CHINESE EXPECTATIONS FOR JIANG'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00725557
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2022
• Case Number: F-2022-01493
• Publication Date: July 16, 1997

Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
�Secret�
Intelligence Report
Office of Asian Pacific and Latin American Analysis
Chinese Expectations for Jiang's Visit to the United States
16 July 1997
Chinese leaders have low expectations for major
bilateral agreements in connection with Jiang Zemin's planned visit to the United
States, primarily because they assess that Washington is not prepared to .respond
positively to Chinese initiatives. The Chinese are instead focused on the fact of the
visit itself, which carries immense symbolic importance to them.
� Chinese leaders view the exchange of state visits as Washington's
acknowledgment of China's reemergence as a world power and as the
end of the opprobrium surrounding the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown.
� Beijing thus is taking steps to promote a positive atmosphere in the
runup to the summit, and Chinese leaders may seek a broad statement
of principles that outlines the strategic basis for bilateral relations,
according to various reports.
Chinese officials have not ruled out agreements on outstanding bilateral issues,
but they appear to be awaiting
indications that Washington will meet their conditions before considering major
concessions. Moreover, even if Beijing sees Washington moving forward, there are
domestic constraints on what the Chinese might offer.
� As this is a political year in Beijing, Chinese leaders are reluctant to
make hard foreign policy decisions or offer concessions to the United
States that might have negative domestic implications. Jiang in
particular must balance his personal desire to use the visit to burnish his
statesman credentials against his need to defend Beijing's interests.
Sccrct
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
�S-erret�
� We cannot rule out the possibility that Beijing would consider
canceling the summit if it thinks those interests are being ignored.
Possible spoilers include a highly publicized US transit by Taiwan
President Li Teng-hui, Chinese mistrust of the US-Japanese defense
guidelines review, or new US sanctions.
Secrct
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Sccrct
Low Expectations
the Chinese have modest
expectations for agreement on substantive bilateral issues during Jiang Zemin's
planned visit to Washington this fall. Even on key issues where significant progress
has been explored, Beijing appears to have lowered its sights:
�
China's chief WTO
negotiator is now arguing that Jiang's visit offers only an
opportunity to resolve some of the problems blocking China's WTO
bid rather than to actually conclude an agreement on accession.
� While Beijing continues to press publicly for permanent MEN status,
Chinese diplomats
focus merely on renewal for another year
�
The primary reason that Chinese expectations for the summit are low is that Beijing,
has calculated that Washington currently has a
limited ability to respond positively to any initiatives the Chinese might offer.
Specifically, Chinese leaders argue that ongoing bilateral problems--such as the
campaign financing scandal, a tougher than expected fight on MEN, and potential
disputes over such issues as Hong Kong and human rights--are due largely to US
domestic political factors, which have constrained the administration's options on
policy toward China:
�
Chinese
3
Secret
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
leaders were concerned that Sino-US relations were being victimized
by different US interest groups that would hamper President Clinton's
ability to formulate and implement China policy.
�
�
Beijing views the campaign
financing allegations as a partisan attack by "anti-China forces" that
came just as "real progress" was being made in Sino-US relations.
As a result, Chinese leaders appear to have decided that their
requirement for reciprocity P in the relationship is not likely to be met under present
circumstances. Beijing appears to be awaiting indications that its own conditions
would be met before considering major bilateral _agreements in connection with the
summit and thus upgrading its expectations.
Beijing's Primary Goal is High Protocol
Even if no substantial agreements are forged on bilateral issues, Beijing is eager to
have the summit because of the immense diplomatic value the Chinese assign to it.
Indeed Chinese leaders would rather
waive major substantive accomplishments of the visit than allow bilateral disputes over
those issues to overshadow the opportunity to have their president received in
Washington. As a result, the Chinese have consistently focused more on the fact of
the visit rather than any specific results of it:
� Foreign Minister Qiin Qichen's primary purpose during his late April
visit to Washington was to secure a firm date for the summit,
4
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Sccrct
� Chinese officials emphasize the importance of the visit even when
protesting US actions.
The exchange of state visits is of profound symbolic importance to Beijing because
Chinese leaders see it as a symbol of China's reemergence as a world power and the
end of the opprobrium surrounding the Tiananmen crackdown. As the Chinese made
clear in failed negotiations for a state visit in the fall of 1995, they believe Jiang must
be received at the highest protocol level, requisite with his position and the treatment
he has received in other world capitals. In an effort to mark the significance of the
event and establish the rhetorical basis for a strategic relationship, Beijing reportedly
may press for the issuance of a joint statement on bilateral relations similar to the
documents Jiang signed with YeFtsin in April and Chirac in May, which were long on
rhetoric and short on substance.
