TRANSCRIPT OF ANGLETON TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - 23, 24, 25 SEPTEMBER 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00038136
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2021
• Case Number: F-2012-01495
• Publication Date: September 23, 1975

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INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES .
SENATE RESOLUTION 21
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
General tonna' *�
Sc4
SELECT COMMTTTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
VOLUME 2
HUSTON PLAN
SEPTEMBER 23, 24. AND 25, 1975
�
���
Printed for the use of the Select Committee To Study Governmental - �
� Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities
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S.
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52
enforcement agencies of the Federal Government and make them
properly responsible and accountable for their actions to the elected
representatives of the people, chief among whom, of course, is the
President himself. _
Now With that brief introduction to the general_ topic for the day.
I would like to ask our witness. Mr. Angleton�who. I understand, is
represented by counsel�to take the oath. Before I ask you to take
the. oath. Mr. Angleton. I wonder if your attorney would identify
himself for the record.
Mr. BROWN. Yes. Mr. Chairman. my name is John T. Brown, counsel
for Mr. Angleton in these proceedings.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Brown. Mr. Angleton. would you
please stand to take the oath? Do you solemnly swear that all the
testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. ANGLETON. I do.
The CHAInmA.N. Mr. Schwarz, would you please begin the
questioning?
TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON, FORMER CENTRAL INTELLI-
____
GEN_CE AGENCY 01.F.LCIAL, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN T. BROWN,
COUNSEL
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Angleton, were you employed by the CIA in
1970?
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes I was.
Mr. SCHWARZ. What was your job at that time?
Mr. ANGLETON. I was Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And when did you start working for the CIA?
Mr. ANGLETON. I began. in 1947. having come from OSS (Office of
Stratecric Services).
Mr. bCH1VARZ. You knew. Mr. A.ngleton. did you not, that the CIA
was opening mail in New York City in 1970. and had been doing so for
approximately 15 or 20 years?
Mr. ANGLETON. I did.
Mr. BROWN. Mr. Schwarz. pardon me. If I may interrupt for just a
moment. As I indicated to the counsel for the committee, Mr. Angleton
had a very brief opening statement. which he wished to make, and I
would like, at this time. to ask for the opportunity to have him make
that. statement., if I may.
Mr. ScHwauz. Yes: I'm sorry. You did say that to me, and I'm very
-sorry. Would you go ahead?
Mr. ANGLETON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my
i name s James Angleton. I am appearing before the committee today.
freely and without subpena. I am mindful of the. serious issues facing
the committee, and I know of your concern that they be resolved
prudently and expeditiously. I have served in the intelligence com-
munity of the *United States for 31 years. beginning with the OSS
during World War II. In 1954, I became Chief of the Counterintelli-
gence Staff of the CIA, a position which I held until 1974. I am now
retired. ,
My years' of service have convinced me that the strength of the
'United States lies in its capacity to sustain perpetual yet peaceful
revolution. It is the ultimate fun�
:is part of our Government., to m:
for peaceful change.
I believe most strongly that the
i,rence community have contribui
versity and strength.
Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
- The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr.
Mr. ScHwAnz. Mr. Angleton, y
!inew in 1970. and had known for
'IA was opening mail in New Yor
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Director He
Hr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And J. Edgar H�
did, he not?
Mr. ANGLETON. I Would assume s
Mr. Scmvsitz. Well. I will read
deposition of last week. "Mr. Hoo
!ions." Now, you have no reason tu
Mr. AxoLETox. I do not.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Sulliya
('IA's mail-opening program, did h.
Mr. AxonETox. That is correct.
Mr. ScawAnz. Now Mr. Helms,
f were all involved in the proce:
the Huston plan. is that correct?
Mr. Axonrrox. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Helms an
they not ?
Mr. ANGLETON. They did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And :Hr. Sullivan
ind other working persons contribv
lid you not?
Mr. AxoLE-roY. Correct.
- Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Would y
of the Special Report. Interagency
1O 1, June 1970 (exhibit 1 1J.
Now that is talking about mail c,
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. ScHwAnz. And it distinguis;
"overt coverage. saying routine cov(.
is Illegal, is that correct ?
:Hr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
.Mr. SCHWARZ. And by covert cover.
did they not?
Mr....ixoLrrox. Exactly.
Mr. ScHwAnz. Would you read ii
under the heading. -Nature of Rest ric
Mr. ANGLETON. "Covert coverage ha
e�Ye.rage has been reduced priniaril
arising from disclosure of routine r
sP. 141.
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Federal Government and make them
untable._ for _their act ion,: to t he elected
chief among whom, of course, is the
uction to the general topic for the day,
s. Mr. Angleton�who. I understand, is
ke the oath. Before I ask you to take
?rider if your attorney would identify
natl. my name is John T. Brown, counsel
eedinor-s.
, Mr. Brown. Mr. Angleton. would you
? Do you solemnly swear that all the
proceeding will be the truth, the whole
1, so help you God?
iwarz, would you please begin the
IETON, FORMER CENTRAL INTELLI-
, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN T. BROWN,
m, were you employed by the CIA in
)ur job at that time?
of the Counterintelligence Staff.
lid you start working for the CIA?
1947, having come from OSS (Office of
fr. Angleton. did you not, that the CIA !
k City in 1970. and had been doing so for
?ardon me. If I may interrupt for just a
counsel for the committee. Mr. Angleton
tement which he wished to make, and I
k for the opportunity to have him make
ry. You did say that to me, and I'm very
nan and members of the committee, my
a appearing before the committee today,
am mindful of the serious issues facing
of your concern that they be resolved
I have served in the intelligence corn-
for 31 years. beginning with the OSS
4. I became Chief of the Counterintelli-
ition which I held until 1974. I am now
convinced me that the strength of the
acity to sustain perpetual yet peaceful
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Ion. It is the ultimate function of the intelligence community.
�, rirt ot our Go% tsrnment. to maintain and eithanee the opportunity
foo� peacef lit change.
iwitt,vv most strongly that the efforts and motivations of the intel-
not. coininunity have contributed to the sustaining: of a, Nation of
t'erSi t V and strength.
Thank yon. Mr. Chairman.
The CI IA IRMA N. Thank you. Mr. Angleton.
Mr. Scl1W41{Z. Mr. Angleton, you just said, did you not, that you
!tit� w in MO, and had known for a substantial period of time, that the
� Lt tvas opening mail in New York City ?
Mr. A NGLETON. That is correct.
--
r. SCHWARZ. And Director Helms knew that, did he not?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. Scu.wAnz. And J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, knew that,
did he. not?
Mr. ANGLETON. I would assume so, sir.
Mr. ScnwAuz. Well. I will read to you what Mr. Helms said in his
fieposition of last week. "Mr. Hoover knew all about the mail opera-
ions." Now, you have no reason to doubt that, do you?
Mr. A. NGLETON. I do not.
SCHWARZ. And Mr. Sullivan of the FBI knew all about the
t � I A's mail-opening program, did he not?
Mr. ANGLETOX, That is correct.
