EGYPT: ASPIRATIONS FOR MISSILE PRODUCTION

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05857834
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• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2021
• Case Number: F-2020-00397
• Publication Date: April 1, 1988

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER EIiE CCM
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Egypt: Aspirations
for Missile Production
An Intelligence Assessment
PROLIWT NUMBER A14---3/9 ,c9/ q.er?
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NESA 88-10024
April 1988
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Egypt: Aspirations
for Missile Production
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of
Scientific and Weapons Research. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief. Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
t2efeL,
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NESA 88-1 024
April 1988
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 13 April 1988
was used in this report.
Egypt: Aspirations
for Missile Production
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Cairo has made the development and production of ballistic missiles a high
priority in its defense planning. The military has been secretly sponsoring a
missile program through its office
of "special projects," and its recent missile
efforts appear likely to succeed. (b)(3)
The missile program encompasses at least two surface-to-surface ballistic
missile projects:
� The Egyptians are working on a Scud-like missile, most likely based on a
North Korean�engineered copy of a 300-kilometer-range Soviet Scud.
They have test-fired this missile and, with North Korean assistance,
could begin series production next year. The military may be attempting
to modify some of the Scud-like missiles to extend their maximum range.
� The Ministry of Defense is trying, as part of a joint program with
Argentina, to produce a new missile, which it will call the Vector. This
missile is similar or identical to Argentina's Condor II missile and
probably will have a range of some 750 to 1,000 kilometers. Egypt could
begin series production of Vector missiles in the early 1990s.
Egypt's current surface-to-surface missile capabilities are extremely limit-
ed. Cairo appears to be focusing on its missile program to boost its
military's prestige and to keep pace with other states in the region�
especially Libya and Israel�that are pursuing their own missile develop-
ment and production projects.
The Ministry of Defense wants the technology to produce ballistic missiles,
rather than simply buy them, to avoid dependence on foreign suppliers and
because it believes the technological expertise acquired through the
ballistic missile program will contribute to Egypt's effort to expand its
defense industries. It will try to export missiles.
Iraqi officials are working through Egypt's office of special projects,
to obtain surface-to-surface
missiles and production technology for Baghdad. The Iraqis probably are
providing most of the funding for Egypt's Condor 11/ Vector development
program and may be involved in the Scud project as well
iii
ThtefeL
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April 1988
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The Egyptians are slowly building their development and production
capabilities, but the missile program will continue to depend on foreign
expertise and foreign funding. Restrictions in the transfer of Western
technology to Argentina and Egypt or, less likely, from North Korea to
Egypt or a reduction in Iraqi financing probably would set back but not
halt Cairo's missile program.
Additional Scud and Condor 11/ Vector missiles will substantially enhance
Cairo's deterrent and retaliatory capabilities. Cairo probably would use the
missiles during another war to try to achieve tactical goals. It also might
use the missiles to strike strategic targets but would do so, particularly in
the case of Israel, only in retaliation for attacks or to avoid defeat.
Egypt's acquisition of the Scuds and Condor 11/ Vectors and related missile
production technology will contribute to missile proliferation in the region
and spur other countries with less advanced missile capabilities�Libya, for
example�to keep up with Cairo by accelerating their own missile procure-
ment and development programs. Next to the Saudis, who recently bought
the CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile from the Chinese, the
Egyptians, with the Condor 11/ Vector, will have the second-longest-range
system of any Arab state in the Middle East.
The Israelis will continue to be concerned about Saudi and Egyptian
capabilities and the likely spread of missiles to other Arab countries,
especially Iraq. Tel Aviv could respond to Egyptian progress in missile
production by speeding its own ballistic missile research and development
efforts and urging the United States to increase pressure on Arab states to
halt the proliferation of missiles.
A direct US confrontation of Egypt with evidence of its involvement in
missile development probably would result in Egyptian denials, temporarily
strained relations with Cairo, and a brief slowing of the program to tighten
access to information on the program's progress.
ret
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Contents ,
Page
Key Judgments iii
Scope Note vii
Desire for New Missiles 1
Desire for Missile Production Technology 5
Production Capabilities 5
Development Program 7
Scud Project 12
Condor 11/ Vector Project 14
Iraqi Involvement in Egyptian Missile Projects 16
Dependence on Foreign Assistance 18
Outlook 19
Implications for the Region and the United States 19
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Scope Note
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This assessment focuses on Egypt's surface-to-surface ballistic missile
development and production program and on related questions concerning
technology transfer and Egyptian goals.
