PACKAGE FOR A/DCI FOR PRINCIPALS ONLY MEETING

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 05916710
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2021
• Case Number: F-2015-00136
• Publication Date: February 5, 1993

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interAgency
Balkan Task Force
(b)(3)
5 February 1993
This package was assembled for
Mt. WOolsey's Principals Only
meeting today on the former
Yugoslavia.
The NSC paper initially came in
for the DCI. Subsequently,
a second copy arrived for me, which
I am sharing.
cc: DDI
D/EURA
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DCI Interagency
Balkan Task, Force
FOR THE DCI
Talking Points on Decision Memo
for the President
Summary of actions taken in response
to taskings at last NSC/PC
Minutes of last NSC/PC meeting
Maps of MUslimr-desired changes to
Vance-Owen Map
Talking Points on Mtslim changes to
nap
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DCI Interagency
Balkan Task Force
FOR THE DCI
Talking Points on Decision Memo
for the President
Summary of actions taken in response
to taskings at last NSC/PC
Minutes of last NSC/PC meeting
Maps of Muslim-desired changes to
Vance-Owen Map
Talking Points on Muslim changes to
Map
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Talking Points: Principals Committee
5 February 1993
The Policy Options Paper is an accurate reflection of the
Principals' deliberations and a good effort toward declaring
broad US goals and policy.
That said, there are certain sobering realities
that limit our prospects for success and which must
be clearly understood at the outset.
(Page 1, 2d para, 1st sentence: "Our options...")
Our options also are limited in a fundamental way by the
ethnic makeup and history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
dissolution of Yugoslavia resulted in large part from the
death of Tito (whose iron rule and shrewd political
balancing had kept the lid on for decades) and the end of
the Soviet military threat (a glue that held the otherwise
antagonistic "Yugoslav" communities together). We cannot
put the Bosnian Humpty Dumpty back together again. We can
improve things, but not necessarily solve them permanently.
(Page 2, 4th para, 1st sentence: "In effect,..." )
Our dilemma, of course, is that visible pressure on Belgrade
will encourage the Bosnian Government to cling to its hope
for eventual international military intervention.
- -
(Last sentence: "Without at least...")
Yes, any imposed plan would have "little hope of
holding," but even a consensual agreement will not
permanently prevent the Bosnian Serbs from one day
renewing efforts to achieve union with Serbia.
(Page 3, 3d para, last sentence: "By early next week� � �")
(If asked) Northern Bosnia is neediest in terms of medical
supplies, Also, it would be easier (b)(1)
to reach from Croatian territory than equally needy (in ODO)
terms of food and medicine) eastern Bosnia.
(Page 3, last para, 1st sentence: "With regard to...")
(If asked) The UN mandate in Croatia technically expires on
21 February, but the Croatians seem to focus on the March
anniversary of UNPROFOR's arrival in country. Either way,
time is extremely short.
(Page 4, 1st para, last sentence: "Putting a force...")
the British would be
willing to increase their contingent in Bosnia to a brigade
to help enforce the Vance-Owen plan provided the US put in
ground troops. Overall, a European contribution matching
that of the US would seen a feasible goal.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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ACTIONS PROPOSED TO INDUCE THE PARTIES TO REACH AGREEMENT
(Page 1, 1st para)
The Russians also want to limit no-fly enforcement to
targetting fixed-wing aircraft only.
(Page 1, 3d para)
The DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force has a data base on
detention camps and war crimes. Although the available
reporting is often stale, fragmentary, and sometimes
contradictory, we are working with State and others to
identify perpetrators. How this material will hold up in
legal proceedings, however, is uncertain.
Page 2, last para)
I would add that a dialogue between the Croatian Government
and the Croatian Serbs is indispensible to defusing that
situation. Perhaps this should be a high priority of the
UN/EC negotiations and our US point man.
DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
(Page 1, para 3)
We believe the Russians are close to their limit on pressing
Serbia. Some real hand-holding, as proposed here, seems
essential to keeping them on the reservation.
(Page 1, para 6)
Perhaps add.a tic here to make my point about encouraging
Croatian Government-Croatian Serb negotiations, which we
believe are needed urgently.
