THE PHOENIX AND PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT PROGRAMS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02191101
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-01120
• Publication Date: December 16, 1969

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0/DCI
ATE 18Dec69
Mr. John M. Maury V
TO
Mr. Joseph C. Goodwin
FROM GACarver, Jr.
SUBJECT Phoenix/PRU Background
REMARKS:
Per the request levied by the Director a
the Executive Committee meeting on
Monday, 15 December 1969, attached is a
background memorandum on the Phoenix
program and the role played therein by the
PRU program. This memorandum can be
used or drawn upon in briefing members
of Congress or in fielding press enquiries.
Geo ge A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affai
cc: C/FE w/att
C/VNO w/att
Oi Oh? a trl
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16 December 1969
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Phoenix and Provincial Reconnaissance Unit Programs
1. Phoenix is an intelligence and operational effort aimed at
identifying, ferreting out and arresting the leaders and key members of the
Communist political structure in South Vietnam. This enemy apparatus --
known collectively as the Viet Gong infrastructure -- is the organization
through which the Viet Cong control, or seek control over the South
Vietnamese people. It includes the Communist Party's control structure,
its subordinate command and administrative network, and the leadership
of the parallel front organization, the National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam (NLF). The destruction of this underground political and
administrative structure, and its replacement by a GVN administration in
the villages and hamlets of South Vietnam, is a vital part of the pacification
program. It is the infrastructure that is the core of the Communist
insurgency, directing and providing support for all the military, political,
economic and psychological programs of the enemy. The importance of
neutralizing this command structure will assume even greater importance
in the event that the conflict shifts to the political plane.
2. While it has long been recognized that the attack against the
infrastructure was essential, identifying the leaders and members of this
covert group presented a formidable task. Over the years, the Communists
have so intimidated the population through terror that they have been able
to operate with impunity, secure in the belief that the people would not
reveal their identities to the authorities. Having conclusively demonstrated
how swift and terrible their retribution can be, the Viet Gong have thus
been able to operate openly in recruiting guerrillas, raising taxes,
impressing laborers, and kidnapping or assassinating those civil servants
who cooperated with the government. Food, personnel and funds are
extracted from the population by this highly efficient organization to
support the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military forces literally under
the government's nose. Without the infrastructure and the coerced support
of the peasantry the enemy could never sustain the military insurgency.
But with the covert organization melded into the population and the population
itself forced into submissiveness the Government of South Vietnam was unable
to take any sustained, significant action against the heart of their problem.
OrTADCT
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3. Clearly the solution had to be one of improved intelligence
collection and of insured coordination among the various security
services. This was the genesis of Phoenix. US advisory planning took
two forms: the organization of intelligence and operations coordination
centers in every district and secondly, programming the covert VC
civilian apparatus as a specific target. The first activity became known
as the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC)
program, and the second was called Intelligence Coordination and
Exploitation of the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure (ICEX). Both
were sponsored by the Agency in a support/advisory role with the full
knowledge and cooperation of MACV, the US Corps commanders and the
Government of Vietnam.
4. Phoenix, which combined the DIOCC's with ICEX, was formally
established by MACV Directive 381-41, dated 9 July 1967, as the American
side of the program for mounting an attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure
(VCI). Once the DIOCC's were established and staffed with the appropriate
representatives of the National Police and the other security services, the
Government of Vietnam launched its parallel program, Phung Hoang, on
20 December 1967 (and thereby Vietnamized Phoenix) when the Prime
Minister issued a letter of instruction which established the Phung Hoang
plan and a national committee for it under the Minister of Interior. On
1 July 1968, the President of the Republic of South Vietnam in Decree Number
280-a/TT/SL formally sanctioned the Phung Hoang plan and simultaneously
stated that the attack on the covert civilian VC organization (VCI) was of
equal priority with the campaign against enemy military units. This
decree made it clear that by VCI it meant "members of the Communist
Party known as the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) and the cadres
which direct and control other parties and organizations in support of the
VC." It specifically excluded "members of the VC military units, citizens
forced to perform as laborers, and citizens living in VC-controlled areas. "
5. The objective of the Phung Hoang plan as stated in the presidential
decree was as follows:
"Concentrate and coordinate the efforts of all agencies to
implement the Phung Hoang plan aimed at achieving maximum
results in the task of eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure. "
The decree assigned the Phung Hoang mission as follows:
"The principal operational element within the Phung Hoang
organization is the National Police, as stipulated in Decree
161-SL/AN of 30 October 1967.
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"The military forces are responsible for providing
support to the National Police until the latter have sufficient
capability to perform their missions. The Special Police
Branch and the Police Field Force are the two components
charged with eliminating the Viet Cong infrastructure, and
when necessary, may receive support from other forces and
resources.
"The mission of eliminating the Viet Gong infrastructure
will be implemented at every level from central down to the
village and hamlet level. "
6. Since a primary objective of the Phung Hoang program is to gain
intelligence on the enemy's identity, his plans, and his organization the GVN
emphasizes the apprehension, rather than the killing, of the members of the
Communist infrastructure. Directives specifically state that it is the policy
of the GVN to treat detainees in a "fair, correct, and humane" manner.