Mr. ScziwAnz. Now Mr. Helms. Mr. Hoover, Mr. Sullivan, and your-
f were all involved in the process which has come to be known as
the Huston- plan, is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Helms and Mr. Hoover signed the plan, did
they not ?
r. A.NGLETox. They did.
Mr. SCHWARZ. And Mr. Sullivan was the primary drafter, but you
and other working persons contributed to the drafting of the report,
hitivou not?
tr. ANGLETON. Correct.
Mr. SrlIWARZ. All right. Would you turn. Mr. Angleton. to page 29
ti the Special Report. Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad
11,,,�). June 1970 r exhibit 1 1].
Now that is talking about mail coverage, isn't it?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. ScHwArtz. And it distinguishes between routine coverage and
,nyert coverage, saying routine coverage is legal and covert coverage
.- illegal. is that correct?
Mr.-A.NottTo.N. That is correct.
M r. SCHWARZ. And by covert coverage, they meant opening the mail,
lid they not?
Mr. ANGLETON. Exactly.
Mr. ScHwAnz. Would you read into the record the first sentence
on.l,r the heading. "Nature of Restrictions." please?
Mr. ANGLETON. "Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine
has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity
r:,inp� from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal pro-
See p. 141.
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ceetling.s and publicity a fforded this matter in congressional hearings
\ ()king tioeth,t0 ion:- of (rOV(.1111D('Ilt:11 illVaS1011 of privacy."
r. ScitwAitz. Nov the first fi words say -covert coverage has
been discont :incl. as you just agreed a moment ago. t hat states
that the opening of mail has been disPontinued, isn't that right?
Mr. ANGLE�ros..:\ lay I seek a little clarification, please?
I be�lieve that. if you read the contribution under preliminary dis-
cussion. we are faced with two problems. We are faced with the
problem of domestic mail that goes from one point in the United States
to another point in the United States.
The CIA activity was devoted to mail to the United States from
Communist countries, and to Communist countries from the United
States. So there are two degrees of opening.
In other words, the entire intent and motivation of the program,
as conducted by CIA. involved the question of foreign entanglements,
counterintelligence objectives.
The domestic mail program was a program that had been conducted
at some time or another by the FBI.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Angleton, would you answer my question?
The words "covert coverage has been discontinued,' covert there
means opening mail, isn't that right?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. I will read to you from the prior paragraph, a refer-
ence which makes perfectly clear that the committee was talking
about both foreign and domestic mail. The sentence which says the
following: "Covert mail coverage, also known as 'sophisticated mail
coverage,' or 'flaps and seals,' entails surreptitious screening and may
include opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail." Now,
the sentence which says "covert coverage has been discontinued,"
is a lie. That is false as far as your knowledge, Mr. Hoover's knowl-
edge. Mr. Helms' knowledge, and Mr. Sullivan's knowledge; isn't that
correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. Excuse me. I'm trying to read your preceding para-
graph. It is still my impression. Mr. Schwarz. that this activity that
is referred to as having been discontinued refers to the Bureau's ac-
tivities in this field.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Well, the words don't say that, first of all. Second,
how would a reader of these words have any idea that that distinction
is being drawn. Mr. Angleton'?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, it is certainly my impression that this was the
gap which the Bureau was seeking to cure. In other words, that they
had had such�
Mr. SCHWARZ. Let's make perfectly clear what we're talldng about.
You knew, Mr. Helms knew. Mr. Hoover knew, and Mr. Sullivan
knew that the CIA was, in fact. opening the mail, and the sentence
says "covert coverage"�which means mail openings�"has been
discontinued."
Mr. ANGLETON. But I still say that the FBI, in my view, are the
ones who made the contribution of that statement. It was covering
the problems that they had had in discontinuing their mail coverage.
Mr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Helms signed the report, didn't he?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. I just want to have you read into the
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511
'ii fins Tfli111('T- in congressional hearings
-ninental invasion of privtl('y.�
five words say -covert coverage has
)11 just agreed a moment ago. that states
-; been discontinued. isn't that. ri,dit?
little clarification, please ?
the contribution under preliminary clis-
two problems. We are faced with the
goes from one point in the United States
States.
oted to mail to the United States from
) Communist countries from the United
es of opening:
intent and motivation of the program,
)cl the question of foreign entanglements,
;.
was a program that had been conducted
!FBI.
on, would you answer my question?
-ge has been discontinued," covert there
t right ?
rect.
to you from the prior paragraph, a refer-
7 clear that the committee was talking
lestic mail. The sentence Which says the
-erage, also known as 'sophisticated mail
entails surreptitious screening and may
ation of domestic or foreign mail." Now,
;overt coverage has been discontinued,"
as your knowledge, Mr. Hoover's knowl-
, and Mr. Sullivan's knowledge; isn't that
1. I'm trying to read your preceding para-
sion. Mr. Schwarz. that this activity that
discontinued refers to the Bureau's ac-
words don't say that, first of all. Second,
words have any idea that that distinction
in?
certainly my impression that this was the
seeking to cure. In other words, that they
e perfectly clear what we're talking about.
ew, Mr. Hoover knew. and Mr. Sullivan
fact, opening the mail, and the sentence
,vhich means mail openings�"has been
ill say that the FBI. in my view, are the
bution of that statement. It was covering
I had in discontinuing their mail coverage.
3 signed the report, didn't he?
)rrect.
t. I just want to have you read into the
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record from two or more documents which relate to the U.S. Attorne.--
6,11ori rs being in formed about mail opening, 1)11c being informed in
11)71. or ill other words, a year after the I rust on plan.
Would you first read into the record from exhibit 56 paragraph
4 of that docunwnt. And while You were looking for it. I will identify
it for the record that that is a (71A memorandum. for I he record. dated
[a\- 19. 1971, subject. "DCI's Meeting Concerning HT/LINGUAL."
vhiili was a code name for the mail-opening program. And it refers,
Mr. Angleton. to a meeting in Mr. Helms' office which involved a
nunther of CIA officials, including yourself.
Now. would you read into the record paragraph 4. please?
Mr. ANGLETON. Paragraph 4:
The DCI." meaning the Director of Central Intelligence, "then asked, who in
Tiw pi k.;1- Office Department knows the full extent of the operation�beyond cover
7.11rveillanee. The Chief of Counterintelligence." meaning myself, "replied that
�nly Mr. Cotter knows, for he has been witting while with CIA and the Office of
:-,�nrity. The previous Chief Postal Inspector, Mr. Montague, had never wanted to
the extent of examination actually done, and was thus able to deny on oath
bet", pre a congressional committee that there was any tampering. Mr. Cotter would
he unable to make such a denial under oath.
In an exchange between .the Director for Central Intelligence and the Deputy
1i:rector for Plans, it was observed that while Mr. Cotter's loyalty to CIA could
he assumed, his dilemma is that he owes loyalty now to the Postmaster General.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. In other words. for the first time, someone
ts in the Post Office Department. who, for sure, knew that the mail
vas being opened. Because of that dilemma, Mr. Helms went to see
1 ice Attorney General, did he not?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, would you read into the record the
Niencorandum for the record. June 3. 1971. subject. -Meeting at the
)( Ts Office Concerning HT/LINGUAL" [exhibit 572] the second
paragraph which refers- to Mr. Helms' statement that he had briefed
the Attorney General concerning the mail opening program.
