FUTURE U.S. ROLE IN THE GVN'S PHUNG HOANG (PH) PROGRAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05015524
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-01120

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WORKING PAPER
SUBJECT: Future U.S. Role in the GVN's Phung Hoang (PH) Program
PURPOSE:
1. The objective of this paper is to suggest how the GVN PH
Program should continue to receive U.S. advisory support during the
forthcoming 18-24 month period and to outline an option for further
continuance if required.
2. Experience over the past four years in the Phung Hoang
Program has pragmatically shown that anti-VCI activity breaks down
in practice into three relatively distinct areas. Any overall plan for
support to the GVN anti-VCI effort should recognize these distinctions
and plan for their continuation.
(a) the intelligence effort against the higher levels
of the VCI who possess intelligence information of value
on enemy plans and intentions. This is generally the
purview of the Police Special Branch, with Police Field
Forces as action arm.
(b) the intelligence effort directed against the
lowest level of the VCI mechanism -- the links with the
populace. By and large, these VCI do not possess
intelligence on the enemy's plans and intentions that is
not already known, and they perform an essentially
political function of relating the Communist Party
mechanism to the population. Intelligence efforts
against this VCI echelon were handled by the National
Police within the PH Committees.
(c) an action effort to neutralize the targets in
(a) and (b). The action forces were directed by the
various PH member organizations and coordinated
within the PH Committees.
BACKGROUND:
3. On 15 October 1971, COMUSMACV informed Washington of
proposed major changes in the concept and operation of the PH Program
involving accelerated Vietnam.ization to include:
ET/ SENSITIVE
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(a) On the Vietnamese side transfer of
national level responsibility from the PHUNG HOANG
Central Committee to the National Police Command.
(b) On the Vietnamese side deactivation of
the PHUNG HOANG Committees and Centers at all
levels.
(c) On the Vietnamese side increased emphasis
on the anti- VCI responsibilities of province and
district chiefs.
(d) On the Vietnamese side use of National
Police as the primary operational element of PHUNG
HOANG.
(e) On the U.S. side withdrawal of U.S. military
advisory support as the National Police Command
assumes responsibility.
4. The proposal to phase down U.S. military advisory support
through CORDS to the PH Program could, as currently planned, result
in a minimum staffing level of about thirty positions during CY 1972.
5. U.S. planning, however, is not entirely in phase with GVN
activity. On 14 December 1971 COMUSMACV advised Washington that
the GVN Prime Minister had issued a directive (3738/PTHT/BDPT/KH)
on 2 December 1971 concerning the implementation of the PH Program.
Key points of the directive:
(a) The Phung Hoang Centers and Committees
will be retained.
(b)In 1972, the National Police will assume
overall responsibility for the Phung Hoang Program.
(c) By the end of 1972, the Phung Hoang Centers
will be completely manned by the National Police.
(d) Special emphasis on the Phung Hoang
Program must be applied at all echelons.
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(e) Wise and active publicity of the Phung
Hoang Program must be made so that the people
clearly understand the importance of their support
to the GVN.
REASONS TO DISENGAGE:
6. The major arguments offered, directly or indirectly, to
support the current MACV phase down proposal are that:
(a) Shifting total responsibility for the
conduct of the PH Program to the GVN and the
withdrawal of U.S. military advisors is consistent
with the Vietnamization policy. It is not at all
clear, however, that this argument really supports
an abrupt drawdown in U.S. effort, as Vietnam ization
implies a phased and orderly turnover of responsi-
bility to the GVN.
(b) The PH Program has a number of serious,
built-in deficiencies which will be compensated by
a reorganization and shifting of responsibilities.
Deficiencies include: lack of GVN coordination and
:ooperation, poorly qualified and poorly motivated
GVN personnel, centers that lack secure repositories
for intelligence information, lack of a direct line of
GVN authority and responsibility and an overall "U.S.
sponsored" atmosphere about the program that does not
satisfy Vietnamese xenophobic inclinations. These
arguments point toward a more effective advisory
effort, but not total removal of the effort.
(c) Because of press distortions the PH
Program is politically sensitive in the U.S. and is a
potential source of adverse criticism. This criticism,
however, is wide of the mark since every soverign
government has the right to counter subversion within
its territory.
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REASONS TO STAY:
7. The need for an effort to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure
remains as great as ever, or greater in view of the Viet Cong's increased
emphasis on attacking pacification. The next 18-24 months will be crucial
in reinforcing the political and economic stability which is at present still
very fragile and vulnerable to concerted enemy subversive efforts. The
enemy's administrative apparatus, the organization which implements
Hanoi's will within the villages of South Vietnam, will remain a principal
source of this threat, and hence remains a valid primary target for the
allocation of GVN/U.S. resources.
8. The lower VCI echelons, by and large, are currently in a
relatively weakened position. Indeed, they are in greater disarray than
at any time during the past several years. Precisely for this reason,
maximum pressure upon the VCI membership should be maintained in
order to further limit its capabilities or otherwise neutralize its activities.
