THE OUTLOOK FOR NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06866478
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-01663
• Publication Date: March 12, 1970

.1Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 60-70
NIE 60-70
12 March 1970
The Outlook for North Africa
Submitted by
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL I Y LLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
12 March 1970
Authenticated:
UTIVE SECRETARY, U
287
CONTROLLED DISSEM
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
�SEePtET�
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
Concurring:
Dr. R. J. Smith, for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Mr. George C. Denney, Jr., for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State
It. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Dr. Louis W. Tordella, for the Director, National Security Agency
Abstaining:
Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr., the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-
mission and Mr. William C. Sullivan, the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
-St-C ftET-
CONTENTS
Page
NOTE 1
CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 3
I. BACKGROUND 3
II. ALGERIA 4
III. MOROCCO 6
IV. TUNISIA 8
V. LIBYA 10
VI. FOREIGN INFLUENCES AND POLICIES 11
A. Arab and African Affairs 11
B. The USSR 13
C. Europe 14
D. The US 15
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
-SEER�T,-
THE OUTLOOK FOR
NORTH AFRICA
NOTE
This estimate examines trends and prospects for the next three or
four years in the four North African states�Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Libya�as well as in the area as a whole.
CONCLUSIONS
A. There are distinct limits on the likely extent of cooperation
among the four North African countries. They do have some common
interests�a regional perspective, involvement with the Islamic com-
munity, and much popular sympathy for the Arab cause against
Israel�and some common problems�notably massive unemployment
and rapidly increasing population. However, each government places
first priority on its own internal political and economic problems. Long-
standing territorial disputes among Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia have
recently been shelved, and their political relations have improved;
but they are not likely to go beyond a moderate degree of economic
cooperation and occasional foreign policy coordination. In the Arab-
Israeli dispute, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, at least, are likely to
support the Palestinians rather than commit sizable resources to the
regular Arab armies.
B. The North African governments are turning toward Western
Europe�especially France�and away from the close association with
either the US or the USSR that characterized their policies in the 1950s
and 1960s. Attitudes toward the US are likely to depend to a very large
degree on how North African governments interpret US policies con-
cerning arms supply and international trade, but US influence in North
Africa will remain severely limited while the US continues closely
identified in Arab eyes with Israel and Israel remains in occupation
SECRET 1
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
CRT
of Arab territory. The USSR is unlikely substantially to improve its
modest political and diplomatic position in North Africa, at least as
long as current regimes stay in power.
C. Algeria has good prospects for political stability and economic
growth over the next few years. It has adequate resources�principally
oil and natural gas--,4o earn the foreign exchange required to finance
its 1970-1973 development program, and the Boumediene regime is
concentrating on internal problems in a fairly competent way. Evidence
on the degree of political support for the government is scanty, but
indications of opposition have been few, and most Algerians will prob-
ably remain desirous of political tranquility at least for the term of
this: estimate.
D. In Morocco, King Hassan has focused his efforts on concen-
trating political power in his own hands. This fact and the country's
paucity of resources have resulted in extremely limited social and eco-
nomic progress. In time, Moroccans are likely to become restive at
the continuing deterioration of their situation in comparison to that of
their neighbors. The loyalty of the armed forces to the monarchy also
is likely slowly to decline. But ilassan's hold on power looks to be
good for some years.
E. Under Bourguiba's rule, Tunisia has made notable economic
and social _advances, but. these have been. expensive, and the country
faces major economic and financial problems in the years. ahead.
Bpurguiba's departure from power, which appears likely before long,
probably will lead to a period of political. instability and eventually
to a government more authoritarian in its methods, more actively in-
volved in the Arab cause against Israel, and 'markedly, less close to the
US., than the. present one: .
F. It seems more likely than not that Libya will experience serious
political, turmoil. in the next few. years. The military junta continues
to display insecurity about its control over the country and uncertainty
about its policies. A successor government, however, probably would
pursue domestic and Arab policies . much like those .of the present
regime; except_ that it might be less susceptible to Egyptian influence.
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
DISCUSSION
I. BACKGROUND
1. The indigenous society and culture of the area now comprising Algeria,
Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya have long been strongly influenced both from
Europe and from the Eastern Mediterranean. Trade, warfare, and power politics
have brought North Africa and Europe into constant contact and occasional
conflict throughout recorded history. The Arab conquest of the eighth century
made North Africa solidly Muslim and imposed Arabic as the area's written
language. Ottoman power also prevailed for a time, although limited for the
most part to ports and coastal areas. In the 19th and early 20th centuries,
European states took over control of the entire area, even settling colonists in
much of it.1
2. The colonial period had widespread and lasting effects. The Europeans
introduced a modern economy, operated by them for their benefit, in and
around the major coastal cities and in some inland areas of particular fertility.