DRAFT PRESS BACKGROUNDER
(Page 2, last pare)
Here too, we should acknowledge the difficult realties in
Bosnia and Croatia (centuries of communal warfare) as
severely limiting what may be possible over the long term
and highlighting the risks in trying.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT:
Purpose
U.S. Policy Toward the Former Yugoslavia
To set your policy course toward the former Yugoslavia and adopt
both a diplomatic and public relations strategy for implementing
it.
Background
Over the past week, the Principal's Committee has considered a
range of options and the steps that would be necessary to
implement them. Our criteria in judging them have included what
we ideally would like to accomplish on the ground (improving the
humanitarian situation; stopping further Serbian aggression;
rolling back Serbian conquests to date; strengthening prospects
for a negotiated settlement) as well as broader foreign policy
objectives such as deterring-others who are judging the
international response to ethnic warfare in this new environment;
maintaining our position in the Muslim world; NATO's
effectiveness; preventing a break with Russia; and the risk of
wider conflict in the Balkans if the fighting spreads to Kosovo
and elsewhere. We also have considered the costs ,in money and
American lives; the prospects for American public support; and
the roles and attitudes of our European allies.
Our optiong were limited when you assumed office by the terrible
situation on the ground. They have been further narrowed by the
Vance/Owen "take it or leave it" gambit, including a call for
military sanctions against any party that refuses to sign their
plan as it stands, and by Russia's favorable view and the
European Community's assertion of "unequivocal support" for the
plan (their private comments to us about its flaws
notwithstanding). Thus if we do not engage on the basis of
Vance/Owen we will be expected to impose our own solution,
including by force of arms if necessary, or else be seen as
blocking the only chance for peace.
: (t)
We considered options ranging fromAsaying that the Vance/Owen
plan can't work, re-writing their map and trying to get allies to
go along with measures we would propose to change the situation
on the ground, toApacking off and telling the Europeans that
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since they have endorsed Vance/Owen, it is up to them to carry it
out. All Committee members agreed that +Haile was feasible.
e y2'zx
At its February 3 meeting the Principal's Committee therefore
agreed that we should engage more actively in the negotiations
now underway in New York from the basis of Vance/Owen. It is
important to understand that this would imply American
willingness to help implement an agreement if one can be reached
by the parties. A hard decision would have to be faced about
whether and how to do so. DOD is assessing what would be
required for missions that could range from monitoring to
� enforcing the provisions of an agreement.
The option we propose neither would embrace the Vance/Owen plan
as it stands nor redraft (and try to impose) our own solution.
Nor would we take the lead in negotiations; that should remain
with representatives of the UN Secretary General and European
Community. We, however, would attach a senior, skilled American
negotiator to the talks who would help explore ideas with all
parties and facilitate compromises among them.
We would take the steps sketched below, to the extent possible
with our allies, to increase _economic and political pressure on
Serbia to compromise. At the same time, we would tell the
Bosnians what we are prepared to do but that we cannot impose
their terms on Belgrade; they must make the best deal they can at
the negotiating table.
In effect, through a combination of increased pressures on the
Serbs and disabusing the Bosnian Muslims of the expectation that
the U.S. will impose their desired result on the Serbs (while
assuring them that we will not force Vance/Owen down their
throats), we would hope to bring the parties into a renewed
negotiation wherein they would agree to a resolution which the
international community would help enforce. Without at least
their grudging consent at the outset, it is our view that any
plan imposed upon them has little hope of holding.
We would push for enforcement of the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia.
This would keep your campaign pledge and could lend greater
credibility to future warnings, although most Washington agencies
doubt it would have much military effect. The British, Russians,
and others will continue finding reasons to delay this measure
and we may not succeed in overcoming their resistance.
Otherwise our immediate pressures on Serbia would be political
and economic. We would:
Mount a far more vigorous effort to enforce economic
sanctions. while we probably cannot deprive Belgrade
or the Bosnian Serbs of the physical means to continue
the present level of fighting, tightening sanctions
enforcement can increase Belgrade's pain and over time
hobble the Bosnian Serbs.