Trying To Foster a Positive Atmosphere
Given the importance Beijing assigns to the visit, Chinese leaders are trying to ensure a
favorable climate in Sino-US relations in the runup to the summit. Beijing has made
some specific gestures designed to improve the atmosphere:
� Chinese leaders and officials have been unusually nonconfrontational in
recent meetings with US counterparts and have reacted relatively mildly
to several sensitive developments that would normally bring harsh
protests--including US criticism of China at the UNHRC and delivery
of F-16 aircraft to Taiwan,
�
Over the past several weeks Beijing has also been unusually
forthcoming in bilateral discussions of individual human rights cases,
Chinese authorities, moreover,
recently overturned the conviction of two dissidents who were jailed in
connection with the 1989 student demonstrations, and allowed the
secretary of jailed dissident Wei Jingsheng to leave China for academic
study in the United States.
5
�Secret--
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
-Secret--
� In April, China released to US custody a suspected drug trafficker,
highlighting the move as a demonstration of Beijing's interest in
improving Sino-US relations.
� Officials from China's official news agency notified US diplomats last
month that controls over foreign economic information would be lifted
and--in the interests of maintaining good relations--US vendors would
face no deadline for com liance with the remaining registration
requirement.
Beijing has even reined in its �ropaganda oraans to limit their "U
the
government was encouraging the Chinese media to feature more favorable coverage of
the United States and to avoid ultranationalistic stories or specific criticisms of the
White House in advance of the Jiang visit. Accordingly, many articles that have
appeared criticizing the United States have either been signed by individuals or
published in the Chinese-backed Hong Kong press--which lends the regime a veneer of
official deniability.
Still Weighing Bilateral Deals
In addition to those steps, Beijing continues to send overtures that it has not ruled out
possible substantive agreements on outstanding bilateral issues:
� For example,
in an effort to make Jiang's trip more "constructive and
fruitful," the leadership is considering "compromises" on human rights,
trade, and proliferation.
�
6
Secret
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Sccrct
we believe the Chinese may yet offer real concessions on
key bilateral issues between now and the summit if they judge that such steps will be
reciprocated. Below is an outline of China's bargaining position on the major agenda
items.
Proliferation. Despite some pessimism about US reliability as a supplier of nuclear
technology, Beijing is likely to press for
implementation of the 1985 Sino-US peaceful nuclear cooperation (PNC) agreement,
arguing that China has met all or most of the conditions for it to proceed.2 The
Chinese side may announce that nuclear export control regulations--which the Chinese
have been working on for three years--have been enacted, thereby meeting a key US
requirement. this probably would take the form of
a State Council executive order near the time of the summit rather than formal
legislation, which would need to be passed by the National People's Congress. There
is precedent for such a procedure; in December 1995 the State Council issued detailed
chemical export controls. Beijing probably is moving to meet some US requirements
for implementation of the
1985 PNC agreement because of its desire to obtain US civilian nuclear technology
and power reactors
The Chinese are likely to deflect any connection between the PNC agreement and
chemical, missile, and conventional arms nonproliferation. Chinese officials have told
US diplomats that Beijing shares Washington's nonproliferation goals, but they have
rejected US appeals to halt what Beijing regards as legitimate exports:
� If pressed on chemical exports, Chinese officials are likely to stress that
both China and the United States ratified the CWC in April. Beijing,
however, has characterized as unwarranted the sanctions Washington
imposed on Chinese entities last month, according to press reports.
� Chinese officials also reject US criticism on Chinese sales of missile
technology and advanced conventional weapons, including cruise
missiles to Iran, by pointing to what they describe as the" roliferation"
problem of advanced weapons sales to Taiwan.
2 The 1985 PNC agreement allows for the transfer of US civilian nuclear technology
provided China meets certain conditions regarding the retransfer of nuclear technology to
third countries and that China uses the US technology for peaceful purposes.
7
�Seeret-
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 000725557
WTO.
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
-Serret�
Chinese leaders have yet to create a
detailed action plan for WTO accession, and their concern
about hurting domestic industries is still preventing forward movement:
� The current tariff reduction package under consideration, for example,
does not lower rates for automobiles and chemicals because they are
considered "pillar industries" that need protection from foreign
competitors.
� While the central leadership is committed to state enterprise reform that
will help make the economy more consistent with WTO, it wants to
carefully control the pace of reform to head off potential instability
resulting from increasing unemployment.