They built excellent roads, communications, power facilities, and other infra-
structure items, largely in those areas. Marked dualism developed between
modern and traditional economies, the latter supporting the vast majority of
the indigenous population. In the French-controlled states, French language,
culture, and education became widespread; the language in particular was
the passport required for those local inhabitants who aspired to move into the
European-dominated sectors of the economy and society. To a considerable
extent this has continued to the present time, and European influence remains
substantial. In Libya, however, where the Italians enforced a form of segrega-
tion, the cultural impact was superficial. In the* aftermath of independence,
Libya came under the cultural, social, and even political influence of the Arab
states to the east�particularly Egypt�to a degree not seen in the other North
African countries.
3. Neither Arab nor European conquest obliterated the special character of
North Africa. The indigenous Berber tribes were not absorbed by foreigners
over the centuries; rather they accommodated to their conquerors and often
assimilated them, and Berber stock remains identifiable throughout much of
the area. The Muslim religion practiced in North Africa is characterized both
by pre-Islamic practices and by a tendency toward extremist sects and heresies.
Most important, the people in all four countries share a sense of common
identity which owes much to the interaction of European, Arab, and Berber
influences.
4. As independent nations, however, the four North African states have moved
along paths that emphasize their individuality rather than their similarity. In
'France moved into Algeria in 1830, took over Tunisia in 1881, and joined with Spain to
divide Morocco in 1912. Italy occupied Libya in 1911.
3
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
large measure, this is because they had somewhat different colonial experiences,
reached independence by different paths, chose disparate political systems and
philosophies, and followed dissimilar methods of economic organization ,and
management. They have common interests�a certain regional perspective, in-
volvement with the Islamic community, and support for the Arab cause against
Israel�and common problems�notably massive unemployment and about a
three percent annual increase in population.2 At present, however, each North
African government places first priority on internal problems of political and
economic control. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to consider first the do-
mestic situation in the four countries and then relations among them and with
foreign states.
II. ALGERIA
5. The Algerian struggle for independence was long, bloody, and extremely
destructive; when it ended, half a million people were dead and some 20 to 25
percent of the indigenous population was displaced. The managerial and organ-
izational structure of Algeria was almost totally disrupted by ,the departure of
a million Europeans. Under the best of circumstances, the early years of in-
dependence would have been difficult; as events transpired, they were ex-
tremely painful. The loss of French managers and consumers and the disruption
of daily life led to a sharp and continuing economic decline. Ben Bella's am-
bitious attempts to acquire international status diverted attention from domestic
needs, and ideological squabbling among his intimates interfered with govern-
mental decisions On a wide range of domestic and foreign matters.
6. Since taking power in 1965, Boumediene has concentrated Algerian efforts
more on internal matters. He has not abandoned Algeria's strong interest in
various national liberation movements, but he has not allowed support for such
movements to interfere with important Algerian concerns. He has continued to
object to the US role in Vietnam, but he has not let this deter him from seeking
advice and expertise from US business firms. And he has taken diplomatic
initiatives that have led his neighbors to shelve their claims on Algerian ter-
ritory, so that potential border incidents are no longer likely to flare up and
demand an Algerian reaction.
7. Executive and legislative power rests with Boumediene and a few close
associates. The armed forces remain the basic constituency of the regime and
ultimate arbiter of power, and senior military leaders are consulted on major
policy questions, but overt military involvement in governmental affairs appears
to have diminished. The 75,000-man military establishment that was built up
after independence has not been significantly expanded in the past several
years. Boumediene retains the post of Defense Minister and controls the military
through a chosen lieutenant; although himself a product of the army, he now
operates an essentially civilian government. The current regime has emphasized
= Current populations of the North African countries are estimated as follows: Algeria-13.6
million, Morocco-15.3 million, Tunisia-4.8 million, Libya-1.9 million.
4
Approved for for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
E RET
results rather than ideology; organization and discipline of the bureaucracy
have improved; and young, pragmatic technocrats are increasingly influential.
These improvements notwithstanding, government efficiency still suffers from
the after-effects of the independence struggle and the relative inexperience of
the present administrators. Jockeying for power within the establishment per-
sists, and overstaffing of government agencies is chronic. All things considered,
however, the Boumediene regime has substantially improved administrative
competence.