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Thztrat
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Egypt: Aspirations
for Missile Production
Despite unsuccessful efforts in the 1960s, Cairo re-
newed its search for technology to develop short-range
ballistic missiles in the late 1970s and has again made
development and production of surface-to-surface
missiles a high priority in its defense planning. A new
program calls for Egyptian production of several types
of surface-to-surface missiles by the mid-1990s,
We suspect Cairo's primary
aim is to obtain a powerful deterrent against other
states in the region�particularly Libya and Israel�
that are pursuing their own missile development and
production projects
Desire for New Missiles
Egypt's current surface-to-surface missile capabilities
are extremely limited.
t acquired about 70 Scud-Bs and 40 FROGs from
the Soviets before Cairo broke relations with Moscow
in the early 1970s. Some of these missiles were used in
the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, and a small number
probably have been sold to Iraq over the past eight
years. The number of missiles remaining operational
probably is less than 50,
Cairo probably worries about missile proliferation in
the Middle East and sees its missile capabilities
shrinking when compared with those of other military
forces in the region. In addition to fielding missiles
with shorter ranges, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and
South Yemen already have Scuds.' The Egyptians are
especially concerned about Libya's missile develop-
ment program and anticipate Soviet deliveries of new,
more capable missiles to Libya, Syria, and other Arab
' Syria also has SSC-I Bs, supersonic, tactical cruise missiles used
for coastal defense. The missiles have a maximum range of 300
kilometers
1
countries. Israeli efforts to develop longer range sur-
face-to-surface missile systems also trouble Cairo.
The Israelis have flight-tested two new surface-to-
surface missiles, both with ranges of at least 600
kilometers. The Egyptians undoubtedly worry about
Israeli conflicts with other Arab states and, though
Cairo wants to abide by its peace treaty with Tel
Aviv, the potential for Egyptian involvement.
The Egyptians probably view the acquisition of addi-
tional Scuds, FROGs, and more capable missiles as a
feasible deterrent to aggression by Egypt's neighbors
and as necessary to counter the development of
missiles by other regional states. In our judgment,
countries in the Middle East would find it nearly
impossible to defend against missiles once they were
launched, and the Ministry of Defense probably be-
lieves the threat of possible Egyptian retaliation would
make other countries reluctant to strike Egypt. In
particular, the Egyptian military appears to be seek-
ing a way to discourage possible Israeli aggression and
to respond to Libyan operations without committing
large numbers of forces. Nonetheless, Egypt would
act cautiously in using such weapons to strike enemy
strategic targets, especially in the case of Israel. Even
though the missiles Cairo acquires are likely to be
inaccurate, the military will count on them to weaken
the military and civilian morale of their enemies as
well as to disrupt military activity behind enemy lines.
The Egyptians probably are convinced of the value of
surface-to-surface missiles as psychological weapons
from their observations of the effects of Scuds used in
the Iran-Iraq war.
The military may also regard acquisition of new
surface-to-surface missiles as essential to maintain its
prestige in the region. We believe it sees itself as a
leading force there�especially after regaining its
honor in the 1973 war�and is reluctant to fall behind
its neighbors in securing new technology.
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We believe the Egyptians want to obtain a variety of
surface-to-surface missiles to meet the military's re-
quirements. Short-range tactical missiles like FROGs
and Scuds most likely would be fielded with artillery
brigades, perhaps even in battalions, to supplement
longer range artillery. The Egyptians probably believe
such weapons would be especially useful in defending
against another Israeli attack through the Sinai. The
military will probably continue to want missiles with
longer ranges to expand its capabilities to strike deep
into enemy territory without endangering air assets
the military considers the Scud's
range too short for purposes of strategic deterrence.
In general, the Egyptians appeared to be
looking for missiles that would have a range of at least
700 kilometers, could carry a 400-kilogram or larger
payload, and have an accuracy of about 700 meters
CEP.' Such longer range missiles would give the
Egyptians the capability to hit targets throughout the
Middle East, possibly an important consideration for
Cairo if its enemies in the region change during the
next decade.