9. The GVN's recent directive that provides special emphasis on
the Phung Hoang Program at all echelons reflects a priority in program
management that should be encouraged and which would benefit from
continued U.S. support. Furthermore, care must be exercised at
the manner of the U.S. drawdown in PHUNG HOANG does not give the
GVN the wrong signal -- i. e., what the Vietnamese could construe as
an indication that the U.S. considers the effort not worth the allocation
of resources.
10. The concept of the anti-VCI effort as a "program" and the
titles PHOENIX and PHUNG HOANG advisors could be dropped on the
U.S. side. However, given the program effort of the GVN, it might be
more appropriate to parallel their effort and simply alter the U.S. program
name. In either case, it would appear to be a USMACV decision as to
how best the objectives and the public relations aspects can be reconciled.
il. The proposed close-out of the U.S. military advisory effort
impinges directly upon the GVN capability to neutralize the VCI. It is
recognized by all sides that the National Police are not yet strong
enough institutionally to take over the full burden at this time.
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12. Given Given the continued . -.-portance of the anti-VCI effort, a -
central problem for the U.S. is or. of providing resources, prin-a.a.3.-ily
advisors, to ensure adequate tr;-.,.:-isition to an all-GVN program, and
enable the U.S. to monitor GVN performance in this critical area.
13. To ensure an orderly drawdown that does not of itself defeat
one of our major objectives, it may become necessary to make
adjustments in the original plan to phase down the Army PH advisors.
RESOURCE TIVIPLICATIONS FOR THE NEAR TERM:
14. Current U.S. military advisory staffing levels of the PH
Program are not necessary to maintain the U.S. advisory input a..nd
monitoring role. Staffing at national, regional and provincial levels
would, as a minimum, be adequate to meet our requirements. A,reso.:ive
management by a province-level staff would permit relinquishing ct.frent
U.S. monitoring efforts at the district level, except for selected ..ey
districts.
15. Staffing levels of U.S. military advisors to he PH Program
should be continued at national, regional and provincial levels, although
many of the PH Elements' province staffs could conceivably be lowered
to the irreducible minimum of one advisor. The distribution of VCI
throughout South Vietnam is not uniform and there appears to be
compelling merit to the idea that our advisory effort -- and the GVN's
effort as well -- should parallel thc VCI threat rather than the political
boundaries of the provinces. An equivalent logic should determine the
level of PH advisory staffing at district level. That is, while most of
the district PH advisory structure can be safely dismantled, those
districts with a chronic problem of VCI activity should have Continued
U.S. sui.:port and advisory staff. In fact, if one adjusts the allied er:iort
to the actual threat, there might be a small U.S. advisory presence in
some kc.:}r districts but none in certain largely secure or non-critical
provinces.
16. The above structure -- Saigon, region, province and di,;tri -� --
should provide the GVN with appropriate levels .of support and in :.f.:dit:ion
should provide the U.S. with a capability to monitor not only thc., CYN
program but also to develop some semblance of an independent estirn.,,'.tive
capability. This latter capability could well be significant in t: :e
to come as U.S. capabilities to observe and evaluate GVN perio:,.:anec. are
diminished.
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17. The staffing levels for the U.S. side of the program are at this
time difficult to predict, althoun clearly they can be expected to
diminish along with the general reduction of U.S. presence. The CORDS
minimum staffing level appears to be about thirty positions, which
would provide coverage of the program at national, regional, and a
few key provincial echelons. Although this number of slots may be
proposed for CY 1972, there exists a strong possibility that,the number
is too low, given that the exact structure of the Vietnamese effort and
their advisory/logistic needs has not yet shaken out. While it may be
that much of the tasking presently directed to the Phung Hoang advisory
staff can be shifted to the Provincial and District Senior Advisory staffs,
this is essentially a management problem for USMACV to resolve.
Given the relatively small numbers involved and the state or organizational
flux characterizing the National Police who are to be given the program
eventually, it is probably advisable to count on a gradual reduction in
advisor requirements rather than a precipitous- drop to minimum level
sometime in 1972.
RESOURCE EvIPLICATIONS FOR THE LONG TERM:
IS. Plans should be drawn Up to have the U.S. military advisory
structure absorb anti-VCI advisory duties during and beyond the transitional
period of the drawdown. In the sense that lVIACV's mission is to support
the GVN's pacification effort, the PH Program cannot be ignored.
19. An immediate survey of all anti-VCI training being conducted
by the members of the Mission Council should 'oe drawn up in order to
project die long-term U.S. concentration of effort in judging and supporting
GVN performance in this vital area. Clear direction regarding U.S.
agency responsibility for advising the National 'Police/Special Police anti-
VCI effort is urgently needed and one by-product of this survey should be
data helping to brinrthat still unresolved problem into sharper focus.
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