8. Since 1967, the Algerian economy has achieved a real annual growth rate
of about six percent, owing partly to the government's actions. The new regime
put Algeria's formerly chaotic finances in order. Rising foreign exchange re-
ceipts�oil revenues and remittances of 500,000 Algerian workers in France�
combined with tight restrictions on consumer imports and a cautious approach
to new investment, led to a steady accumulation of reserves, which exceeded
$600 million at the end of 1969. The Algerians are showing a new willingness
to compete for export markets, and semiautonomous state-owned firms now
manage nationalized businesses and are replacing the costly worker-manage-
ment system that had sprung up after independence. During the past year or so,
work on investment projects has greatly accelerated and it now seems likely
that the bulk of future increases in foreign exchange earnings will be spent
to promote economic development.
9. Algeria seems in a position to maintain its economic momentum, at least
for the next several years. Projects already under way or completed will permit
the production and export of sufficient petroleum and natural gas to finance
the 1970-1973 development plan without resort to heavy foreign borrowing.
Petroleum production, now at the rate of about 900,000 barrels per day, is likely
to increase at an average rate of 5 to 10 percent annually. Output of export-
able natural gas is scheduled to rise from 1.5 billion cubic meters ( bcm) an-
nually to 5 billion during the same period.3 France has contracted to in-
crease its annual gas purchases from 0.5 bcm to 4 bcm and a French market
for at least half of total oil production seems assured. By 1973, Algeria's annual
foreign exchange earnings will include about $800-$900 million from oil and
about $100 million from natural gas. Locally available fuel also provides a
cheap energy source for Algerian industry. Thus a continued growth rate of
about 6 percent (3 percent per capita) over the next several years appears attain-
able within Algerian financial resources.
10. The 1970-1973 development plan emphasizes capital intensive industry
that will provide new employment opportunities and better living standards
for relatively few people. During this period, the regime is depending on minor
investments in the traditional agriculture sector, labor exportation, and outright
dole as temporary expedients to retard migration to the cities and to cushion
'Under a tentative agreement between Algeria and the El Paso Natural Gas Co., export to
the US of 10 bcnilyear of Algerian natural gas for 25 years is scheduled to begin in November
1973. Financing of the facilities for this additional production has not yet been arranged.
-5EERE-T-
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
the effects of unemployment. Agriculture is slated to receive relatively little
investment in the next few years; in the absence of strong governmental efforts,
farming will continue to provide only a scant livelihood for the bulk of the
population at least through this decade.
11. The outlook for the Algerian economy beyond the mid-1970s is uncertain.
Beginning in 1973, the government intends to channel public investment into
light industry and other sectors, with the object of achieving full employment
within a decade. In these circumstances, substantial alleviation of the un-
employment problem is years away. Realization of these governmental intentions,
moreover, depends On continuing growth of foreign exchange earnings and
hence on locating adequate new deposits of oil and the requisite markets for
oil and natural gas.
12. Our evidence on the degree of political support for the government is
scanty; certainly outward manifestations of opposition have been few in recent
years. Boumediene apparently does not seek a charismatic image and certainly
does not project one, but neither does his diffident manner inspire antagonism.
He is gradually erecting a set of largely powerless representative institutions
and is moving to bring the trade union, student organizations, and other special
interest groups under closer government control. The adult population has pas-
sively accepted these initiatives; it will probably remain war weary and in no
mood to support revolution or civil uprising that could lead to widespread
bloodshed. Students and unemployed youth, although attracted by the regime's
revolutionary slogans, dislike its authoritarian style. Their opposition will prob-
ably flare up periodically, although it does not pose the same threat as would
factional strife within the army and regime. We cannot rule out either assassina- �
tion or a coup�with unpredictable results�but we think the present regime
has a good chance of continuing to govern Algeria for some years to come.
III. MOROCCO
13. In nine years of rule, King Hassan has successfully gathered all political
power into his own hands and is intent on maintaining this position. He clearly
seeks to protect himself from such modern movements as republicanism, so-
cialism, and pan-Arab nationalism. Whereas for a time after independence in
1956 the political system was responsive to a wider range of interest groups,
it has been greatly narrowed. Some political parties are permitted to exist, to
bold meetings, and to publish newspapers (subject to frequent suspension).
Otherwise, political activity has been suspended since June 1965, and the King
has given no sign that he intends to end this "state of exception," at least until
he is confident that he has arranged to control a future parliament. He relies
on traditional palace advisers and increasingly on a group of key officials, many
of rural Berber origins. Hassan has placed these individuals in positions of au-
thority in the armed forces, security apparatus, local administration, and major
economic sectors.