Mr. A.-NoLrrox. Paragraph 2:
Mr. Helms stated that on Monday he had briefed Attorney General Mitchell
ii the operation. (Nom.�Mr. Helms may have meant Tuesday. June 1, Monday
!..tving beet' a holiday.) Mr. Helms indicated that Mr. Mitchell fully concurred
'hi value of the operation and had no "hangups" concerning it. When discuss-
the advisability of also briefing Postmaster General Blount, Mr. Mitchell
,.:,,,uraged Mr. Helms to undertake such a briefing.
Mr. SCHWARZ. All right. Now, that document was dated June 3,
1971. and the mail opening program lasted until January or Febru-
ary 1973, when at the insistence of Mr. Colby, who said it was illegal,
it was dropped. Is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct. It was actually�the Director was
Mr. Schlesinger.
Mr. SCFIWARZ. And was it not Mr. Colby who was the moving force
-:tying it was illegal?
Mr. ANGLETON. Precisely.
Mr. Sri-in-Am. All right, no further questions. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Angleton�well. first of all. Mr. Smothers, do
von have any questions at this time?
���S.i. p. 365.
,'ee P. 368.
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Mr. S3roTurn. Yv.5: I do. Mr. Chairman. Mr. A nileton. there are
two matters I would like to inquire into briefly. First. the process
regarding approval for such actions as mail openitilf: and spronil. the
nature of this working group itself. The chief counsel has just raised
the questions regarding the statement in the report. of-the interagency
group. and you indicated in response to his question that that may
have been put in by the FBI. Is that correct ?
Mr. ANGLETON. Pardon?
Mr. SMOTHERS. With respect to the discontinuance of the covert op-
eration, mail opening, as mentioned in that report. you theorized, in
response to Mr. Schwarz's question. that that may have been a state-
ment put in by the FBI. To the best of your knowledge, didn't the
FBI do most of the drafting on this report?
Mr. ANGLETON. The FBI, as I recall it. collected the opinions after
each meeting of the participating agencies and appeared at the next
meeting with minutes and a draft of the previous session.
Mr. SMOTHERS. All right. With respect to the question then of mail
opening, is it your experience that this kind of operation by the CIA
would have been discussed in interagency working group meetings
among perSOns who would otherwise have been uninformed of such
operations?
Mr. ANGLETON. No; we would not raise such an operation.
Mr. SMOTHERS. In the normal course of things, would there have
been an approval channel other than such interagency groups for se-
curing Presidential advice and consent to such operations?
Mr. ANGLETON. I am not aware of any other channel.
Mr. SMoTHERS. Would such channels as the Special Group or the
Intelligence Board have been a proper place for such matters to be
raised?
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not believe that an oneration of this sensitivity
would have been raised in any body. It would have been�if there was
going to be submission for Presidential approval, it would have been
raised either by the Director of the FBI or the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Mr. SmorifERs. But in any event, it would not have been raised with
this working group involved with the Huston plan?
Mr. A.-soLrroN. That is correct. That is correct.
Mr. SMOTHERS. Mr. ..knzleton. if we could turn for a moment to the
process resulting in the Huston plan itself. I would like to take you
back to your testimony before the staff of this committee on the 1'. 2th
of September. At that time. you were asked about the involvement of
Mr. Tom Charles Huston in the development of this plan. I would
like to read to you from page 16 of your transcript and ask you if it
accurately reflects your Comments at that time.
Mr. Loch Johnson is doing the questioning, and his question to you is:
Do you think that Tom Charles Huston viewed himself as a potential arbitor
for domestic intelligence disagreements within the community?
Your response:
I think he did because his short letter of instructions to the heads of the
intelligence community said that his role was to be what Dr. Kissinger's was in
foreign policy. It W28 a very clear-cut edict. so to speak, that he was the ultimate
authority in the Executive for domestic security.
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56
e7hai-rtivati. Mr. Anglo on. there are
inquire into brietly. Firt,t t he proepss
tetions as mail open ina� : aml sveond. the
itself. The chief counsel ha-- just raised
a tement in the report of time interatzeney
response to his quest ion t hat that may
s that correct .&
.t to the discontinuance of the covert op-
itioned in that report. you theorized, in
estion. that that may have been a state-
the best of your knowledge, didn't time
ni this report?
is I recall it, collected the opinions after
iting agencies and appeared at the next
lraft of the previous session.
Vith respect to the question then of mail
?, that this kind of operation by the CIA
n interagency working group meetings
therwise have been uninformed of such
id not raise such an operation.
-mal course of things, would there have
her than such interagency groups for se-
d consent to such operations?
ware of any other channel.
channels as the Special Group or the
n a proper place for such matters to be
ilieve that an operation of this sensitivity
,v body. It would have been�if there was
'residential approval, it would have been
r of the FBI or the Director of Central
event, it would not have been raised with
with the Huston plan?
-rect. That is correct.
ton, if we could turn fora moment to the
ston plan itself. I would like to take you
ire the staff of this committee on the 12th
you were asked about the involvement of
n the development of this plan. I would
ge 16 of your transcript and ask you if it
'nents at that time.
- the questioning. and his question to you is:
.es Huston viewed himself as a potential arbitor
ements within the community?
zhort letter of instructions to the heads of the
,t his role was to he what Dr. Kissinger's was in
ar-cut edict, so to speak, that he was the ultimate
domestic security.
pprove_d_ for Release: 2021/04/06 C00038136true ? Does that accurately re-
. tiect your testimony -on September 12?
.11r. .1.Nut.r.roN. I think it does. I could expand on IL but I think that.
t,1111, al.v.urate.
;-;mirrilliRS. But that response then is still true? You still believe
it t1Nol 11.).eAl ie
-slicLoisr. I believe it very much so and that. particularly after
listening-tolir.uston Yesterday.
r. SmoTiwits. Let me then raise with you another question regard-
Mr. Huston's role. If you would. counsel, turn to page 24 of the
same transcript. Mr. Angleton. the question is raised as to whether
Mr. Huston was in fact the White House authority, but in addition
as to whether he was competent to manage such a group as the one that
was involved in the preparation of the Huston plan.
If you would turn to the last Angleton statement on page 24, let me
read into the record your comment at that. time and ask if that still
represents your view.
Talking about his experience in the intelligence area, he was very know-
ledgeable. He had obviously gone into this matter at some length prior to the
meeting. He knew preseiseiy what none of us really knew, that is the depths of
the White House concern. In fact, the most dramatic moment, I think, was at
the beginning of one meeting. At some stage in the meetings after preliminary
draft had been put forward, he found it totally unacceptable, and his comments
were to the effect that the subcommittee was not being responsive to the
_ _President's needs.
Does that accurately reflect your comments?
Mr. ANGLETON. It. doe indeed. I think it is almost a direct quotation
:t:� it . relates to his insistence, after one of the sessions. He began the
next session with the statement to the effect that the committee was not
responding�the. drafting committee was not responding to the
President's requests and was not responsive to it.
