CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 15730606
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2022
• Case Number: F-2019-01230
• Publication Date: June 20, 1954

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20 June 1954
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
LATIN AMERICA
1. Comment on the Guatemalan situation as of 20 June (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Viet Minh division may be preparing 1 July attack on delta (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Iraqi decision on Turk-Pakistani pact unlikely before fall (page 6).
4. Comment on continuing Syrian political paralysis (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
5.. High British officials urge early action on West German sovereignty
(page 7).
6. Comment on proposed new French cabinet (page 8).
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LATIN AMERICA
I. Comment on the Guatemalan situation as of 20 June:
As of 20 June the outcome of the efforts
to overthrow the regime of President Arbenz of Guatemala remains
very much in doubt. The controlling factor in the situation is still
considered to be the position of the Guatemalan armed forcesp and
thus far this group has not given any clear indication of whether it
will move, and if so, in which way. If the Guatemalan army sho4d
move within the next few days against the Arbenz regime, it is con-
sidervd to have the capacity to overthrow it. On the other hand if it
remains loyal and if most of the military elements commit them-
selves to vigorous action against the forces of Castillo Armas the
latter will be defeated (see map, page 5).
The position of the top-ranking military
officers is constantly shifting, with daily rises and falls in their
attitudes. This group has long proclaimed its strong anti-Commu-
nist feelings and its ultimate intention of doing something to rid the
government of Communist influences. Various officers have de-
clared themselves as willing to take action against the regime given
just a little more time or just a little more justification. It is prob-
able that the rising pressure of events will compel this group to
declare its position, one way or the other, at any time from now
on--although the possible result could be a split in the ranks. /There
were unconfirmed rumors as of Saturday night to the effect that
Colonel Diaz, the Chief of the armed forces, and some 40 officers
had applied for asylum in various foreign embassies in Guatemala
City, but these embassies have not yet confirmed this reporti
There were new defections on Saturday
from the Guatemalan air force, one pilot flying out with his plane
and several others obtaining asylum in the Salvadoran embassy.
The Guatemalan air force has thus far failed to produce any inter-
ception effort against the overflights by the Castillo Armas planes.
However, heavy antiaircraft fire is reported.
There is thus far no evidence to confirm
the charges and propaganda of the Guatemalan regime of bombing
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attacks upon Guatemala. On the contrary, there are eyewitness
accounts of clumsy efforts to fabricate evidence d aerial bombard-
ment (the home of Colonel Mendoza, one of the defecting air force
officers, was set on fire by the police). It is probable that some of
the damage to oil storage facilities and other installations, attributed
by the Guatemalan Government as well as by Castillo Armas to bomb-
ing attacks, is in fact the result of sabotage efforts on the part of
Castillo Armad agents or other resistance elements.
There is considerable evidence of a determi-
nat�on on the part of the Guatemalan Government to mobilize and arm
Communist-controlled student youth and labor organizations. At the
same time there is evidence of a hasty attempt to mobilize additional
strength for the army.
There are strong indications of mounting
tension between the army and the Guardia Civil, the Communist-
influenced police organization.
Reports that Puerto Barrios and San Jose
have fallen to the Castillo Armas forces cannot be confirmed, but it
Is clear that there have been uprisings in these and other cities.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Viet Minh division may be preparing 1 July attack on delta
the Viet Minh 320th
Division and some irregular units have
been ordered to prepare for action on
1 July in the southern part of the Tonkin
Delta. One regiment of the 304th Divi-
sion may be involved.
The French are undecided whether this
operation would be part of an attack on the entire delta or a limited
campaign in the southern region.
General Cogny told the American consul
in Hanoi on 17 June that he had no indications that the Viet Minh
would make a major attack "within the next week or ten days." He
added, however, that if he were General Giap, he would have at-
tacked the delta two weeks ago. He said that the Viet Minh battle
corps was in position and ready to move against the French "at any
time."
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Iraqi decision on Turk-Pakistani pact unlikely before fall:
Prime Minister al-Umari, who was
appointed in April to head a caretaker
government to supervise the recently
concluded elections, will probably
remain in office until autumn, according to Foreign Minister Jamali.
In the fall, Jamali told American charg�reland on 17 June, a new
government will be formed, perhaps with elder statesman Nun i Said
heading a coalition.
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Comment: As long as al-Umari's
caretaker government remains in power, Iraq is not likely to
make any significant move toward joining the Turkish-Pakistani
pact. The country's two strongest supporters of the pact are Nuni
Said, who is in London, and Somali, who is preparing to take a
trip to the United States.
4. Comment on continuing Syrian political paralysis:
The formation of a nonpartisan Syrian
cabinet, reported by the Damascus radio
on 19 June, manifests the political bank-
ruptcy of the dominant parties and the political strength of the army.
The new cabinet, headed by Said al-Ghazzi,
a well-known lawyer and former minister of finance, is composed of
relatively weak and undistinguished characters. It was formed be-
cause no strong political figures would assume responsibility.
The cabinet's immediate task is the hold-
ing of free parliamentary elections. However, the personality con-
flicts and party animosities which have immobilized the Syrian
government since the fall of Shishakli in February will probably make
this very difficult, if not impossible.
Meanwhile, the army, whose opposition to
Defense Minister Dawalibi's policies brought on the resignation of the
Asali cabinet on 11 June, appears content to let the politicians try
once again to establish a government to its liking. Continuing politi-
cal deterioration will orobablv resrt in open return of the military
to power, however.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. High British officials urge early action on West German sovereignty:
At least three top British Foreign Office
officials hold that the EDC is dead. Parlia-
mentary Under Secretary Nutting told
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Ambassador Aldrich that he, Permanent Under Secretary Kirkpatrick,
and Under Secretary Sir Frank Roberts feel strongly that the United
States and Britain should act as soon as possible tobrg the contrac-
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The British believe that German troops
should "eventually" be an integral part of NATO forces.
Comment: Many Western diplomats have
long held that an alternative to EDC would become necessary. They
have feared, however, that separation of the Bonn and Paris treaties,
and subsequent agreement on any formula for German rearmament,
would be as protracted and complicated as the EDC negotiations.
6. Comment on proposed New French cabinet:
The Socialists' refusal to participate in
his government has obliged Premier
Mendes- France to pick a cabinet pre-
ponderantly rightist in character, although
several deputies holding key ministries represent the center parties.
Finance Minister Edgar Faure, a Radical Socialist whose views on
economic and foreign policy closely parallel the premier's, is the
only prominent holdover from the Laniel cabinet. Several of the new
ministers,although relatively young, have had previous cabinet ex-
perience.
A reappraisal of France's foreign policy,
particularly in Europe, seems in prospect. Mendes- France will be
his own foreign minister.
There is no important pro-EDC spokesman
in the proposed cabinet. Over one-third of the ministers and under-
secretaries were reported as recently as late April to favor EDC.
Another third were reported undecided. Four key figures, however--
the premier himself, Faure, Guerin de Beaumont and Francois
Mitterrand, minister of the interior--have gradually qualified previous
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support of EDC by more and more open opposition to early ratifi-
cation. Pierre Koenig, who replaces Pleven as minister of defense,
is a strong opponent of EDC and a close personal friend of General
de Gaulle. '
Mendes- France has retained the Foreign
Ministry for himself primarily in order to exercise personal control
over negotiations on Indochina. He may also hope to woo the Popular
Republicans' support by holding out the prospect of their return to the
Foreign Ministry.
The cabinet includes two of the ten left-wing
Popular Republicans who voted for Mendes-France. This probably
reflects a desire by the premier in eniinter the impression that right-
ist elements predominate.
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