6 SEC
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
14. The King is anxious to preserve the foundations of his political control.
Hence he has chosen to refurbish traditionally loyalist institutions and to resist
social and economic innovations. The overriding attention which the palace gives
to political matters has been one factor leading to limited educational oppor-
tunities and health facilities in Morocco. Expenditures in these fields are the
lowest in the area on a per capita basis; in literacy rate ( about 15 percent)
and in the proportion of children attending school, Morocco does roughly half as
well as the other North African countries. Similarly the primacy of political goals,
combined with limited resources and undependable weather, have resulted in
a decade of economic stagnation in Morocco. Since independence, Morocco
has received about $1.5 billion in foreign aid, including some $800 million from
the US. Rapid population growth, however, has absorbed most economic gains,
and per capita income has remained roughly what it was in 1960.
15. Future economic prospects are no brighter. The development plan for
1968-1972 envisages the highest investment level in Moroccan history but aims
for a growth rate of only 4 percent; since population is growing at about 3.3
percent annually, fulfillment of the plan would raise per capita incomes by only
about one-half of 1 percent per year. Even the modest objectives for the 4 year
period will not necessarily be achieved. Goals are predicated on adequate rain-
fall throughout the plan period, whereas periodic droughts are to be expected
in Morocco. Economic growth in the first year of the plan period was 12 to 13
percent, thanks to an excellent harvest after 2 years of drought, but total output
declined in 1969. Moreover, Hassan has been extremely reluctant either to force
domestic savings and investment or to borrow abroad on anything except
concessional terms. Annual investment targets involving roughly $150 million
from foreign sources and $250 million from domestic sources, therefore, may
not be met.
16. There is little reason to expect that Hassan's grip on the levers of power
will be broken in the near future. His roots and those of the dynasty are deep; his
position as religious leader of the Moroccans supplements his temporal role
and binds his people to him, especially in the countryside. The King's favored
appointees are well rewarded and are not likely to mount a threat to the throne.
Because Hassan's father became a leading symbol of the independence move-
ment, anticolonialism did not become antimonarchial; this is an important ele-
ment in the royal family's strength. Hassan is fully aware that the principal
danger lies in the discontented elements in the cities and universities. Occasional
outbursts of trouble are likely, but he has shown himself willing firmly to suppress
demonstrations and disturbances before they can attract widespread support.
Politicians who speak out against him or against existing conditions or policies
are harassed, placed under house arrest, or jailed. With a deft combination of
force and favor, he probably can suppress or buy off potential dissidents for
at least several years to come.
17. Over the longer run, Hassan's ability to retain his throne is open to serious
question. Moroccans will come to see that the comparison between Morocco
- 5 f e R E T- 7
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
and its neighbors, in social and economic areas at least, increasingly favors the
latter. People have been streaming into overcrowded city slums since World
War II, and there are no serious attempts at present to devise ways to hold
them to the land or to provide housing or jobs in the cities. As the cities grow
in size, discontent will probably increase and repression will become more
necessary.
18. Moreover, the loyalty of the armed forces to the monarchy is likely to de-
cline over time. Even today, a carefully hatched plot along Libyan lines cannot
be ruled out. The urban elite have recognized the military as a promising career
for their sons, and young men from educated, relatively progressive and sophisti-
cated city families have entered the officer corps. If the King denies these young
officers access to the top ranks and continues to favor the rural Berber element
in the armed forces, he eventually will increase, rather than diminish, the threat
to himself. If he died, or even if he were overthrown, the elements which now
support his regime might be able to work together to maintain control. But
whether this occurred, or whether presently suppressed radical elements suc-
ceeded in coming to power, would depend on the circumstances of Hassan's
departure and the political situation at the time, including the attitudes and
power of the military.
IV. TUNISIA
19. Since independence, Tunisia has been led by Habib Bourguiba, a product
of the urban middle class who thinks and acts much like a French politician
of the 1930s. Bourguiba's style has always been dramatic and abrupt; he has
leapt forward with new ideas, then inched backward to a level of innovation
that his countrymen would tolerate. Rather than use religious tradition to bolster
his own position, be has openly advocated discarding the trappings of medieval
Islam. He has been equally innovative in economic affairs�vineyards have been
uprooted to make way for other crops, communal farming has been introduced,
new industries have sprung up throughout the small country. Tunisia has em-
barked on a widespread birth control program and has poured money hito
education and health.
20. To date the results of this activist approach have been mixed. On the
positive side, the economy has grown at an annual rate of almost 4.5 percent
for the past decade, while the rate of population growth�though it has risen
slowly�is about 2.8 percent. Industry now provides about 15 percent of the
national product, compared to about 10 percent at independence. Over half
of the eligible children are in school, and literacy is increasing rapidly. The
Destourian Socialist Party began as a pre-independence popular movement and
has functioned reasonably well. Elections have been held on schedule and, within
the limits of a one party system, have provided a modicum of choice and a
minimum of violence. Tunisia has stayed largely aloof from the Arab-Israeli
conflict and has maintained peaceful, if not always amicable, relations with its
neighbors; resources that might have been absorbed by a large military estab-
lishment have been put to civilian use.
