RENEWED CIA PARTICIPATION IN THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05015431
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-01120
• Publication Date: December 7, 1970

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ID
A
7 December 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Renewed CIA Participation in the Phung Hoang Program
REF : (A) Korner Report (Vietnam Revisited)
(B) The Situation in the Countryside (October 1970)
1. The report of former Ambassador Robert Korner on the
status of pacification in South Vietnam included a special section
on the Phung Hoang Program to eliminate the Viet Cong Infra-
structure (VCI). This section of the report, entitled "Phung
Hoang Fiasco" inventoried many of the shortcomings of the program
and included several suggestions for improvement. Among these
1/
suggestions was that the CIA renew its involvement in the program. �
2. Ambassador Komer's suggestion regarding CIA struck
a responsive chord in many areas of government -- at least in
Washington -- and as a result there is more interest in this
suggestion than is usually generally generated by Veni Vidi reports.
The interest in improving the program has been stimulated by the fact
that the attack on the VCI has not reached up to its expectations.
Disappointment in the program remains despite the fact that it has
1/ "The U.S. advisory effort must be pulled together more effectively.
I realize how much pain it would cause, but if I could not think of
a better solution, I would transfer opcon over the whole business
to OSA. "
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made its statistical goals in terms of VCI neutralized. The reason
for this is that the low level of combat over the last year should have
brought forth major efforts and successes in attacking the VCI. The
Komer suggestion offers one of the few concrete changes in the
program, and there is a desire to try almost anything that will make
the plan work.
3. The following issues appeared to be relevant to the examining
of the merits of Komer's proposals: First, the CIA involvement in
such a large program would present serious cover problems, particularly
in view of the recent difficulties encountered with USAID cover. Second,
the funding of the program should remain under U.S. Army auspices
since only this would comply with congressional intent. Under these
circumstances, CIA would end up managing a program without control
of its purse strings. Third, if the CIA were to be again involved in the
program, logic would seem to dictate that it would do so only if we
could provide skills and or services not available from other agencies.
4. There does appear to be a level and type of CIA involvement
in the Phoenix program that would satisfy all of these constraints.
More importantly, it offers at least the hope of greater success in the
Phoenix program. In order to understand the proposed CIA involvement,
certain background elements regarding the VCI and the existing Phoenix
program must be understood:
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A. Over half of the VCI are concentrated in
8 provinces. (See attached map and table 1)
B. The existing communication and data
processing network that supports the Phoenix
program exhibits the classic tendency of information
systems to data flows more easily upward than downward.
The result is that more information exists at various
command levels then is available at the operating
levels.
C. One of the major problems effecting the
program is the lack of emphasis placed on it by GVN
officials and U.S. military. �2/
5. Given these characteristics and the constraints listed
above, it would appear that a modest CIA-managed program might
have a favorable impact. This program would have two major thrusts:
The first would be to install CIA specialists as Province Senior
Advisors in each of the eight provinces where the military situation
offers the possibility of extensive roll-ups of the VCI. The second
aspect of the program involves the establishment of an improved
communication system and identification system for those eight
provinces which would permit virtually instant identification data
for GVN officials at check points and other pick-up areas.
2/ "The biggest lack of vigorous high-level operational GVN leader-
ship at the center. " "The U.S. advisory effort is fragmented
and mostly low quality. " Vietnam Revisited
-3-
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Examination of the Merits of the Proposal
A. Concentration of Effort. Concentration of Phung Hoang
efforts in the eight provinces shown on the attached map would
appear to have obvious merit and it is certain that this fact has
not escaped the notice of MACCORDS. It is probably safe to
assume that for CY 1971 concentration of effort, as such, would
be characteristic of any variant of the Phung Hoang program. The
program, however, is already bogged down by a very considerable
inertia resulting from its committment to large-scale programs
such as upgrading the National Police, the identity-card program,
and Big Mack. Whether or not emphasis can be shifted to a more
concentrated area from this type of national program in time to
have any significant effect within a year is questionable.
B. CIA Province Senior Advisors. Whether we like it or
not, or admit it or not, the career military officer in the U.S.