The Ministry of Defense in the short term probably
intends to use conventional warheads on its surface-
to-surface missiles, but defense
planners expect them eventually to carry a variety of
warheads. The Egyptians, for example, probably
would seek to expand their strike capabilities by
fitting cluster or chemical warheads on surface-to-
surface missiles. Cairo is expanding its chemical
industries, and Egypt's use of chemicals in the mid-
1960s in the Yemen war and the transfer of chemical
technology to the Iraqis suggest that the Egyptians
would consider using chemical warheads in a future
conflict. Although the surface-to-surface missiles
Egypt is seeking could accommodate nuclear war-
heads, Egypt will lack the capability to produce such
warheads for the foreseeable future.
The circular error probable (CEP) is the radius of a circle centered
on the target into which half the missiles fired could be expected to
fall.
Egypt's Chemical Warfare Capability
Egypt's chemical warfare capability is one of the
oldest and best among the Arab states. The Egyptian
military began developing its chemical capability,
including training, materiel, and indoctrination, in
the late 1950s with Soviet assistance. It used chemi-
cal agents�probably tear gas, mustard, and phos-
gene�against Yemeni tribesmen in 1963. After Sovi-
et assistance ended in the 1970s, Cairo continued to
enhance its chemical warfare capabilities.
the Egyptians have been
attempting to acquire technology and precursor
chemicals for indigenous production of chemical
agents, probably to be carried out in their Abu Za'bal
plant north of Cairo. The Egyptians also have been
involved in Iraqi chemical warfare efforts
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(b)(1)
Missiles FROG Scud-B Al-Husayn. SS-21
Jericho CSS-2
Surface-to-Surface Missiles in the Middle East
(b)(3)
Maximum range 70 300 600+ 100
500 2,800-
(km)
3,100
Warhead weight 430 1,000 160 500
(kg)
1,000 1,600b
Origin USSR USSR Iraq USSR
Israel China
(b)(1)
Iraq's Al-Husayn missile probably is a modified Scud. Figures
payload weight are estimates.
for
FROG Scud-B AI-Husayn SS-21
range and
Lance
Jericho
CSS-2
Comment (b)(3)
b weight of reentry vehicle.
Egypt
Egypt is producidg prototypes of a FROG-like missile called the Sakr-80.
It also is developing surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems with
Argentina�the 750- to 1,000-kilometer-range Condor II/Vector�and
with Nortll Kore�a Send-like missile nrohnhlv with a ranee nf cumeInn
kilometers
Iraq is involved in the Condor II/Vector program
and probably in the Scud project as well.
Iran � Iran is producing:the "Eagle" missile�an inaccurate system with a
maximum range of 40 kilometers and canable of carrying o naylnad of no
to 80 kilograms.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Iraq � � � Iraq probably haseveral missile development programs under way. One is
based largely on Egypt's Condor II/Vector project. Baghdad has been
funding Egyptianimissile development since 1984 and probably hopes to
obtain operational systems as well as a production capability. Iraq also is
working on some 'shorter range systems�including the extended-range
Scud missiles that it has been using against Iran.
1:
Israel
Tel
Aviv also has been working on a single-stage surface-to-surface missile
with a maximum range of probably 600 to 1,400 kilometers.
Libya
Libya since the erly 1980s has been developing a liquid-fuel rocket with a
70-kilometer range and 40-kilogram payload. Production probably will
begin by the end of 1988. It also is working on a longer range, solid-
propellant missile, but development is proceeding slowly and production
before the mid-1990s, even with continued foreign assistance, is unlikely.
Libya is developidg both missiles under the project name "Al Fatah."
Syria � � � Although Syria 1Lks a surface-to-surface missile production capability,
Damascus probably is placing a high priority on developing one. Economic
constraints are likely to delay development efforts, and Syria probably
cannot produce it own missiles before the 1990s, and then only with
considerable foreign assistance.
Saudi Arabia
� Saudi Arabia probably has no missile development program but has
constructed CSS-2-related missile facilities with Chinese assistance and
may have or soon receive CSS-2 missiles.
North Yemen
�
North Yemen hano missile development program and may not be trained
to use its SS-21s.1
South Yemen � �
South Yemen ha no missile development program.
1
�
Kuwait
�
Kuwait has no missile development program.