8
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
SE
21. Yet Tunisia's progress is no more a guarantee of a promising future than
Morocco's relative stagnation is of imminent revolution. Success has been costly
in both monetary and social terms. Maintaining and expanding the economy has
absorbed over $1 billion in foreign aid (including about $600 million from the
US) since independence, and the gap between foreign earnings and foreign ex-
penditures has seldom fallen below $100 million per annum. Tourism has begun
to bring in foreign revenues, but it cannot hope to earn enough to replace aid for
years. Economic problems are likely to present a major challenge to any Tunisian
government in the next few years. An immediate concern is to repair extensive
damage to roads, railways, and farms caused by disastrous floods in 1969. Most
of the relatively easy opportunities for stimulating growth have already been
seized; the country has been exhaustively explored for new mineral resources
without much success. Foreign debt service charges have more than doubled
in the past five years and will remain high at least for several years to come.
Private foreign investment has been discouraged by a government which has
nationalized or collectivized virtually the entire economy; only tourism has re-
mained in private hands and attractive to foreign investors.
22. The Bourguiba regime has already begun to reverse the extreme policy
of forced agricultural collectivization, started by former economic czar Ahmed
Ben Salah, which had aroused strong opposition. The balance between collec-
tively owned and individually owned agricultural land probably will shift back
somewhat in favor of the independent farmer, and there are pressures which
may over the long term bring some return to private ownership in such fields
as retail trade. Even such minor corrections, however, will antagonize that
element in Tunisian society (principally confined to the universities at present)
which believes that Ben Salah's program would have been successful if pur-
sued to its conclusion. In any event, socialism in some form is likely to remain
the dominant economic philosophy. Moreover, inability to attract sufficient
foreign aid and other capital to finance foreign exchange requirements is likely
to force Tunisia to retrench economically; the need for enforcing austerity is
likely, in turn, to lead to more authoritarian political methods.
23. If Habib Bourguiba were still in full vigor, Tunisia probably could get
through several more years without severe political trouble. However, he has
been seriously ill several times in the past two years; his age (67), general health,
and apparent loss of political acumen make it extremely doubtful that he will
be able effectively to direct Tunisian affairs much longer. None of his close
associates appears to have the personality and political savvy necessary to make
the system work when he is gone. Prime Minister Bahi Ladgham, whom Bour-
guiba has appointed as successor, has been running the day-to-day business of
the government for some months but he has shown himself to be somewhat
indecisive, compromising among various factions in a manner that satisfies no one.
24. While Ladgham probably will become the titular head of government
when Bourguiba leaves the scene, we doubt that he will be able to maintain
control for long. He will be challenged by younger elements within his party
-5C-eRET� 9
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
CRt
who are impatient at the party's growing immobilism and eager for power. There
will be challenges from without the party�e.g., by men expelled from it for
failure to follow Bourguiba's command and by presently embryonic ideological
movements among students. The military, which has exerted virtually no in-
fluence on government policy, might seek a political voice in a post-Bourguiba
government. The likely course of such challenges is unclear; much will depend
on the time and circumstances of Bourguiba's departure. We believe, however,
that a post-Bourguiba government is likely to be more authoritarian in its methods
and more in tune with Arab world trends than the present one.
V. LIBYA
25. After six months in power, Libya's Revolutionary Command Council
( RCC) continues to display a sense of insecurity about its position and uncer-
tainty about its domestic and foreign policies. There are indications of disagree-
ment within the RCC and of discontent within the country, focusing most
notably on relations between Libya and Egypt. RCC President Qaddafi's
advocacy of extremely close relations with Nasser and his transfer of Libyan
troops to Egypt have already caused one split within the leadership. In the
face of persistent opposition from other members .of the RCC, he has tempo-
rized. The Egyptian presence in Libya has remained for some time at the level
of about 1,500 troops and about 500 advisers, mostly civilians. If Qaddafi is
willing to play down his affinity for Egypt, he probably can remove the most
serious immediate cause- of domestic opposition.
26. The RCC's actions so far have underscored both- the Libyan and the
'Arab character of the revolution but have shown no other consistent pattern.
It is clearly determined to identify with the militant Arab line toward Israel 'and
has increased its financial contributions to Egypt. It insisted on the early
termination of the US and UK military presence. It completed the Libyaniza-
tion of foreign-owned banks which had begun under the Monarchy. It intro-
duced partial prohibition, presumably out of deference to Islamic fundamental-
ism. It removed foreign-language signs and deleted English language courses
from the school curriculum. It carried out widespread arrests of politicians,
businessmen, and senior military personnel associated with the old regime. It also
began negotiations�originally, scheduled by the Idris government�for an up-
ward revision of the price structure on which Libyan oil revenues are calculated.