Arr. SMOTHERS. During the course of the meetings of this interagency
intelligence group, was there any doubt in your mind that your pur-
pose was to respond to the White House's bidding and that the
message regarding the desires of the White House was being brought
iv Tor Charles Huston?
Mr. ANGLE-roN. There was no question in my mind, nor in the minds
f others, that he represented the Commander in Chief in terms of
hrin7ing together this plan. and he certainly never qualified what his
hority was. He made it. very clear, and he submitted in writing that
ii was to have this role for domestic intelligence comparable to Dr.
issinger's role in foreign affairs.
INir. SMOTHERS. Thank you. Mr. Angleton.
Mr. Chairman, I have nothing further.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Angleton. you heard .Mr. Huston's testimony
erdav ?
Mr. ANOIXTON. I heard most of it. sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You will remember then that he represented to the
..ommittee that in response to the President's desire to extend intel-
: covernov within this country, that he asked the various de-
inents of the Government involved. the FBI, the CIA. the NSA.
orne together with a plan and give the President. some options, and
iitr the purpose of the recommendations that were made to the
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President in the so-called Huston plan, based upon the recommenda-
tions that had come from these departments, was to secure the
President's authorization to eliminate restrictions that he felt were
obstructing this gathering of intelligence.
Now, Mr. Huston told us that he was never informed by the CIA,
the FBI, or any agency that, the mail was being opened. He made a
recommendation to the President. The President authorized mail open-
ings, and he testified that to his knowledge the President did not know
that the mail was being opened either.
Now, when we asked Mr. Helms, the Director of the CIA, if to his
knowledge the President had been told of the mail openings, he said,
I do not know whether he knew it or not.
So the state of the record is that to the best of our knowledge the
President had not been told that the mail was being opened. He gets
a recommendation in which it is represented that covert coverage,
which is mail openings, has been discontinued, and he is asked to
;
authorize the reopening of this program. Now, you have, referred to
the President as the Commander in Chief. What possible justification
was there to misrepresent a matter of such importance to the Com-
mander in Chief?
Mr. Als7GLETON. I would say that your question is very well put, Mr.
Chairman. I can only speculate�and I do not have any record of the
discussions between ourselves and the FBI during the drafting stages,
but I know we had several where matters tabled within the drafting
committee. were matters that we never explained to the other members,
and one of them. of course. was the mail intercept. Again, only by way
of speculation. I believe if the President had approved, or even if
there had been some access to the President�because. I think, this is
probably the most difficult task of all, was to have the audience in
which these things could be explained�I have no satisfactory answer
to your question, except that I do not believe that a great deal of the
mail problem centered on the Bureau's lack of coverage, not the
Agency's.
The CHAIRMAN. But the CIA was the agency principally involved in
thP mail openings.
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct for all foreign mail, not for domestic.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes: and we will explore the whole breadth of that
program in due course. Did not the CIA have an affirmative duty to
inform the President about such a program?
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe so. with-out any question.
The CHAIRMAN. But it apparently was not done. You did not inform
the President. Director Helms did not inform the President, so�
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say, sir, not by way of any excuse, but
those were very turbulent periods for the intelligence community and
particularly for the FBI, end I think that all of us had enormous
respect for Mr. Hoover and understood the problems which he had
in sustaining the reputation of the FBI.
The CHAIRMAN. But the fact that the times were turbulent, the fact
that illegal operations were being conducted by the very agencies we
entrust to uphold and enforce the law makes it all the more incumbent
that the President be informed of what is going on; does it not? It
is really not an excuse.
Mr. ..kNoLErox. I do not think there was ever the forum in which
these matters could be raised at that level. I think that has been one
of the tri
intel !igen
of those oi
The (1
on the CI.
Mr. AN
The Cr
of duty t(
Mr. A2
hesitated
a review
The CI
asked Hy
together t
recommei
INEr. A
forum.
The Ci
solidly b
formed.
should be
Not on
the open.
pay the -
you say.
Mr. A2
The C:
Mr. A:-
The C
haying r
So that
all. He i
place. bc
did say -
Chief.
I hay.
Senat,
the inte:
eoncern
tember
of your
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r�mlarks
brief am
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is any
�
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on pfan, based upon the recommenda-
lese departments, was to secure the
iminate restrictions that he felt were
tell igence.
it he was never informed by the CIA,
he mail was being opened. He made a
it. The President authorized mail open-
knowledge the President did not know
either.
lms, the Director of the CIA, if to his
een told of the mail openings, he said,
it or not.
that to the best of our knowledge the
at the mail was being opened. He gets
is represented that covert coverage,
ieen discontinued, and he is asked to
3 program. Now, you have referred to
?.r in Chief. What possible justification
atter of such importance to the Corn-
hat your question is very well put. Mr.
�and I do not have any record of the
ad the FBI during the drafting stages,
are matters tabled within the drafting
e never explained to the other members,
the mail intercept. Again, only by way
e President had approved, or even if
the President�because, I think, this is
of all, was to have the audience in
alained�I have no satisfactory answer
do not believe that a great deal of the
a Bureau's lack of coverage, not the
was the agency principally involved in
for all foreign mail, not for domestic.
. will explore the whole breadth of that
it the CIA have an affirmative duty to
a program?
ithout any question.
�ently was not done. You did not inform
lid not inform the President, so�
y, sir, not by way of any excuse, but
ads for the intelligence community and
I I think that all of us had enormous
Inderstood the problems which he had
the FBI.
: that the times were turbulent, the fact
conducted by the very agencies we
:he makes it all the more incumbent
d of what is going on; does it not? It
ink there was ever the forum in which
at that level. I think that has been one
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the trouhles in domestic counterintelligence and foreign eounter-
1i.re1ee that the isSues never do- get beyond the parochial circle
ft hose engaged in that activity.
cim trot:\ x. But you have said that there was an affirmative duty
t he CIA to inform the. President? -
Mr. ANGLETON. I don't dispute that.
The CT1AIRMAN. And he was not informed, so that was a failure
of duty to the Commander in Chief is that correct?
M I.. A Not,rroN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think anyone would have
hesitated to inform the President if he had at any moment asked for
� rt.eiow of intelligence operations.
The CHAIRMAN. That is what he did do. That is the very thing he
as;..ed Huston to do. That is the very reason that these agencies got
Nrt her to make recommendations to him, and when they made their
mendat ions, they misrepresented the facts.
Mr. ANGLETON. I was referring, sir, to a much more restricted
r�riun.
The CHAIRMAN. I am referring to the mail, and what I have said is
based upon the evidence. The President wanted to be in-
f,rined. He wanted recommendations. .He wanted to decide what
he done, and he was misinformed.
N"t only was he misinformed, but when he reconsidered authorizing
� ._).)ening: of the mail _5 days later and revoked it. the CIA did not
the slightest bit of attention to him. the Commander in Chief, as
say. Is that so?
r. ANGLETON. I have no satisfactory answer for that.
The CnAinmax. You have no satisfactory answer?