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Figure 1. Sakr-80 rocket. The
Egyptians exhibited this
FROG-like system at their de-
fense show in Cairo in Novem-
ber 1987. The Sakr-80 is an
unguided rocket with a range of
30 to 60 kilometer
I
Desire for Missile Production Technology
Cairo wants the technology to produce ballistic mis-
siles rather than buy them,
As is the case with other weapons,
the Egyptians probably fear dependence on foreign
suppliers and are willing to pay high initial costs to
produce their own missiles. We suspect the scarcity of
reliable suppliers of surface-to-surface missiles and
Western efforts to restrict transfers of missiles and
related technology are reinforcing the Egyptians'
commitment to indigenous production. Moreover,
Cairo probably hopes technology acquired through
the missile program will help establish a technological
and industrial base that will benefit other parts of
Egypt's defense industries.
Cairo intends to earn
needed foreign exchange by selling missiles and possi-
bly guidance and other missile technology.
Egypt has been seeking to produce surface-to-surface
missiles since the 1950s. Financial difficulties, higher
priorities for other projects, and interruptions of re-
search by war have caused temporary setbacks. Sever-
al missile programs begun in the 1960s�the Victor,
Conqueror, and Pioneer�met with little success and
were canceled after the Arab-Israeli war. in 1967.
Nonetheless, Cairo's interest in missile development
and production intensified in the late 1970s, when
peace with Israel enabled it to redirect resources and
5
the Arab Organization for Industrialization offered
the prospect of increased funding and cooperation
with Western firms.'
Production Capabilities
A series of joint ventures and contracts with Western
firms has enabled the Egyptians to make gradual
progress in building their missile production capabili-
ties since the late 1970s, but their output is limited to
smaller scale rockets and missiles
s producing RPG-7
antitank rockets, 122-mm light artillery rockets, tar-
get rockets, smoke-generating 'rockets, and Sakr-eye
surface-to-air missiles (reverse-engineered SA-7s).
The Egyptians also have developed a prototype of a
FROG-like weapon, called the Sakr-80.
'The Arab Organization for Industrialization (A01) was formally
established in 1975 when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the.
United Arab Emirates provided about $2 billion to start an Arab
military industry based in Egypt. Cairo contributed manpower and
four arms factories that could produce aircraft, armor, munitions,
and engines. Egypt's peace treaty with Israel resulted in the
withdrawal of Arab funding from AOI, but Cairo has been
operating the AOI on its own, relying on foreign credits and money
from arms exports. With the gradual warming of relations with the
Gulf states, Cairo has been tryineorekind1einerest in renewed
funding for joint Arab projects
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As part of a completely separate program from its
ballistic missile development, Cairo is attempting to
improve its remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) fleet,
Lgypt is undertaking the
multimillion -dollar RPV program to build the mili-
tary's reputation as a modern force and to keep up
with the perceived capabilities of Western and neigh-
boring military powers.
Cairo's plans call for purchases of more sophisticated
systems that will enhance Egypt's reconnaissance
capabilities in the short term but that can be config-
ured to perform other tasks.
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but the Ministry of Defense is working to extend its
range to at least 60 kilometers.
While expanding its capabilities to produce small
missiles and rockets, we believe Egypt has been
gradually acquiring some of the technology, expertise,
and facilities it will need to manufacture surface-to-
surface ballistic missiles:
� The Egyptians probably have sufficient capacity
and the work force to increase production of bal-
listic missiles at their Sakr Factory (and the nearby
Arab-British Dynamics building, which is part of
the Sakr complex), located north of Cairo, Egypt's
primary missile and rocket production facility.
development, is well equipped with modern Western
machinery and is generally well managed.
The Egyptians have established a "Space Research
Center" in the Cairo area with assistance and
technology from a West German firm, Messer-
schmitt-Boelkow-Blohm,
The center will be used to
improve guidance systems for surface-to-air mis-
siles, but we believe some facilities within the center
or nearby will support work on inertial navigation
systems and components used in ballistic missile
production.
� Egypt is continuing efforts to expand its solid-
rocket-propellant manufacturing capacity at its Abu
Za'bal chemical factory. With assistance from a
West German firm in 1979, the factory probably
7
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gained the capability to manufacture composite
propellants that could be used in rocket motors.
in August 1987, Cairo
expected to obtain a 300-gallon propellant mixer
from a West German firm that will enhance
Egypt's propellant production capabilities (the mix-
er will enable Egypt to produce at one time enough
propellant to load a 2,000-kilogram solid-rocket
motor or several smaller motors). The Egyptians
also are seeking West European assistance to ex-
pand their facilities for producing ammonium per-
chlorate, a key solid-propellant ingredient, and to
improve their ammonium perchlorate grinding
technology in order to reduce Egypt's dependence
on external suppliers of solid-propellant ingredients.