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Step up publicity and preparations for war crimes
trials
Increase U.S. government-funded broadcasts into Serbia
to break Belgrade's "information blockade".
Talk to key West European governments and Russia about
prospects for increasing Serbia's diplomatic and
physical isolation, e.g. by cutting its financial and
telecommunications links.
We would tell the West Europeans and the Russians that we are
joining them in giving the Vance/Owen process a chance to work �
and that we will contribute American energies and political
capital to their efforts, both by our role in the negotiations
and by additional actions to press the Serbs and other parties,
and that we hold the possibility of more forceful action,
including military action, in reserve. That tacit threat may
itself provide some leverage on Serbia. The possibility of an
American role in actually enforcing a settlement -- not just
observing whether or not the Serbs comply -- would meet one of
Sarajevo's prime objections to the Vance/Owen plan as it stands.
We considered adding to our pressures on Serbia military action
to identify and open all detention camps, and lifting the arms
embargo against Bosnia. We rejected the first because in
practical terms it could mean military intervention to take
control of Bosnia, and the second because both the relief
agencies and their UN protectors would cease operation as soon as
we were seen to have taken sides in the conflict.
At the same time, we would take what steps we can to improve the
humanitarian situation in Bosnia. We would increase our own
donations and put continued pressure on UN forces in Bosnia to
use force if necessary to get the supplies through. By early
next week, we will'have a separate paper on what U.S. action
would be required either to try to meet Bosnia's need for
medicines and vitamins on a continuing basis, or for a one-time
supply of food and fuel as well as medical supplies to Northern
Bosnia (the neediest area).
With regard to Kosovo, we would reaffirm former President Bush's
Christmas Day warning that in the event of conflict caused by
Serbian action the United States will be prepared to employ
military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia
proper, as well as his message to Albania and to the Kosovar
leadership urging that they avoid any step that might stimulate
or provide a pretext for violence. And we would propose
increasing the UN military presence in Macedonia.
With regard to Croatia, we would push for a renewal of the UN
mandate before it expires next March, but this time with tougher
action to compel Serb compliance with the agreement it signed in
January 1992. We would urge Germany to use its considerable
influence with Zagreb to curtail the latter's unilateral action
to take back Serbian-held parts of Croatia.
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Costs. This would cost some money. Providing more material and
civilian personnel to help Serbia's neighbors enforce sanctions
could cost some $3 million; persuading them to tighten
enforcement could require compensating their sanctions-related
economic losses of about $3 billion a year. (The EC should
help.) Costs of any military action we might choose to undertake
obviousfy would depend on the action. Putting a force of 10,000
men on the ground either for humanitarian purposes or to help
enforce a settlement could cost in excess of $1 billion for six
months; a longer effort could triple the cost because of rotation
requirements.
The biggest costs, in money, political capital, and the risk of
American lives, could come if we succeed in helping to forge an
agreement which would need to be enforced against violations by
any of the parties. While not saying now what the American role
in enforcing a settlement would be, we would have implied
willingness to participate in some fashion. While we could
propose that the prime American contribution be air power -- for
instance, to retaliate against a party guilty of a pattern of
violations -- the West Europeans could insist on an American
ground component at least in the initial phase of separating the
parties and getting heavy, weapons under control. Some
multilateral peacekeeping force will be necessary in Bosnia,
whenever and however the fighting winds down. One key question
is whether it will have the mandate and muscle to ensure
compliance with agreements reached on paper. If you approve this
strategy you should be aware that we will be under considerable
pressure to help do that job.
More detailed information about the steps we propose is at Tab A.
We have also drafted a diplomatic plan to begin implementation of
this policy. It is attached for your review at Tab B. A draft
Press Backgrounder is attached at Tab C.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the Policy outlined above.
Approve Disapprove
Attachments
Tab A Proposed Action
Tab B Diplomatic Strategy for Implementing the Strategy
Tab C Draft Press Guidance for Background Use
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ACTIONS PROPOSED TO INDUCE THE PARTIES
TO REACH AGREEMENT
Push for Enforcement of the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia.