Rapid and equitable screening and release of innocent civilians, with a
minimum of discomfort and dislocation, is also urged, in order not to "lessen
the support of the people for the task of elimination of the Viet Gong infra-
structure. " Since Communist cadre are a valuable commodity, they are well
protected by security elements, and generally resist when practicable;
inevitably casualties occur on both sides.
7. The command structure for the Phung Hoang program has national,
corps, provincial and district committee levels. The national chairman is
the Minister of Interior and the committee Secretary General is the Director
General of the National Police. Its membership contains representatives
from the Defense Ministry, the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Ministry, the
Revolutionary Development Ministry, the Military Security Service of the
Army, the Special Police Branch, the Police Field Forces and the Joint
General Staff. The composition at each of the lesser committee levels is
essentially the same. Phoenix advisors exist at each of these levels, serving
primarily as coordinators. Phoenix coordinators formerly were Agency
personnel in the form of the ROIC's (Regional Officer in Charge/Base Chief)
and the POIC's (Province Officer in Charge). In 1969 these coordination roles
were assumed by CORDS military assignees, and the ROIC's and POIC's were
subordinated to the role of deputy coordinator. Until now, the senior US Phoenix
advisor and overall supervisor of the Phoenix advisory network has always
been an Agency officer, loaned for this purpose to the Deputy COMUSMACV
for CORDS (formerly Ambassador Korner, now Ambassador Colby). When the
Vietnam tour of the officer now serving in that position ends in 1970, however�
he will be replaced by an active duty military officer or a non-Agency civilian.
8. The main significance of the accomplishments of the Phoenix/
Phung Hoang program lies in the fact that of the estimated total figure for VCI
of 80, 000, the programs neutralized 20% in 1968 and 17% in 1969 through
August. Although the criteria for confirmed VCI neutralizations in 1968
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were fairly broad, in 1969 they became more stringent, requiring that the
individual hold a position in the VC civilian organization which has been
pre-designated, such as secretary of a village Current Affairs Committee.
A very complete nationwide system for categorizing VCI has been worked
out recently by the Phoenix program director and instituted by the Minister
of Interior. This categorization includes involuntary personnel and also
provides a specific sentence of so many years for each of three separate
categories of VCI as follows:
a. Full or probationary members of the Communist
Party at any echelon national through hamlet, 2 years.
b. Cadre other than leaders of any level from national
to hamlet -- meaning a volunteer who has been trained and
performs on a regular basis, 1-2 years.
c. All other elements who serve the Communist Party
voluntarily or involuntarily, not to exceed 1 year.
9. The Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) program in South
Vietnam provides both an investigative function and a para-military attack
upon the VC infrastructure. PRU teams, currently totaling approximately
4, 200 men, operate in 44 provinces. They are based in their home areas
and operate in teams of 15 to 20 men. These teams act upon intelligence
leads produced by Vietnamese and American units in the Phoenix/Phung Hoang
program. They also have their own intelligence gathering capability. At
the direction of the Vietnamese province chief, they conduct operations aimed
specifically at capturing known members of the VCI, but also become
involved in firefights with VC units. They are the most effective existing
weapon for striking directly at the long entrenched Communist cadre who
are making the insurgency possible. They seek to capture the hamlet,
village and district level Communist cadre who coordinate village support
for enemy main force units, and who direct terrorist and harassment attacks
against Government of Vietnam officials and organizations in the countryside.
10. The PRU teams, while an important element in the Phoenix/Phung
Hoang program, represent but one reaction force available to the district
chief. During August 1969, Phoenix/Phung Hoang in its entirety neutralized
1, 381 VCI. Of these, PRU teams were responsible for 207 (14%), although they
represented less than one-half of 1% of the total forces supporting the Phoenix/
Phung Hoang program. The PRU teams tie into the Phoenix/Phung Hoang
program at the district and province level where they operate as part of the
DIOCC and Provincial Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center (PIOCC).
Their intelligence product on the VCI is turned over to the DIOCC or PIOCC,
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and they frequently react to the intelligence product on the VCI of other
agencies such as the Special Police. A great deal of PRU time and effort
is spent collecting information on the specific VCI targets assigned by
the Phoenix/Phung Hoang program via DIOCC and PIOCC personnel.
Upon the development of sufficient information, a decision as to exploi-
tation is made, and frequently the PRU's are assigned the mission of
capturing the target.
11. In FY 1969 PRU accomplishments included the capture of 12, 140
cadre and guerrillas and the killing of 6, 112. This represented 76 vciyci
for every member of the PRU lost.
12. The PRU are completely under Vietnamese control and are
' essentially the responsibility of the Director General of National Police.
The Agency is in an advisory/support role. Operational control is essentially
in the hands of the Vietnamese province and district chiefs.
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