� Between 1984 and 1985, Egypt acquired a static-
firing rocket test facility and calibration laboratory
from a French company and, with French assis-
tance, gained the capability to manufacture large
rocket motors.
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Development Program
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We believe responsibility for surface-to-surface mis- (b)(1)
sile development continues to rest with the military, (b)(3)
which has
been secretly sponsoring the missile program through
its office of special projects,
The primary role of special projects appears to
e coordinating missile development and production
plans, obtaining needed technology, and managing
joint ventures. We believe physical development and
production of surface-to-surface missiles takes place
at the Sakr and Arab-British Dynamics facilities
under strict secrecy.
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Figure 2
Egyptian Missile-Related Facilities
Alexandr
Mediterranean Sea
Butrayrat al
. Burullus
Rosettaso I
Abir Qir
Damanhar
Leben
Medi erranean Sea
lure
Area of
main map
Egypt
Lake
Nasser
Sinai
Saudi
Kritme
_JS4dan
Tanta
()
Egypt
8
0 50 Kilometers
0 50 Miles
Az Zaciaziq
Abb Za'bal
3
Heliopolis
5
Damietta
Port Said
Suez
Canal
smailia
Great
Bitter
Lake
o
1 Sakr Factory
2 Arab-British Dynamics Company
3 Abu Za'bal Company for Specialized Chemicals
4 Jabal al tlamzah Test Range
5 Egyptian Space Research Center
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Facilities Related to Missile Production
the following facilities are in
some way related to surface-to-surface ballistic mis-
sile development and production in Egypt:
� Sakr Factory for Developed Industries (formerly
Factory 333). The Egyptians carry out most of their
missile development and production at this factory,
located in the Almaza section of northeast Cairo.
clean and well equipped with machines from West
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Switzerland and has a work force of
about 5,000 people. The Sakr Factory produces a
variety of rockets and missiles including RPG-7
antitank rockets, Hosam antitank handgrenades,
122-mm artillery rockets, trainer flying target
rockets, smoke generating rockets, 122-mm illumi-
nating rockets, Sakr-eye surface-to-air missiles (re-
verse-engineered S4-7s), and the Sakr-80 rocket
(FROG-like weapon). We believe development of
Egypt's Condor 11/ Vector also is under way at the
Sakr Factory, probably in one of the newer
buildings.
� Arab-British Dynamics Company. This facility is
also part of the Arab Organization for Industrial-
ization and is located in the Sakr Factory com-
pound adjacent to Sakr facilities. The Egyptians
have used the factory to produce British-designed,
1960s-generation Swing/ire antitank guided mis-
siles.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
� Abu Za'bal Company for Specialized Chemicals. (b)(1)
We believe the Egyptians are manufacturing solid (b)(3)
fuel for rocket t rs at th's
rocket motors.
� Jabal al Hamzah Range. The Egyptians probably
conduct most of their surface-to-surface ballistic
missile tests at this range. It is located northwest of
Cairo. The Sakr Factory also uses the range to test
other munitions.
(b)(1)
� Egyptian Space Research Center. We believe part (b)(3)
of the center may house surface-to-surface ballistic
missile-related equipment.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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The "special
projects" office probably is funded partly through the
official budget.
Many of the details of Egypt's missile development
program are unclear, but,
we believe the Ministry
of Defense is developing at least two surface-to-
surface ballistic missiles for Egyptian forces and to
sell abroad. In the next one to five years we expect
Egypt to produce versions of Scud missiles and a
longer range missile system similar to Argentina's
Condor II missile currently under development. The
Egyptians cannot manufacture entire Scud or Condor
systems independently, however, and are involved in
coproduction projects with North Korea and Argenti-
na, respectively.