NATO allies and Russia all have agreed in principle but
insist on very restrictive rules of engagement (e.g., a
30 day waiting period after a UN Security Council
resolution is passed, and a phased approach which at
least initially would restrict action to attacking only
planes violating the prohibition in Bosnian air space,
not their air bases in Bosnia or hot pursuit of
violating planes themselves over, for instance,
Serbia). And all argue for delay even in starting the
30-day clock so long as negotiations continue. (S)
Mount a far more vigorous effort to enforce sanctions.
Leon Fuerth has assumed chairmanship of our interagency
sanctions enforcement effort. His group is considering
ideas such as using administrative review to slow down
all transactions by Yugoslav firms and citizens;
upgrading the customs services of Serbia's neighbors
and providing additional Sanctions Assistance Monitors
to help them; restricting Serbia's overseas financial
transactions; and pressing West Europeans publicly as
well as privately to crack down on their citizens and
firms engaged in sanctions violations. (S)
Step up publicity and preparations for war crimes
trials. While naming names now could make the accused
less likely to compromise in the negotiations, we could
begin by trying to identify grass roots criminals. (S)
Increase USG funded broadcasts into Serbia. The
Serbian public has very little access to any view other
than that of their government, which portrays Serbia as
the victim of a conspiracy of its traditional enemies
-- Islam, Germany, and the Vatican. We would try to
counter that view by increasing VOA broadcasts into
Serbia and by reprogramming some Radio Free Europe
assets still devoted to former Communist states on
Central Europe. Part of our message would be that our
quarrel is not with the Serbian people, whom we
consider the victims of their own government and for
whom better relations with the U.S. and the West are
possible. (S)
Talk to key European governments about increasing
Serbia's diplomatic and physical isolation. The
European Community is exploring ways to do this. Ideas
include severing its financial and telecommunications
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links with the outside world. We appreciate the
potential downside of increasing the Serbian peoples'
isolation_from outside contacts and therefore
perspectives, and also would need to find a way to
delink the communications links of, for instance,
Bulgaria and Romania from those of Serbia. (S)
Take stePs to improve the humanitarian situation in
Bosnia. We are trying to get a better fix on whether
lack of supplies is part of the problem, or only
Serbian (and other) impediments to their delivery. The
best way to improve the humanitarian situation would be
to end the siege of Sarajevo and other Bosnian-held
towns. But that, like freeing the camps, could mean
large scale intervention of ground forces. (S)
Reaffirm the threat to take military action if Belgrade
provokes fighting in Kosovo. We need to know what we
mean by this, and are working on contingency plans for
you. (S)
Push for a stronger mandate for UN forces in Croatia.
Fighting has resumed there because Serbs have not
complied with the Vance Plan they signed in January
1992 to turn the UN Protected Areas over to UN control.
Serbian gunmen still control the areas, Croatian
refugees are not being allowed to return home, and some
degree of ethnic cleansing continues. Croatian
patience is wearing thin, but unilateral action to
regain territory risks broadening the war and
destroying any hopes for peace. Chances are slim that
present contributors to the UN force in Croatia will
take forcible action to reclaim the territory in
question unless the U.S. is on the ground sharing risks
with them; but all Principals agree we should try to
persuade them. (S)
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PIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
I) To demonstr-ate our commitment to the process, we will
send a senior diplomat to New York to serve as our primary
liaison with the various parties. (S)
2) President Clinton will send messages to key counterparts
explaining our approach. Messages will also be sent from
Secretary Christopher to his counterparts in key countries
(Security Council members, other EC member states, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, inter alia) outlining our position. President Clinton
and Secretary Christopher will use their meetings with visiting
officials to explain our position. (S)
3) We will devote particular attention to ensuring that
Russian support for the effort continues. Secretary Christopher
can meet with Ambassador Lukin here and remain in telephone
contact with Minister Kozyrev between now and their meeting later
this month. U.S. representatives in New York will also make a
special effort to keep in close touch with Ambassador Vorontsov.
We may wish to send a special envoy to Moscow to discuss the
issue with senior Russians, including Yeltsin and to show the
Russian people that we give high priority to the relationship.