Mr. A.NGLETON. No: I do not.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not think there is a satisfactory answer, because
having revoked the authority, the CIA went ahead with the program.
��:() that the Commander in Chief is not the Commander in Chief at
all. He is just a problem. You do not want to inform him in the first
piA,p, because he might say no. That is the truth of it. And when he
� !id say no you disregard it and -then you call him the Commander in
I have no further questions. Senator Tower?
senator- TOWER. Mr. Angleton, the role of certain leaders within
intelligence community, such as that of Mr. Helms, has been of
..eneern to this committee. Referring back to your transcript of Sep-
timber 12, at page 17, you were asked about the role of the Director
of your Agency, the role of Mr. Helms. You began by discussing the
7irst meeting of the interagency committee. You were asked who at-
onded it and your response was as follows, and I read directly from
the transcripts:
Mr. Helms, but he attended only for a few moments. Huston made the opening
r,,znerks as I recall. And since it was being held in our building, Helms made a
0-0.f appearance so to speak. the host, and he took off and I do not think from
�hat moment he attended any other meetings.
Now Mr. Angleton. the question is this: is this still an accurate
.haracterization of Mr. Helms' participation in the decisions and
recommendations leading up to a so-called Huston plan?
Mr, A2.7GLEToN. I did not mean my statement to indicate that there
Is any neglect of duty. It was simply that the working group was
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quid' lied to adhere to certain guidelines. Mr. Helms appearance, first-
appen ranee, was to lend weight to the President's request and to sup:.
port Mr. II ust on.
Senator TOWER. Are you saying then that Mr. Helms made no sub;
stant ial contribution to the substance of the report'? 4
Mr. ANGLETON. No; I am speaking about the�that his original.
talk was only to outline what the President required from the work:
ing group and naturally I saw him from time to time in -terms
would telephone him to indicate where we stood on the report.
Senator TOWER. Now, Mr. Angleton, in these working group ses-
sions, who represented the FBI? _
Mr. Axot.urox. Mr. Sullivan, sir, who was also the chairman of the
working group.
Senator TowEn. In your opinion, did Mr. Sullivan's views accurately
represent those of Mr. Hoover?
Mr. ANGLETON. NO; I do not think so.
Senator TOWER. Could you elaborate on that?
Mr. ANGLETON. Mr. Sullivan. as the chief of internal security,
Assistant Director for Internal Security, found himself handicapped
by lack of personnel and funding and in addition many of the aggres-
sive operations conducted by the Bureau in the past have been system-
atically cut out by Mr. Hoover.
Senator TOWER. What does that mean? What is the significance?
Mr. ANGLETON. The significance being that the production of Inter-
nal Security fell down considerably.
Senator tow-En. Now, Mr. Angleton. did you come to gain some
insight into the relationship between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Tom
Charles Huston ?
Mr. ANGLErrox. Well, it was my understanding. sir, that they had
known one another for over a year prior to the meetings. And I would
suggest that Mr. Huston was much better educated when he embarked
on these matters than his testimony suggests. I find him extremely
knowledgeable. He was certainly aware of the gaps.
Senator TOWER. Would you say that Mr. Huston reflected the views
of Mr. Sullivan?
Mr. ANGLETON. Very much so. sir.
Senator TOWER [presiding]. I have no further questions.
Mr. 1Ntondale ?
Senator MONDALE. Thank you, Senator Tower.
Mr. Angleton. you were in charge of the covert mail cover program
from the beginning: am I correct
Mr. ANGLETON. Not from the beginning, sir, from 1955.
Senator MONDALE. All right.
Mr. ANGLETON. I took it on as an ongoing operation which had been
lodged also in the Agency.
Senator MoNnarz. What is your understanding as to who authorized
the program? �
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say that the operation that was first initiated
in 1952, at some stage the authorization was from the Chief of Opera-
tions of the Clandestine Services, -
Senator MONDALE. As you conducted this program, under whose
authority was it your understanding that you were operating?
Mr. ANGLETON. Within the Agency?
en :1
Mr.
Sena
author:-
either
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from t
author
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only a�
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Mr. K
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- 60
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in guidelines. Mr. Helms appearance, first
.ight to the Preiclent's_request and to suti:
saying then that Mr. Helms made no sub.
e substance of the report?
im speaking about the�that his originj
:tat the President required from the work;
saw him from time to time in terms of----1
licate where we stood on the report.
[r. Angleton, in these working group ses.
FBI?
ivan, sir, who was also the chairman of the
pinion, did Mr. Sullivan's views accurately
not think so.
u elaborate on that?
ilivan, as the chief of internal security,
rnal Security, found himself handicapped
,nding and in addition many of the agcr6res-
iy the Bureau in the past have been system-
var.
r�s that mean? What is the significance?
.ficance being that the production of Inter-
siderably.
fr. Angleton. did you come to gain some
rip between Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Tom
was my understanding. sir, that they had
a year prior to the meetings. And I would
is much better educated whn he embarked
testimony suggests. I find him extremely :
ain13.- aware of the gaps.
ou say that Mr. Huston reflected the views
Ii so. sir.
:ling]. I have no further questions.
you, Senator Tower.
n charge of the covert mail cover program
rt�ect ?
the beginning, sir, from 1955.
in as an ongoing operation which had been
.5 your understanding as to who authorized
,y that the operation that was first initiated
tthorization was from the Chief of Opera-
vices.
ai conducted this program, under whose
rstanding that you were operating?
he Agency?
*Asiltlt 01. MONDALE. YQS.
Nir. A Nmyrrox. Under the Chief of the Clandestine Operations. --
Senator NloxoAr.E. The Deputy Director for Plans, would that be?
Mr..!;..Noix:rox. Correct.
5enat0r MoNDALE. For your purposes. was that considered adequate
anthority or was this such that you felt authority had to flow from
,sit her the President or the National Security Council?
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe that I regarded that, plus the authority
the Director who was knowledgeable of the program, as internal
Senator MONDALE. At your level of operations, that. would be the
only authority with which you would concern yourself?
'fr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. All right. What was your understanding of the
of the covert mail operation?
Mr. ANGLETON. That it was illegal.
Senator MONDALE. It was illegal. Now, you are an attorney?
Mr. ANGLETON. No, I am not, sir.
Senator MONDALE. Well, that might be an asset.
Mr. _ANGLETON. That is my cover, Senator.
Senator MONDALE. How do you rationalize conducting a program
You believe to be illegal?
Mr. ANGLETON. To begin with. I was taking it over as an ongoing
n�)(�ration and there was probability that the program, through lack
nf personnel and funding, would have been scrubbed at some Stage.
From the counterintelligence point of view, we believe that it was
..xtreinely important to know everything possible regarding contacts
of American citizens with Communist countries.
And second, that we believed that the security of the operation
was such that the Soviets were unaware of such a program and there-
fore that many of the interests that the Soviets would have in the
United States. subversive and otherwise, would be through the open
mails, when their own adjudication was that the mails could not be
violated,
Senator MONDALE. So that a judgment was made, with which you
_concurred, that although covert mail opening was illegal, the good
that flowed from it, in terms of the anticipating threats to this coun-
try through the use of this counterintelligence technique, made it
worthwhile nevertheless.