Scud Project
The Ministry of Defense, we believe, has been work-
ing with North Korea since the early 1980s on a
project to produce in Egypt missiles similar to Soviet
Scuds. Cairo
provided Scuds to North Korea in 1983 for reverse-
engineering, most likely in exchange for North
Korean promises to assist in production of Scuds in
Egypt. We believe the Egyptians are paying P'yong-
yang a considerable sum for its assistance.
the Ministry of Defense was negotiating a
license to manufacture North Korean Scuds in 1986,
and North Korean and Egyptian officials signed an
agreement in December 1987 for the transfer of
missile technology�probably for Scuds�to Egypt
the North Koreans expect
to receive some of the Egyptian missiles as part of the
agreement, but the deal may only call for additional
royalty a ments on Egyptian-produced Scuds
the Scud project-
consists of several phases. During the first phase,
Egypt was to conduct a range test of a missile
assembled in North Korea. The intermediate stage
involves moving to Egyptian assembly and testing of
Scud-"kits" provided by North Korea and developing
the tooling and infrastructure that would enable
Egypt to manufacture all components. During the last
part of the program, Egypt is to begin series produc-
tion of the missiles with little or no North Korean
assistance.
We believe the Egyptians have reached the intermedi-
ate phase of the project�building missiles from kits
and testing them.
Egyptian military officers spent some 18 months in
North Korea during the period 1984-85 conducting
research and receiving training on the Scud system.
by September 1986, the Egyptians and
North Koreans were assembling missiles�probably
prototypes�in Egypt.6 The Egyptians apparently
made more progress in 1987.
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<
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Se et
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Figure 6. Scud missile system.
probably manufactured with North Korean assistance
from kits, at their Jabal al Hamzah test range.
We do not know the specifications of the North
Korean�Egyptian Scud-like missile, but the North
Koreans probably have made few if any modifications
to the Soviet system.
the missiles tested in Egypt were similar in
maximum range�about 300 kilometers
Nonetheless, we cannot rule out
Egyptian attempts to alter the missile, possibly using
technology acquired from the West or from Iraq, to
achieve greater range and accuracy and perhaps to
carry a different payload.
Egypt in 1986 was exploring possibilities that
might lead to production of a 600-kilometer-range
system
Condor 11/ Vector Project
�
The office of special projects is working with Argenti-
na and West European firms to develop a new
surface-to-surface missile.
the Egyptians began participating in
-getret,.
Argentina's Condor II project�an effort to develop a
two-stage, short-range ballistic missile system�as
early as 1983. We do not know the specifics of the
Argentine-Egyptian cooperation agreement, but we
believe Cairo is helping to fund the program and is
assisting directly in coproducing the system. Egyptian
military technicians have been working with Argen-
tine engineers at Argentina's Cordoba facility since
about 1984.
Both countries
are working closely with West European firms from
which they are receiving technology for the missile
subsystems
Cairo may buy a small number of missiles and key
components in the short term, but the Ministry of
Defense probably expects to gain full production
technology for the Condor II system by the early
1990s through cooperation with Argentina. The office
of special projects is sponsoring a separate develop-
ment and production program in Egypt for a missile
similar or identical to Argentina's Condor II
the Egyptians refer to
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-ireseL_
15
t..,
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their missile as the "Vector" rather than the "Condor
The Condor 11/ Vector relies on Western technology,
and it will have greater range than the Scud.
Iraqi Involvement in Egyptian Missile Projects
We believe Iraqi officials are working with Egypt's
office of special projects to obtain surface-to-surface
missiles and production technology. The Iraqis provid-
ed startup capital for a
joint project with the Egyptians,
Although the exact nature of
Iraqi involvement is uncertain, Baghdad appears to be
working with the special projects office in a pro-
gram�codenamed "Badr 2000" or "Project 2000,"
to pro-
duce a missile with a range of at least 700 kilometers.
This missile almost certainly is the Condor II or
Vector. Baghdad's participation in the Egyptian-
Argentine program appears to be limited mainly to
providing funding. The Iraqis probably expect to gain
Egyptian-produced Vectors (or possibly some Argen-
tine-produced Condor us) in the short term and to
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Iraq's Missile Development Program
Baghdad probably is pursuing two separate missile
development and production projects. One involves
modifying Scud-B missiles to increase their range.
The second project most likely calls for acquiring
production technology for the Condor 11/ Vector sys-
tem through the Egyptian missile program and from
Western firms.
