PFIAB REPORT ON EDWARD LEE HOWARD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05592164
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: July 11, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2022
• Case Number: F-2013-00498
• Publication Date: June 4, 1986

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington D C 20505
4 June 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: PFIAB Report on Edward Lee Howard
1. I appreciate the opportunity to review the excellent and extremely
thorough PFIAB report on the Edward L. Howard espionage case. The report gives
a very well balanced perspective on the important issues raised by the case,
particularly from a counterintelligence point of view. I found that the report
reinforces a number of the findings that we have reached as to the serious
implications that Howard presents for handling of possible similar cases in
the future. It also produced some information that was new to us.
2. The report does demonstrate vividly several specific organizational
and attitudinal shortcomings which existed in the Agency and which ultimately
contributed to the mishandling of this case. The PFIAB report has helped me
bring forceful attention to these issues and take corrective action to guard
against another incident of this sort. Based upon the earlier Agency Inspector
General report, I directed the implementation of a number of modifications
designed to improve Agency handling of employee suitability issues. These
modifications were implemented some months ago and are in place today. Please
refer to the attached document for the specific steps taken as a result of
the Howard case. I also found it necessary to reprimand two senior Agency
officials directly involved in the handling of Edward Howard prior to his
defection. The PFIAB report contains three additional recommendations which
I heartily endorse.
3. In order to avoid a future occurrence of this nature, I have directed
the Deputy Director for Operations to ensure that his Division and Staff Chiefs
share pertinent counterintelligence information with the Director of Security
and the Chief, Counterintelligence Staff as soon as such information is known.
Along with this directive was a strong reminder to the Deputy Director for
Operations that he and his organization must be much more alert to possible
counterintelligence cases in the ranks. Furthermore, I have instructed the
Executive Director to hold monthly meetings with the Director of Security
and the Chief, Counterintelligence Staff to ensure an adequate exchange of
sensitive information of a counterintelligence nature involving CIA employees.
In this connection, the Director of Security also convenes ad hoc meetings
with the Director of Security, the Director of Personnel and the Chief,
Counterintelligence Staff as an advisory body to him to ensure that he is
kept informed of all pertinent aspects of counterintelligence-related cases
involving Agency employees.
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4. The most inexcusable circumstance in this whole matter involves the
repeated efforts of to have Howard's telephone
calls checked and the failure of anyone up the line of command to respond
to his concerns. With what he saw at stake, he should have understood that
he could bring this directly to the DDO or the DDCI or the DCI. To prevent
this kind of a breakdown in organization and communications, I have directed
the DDO to see that DO officers likely to find themselves in the position
was in in the Howard matter understand that if they are unable to
get a response on a proposal they consider necessary to protect a CIA asset,
they are expected to bring it to the attention of the DDO, DDCI or DCI.
5. I believe the combination of the actions outlined above and the
three recommendations contained in the PFIAB report will help correct the
organizational and attitudinal deficiencies which permitted a case such as
this to develop in the first place. Again, I am thankful for the opportunity
to have commented on the PFIAB report. You can be sure that I will continue
to give this subject highest priority.
Attachment:
as stated
William Cas y
Director of Cen Inte ence
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4 June 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Howard Case
1. I am appalled at the DO's handling of the Howard case as described in
the recent PFIAB report. I need only cite: the warnings from that
went essentially unheeded; the long delay in bringing the matter to FBI attention;
the failure to consult the Counterintelligence Staff; the absence of overall
direction; the reluctance to recognize that a major counterintelligence problem
was unfolding until it was too late; the failure to bring the matter to my (W(1)
personal attention promptly; and, above all, an astonishing complacency about,(b)(3)
seemingly an unwillingness to accept even as a possibility, a DO officer
committing espionage for the Soviet Union.
2. The DDO and SE were front and center in this case. Both deserve censure.
To prevent any recurrence, I direct you to instruct your division and staff chiefs
as follows in the strongest possible terms:
-- The DO must be more alert to possible CI cases in the ranks.
Complacency as to the possibility of hostile penetration or
turning of a DO officer is intolerable and must be overcome.
-- On detecting any suggestion of such a development, they
are responsible for sharing all pertinent information,
without delay, with the Director of Security, the Chief,
Counterintelligence Staff, and Inspector General if you think
appropriate.
-- Decisions as to further investigative steps will be made by
the Director of Security, in consultation with the Chief,
Counterintelligence Staff, not by themselves.
-- All DO officers who may find themselves in the position
was in in the Howard case, being unable to get action
on a step believed necessary to protect a CIA asset, are
encouraged to take the matter to the DDO, the DDCI, or the DCI.
3. Invaluable operations have been compromised and at least one life was
lost as a result of the gross mishandling of this case. Deficiencies in process,
organization, and attitude that contributed to this catastrophe must be corrected,
and I hold you personally responsible to do so.
� EYES ONLY ,
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FROM:
SUBJECT:
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Deputy Director for
Deputy Director for
Deputy Director for
Deputy Director for
Director of Central Intelligence
Administration
Intelligence
Operations
Science & Technology
27 February 1986
Proposed Modifications in Handling Employee Suitability
Issues �
�
1. I have read the attached thoughtful response from the DDA
concerning improvements needed in the wake of the Howard case. The very
sensible recommendations -Dick Kerr's people have made will be of value to
the extent-that we are able to-apply-them. This means that each
chiefs must pay very close attention to any serious emerging
personnel problem.
2.. I would like each of you to read this document carefully. I
would like you to transmit it with this note to each of your component
chiefs with a request that they, in turn, read it carefully. All of us
must derive every possible benefit from this unfortunate experience and
work to prevent it from happening again.
Attachment: As Stated
Wil lam J. Ca
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