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. How do You recommend that this committee deal
with this profound crisis between political and legal responsibility
in government, a-nation that believes in the laws, and what you regard
to be the counterintelligence imperative of illegal activity? What do
we do about it?
Mr. ANGLETON. My own belief has always been that high authority.
whether it be on the Hill. the Congress. or in the Executive, needs
to examine very closely the counterintelligence content available to
this Government regarding its adversaries, and regarding the Soviet
- and the Soviet Bloc.
To my knowledge. there has never been such an examination. I
believe very much in a statement made by Director of the FBI,
Mr. Kelley, that it is his firm view, which he expressed in Canada
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at a bar association convention. that certain individual rights have
to be sacrificed for the national security.
Senator MONDALE. DO you believe that national security cannot be
protected except through the sacrifice of these rights?
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe that all matters dealing with counter- '
espionage require very sophisticated handling and require consider-
able latitude.
Senator MONDALE. Who do you think should be empowered to deter-
mine which rights should be set aside?
Mr. ANGLETON. I think that, sir. not being an expert in these
matters, that it should be a combination of tile Executive and the
Congress.
Senator MONDALE. How would the Congress express itself? Tradi-
tionally, it is through the adoption of laws.
Mr. ANGLETON. I am afraid I do not�
Senator MONDALE. As I understand the progression of this dis-
cussion, it is your opinion that this Nation cannot protect itself with-
out setting aside certain personal liberties. Then I asked you, who
would determine_ what liberties were to be set aside? And you have
said it should be a combination of the Executive and the Congress.
Of course. the Congress acts through laws. Are you saying that we
should take another look at our laws to see whether they fully meet
the needs of national security?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. Would it not have been better then, when these
laws were violated in the past, to do just that? Come to the Congress
and say, "in_ our opinion we cannot defend you under the present laws
and, therefore, we make these recommendations for change." That
was not what was done. Surreptitiously and privately and covertly,
legal rights of the American people. were violated in this case. mail
was opened, without any such approval in the law. Is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator MONDALE. Do you think that was a correct way to proceed?
Mr. ANGLETON. I think in an ideal world dealing with intelligence,
and I have never seen one yet. that these matters should have been
brought up vigorously. All through the life span of the CIA, I do
not think there was the proper forum here for the airing securely
of these matters.
Senator MONDALE. I disagree with you on the question of national
security. I think our Constitution provides plenty of power to protect
this country. In any event, I see no authority for anyone in the
executive or in the Congress or anywhere else for determining, on
his own, that the law is not good enough and therefore taking it into
his own hands. I see no way of conducting a civilized, democratic
society with those kinds of rules.
Now in your system for covert openings, there was prepared a
watch list which set forth certain names of organizations and purposes
and those names were the trigger for opening mail to or from them
which was sent internationally.
Mr. ANGLETON. To the Soviet Union.
Senator 'MONDALE. To the Soviet Union. The list included Linus
Pauling, John Steinbeck. the author, and Victor Reuther of the Auto
Workers. What counterintelligence objective was it you thought you
wert�
tO
M.
quest
Se:
not I.
is ha'
II.
in an
Se:
not 1..
Se:
watc:
shoul
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be di,
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'wean-
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mit to
rat ion
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inent :
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to do
would '
Mr..
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3n, that certain individual rights havi
al security.
,miieve that national security cannot
sacrifice of these rights?
hat all matters dealing with eounter-i:
ticated handling and require consider.'
,ou think should be empowered to deter.
set aside?
at, sir, not being an expert in these
oombination of the Executive and the
mid the Congress express itself? Tradi-
;tion of laws.
I do not
derstrid the progression of this dis-
this Nation cannot protect itself with-
onal liberties. Then I asked you, who ;
.s were to be set aside? And you have
m of the Executive and the Congress.
:Iirough laws. Are you saying-- that we
ir laws to see whether they fully meet
� ?
-rect.
not have been better then when these
to do just that? Come to the Congress
mot defend vou under the present. laws
recommendations for change." That
.ptitiously and privately and covertly,
eople were violated in this case. mail
approval in the law. Is that correct?
-ect.
ink that was a correct way to proceed?
ideal world dealing with intelligence,
. that these matters should have been �
.ough the life span of the CIA. I do
^ forum here for the airing securely
with you on the question of national
In provides plenty of power to protect
see no authority for anyone in the
^ anywhere else for determining, on
.d enough and therefore taking it into
-)f conducting a civilized, democratic
les.
vert openings, there was prepared a
n names of organizations and purposes
!er for opening mail to or from them
�
t.
'net. Union. The list included Linus
thor. and Victor Reuther of the Auto
ace objective was it you thought you
Approved for Release: 2021104106C00038136
Aolticvinz in opening the mail of what most of us would assume
1,, very pat riot ie. thoug-lit fut. deoent Anwrieans
I *mild prefer, if possible. to respond to that
niest ion in executive session.
� -:enittor MONDALE. Well, I would like the answer. The chairman is
here so 1 think we ought to pass that request up until the chairman
is back.
I have several other questions along that line with other names. But,
;,, anv event, let us wait until the chairman returns.
Senator TowEit,_ What was the request of the witness? That it
no; he answered except in executive Session?
Senator MONDALE. Yes; I asked about three names that were on the
watch list and he asked to answer that in executive session. I think we
await the chairman.
*Mr. ANGLETON. Sir, may I please modify that?
Mr. BROWN. Would the Senator please just indulge us for just a
moment so I can confer with Mr. Angleton?
Senator TOWER. Let us have order, please.
Mr. Angleton, should you answer this question in open session,
wniticl you be disclosing classified information that has not been
1.reviously cleared for disclosure?
INfr. ANGLETON. I would also need to have the opportunity to review
!lies in the agency before making any response.
Senator TOWER. In other words, you do not know whether it would
he disclosing classified information that has not been cleared?
Mr. ANGLETON. I would not depend on my memory, sir, at this time,
.eciiiise these are cases or matters which apparently were some time
back.
Senator TOWER. The Chair will rule that for the time being, you
will not be required to answer the question in open session; but that
the matter can be reopened, should the committee decide that they
should be disclosed in public session.
Mr. ANGLETON. Thank you.
Senator MONDALE. I have got some other names I would like to sub-
nit Mr. Angleton which I wish he would use in his review in prepa-
t�at ion for that answer, whether in public or in private.
Senator TOWER. Thank you, Senator Mondale. Senator Baker?
Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I believe most of the information relevant to the Huston plan docu-
ment have been covered by other members of the committee and by
..,,unsel. But there are two or three things of. a more general nature
t hat I would like to direct Mr. Angleton's attention to, and ask his
rpaction or comments on.
Before I do, however, what was your job at the time of your retire-
ment from the CIA?
:Nrr. ANGLETON. I was the head of counterintelligence.
Sell:IrOr BAKER. Counterintelligence, in layman's terms. implies
-omething other than intelligence. I take it that it implies something
ro do with keeping up with what the other fellow's intelligence
would be:
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
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Senator BARER. Was a major part of :vour operation concerned with
intelligence operations against the United States by, say, the Soviet.'