It turned almost immediately to France for military aircraft but continued to
seek tanks from the UK; if the British refuse the Libyan bid, France is likely
to be asked for tanks and other equipment as well.
27. We have little to go on M assessing likely political developments in Libya
over the longer term. The RCC has now installed its own members in the key
cabinet posts and has improved its ability to monitor the daily activities of the
bureaucracy. It is apparently making an effort to avoid exacerbating tribal or
regional tensions and rivalries. It has purged the military of followers of the
old regime, who would almost certainly have been a threat to the new order,
10 -5Eelter
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
SECRET
but it probably has failed to identify the potential dissidents among officers
who remain on active duty. Moreover, there are divisions even among the
junta. It seems more likely than not that Libya will experience serious political
turmoil in the next few years, but there is little basis for predicting the various
circumstances and contingencies that might arise. Economic problems per se
are not likely to bring on domestic strife, thanks to Libya's very large oil
revenues, which amounted to some $1 billion in 1969. If a part of the present
RCC were to seize control or if another group of officers should move in, the
odds are that a successor government would pursue domestic and Arab policies�
except perhaps in regard to Egypt�much like those of the present regime.
28. A Libyan attempt to nationalize oil production does not appear likely.
Nevertheless, it cannot be entirely ruled out, especially in the event of major
Arab-Israeli military hostilities. The RCC is deeply committed to the Arab cause,
and oil is the major weapon at Libyan disposal. An embargo of oil shipments
to certain countries is much more likely in such circumstances than is nationaliza-
tion. Selective oil embargos, however, are relatively easy to circumvent, espe-
cially in view of the many alternative sources of oil. Should Libya choose to
attempt nationalization, it is in a unique position to carry through without
severe damage to itself. Twenty-five percent of the crude oil imported in 1968
by the European Common Market countries�and 43 percent of West German
imports�came from Libya. Independent oil companies in importing countries
would probably not refuse to buy oil from nationalized companies, as long as the
price remained competitive. Furthermore, Libya has accumulated foreign ex-
change reserves adequate to ride out a lengthy period during which it could
seek new customers; imports other than oil field equipment could be maintained
at current levels for roughly two years with the funds Libya now has on hand.
The strong Libyan position in regard to nationalization will diminish in a year
or two with rising oil production from the Gulf of Guinea�principally Nigeria�
and with substantial increases in world tanker tonnage. In any event, with
Libyan financial support for Egypt now running at a high leve1,4 Arab solidarity
may act more to protect than to threaten Western oil interests.
VI. FOREIGN INFLUENCES AND POLICIES
A. Arab and African Affairs
29. The recent shelving of long-standing territorial claims among the French-
speaking states of North Africa has markedly improved their political relations.
These disputes, which kept tensions high and even provoked border clashes,
have now been formally resolved or set aside at Algeria's initiative. Since January
1969, Algeria has concluded treaties with Morocco and with Tunisia that call for
permanent peace between the parties, renunciation of force in the case of dis-
putes, and non-adherence by either party to any pact or coalition directed against
Under agreements reached at Khartoum in 1967, Libya gives Egypt an annual subsidy of
$59 million. In late 1969, Qaddafi offered Nasser an additional $96 million and may provide
such extra sums occasionally in the future.
trr 11
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
the other. Boumediene also has helped promote contacts that have led to Mo-
rocco's formal recognition of Mauritania, thus, in effect, renouncing long-standing
Moroccan claims to that country. And Tunisia, Algeria, and Mauitania appear
willing to cooperate with Morocco in pressing Spain to relinquish political con-
trol of the Spanish Sahara.
30. With territorial issues shelved, the North African countries may move
forward on. economic collaboration. For example, iron ore deposits in Algeria
would become profitable to exploit if transportation across Morocco to the
Atlantic could be arranged. Negotiations for a preferential trade zone in North
Africa ( perhaps including Mauritania) were slated to resume in March 1970
but were postponed; if such an agreement eventually is reached, it would afford
some small advantages to each of the participants. However, all of the North
African countries are concerned principally with their internal problems and
have a distinct sense of their own individuality; moreover, their international
economic interests are divergent. For these reasons, a moderate degree of eco-
nomic and occasional foreign policy coordination represents the likely limit of
their cooperation.