The Iraqis may have produced the missiles�proba-
bly modified Scuds�that the military used against
Iranian cities this spring. Iraq fired more than 100 of
the missiles, referred to in Iraqi press statements as
Al-Husayn missiles, into Tehran in March.
the Iraqis have modified Scud-B
missiles acquired from the Soviets to increase their
maximum range to some 600 kilometers�sufficient
to strike Tehran at a distance of about 580 kilome-
ters from Iraq's launchsite.
we believe Egypt is transferring Condor II/
Vector�related technology to Iraq and suspect it will
supply Baghdad with some of the first Condor II/
Vector missiles produced by Argentina. Once Cairo
obtains full production technology for the missiles, it
is likely to transfer additional material and technical
expertise to Iraq so that it can begin its own produc-
tion.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Cairo and Baghdad may be negotiating on details for
a sale of Egyptian-produced Scuds to Baghdad. We
cannot rule out a possible transfer of Iraqi technology
to Cairo to make modifications in the Scuds Egypt
will produce
even with foreign assistance, the Iraqis probably
cannot begin full production of the missiles until the
mid-1990s at the earliest.
acquire the technology and expertise to build their
own missiles. Iraq has a national missile production
program under way and is acquiring production tech-
nology and materials from Western firms that supply
Argentina and Egypt. Baghdad may have decided to
work with Egypt to take advantage of Egyptian
expertise and to gain access to Western technology it
might find more difficult to obtain independently.
17
(b)(3)
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.-gthecti.
Figure 9
Estimated Maximum Ranges of Egyptian Missiles
mica ci
'
Sardinia
1 VALLETTA
Malta*
*
Tunisi'
Italy TIRANE
Sicily.
TRIPOLI
*SOFIA
Bulgaria
Black Sea
Crete
Mediterranean t1=' Cyprui--BEIRUT
5"-
Sea Tbano
Israel
Tel Aviv-Yafo
Egypt
Nigeria
'N'DJAMENA
Dependence on Foreign Assistance
Soviet
Union
Syria
� AMASCU
AMMAN
Jordan
Adminiatralive
Boundary
KHARTOUM
Foreign technology and material assistance are criti-
cal to Egypt's missile program. Cairo, in our view,
lacks sufficient technical expertise�especially in pro-
pulsion systems, rocket-motor production, and guid-
ance and control�to produce surface-to-surface mis-
siles like the Scud and the Condor independently. In
particular, the Egyptians cannot manufacture in suffi-
cient quality and quantity many of the materials
needed for Condor production, including ammonium
perchlorate for solid propellants and probably the
special steel needed for motor cases. Cairo has ac-
quired or will soon obtain most of the equipment,
technology, and materials to produce Scuds, but,
Bahrain
*RIYADH
Arabia
Caspian
Sea - I
*TEHRAN
owe
KUWAIT
Pars a
lTd
MANAMA
afar DAHEIU
DONA
Uni ed Arab
Emirates
no deemed boirndary
People's Dem.
Dep. of Yemen
(S. Verne
Ethiopia
DPI*,
DJIBOU
Socotra
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritative.
Soviet Union
Afghanistan
Pakistan
MUSCAT
Arabian
Sea
Scud range (300 kilometers)
Condor II/Vector range (1,000 kilometers)
0 10,00 Kilometers
1000 Miles
Sc, scale accurate at equator only
713166 (A04723) 4-88
given Egypt's poor performance in other military
production efforts, we suspect that assembly of such
missiles would quickly stop without North Korean
technical assistance. The North Koreans must help
the Egyptians overcome even minor difficulties and
assure quality control.
Cairo also depends on foreign financial assistance to
continue its missile program. Even though the Minis-
try of Defense pays for part of the program
it probably cannot cover all costs,
especially with other military programs competing for
funds. We suspect that most of the missile program is
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supported by Iraqi payments and perhaps transfers
from Saudi Arabia either directly or through Iraq.
Outlook
Cairo is likely to continue making surface-to-surface
ballistic missile development a high priority. The
military's progress with the Scud and Condor II/Vec-
tor projects will sustain high-level support for missile
development, in our view. Moreover, the acquisition of
new or more missiles by other Middle Eastern
states�such as the Saudis' purchase of CSS-2 inter-
mediate-range ballistic missiles from China�may
cause the Egyptians to try to accelerate or expand
their program, though they probably would need
additional foreign support.
The military appears more likely to succeed in the
near term with its Scud production efforts than with
its Condor 11/ Vector project. Series production of
Scud-like missiles in Egypt could begin late next year
if North Korea provides assistance and kits or most of
the parts for assembly. Egypt probably cannot pro-
duce the entire missile independently before the early
1990s.
we
believe Cairo could receive the necessary assistance
from Western firms involved in Egypt's other missile
projects or possibly from Iraq.