(S)
4) In our contacts with Izetbegovic and other Bosnian
officials, we will make clear that:
We actively will engage in the negotiations, oppose
imposition of a settlement on them, and increase
pressures on Serbia to compromise;
But we cannot force a settlement on Belgrade; they must
make the best deal they can at the negotiating table.
(S)
5) With the Serbs, both in Belgrade and Bosnia, we will:
Affirm our intention to tighten the sanctions noose in
a variety of ways;
Make clear that if they do not engage constructively in
the negotiations, American military action remains a
possibility;
Reiterate the Christmas Day warning regarding Kosovo.
(S)
6) With the Croatians, we will:
Warn that unilateral offensives to retake Serb-held
- territory in Croatia will forfeit them sympathy at the
negotiating table;
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Insist on the Vance/Owen "constitutional principles" to
which all three parties have agreed, and in particular
make clear that any effort to annex the Croatian
majority provinces in Bosnia will have an immediate and
serious negative impact on Croatia's relations with the
United States and the rest of the world. (S)
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EURA-5003/93
4 February 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on "Yugoslavia,"
3 February 1993
1. This second NSC/PC reviewing US policy toward the former
Yugoslavia established the basic approach of US policy, selected
specific actions to propose to the President, discussed military
options (but set them aside for now), and directed specific
intelligence and policy "next steps." The NSC/IWG was instructed
to prepare an options paper for the President to be considered by
another NSC/PC, likely tomorrow. (The NSC/IWG approved that
draft this morning, and the NSC promised us a clean copy this
afternoon to be cleared by Principals.)
2. US Policy Takes Shape. Tony Lake began by outlining
four broad policy approaches:
A. Own the Problem. Dump the Vance-Owen (V-0) proposal and
stake out an assertive US approach.
B. Lead the Effort. Modify the V-0 map into something we
can support morally and practically, and impose it.
C. Support the Effort. Stay out of the map debate, impose
nothing, but press all parties toward whatever settlement
they can collectively accept.
D. Disown the Problem. Back off this "European problem"
except to provide aid and support sanctions.
3. Ambassador Albright and Secretary Christopher described
with some frustration our isolation among the Allies, Vance, and
Owen in New York. They said the others disparage the Muslims we
are accused of goading on, and that the Allies insist they will
pull out if we try to lift the arms embargo. Lake then moved,
and all agreed, to discard "A" and "D." Consensus evolved to a
"B-/C+" solution.
.m � ONO
Secretary Christopher favored "B," likening it to
the US-brokered Mid-East Peace Process, although he
urged that military force not be used until the V-0
proposal is tried and seen to have failed.
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SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on "Yugoslavia,"
3 February 1993
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,1=1.
Secretary Aspin urged "C," not imposing anything,
remaining "agnostic" on V-0, insisting that "only a
consensual 'C" could endure, and suggesting Bosnia
might surpass the Cyprus record as a peacekeeping
mission without end. General Powell explained the
requirements and costs of a high-end military
option and judged that the Europeans have no more
troops to contribute. He underscored that
"imposing" a plan could mean anything from
peacekeeping to full combat.
Lake dismissed the V-0 map as unacceptable. He
defined the group's consensus as "C+," although it
was not clear precisely what this means.
The Principals then reviewed approximately 30
specific policy actions and selected those to be
proposed to the President. They shelved the high-
end military options for now and deemphasized the
military aspects of the remaining options, but
retained most suggestions designed to promote the
delivery of relief assistance and tighten sanctions
and other pressures on Belgrade).
4. On modalities, the US intends to work with the P-4;
Lake's suggestion of forming a contact group (ala Namibia) was
abandoned in favor of Ambassador Wisner's advice to work in
parallel with the Allies and Russians rather than in concert.
Lake suggested we work with the Bosnian Muslims to redraw the V-o
map, sell it to the Europeans, and then impose it. Recognizing
that Vance is tired and won't commit beyond February, State will
nominate a US point man to work with and pressure whomever the UN
names to succeed Vance. We should also send someone (Matlock?)
to brief Yelftsin, and we need to get the Germans to restrain
Croatian President Tudjman.
