.
4. Robbins, Air America, p. 138.
5. Joseph Westermeyer, Poppies, Pipes,
and People: Opium and Its Use in Laos
(Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982), p. 51.
6. Ted Gittinger, interview with Will-
iam Colby, 2 June 1981, Oral
History Program, LBJ Library.
7. For a detailed account of CAT, see
Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport
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and CIA Covert Operations in Asia
(University of Alabama Press, 1984).
8. Sec Department of Defense, United
States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967,
12 books (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1971), Book 9, p. 38.
9. Leary, Perilous Missions, pp. 164-67.
10. Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small
Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu
(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966),
remains the standard account of the
battle.
11. Leary, Perilous Missions, pp. 181-92.
12. In US policy toward Laos, see Arthur
J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Pol-
icy of Neutralization, revised edition
(New York: Praeger, 1971), and
Charles A. Stevenson, The End of
Nowhere: American Policy Toward
Laos Since 1954 (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1973).
13. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Viet-
nam, pp. 16-17.
14. "Rice Drop Over Laos," CAT Bulle-
tin 8 (December 1955), pp. 4-5.
15. Lcary interview with Blevins, 11 July
1987.
16. See "Minutes of Meeting on Name
Change," 4 April 1959, in microfilm
collection of Air America legal
records, in the author's possession.
17. See Conboy and Morrison, Shadow
War, pp. 20-21.
18. Leary interview with Rousselot, 10
August 1987.
19. Leary interview with Dale D. Will-
iamson, chief pilot of the first
helicopter contingent to Laos, 13 July
1987.
20. Leary interview with Rousselot, 10
August 1987.
21. Leary interview with Aderholt, 28
August 1990.
22. Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower,
1960-61 (Washington, DC: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961), p. 641;
Felt is quoted in Edward J. Marolda
and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United
States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict:
From Military Assistance to Combat
(Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1986), pp. 24-25.
23. Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 110-
20.
24. Felt and Burke are quoted in Marolda
and Fitzgerald, United States Navy,
p. 55.
25. Leary interview with Lair, 3 July
1993. Lair's story is best told in
Warner, Shooting at the Moon.
26. Jack F. Mathews to the author,
15 February 1998.
27. Leary interview with Lair, 3 July
1993.
28. Aid.
29. Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Moun-
tains, pp. 86-94.
30. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Viet-
nam, pp. 29-30, 43-44.
31. Abadie to Leary, 10 June 1990;
Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains,
p. 108.
32. Lansdale to Taylor, "Resources for
Unconventional Warfare in S. E.
Asia," n.d. [July 19611, in The Penta-
gon Papers - New York Times Edition
(New York: Bantam books, 1971, pp.
130-38.
33. Leary interview with Andresevic,
19 June 1987.
34. On Buell, see Don A. Schanche, Mis-
ier Pop (New York: David McKay,
1970), and Warner, Shooting at the
Moon, passim.
35. William Colby, Honorable Men: My
Life in the CIA (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1978), pp. 191-93.
36. Casterlin to his parents, 24 January
1963, copy provided to the author by
Captain Casterlin.
37. Colby, Honorable Men, pp. 192-95.
38. Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Moun-
tains, pp. 113-26; Casterlin to his
parents, 11 November 1963.
39. Marolda and Fitzgerald, United States
Navy, p. 378.
40. For Klusmann's account of his
escape, see his "The Price of Free-
dom," Air America Log 14 (October-
December 1997), pp. 12-15.
41. Leary interview with James L.
Mullen, who worked in Air Amer-
ica's Flight Information Center in
1965, 13 July 1987.
42. Casterlin, "For Posterity," 21 June
1965.
43. Gittinger interview with Helms,
16 September 1981.
44. Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 208-
18.
45. See the informative staff report of a
visit to Laos by James G. Lowenstein
and Richard M. Moose: US Senate
Subcommittee on US Security Agree-
ments and Commitments Abroad of
the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Laos: April 1971, 92'd Cong., 1st
sess., 1971; Leary interview with Lan-
dry, 3 July 1993.
46. CIA, Special National Intelligence
Estimate 58-60, Communist Inten-
tions in Laos, 21 March 1968,
Declassified Documents Reference
System (DDRS), 1989: 1865. For a
detailed account of the ground war in
66
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Laos, see Conboy and Morrison,
Shadow War.
47. Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand:
Revolution and Reaction in Southeast
Asia (New York: Harper and Row,
1969), pp. 347-48.
48. Raphael Littauer and Norman
Uphoff (eds.). The Air War in Indoch-
ina, revised edition (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1972), p. 79.
49. CIA, SNIE 14.3-1-70, North Viet-
namese Intentions: Indochina, 3 June
1970, DDRS 1980: 324.
50. CIA, Office of National Estimates,
Stocktaking in Indochina, 17 April
1970, DDRS 1977: 270C.
51. Leary, "The CIA and the 'Secret War'
in Laos: The Battle for Skyline Ridge,
1971-1972," The Journal of Militaiy
History 59 (July 1995): 505-18.
52. The Washington Post, 21 January
1972.
53. On the war in the south, see
Soutchay Vongsavanh, "RLG Mili-
tary Operations and Activities in the
Laotian Panhandle," Indochina Mono-
graphs (Washington, DC: Army
Center of Military History, 1981);
and Conboy and Morrison, Shadow
War.
54. AVPFO/DFD TPE to All Chief
Pilots, 27 April 1972, the papers of
David H. Hickler, Air America
Archives, University of Texas at
Dallas.
55. United States Senate, Select Commit-
tee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelli-
gence Operations [the Church
Committee], Foreign and Military
Intelligence - Book I - Final Report
[No. 94-755], 946 Cong., 2nd sess.
(Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1976), p. 241.
56. Telex, VP-NTD UTH to Chief
Executive Office, 3 June 1974, Hick-
ler Papers.
57. 57.United States Senate, Foreign and
Military Intelligence, p. 239.
58. Remarks by James N. Glerum at the
annual ceremony for CIA employees
who lost their lives in line of duty,
31 May 1988.
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