Army gains little from a tour within the Phoenix Program. This
is generally so whether he is working directly with the program
or whether it is a matter of emphasis in his role as Province
o
Senior Advisor. This phenomenon results only in part Ss atavism;
in large measure the marginal attitude toward Phoenix results
from the absence of concrete results -- particularly the quantitative
-4-
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type. Given an opportunity to choose between clearing an area
and upgrading the security scores of the included hamlets and
devoting the same time, effort, and resources to rounding up
an unimpressive group of suspect VCI, any red-blooded West
Point graduate would choose the former. For much the same
reasons, any U.S. military officer with an eye to career develop-
ment would choose the same alternative. It is not surprising
that the GVN province chief feels the same way; he too is a
military officer.
The appointment of CIA officers as Province Senior
Advisors and to fill district slots as well in the eight target
provinces has several apparent advantages. First, the officer
is being tasked with a job which not only relates to his professional
skills but also which, if successfully completed, relates to his
chances of promotion in a positive rather than a marginal or
negative way. Second, the officer is somewhat freer to use command
relationships not available to the U.S. military officer and also
draw on logistics resources not generally available to military
programs. Third, the officer can utilize unofficial means of
financing efficiency if this appears appropriate. It should be noted
that none of these advantages are founded on the premise that the
CIA officer is smarter, better trained, or necessarily a superior
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human being in any respect; but rather that he fits into the existing
political environment more easily and can therefore act with more
freedom.
C. Target-Area Communications System. For reasons that
are not at this time entirely clear, the communications and data
processing systems supporting the Phung Hoang Program are not
performing satisfactorily. It would be both interesting from an
analytical viewpoint and necessary from a long-run standpoint
to find out what is wrong and correct it. However, in order to
achieve maximum impact in the short-run, i. e. , 1971, the best
action is probably to bypass the existing systems and set up what
is required on the spot. Given that the effort can be divided into
two separate areas of four provinces each, the communications and
data processing systmes necessary would not represent a mamouth
undertaking. Systems support should permit a radio-carrying police-
man at a checkpoint to obtain immediate confirmation on a name
check, 24-hour confirmation on fianerprints, and current information
as to the status of prosecuted suspects. Systems support and data
centers should be located in the target areas (e.g. Quang Ngai city
and Can Tho) rather than in Saigon.
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Shortcomings of the Proposal
The major shortcoming of the proposal is that it reintroduces
CIA into a program from which it had willingly disengaged because
of Congressional and logical pressures regarding financial and
cover aspects of Phung Hoang. Since the proposed concentration
program would not involve a large number of people, it would not
appear that cover, as such, would present serious problems. Nor,
for that matter, would finance, since the communications/data
systems would be funded overtly and extraordinary expenditures
should not be large.
A second shortcoming of the proposal is that it fragments
an effort against the VCI that is already suffering from organizational
and motivational difficulties. Given the concentration of VCI in the
target areas, however, it would not appear that an equivalent effort
within Phung Hoang seriously jeopardizes the overall effort. More-
over, it is possible -- but assuredly not guaranteed -- that a high-
impact program such as that proposed could galvanize the National
Police into the type of force needed in South Vietnam's future. This
could result not only from satisfaction resulting from the job done
(witness the Cambodian operations' effect on ARVN) but also from an
appreciation at the Saigon level where the National Police have yet
to achieve full membership in the bureaucracy.
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TABLE 1
VCI Strength in Eight Provinces:
March 1970
Strength
Percent of Total in SVN
Quang Nam/ Danang
6, 156
8. 1
Quang Tin
5, 668
7. 4
Quang Ngai
3, 908
5. 1
Binh Dinh
3,997
5.2
Dinh Tuong
4, 192
5.5
Kien Hoa
4,698
6.2
Vinh Binh
6,449
8.5
Vinh Long
3, 714
4.9
Source: USMACV; As reprinted in SEA Analysis Report, Sep/ Oct 1970,
published by ODASD (SA) Regional Programs.
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BE T COPY
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