5. Military Options. General Powell advised that airpower
"solutions" won't work, and his preference (if a military option
is called for) is to go in fast and heavy, intimidate the
opposition, and hopefully scale back rapidly. His estimate of
the force needed to enforce a V-0-type solution would be a
"division package" of 20,000 troops for openers, triple that if
rotations are needed over a long haul, UN Chapter Seven ROEs, and
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SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on "Yugoslavia,"
3 February 1993
$1 billion marginal costs over the first six months. General
Powell also warned that Congressman Murtha has begun calling to
ask the price tag.
6. CIA Contributions. Mr. Woolsey supported the discussion
by outlining differences between the V-0 map and what the Muslims
want, by walking participants through the humanitarian aid
shortfalls, and by highlighting likely reactions to the proposed
policy options (our matrix was not as useful as hoped, however,
because, in simplifying, we glossed over some important
exceptions, and because the NSC had changed the order of the
policy options addressed in the matrix). All in all, however,
the meeting was well served with intelligence.
7. Next Steps. I have passed along several taskings from
Mr. Woolsey General Powell (b)(1)
(medical shortfalls in Sarajevo), and Ambassador Wisner (fuel ODA
deliveries and a suggestion to smuggle in medicine). We also are
printing a map for tomorrow's PC meeting that will highlight the
changes the Muslims want to the V-0 map, with accompanying
talking points on the implications. Finally, is (b)(3)
attending a meeting of Leon Fuerth's new sanctions group this (b)(6)
afternoon.
Daniel W. Wagner
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
cc: DDI, D/EURA, D/RTT,
(b)(3)
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5 February 1993
NOTE FOR:
SUJECT:
The Director of Central Intelligence
Taskings from Last Principals Committee
Meeting
General Powell's question: Yesterday, a Task Force
analyst provided a one-pager on medical needs in Sarajevo to
RADM Cramer for General Powell (attached). We believe our
estimate is correct that 72 percent of Sarajevo's medical
needs were unmet during the period 26 November to 13
January.
Ambassador Wisner's question: There are no data
available on fuel needs in Bosnia; unlike food needs (f of
people X minimal daily requirement), we cannot estimate the
need for fuels like firewood, coal, etc. We will continue
to work this problem, however.
Leon Fuerth's initiative: Task Force analysts attended
Mr. Fuerth's meeting yesterday on tightening sanctions; we
will support this interagency working group along with
State, OSD, JCS, and Treasury. We also discussed with Mr. M(1)
Fuerth his information on smuggling into Bosnia. We were ODA
already in contact with�ha�c-a-dual and will relay
Mr. Fuerth's suggestion
paniel w. wner
Chief, DCI Interagency lkan Task Force
�
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4 February. 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR: RADM Michael W. Cramer
Director J-2
Joint Staff Intelligence
FROM: Daniel Wagner
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
SUBJECT: Response to Gen. Powell's Question on Medical
Needs in Sarajevo
Our estimate that 72 percent of Sarajevo's medical needs
were unmet during the period 26 November to 13 January was made
on the basis of Bosnia and Herzegovina Government data on medical
needs and UNHCR data on deliveries. In a late November paper,
the Bosnian Ministry of Health estimated that 7 percent of
Bosnia's medical needs had been satisfied with deliveries of 41.5
metric tons (MT) of medical material during the week of 16 to 23
November 1992. From that, we extrapolated the amount needed for
one week to about 600 MT. The Bosnian Government further stated
in its report that Sarajevo accounted for about one-quarter of
the total medical need for all of Bosnia. On that basis, we
estimated Sarajevo's weekly medical need to be 150 MT, or 1,050
MT for the seven weeks from 26 November to 13 January. UNHCR
reports stated that UNHCR had delivered 290 MT of medicines and
medical and hygiene materials--106 MT via the airlift and 184 via
land convoys--to Sarajevo during the same period. (UNHCR is the
only relief agency that is regularly delivering humanitarian aid
to Sarajevo, therefore this figure represents virtually all
deliveries.) Dividing deliveries by the need gives us 28 percent
of the need met, or 72 percent unmet.