31. The revolution in Libya, however, has helped to stimulate cooperation
among the other North African states, and future events in Libya will have a
substantial impact throughout the area. For Morocco and Tunisia, the Libyan
revolution was a blow, raising the specter of the overthrow of conservative gov-
ernments by radicals and removing one more country from the dwindling ranks
of Arab states maintaining an avowedly pro-Western foreign policy. The Al-
gerian Government probably cheered the revolution, but the subsequent increase
of Egyptian influence in Libya was no more welcome in Algiers than in Rabat
or Tunis. Algeria would like to have Libya as a collaborator on oil policy and
an independent member of the Arab family, rather than a stooge or tool of Cairo.
Morocco and Tunisia are worried about Libya as a possible base for Egyptian�
and perhaps eventually Soviet�subversion. There are clear signs, however, that
the present Libyan leaders are strongly opposed to both communist ideology
and Soviet tutelage and that some are equally fearful of Egyptian intentions.
If Libyan nationalists prevail in Tripoli, the other countries will be somewhat re-
assured. On the other hand, if Libya pursues a pro-Egyptian course, this will
probably lead to greater political collaboration among Tunisia, Morocco, and
Algeria.
32. Since 1967, the Arab-Israeli dispute has increasingly engaged the attentions
of the North African states. Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco do not wish to become
deeply involved but, for reasons of both domestic and inter-Arab politics, cannot
afford to remain entirely aloof. They wish to minimize the commilinent of their
resources to the buildup of regular Arab armies arrayed against Israel, which
they probably see as a futile effort; hence, their support has been given prin-
cipally to the Palestinians. Algeria's long-standing support for the fedayeen is
likely to continue and increase. Both Morocco and Tunisia will probably step
up somewhat their financial and verbal support for the Palestinian cause.
12 -SECRET
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
33. The new Libyan regime has chosen to join the ranks of the militant Arabs
and to increase its financial contribution to ,the cause. Libya's military forces
are very small. The regime has arranged to purchase over 100 jet aircraft from
France, but the bulk of these planes are not scheduled for delivery for some
years. Moreover, their effective operational use will require extended training
for pilots and maintenance personnel and establishment of an adequate ground
support system. Even if Libyan planes were made available to Egypt, Egypt
lacks the personnel to operate them. Hence, Libyan planes will not materially
affect Arab military capabilities against Israel at least for the next three or
four years.
34. In the event of another major round of Arab-Israeli hostilities, the extent
of North African participation would depend in part on the duration of the
fighting. If it dragged on long enough to make reinforcement possible (or the
failure to send reinforcements too obvious), Algerian and Libyan units certainly
would be provided, and probably Moroccan and Tunisian ones as well. The depth
of popular emotion in all the North African countries probably would compel
such actions, although Tunis and Rabat, at any rate, would move reluctantly.
35. By and large, the North African countries play only a limited role in Arab
and African affairs. Algeria's national oil company has cooperation agreements
with national oil companies in Yemen, South Yemen, and Iraq and has proposed
similar arrangements with Libya and Syria. Both Arab and Islamic summits have
recently been held in Morocco. The Algerians and Tunisians have occasionally
exchanged visits with some ruling political parties in Arab states. No major
expansion of such activity is likely. Under Qaddafi, Libya is actively cultivating
closer relations with the Eastern Arabs, especially Egypt and the Sudan. Libya's
money, however, is likely to be more consequential than its political role.
36. All four North African states belong to the Organization of African Unity,
and all but Libya have on occasion been quite active in African affairs. These
interests, however, have never been great; the vast desert that separates black
from North Africa and the wide disparities of culture and race give the two
areas little in common. Algeria sympathizes with and provides office space and
subsidies for the representatives of a score of liberation movements, e.g., those
of Angola and Mozambique. It also cooperates to some extent with the Cubans
in such ventures. In general, however, Algerian enthusiasm for these groups has
declined in recent years and is unlikely to increase.
B. The USSR
37. The Soviet Union is unlikely to make substantial political and diplo-
matic gains in North Africa while current regimes remain in power. The new
Libyan regime has already brushed aside several Soviet arms offers and has
recently inspired Libyan newspapers to launch an anticommunist press cam-
See NIE 11-6-70, "Soviet Policies in the Middle East and Mediterranean Area," dated
5 March 1970, SECRET, for a fuller discussion of the USSR's political, economic, and military
goals and activities in the North African area.
13
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
SECRET
paign. The USSR cannot expect greatly enhanced influence in either Morocco
or Tunisia under existing regimes; even in the event of a revolution in either
country, any growth of Soviet influence would be limited by North African
suspicions, traditional cultural and economic ties to Western Europe, and fear
of Soviet-Egyptian collaboration. The Egyptians, for their part, do not appear
to favor a greater Soviet role in Libya.