Union or other countries?
Mr. ANGLETON. It was a question of all hostile intelligence services
where we have a situation, for example, that in the Soviet bloc alone,
there are over 27 intelligence services who would conduct activity in
the United States and in the territories of allies.
Senator BAKER. Well, to put it in lay terms again, counterintelli-
gence was to protect our intelligence resources?
Mr. ANGLETON. It was to penetrate and frustrate the espionage and ;
subversion from outside.
Senator BAKER. How, then, was counterintelligence, your area of
concern and expertise, important to that area to be involved with mail
openings?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, since the mail openings were to the Commu-
- nist countries, it meant that there was a contact, regular contact, with
Americans and third country nationals who were here. For example,
there are many third country nationals that were here studying, who,
in turn, had relatives who were studying in Soviet institutions.
Senator BAKER. I can follow that. But what prompted the question
was, why on earth would you have, for instance, Frank Church or
Richard Nixon on that list?
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say it was very much an error.
Senator BAKER. It was an error to have them on the list?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is precisely correct.
Senator BAKER. Are there other members of this committee that
were on that list?
Mr. ANGLETON. I'm not aware of it, sir. I've not gone through the
listings.
Senator BAKER. You began this operation in 1951 or thereabouts,
I understand.
Mr. AN-G=0N. It was started in another part of the agency in 1952,
and it was taken over by us�counterintelligence�in 1955.
Senator BAKER. I understand from your testimony to Senator Mon-
dale that you think that it is of sufficient value so that it ought to be
continued.
Mr. ANGLETON. It is certainly my opinion, and the opinion of my
former associates.
Senator BAKER. It should be continued even if it required the change
of the statute law�and I am not sure that would even do it. Let us
just assume for the moment that you have a congressional debate on
the necessity for doing it. and thus change the nature of the postal
system; that is. people no longer would assume that their mail was
inviolate. that. people probably- were going to inspect it. That gets us
terribly close to Big Brotherism the idea that when you mail aletter,
you have got to assume that somebody may read it, at least a letter
outside the. country. Even if you assume that that would be the range
and scale of the debate in Congress, you would favor the passage of
such a bill
Mr. ANGLETox. I didn't quite say that. sir. I believe I would prefer,
if possible. to stick to what I believe_to be the approach to the prob-
lems within the intelligence community: and that is that both the
executive, at a high level, and the Congress examine in depth the nature
of the threat to our national security.
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St'
to c.
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.64
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65
3r part of your operation concerned with
it the United States by, say, the Soviet'
.estion of all hostile intelligence servicel
r example, that in the Soviet bloc alone,s1
services who would conduct activity al.=
rritories of allies.
at it in lay terms again, counterintelli-
igence resources?
netrate and frustrate the espionage and
, was counterintelligence, your area of
tnt to that area to be involved with mail
I the mail openings were to the Commu-
iere was a contact, regular contact, with
nationals who were here. For example,
nationals that were here studying, who, -
7e studying in Soviet institutions.
v that. But what prompted the question
1 have, for instance, Frank Church or
t was very much an error.
ror to have them on the list?
3ely correct.
other members of this committee that
.re of it, sir. I've not gone through the
this operation in 1954 or thereabouts,
d in another part of the agency in 1952,
iunterintelligence�in 1955.
d from your testimony to Senator Mon-
>f sufficient value so that it ought to be
ly my opinion, and the opinion of my
continued even if it required the change
not sure that would even do it. Let us
lat you have a congressional debate on
I thus change the nature of the postal
ger would assume that their mail was
� were going to inspect it. That gets us
n: the idea that when you mail a letter,
omebody may read it. at least a letter
Ai assume that that would be the range
.gress. you would favor the passage of
say that. sir. I believe I would prefer.
vlieve to be the 'approach to the prob-
ommunity : and that is that both the
e Congress examine in depth the nature
eurity.
Senn t 07' BAKER. If I may interrupt you for a minute. 1 think I ought
:0 1,,in why I am proceeding in this way. I know. from reading
briefing papers, and from a general inipression of'your service
io vour eountry and to the CIA, that you have been an extraordinarily
your
tant figure in the intelligence and counterintelligence scheme of
for many, many years. I believe, based on your testimony, that
volt haye a grave concern for the nature and the scope of the foreign
and the importance of the methods and techniques that are
� ;;I:lioveil or may be employed by the CIA, by the DIA, and by other
. �
e 1 ligence agencies.
my general impression. But your impression of us should be
that. while we recognize the importance of that, it gets right sticky
when it would appear, in some cases clearly, that those methods and
�,,.liniques violate either the statute law or the Constitution of the
*nite,1 States. What I am putting to you is whether or not this coun-
try should engage in a debate in the congressional forum�which is
where laws are made and changed�about a matter such as the chang-
::1,, of the fundamental nature of the postal system�that is to say, to
..roate a situation where people must asTsurne that their mail is being
7..�:1% I.
NOw. are the techniques for intelligence gathering�is the nature of
v� foreign threat such that we should go ahead with that debate, or
,.ven pass such a statute?
Mr. ANGLETON. I think in the present atmosphere. it would be
mnossible.
Senator BAKER. That is sort of our job, too; to guess what is possible
:Ind impossible in the Congress, and I am often fooled about what is
possible and impossible. From your standpoint, what I am trying to
drive at is whether or not you believe the scope and the extent of the
threat to this country from abroad is sufficient to launch this Congress
into a debate on whether there should be such a change in the postal
laws or not.
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I must accept, sir, the fact that again, that I do
not believe that the atmosphere would even tolerate this subject being
t he subject of debate. I think these perceptions of dangers and threats
have changed very greatly in the last 2 years. I think the policies of
dkente and, prior to that, peaceful coexistence
Senator BAKER. What do you think of the policies of detente?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I would only speak to the question of detente,
peaceful coexistence, strictly from counterintelligence observation.
Senator BAKER. That is why I asked you. You were the head man in
that field. What do you think of it?
Mr. ANGLETON. My view is that there is complete illusion to believe
that, on the operative, clandestine side�which is, in a sense, a secret
war that has continued since World War II�that the Soviets or the
Soviet bloc have changed their objectives. And I base this on counter-
intelligence cases.
Senator BAKER. I do not mean to embarrass you, Mr. Angleton, but
I want to ask you this question. In that respect, is your disagreement
with detente as a national policy part of the reason why you retired
from the CIA at the time you did?
Mr. ANGLETON. I really cannot say. Every day that passes, I discover,
much to my amazement, Certain points-of view and activity in which I
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might say, neither myself nor my colleagues were in great favor. I
oamuyi sllocitio.I 1,, 11,,t have fat.p...
Senator ilAittn. Mr. A.ngleton, then, at e niany questi;sins I could ask.
Your experience covers a tUrbak lit ma in oistury. and the tempta-
tion to ask you speciiie details aoout it is almost irresistible. But
for the moment, in view of the time restraints, I Will postpone that.