� Various reports say that Jiang personally favors WTO accession. but
not at the risk of harming China's fundamental interests.
Trade and Big Ticket Contracts. Beijing frequently times the announcement of large
purchases to coincide with state visits and will probably plan similar deals to coincide
with the summit.
However, while the Chinese continue to emptiiza
8
Sccret
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
willingness to to purchase more US-manufactured goods, they claim that US export
controls restrict many of the desired purchases. Moreover, China will probably import
much less US grain this year because of ample stockpiles and the expectation of
another good harvest.
(b)(3)
Human Rights. Beijing's overriding concerns about stability and maintenance of
regime control will continue to limit Chinese leaders' willingness to make concessions
on human rights issues. they (b)(1)
doubt the sincerity of US human rights concerns because they continue to believe that (b)(3)
Washington's underlying goal is to subvert Communist rule. There also is tremendous
reluctance in China's public security and military apparatus to making concessions on
human rights. (b)(3)
Nevertheless, a variety of reporting shows that Jiang and the Foreign Ministry
occasionally support offering gestures--such as limited dialogue, release of dissidents,
or the signing of international covenants--to foster positive bilateral relations to
improve China's image. (b)(1)
China is willing to resume the bilateral human rights dialogue or sign new (b)(3)
international covenants--but only if the United States first drops its "confrontational"
approach to China at the annual session of the UNHRC:
� Beijing has underscored this linkage by opening human rights dialogues
and legal exchanges with countries that opted not to cosponsor the
"anti-China" resolution this year
�
if the United States is willing to
take a "more positive" approach on the issue, Jiang could be prepared
to offer major human rights concessions, such as the signing of the
UN covenant on civil and political rights.
Chinese Domestic Constraints
Even if Beijing altered its assessment by calculating that Washington was ready for
substantial agreements, there are limits to what Chinese leaders would offer. Because
they are currently preoccupied with domestic concerns--such as sustaining a smooth
transition in Hong Kong and preparing for the upcoming 15th Party Congress--they
probably are disinclined to confront hard foreign policy decisions. Moreover, even
under the best of circumstances, it is difficult for them to reach a consensus on any
proposed concessions to Washington:
9
ell
et
(b)(1) _
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Sccrct
The senior leadership's desire to avoid both internal crises and any
serious confrontation with the US during what is essentially an
"election year" in China has made consensus on major new initiatives in
Sino-US relations highly problematic. For example, Beijing is reluctant
to meet some of Washington's requirements for a bilateral WTO deal
because it would involve economic policy measures that would hurt
domestic Chinese industries.
� Moreover, each member of the leadership is determined to avoid the
appearance of being "soft" on the United States during the political
jockeying in the runup to the party congress. On the contrary, each
feels the need to burnish his nationalist credentials and demonstrate that
he can stand up to US "pressure.'"
Jiang is especially vulnerable because he must balance his personal desire to make the
trip against his need to defend Beijing's interests and its agenda for the bilateral
relationship:
� Jiang is clearly anxious for the summit so he can burnish his credentials
as a statesman and solidify support behind his stewardship of Sino-US
relations, which was bestowed on him by Deng Xiaoping.
�
�
Wild Cards: Potential Summit Spoilers
These pressures on Jiang in large part reflect a consensus within the Chinese leadership
that the conditions of the summit must not compromise national interests. As a result,
we cannot rule out the possibility that Beijing would consider.canceling the summit
under certain circumstances.
10
Sccrct
Isisimilmmipproved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
Approved for Release: 2022/10/18 C00725557
(b)(3)
Secret
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
� US support for Taiwan. a
possible transit of the United States by Taiwan President Li Teng-hui,
who will be making a trip to Central America in September. While the
Chinese have accepted transits of the United States by senior Taiwan
authorities in practice, they fully expect that Li would use any transit or
meeting with US officials at an international forum to advance
Taiwan's international agenda.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
� US-Japan Defense Guidelines Review.
�
Beijing believes the alliance is increasingly aimed at China
and will give Japan a greater security role in the region that could
include "interference" with China's claims over Taiwan and the South
China Sea.
New US sanctions on China. Beijing has repeatedly condemned
sanctions and threats of sanctions as "US oressure" and "interferenrp in
China's internal affairs."
Accordingly, harsh sanctions on China--such as
Category I MTCR sanctions or other packages being considered in the
US Congress--would probably bring a renewal of such rhetoric and
present an obstacle to Jiang's visit.
I I
Ct-1 C
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1) -
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
pproved for Release: 2022/10/18 000725557