38. Over the past year or so, relations between Algeria and the USSR have
cooled. The Algerians apparently have rebuffed Soviet requests for some sort
of naval facility and have repeatedly called for the withdrawal of the fleets -
of non-Mediterranean powers from the Mediterranean Sea. Bournediene ap-
pears to be making a deliberate effort to limit Soviet influence in Algeria; he
has recently concluded a small military procurement and training .agreement
with France that is evidently the beginning of an attempt to diversify sources
of arms procurement.
C. Europe
39. France is likely to expand its already substantial influence in North
Africa in the years ahead. Recent French policy initiatives appeal to the North
Africans. Among them are emphasis on the role of the Palestinians in the Arab-
Israeli dispute, the embargo on arms sales to Israel, and willingness to sell arms
to some Arab customers. France favors eventual withdrawal of non-riparian
naval forces from the Mediterranean and may indeed be orchestrating � a cam-
paign to that end. The small sale of French anns to Algeria and the subsequent
multimillion dollar aircraft deal with Libya will probably be followed by further
arms sales in North Africa. Over 600,000 North Africans presently work in
France and this number may rise somewhat. The French Government undoubt-
edly will attempt to promote the commercial interests of French oil companies
and other French businesses in North Africa. France is also likely to court North
Africa by providing increased technical assistance, by continuing to buy North
African products, and by promoting North African efforts to expand preferential
access to the European Economic Community (EEC).
40. This is not to say that relations between France and the North African
countries will be uniformly smooth. Even during de Gaulle's day, there were
serious and unresolved disagreements between Algeria and France�notably
over French reneging on a contract to purchase Algerian wine. Other bilateral
problems are likely to arise in the next few years. In addition, impending
renegotiation of Franco-Algerian oil agreements is bound to cause some fric-
tions between the two. France has recently normalized relations with Morocco
and made some conciliatory gestures toward Tunisia as well. It is likely to
increase economic and military aid to both�though probably not as much as
they would like. The North African countries will continue to compete with
one another for the French market�a major recipient of their oil and agri-
cultural goods�and will seek special favors at one another's expense. Thus
periodic strains in relations among the North African states and in dealings be-
tween France and individual states are likely.
14 SECRET
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 C06866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
41. A further diversification of North Africa's international ties is likely in
the 1970s. While West Germany, Italy, and the UK are not likely to equal
France or the US in diplomatic, political, or economic influence in the area,
all three are likely to improve their position. Spain will also try to cultivate its
Arab neighbors, but it is not likely to accede to Moroccan desires for control of
the Spanish Sahara; relations between Spain and North Africa, therefore, are
likely to remain cool.
D. The US
42. US relations with Morocco and Tunisia are cordial; the US has important
commercial interests in Libya and Algeria but official relations only with the
former. Friendly government to government relations are almost certain to per-
sist between the US and Morocco and Tunisia, at least as long as the present
regimes remain in power there. Both regimes look to US friendship as in some
measure a bulwark against domestic as well as foreign enemies. Beyond this,
attitudes of all four countries toward the US are likely to depend to a very
large degree on how they interpret and react to US policies and actions on
matters going beyond North Africa itself. Among these are, for example, the
question of arms sales to Israel and diplomatic positions in the Arab-Israeli
issue, support or opposition to North African countries association with the
EEC ( since the US is formulating a single policy toward all such applications),
US policies on imports of oil and natural gas ( the latter affecting a tentative
arrangement for the sale of $1.4 billion worth of Algerian gas in the US over
the next 25 years), and the general availability of foreign aid and investments.
43. So long as the US remains closely identified in Arab eyes with Israel
and Israel remains in occupation of Arab territory, any substantial growth of
US influence in North Africa is highly unlikely. Indeed, frictions and irritations
are almost certain to recur at frequent intervals. However, if the Arab-Israeli
issue does not flare up into widespread new hostilities, we anticipate a con-
tinued gradual warming of Algerian-US commercial relations. The existing gov-
ernments of Tunisia and Morocco will continue to cooperate with the US, but
perhaps less readily than in the past; warming North African relations with
France, reductions in the level of US aid, and growing doubt in both Tunisia
and Morocco about American willingness to actively defend their regimes will
all work to loosen ties to the US. In sum, now that the shocks of independence
and decolonization have been weathered, the North African states are once
again turning toward Western Europe and deemphasizing the close associa-
tion with either the US or the USSR that characterized the 1950s and 1960s.
15
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a
need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the follow-
ing officials within their respective departments:
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the
Department of the Army
d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the
Navy
e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air
Force
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
i. Director of Central Reference Service, CIA, for any other Department or
Agency
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
arrangement with the Central Reference Service, CIA.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may
retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the
document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or per-
mission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with
IAC�D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be clas-
sified: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Approved for Release: 2021/01/28 006866478