cc: James Woolsey, DCI
Daniel Wagner
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DECL: OADR
DRV FM: Multiple
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Bosnian Government's Proposed Changes
to the UN Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina
tide asserted
�
as a sole tr
48stronontotia:: �� � "
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UN Proposal Bowden Changes
IM Serb M Addition to
Muslim area
Croat
Muslim
6 Province
El Mixed number
727779 (R00389) 2-93
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3ECRET
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
5 February 1993
Bosnian Government's Proposed Changes to the Vance-Owen Map
Percentages of Pre-war Population in Bosnia and Herzegovina:
Bosnian Serbs 31 Percent
Bosnian Croats 17 percent
Bosnian Muslims 44 percent
IM����
.M.1�allo
Current Territorial Control:
Bosnian Serbs
Bosnian Croats
Bosnian Government
Territory under
Bosnian
Bosnian
Bosnian
Territory after
-- Bosnian
Bosnian
Bosnian
POINTS
Vance-Owen
Serbs
Croats
Government
about 70 percent.
about 20 percent.
about 10 percent.
Map:
42 percent
27 percent
27 percent
Muslim changes to Vance-Owen:
Serbs 34 percent
Croats 26 percent
Government 37 percent
The Bosnian Serbs have already rejected the Vance-
Owen plan to reduce their current 70 percent
territorial control to only 42 percent. They would
protest a further reduction to only 34 percent
(leaving the Muslims with the largest portion)
unless compensated (we wonder how?).
The Serbs would also resist strongly the change in
the-northeast (province 4) that further erodes their
northern corridor. The Croats would protest as
well, although they would not be wedded to this
still-contested area of eastern province 3.
The Serbs would argue to retain the disputed portion
of province 6 in the southeast, but could sacrifice
part of that finger of territory because they retain
access to southern Herzegovina (province 6) through
Montenegro.
The Serbs would be less insistent about retaining
the southernmost part of province 6 (although they
want to retain the Serb-majority city of Trebinje)
and some of the Muslin-desired area in western
province 2.
SECRET
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*DECRET
The latest Bosnian Government map omits earlier
insistence that Sarajevo become a Muslim province
and that the small Serb island of province 6
(totally within province 5) be eliminated.
the Muslims may also drop demands for eastern slices
of provinces 2 and 4.
SECRET
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SECRET
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Deputies Meeting Intelligence Update
8 February 1993
Fighting
-- Croatia (
o Croat- Serb skirmishes continue east of Zadar.
Intercept today reports a Croatian Serb helicopter
fired on UNPROFOR near Zadar.
o The Krajina Serbs have some 12 Gazelle
helicopters-- capable of carrying rockets and anti-
tank missiles--and probably a handful of Hip
multipurpose helicopters.
o They operate primarily from two airfields near
Knin. Bosnian Serbs have provided some maintenance
and logistic support for Krajina Serb helicopters
at Zaluzani airfield in Bosnia.
o UN accusing Croatian Serbs of firing at German
C160 relief flight on Saturday near Karlovac. UN
observers say they saw Serb fire. Serbs admit it,
claiming flight not registered.
o UN relief flights to Sarajevo on again; 14
-4^4.4-04g-
flights expected today. ma
Bosnia (16161 er..4J 4.40tle4�-d- oe�41.444.444. (WI Xer714447
'1011,"4142;1014)
o Muslims resumed attacks around Bratunac.
o Bosnian Serbs continue shelling around Brcko
and Sarajevo.
o Croatian Army shelling Bosnian Serb forces
around Trebinje and Bileca.
o Croats and Muslims resumed fighting in central
Bosnia following a week-long cease-fire.
o Tulsa Muslim leaders threatening "chemical
warfare."
Vance-Owen
o "Map" chatter going nowhere, Muslims want to
reduce Serb gains almost to status quo ante. Refer
to mapit41, )tuA.44.0.c.o6441wg-44.4.
o Muslim expectations include Western--and US--
military force to get them a better deal.
DECL OADR
DRV FM MULTIPLE
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