We believe Egypt could begin series production of
Vector missiles by the early to middle 1990s. Access
to Western technology and systems, such as the
thrust-vector control for guidance, has advanced Ar-
gentine and Egyptian progress over the past 18
months on the Condor II. Full-scale production of
that system in Argentina may begin by 1990, and we
would expect to see additional technology and compo-
nent transfers to Egypt shortly thereafter that would
enable Cairo to begin producing Vector missiles with-
in two years. Argentina's and Egypt's continued
uncertainty about the missile's second stage and
reliance on Western firms for parts and technology
may slow development and production efforts.
19
Implications for the Region and the United States
Possession of more Scuds and of Condor 11/ Vector
surface-to-surface missiles, in our view, will substan-
tially enhance Egypt's capability to deter and retaliate
against enemy attacks:
� Additional secure supplies of Scud missiles�partic-
ularly if Egypt's inventory is larger than that of its
opponent�may increase Cairo's willingness to use
the weapons in response to military threats. Larger
numbers of the missiles would increase the Egyp-
tians' chances of hitting specific targets, since many
missiles often must be used to compensate for their
inaccuracy. The range of the Scud would allow
Cairo to hit targets in Israel as well as Israeli troop
concentrations in the Sinai. Most important targets
in Libya and Sudan, however, would remain out of
range.
� If Cairo obtains the Condor 11/ Vector, it will have a
longer range surface-to-surface missile than those
held by other Arab states, except for Saudi Arabia.
The Condor II! Vector would put many targets in
the Middle East and Africa within range, including
those in northern Chad, northern Sudan (including
Khartoum), southern Syria (including Damascus),
and western Libya (including about half of Libya's
ground forces and some Libyan oilfields).
Cairo almost certainly would use the missiles in the
event of another war to try to achieve tactical aims. It
also might use such weapons against enemy strategic
targets�civilian and economic facilities�but proba-
bly only in retaliation for similar attacks against
Egypt or to avoid defeat. In the case of another war
with Israel, Cairo probably would be especially reluc-
tant to escalate the conflict by initiating missile
strikes against strategic targets for fear of devastating
Israeli reprisals
Egypt's acquisition of additional Scuds and Condor
11/ Vectors will contribute to and probably accelerate
the proliferation of surface-to-surface missiles and
missile production efforts in the region. The Saudis'
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recent purchase of CSS-2 missiles from China and
Iraq's acquisition�probably by altering a Scud�of
the Al-Husayn missile already have weakened con-
straints on the proliferation of missiles with ranges
greater than 300 kilometers. Libya and Syria, in
particular, would want to hasten their missile develop-
ment programs to keep pace with other states in the
Middle East. Meanwhile, Cairo eventually will sell
Scuds and Condor II/Vectors to Baghdad while Iraq
completes its own missile-production facilities. We
cannot rule out sales of the Egyptian missiles to other
countries, including the Arab Gulf states and Paki-
stan, possibly giving Islamabad a delivery vehicle for
nuclear weapons.
The Israelis consider the Saudis' CSS-2s a serious
security threat and will continue to be concerned
about Egyptian capabilities and the likely spread of
missile systems and production technolo to other
Arab countries, es seciall Ira
Tel Aviv could respond
to Egyptian advances in missile production by speed-
ing its own ballistic missile research and development
efforts as well as urging the United States to increase
its efforts to help halt the proliferation of such Arab
missiles.
US efforts to curtail transfers of missile-related tech-
nology and raw materials to Egypt probably would
slow but not halt Cairo's missile program. Unless
more countries support the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime and those countries in the Regime en-
force its restrictions more rigorously, Cairo will con-
tinue to find firms or countries�such as North Korea
and possibly China�that will be willing to provide
support.' A direct US confrontation of Egypt with
evidence of its involvement in missile development
probably would result in Egyptian denials, temporar-
ily strained relations with Cairo, and a brief slowing
of the program to increase security and tighten access
to information on the program's progress.
The Missile Technology Control Regime was announced by the
United States and Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan,
and the United Kingdom in April 1987. It attempts to halt the
transfer of ballistic missile technology to potential nuclear prolifer-
ants.
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