W011iti ask only a single thing, and that is whether or not you think
there should he a significant national debate in a congressional forum,
as well. on the question as to whether or not we, should legalize some of
t he activities that now appear to be illegal in the intelligence-collecting
field. sow, it is my own personal view that if you are going to do
some of these thine-s. the country will not accept them, and should not.
They are intrinsically an intrusion, beyond the scope of the permissible.
But if you are going to do some of the others. thin are more closely
held. you ought not to do them without asking. You ought to send
them up to Congress and find out what the likelihood of the law being
chan7ed may be. Would you generally agree, in retrospect, that that
ought to be the way this matter is approached?
Mr. ANGLETON-. There is no question in my mind.
Senator BAKEn. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tr. c�wR. Senator Ruddleston?
Senator lienni,EsTox. Thank. you, Mr. Chairman.
Angleton. first I wonder if we might bring some of the intern-
en'e terminology down to lay language, so that the people will have
a complete understanding of what we are talking about here. I think
we have pretty well covered mail coverage, but just to clarify it maybe
somewhat further, we are discussing the actual opening of mail of cer-
tain citizens who appear on a predetermined list. 1 ioes some individual
'actually read this mail, or is it photographed. or just how is this
handled?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, sir, the process was to collect mail at an inter-
national terminal before it went abroad, and mail coming from abroad
from Communist countries, and having the opportunity to surrepti-
tiously open the envelopes, photograph the contents, and to dispatch
the mail to the addressee. The photographs of the mail were brought
through another part of our organization to us in Counterintelligence.
where we had a group of some six people very fluent in languages. and
also in holograph and flaps. and they were very sophisticated tech-
nicians and analysts. They would make abstracts of the mail where, it
was important. together with internal findings and dossiers, and direct
it to certain selected customers.
Senator HronT,EsToN. Customers being specific agencies of the Gov-
ernment. either CIA.�
Mr. _ANGLETON. For all intents and purposes it was only to the FBI,
although there was some mail that did�there were some special items
that went to military intelligence.
Senator Hrpm.,EsToic. Now, electronic surveillance�what all does
this involve
Mr. ..A.Not.r.Tox. Pardon. sir?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Electronic surveillance�what does this in-
volve specifically?
Mr. ANGLETON. We were not involved in electronic surveillance.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You know what it is, do you not?
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Mr.
so:
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66
r my colleagues were in great favor. I
.e the facts.
m, there are many questions I could ask,
ailent time in history, and the tempta-
1s about it is almost irresistible. But
le time restraints, I will postpone that.
lig, and that is whether or not you think
itional debate in a congressional forum,..
nether or not we should legalize some. of
.o be illegal in the intelligence-collecting
ional view that if you are going to do
Ty will not accept them, an dshould not.
non, beyond the scope of the permissible.
ome- of the others. that are more closely
am without asking. You ought to send
put what the likelihood of the law being
zenerally agree, in retrospect, that that
r is approached?
uestion in my mind.
' sir. Thank you. Mr.. Chairman.
dclleston ?
c you, Mr. Chairman.
r it we might bring some of the intelli-
language, so that the people will have
what we are talking about. here. I think
ail coverage. but just to clarify it maybe
assing the actual opening of mail of cer-
)redetermined list. Does some individual
3 it photographed, or just how is this
e process was to collect mail at an inter-
it abroad, and mail coming from abroad
rid having the opportunity to surrepti-
lotogra.ph the contents, and to dispatch
� photographs of the mail were brought
�ganization to us in Counterintelligence,
six people very fluent in languages, and
and they were very sophisticated tech-
uld make abstracts of the mail where it
nternal findings and dossiers, and direct
mers being specific agencies of the Gov-
its and purposes it was only to the FBI,
that did�there were some special items
ice.
electronic surveillance�what all does
Tonic surveillance�what does this in-
t involved in electronic surveillance.
know what it is, do you not?
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67
mr, ANGLETON. Yes, sir. It is all forms of eavesdropping.
Senator HunmxszoN. is this tapping telephones?
Mr. .A7N-0LETON. Telephones.
Senator HunnLEsToN. That is, a wiretap.
M1'. ANGLETON. Bugs.
Senator HVDDLESTON. Bugs in rooms, or in places where people
� : ,i It assemble ?
Mr. ANGLETON. Precisely.
Senator Htmnr-EsvoN. Without their knowledge?
Mr. ANGLETON. Hopefully.
Senator HcomzsToN. Surreptitious entry�what is this describing?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is the ability to penetrate into either a build-
or mail�
Senator Hunor:EsToN. Break it down into a simple context that we
r in every police court in the country on Monday morning. It is
tkitio� and entering to a great degree, is it not? 'It might be�
m I.. ANGLETON. As long as there is no�I say I agree, sir.
Senator HunimEsTox. It would be breaking into someone's home
his office or his apartment. and, in effect, taking what you con-
t.�!. to be important to the objective.
Mr. ANGLETON. It is not so much taking as it is photographing.
SP tlator Iirmurr-sTo. Or photographing.
r. ANGLETON. There is not really much breakage.
Si.nator Iltront,EsToN-. What do you mean by development of campus
?
Mr. ANGLETON. Is that in the context, sir, of the Huston plan?
Senator IltynDLEsTort. Yes, that was part of the Huston objective.
Mr. ANGLETON. It simply meant the eventual recruitment of sources
,,a the campus.
Senator Iltenntzgrox. Would that be students?
Mr. ANGLETON. I believe it referred specifically to students and
riia ps some instructors.
Senator HL1DDLESTON. Who would perform as informants or as�
r. ANGLETON. They would be spotters in terms of possible recruit-
%lent of people. or informants.
Senator lirmt,Evrox. I think it is important that the people under-
stand what we are talking about when we talk in intelligence terms,
Mr. Angleton. and those descriptions I think will be helpful.
Now, prior to the development of the Huston plan, would you say
t hat one of the reasons that this development occurred was that con-
filets had grown specifically between the CIA and the FBI?
Mr. ANGLETON. Unfortunately, yes.
Senator HrDDLESTON. Would' You describe what some of those con-
th�ts were, some of the things that were troubling Mr. Hoover?
INir. ANGLETON. Well, to begin with, in all fairness to Mr. Hoover,
After World War II. he was not happy with his activities in certain
�:,arts of the world which he conducted during wartime, being trans-
ferred to another agency. I do not believe that this was jealousy, as
ifts often been stated. I think that he only had to look at the fact
that during World War II. the OSS had many people who were loyal
to General Donovan, but also had loyalties to the opposition�and I
'to not want to characterize it as many. I think it is in many records.
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68
And therefore. there was a very grave problem of the security stand,
ards of t he Agency coining from World War 11.
Senator IlUDDLESTON. Did this result in the con-cern that he had t
there were informants within the Flil that. were telling the C
things that. Mr. Hoover did not think they should be telling?
Mr. ANGLETON. sir, I think you are referring directly to the
straw that broke the camel's back.
Senator lit-nnt.EsTo�.-. Was this a single incident?
Mr. .AN-qu7rox. A single incident in which an officer of the CIA re,
ceived information to which he was entitled regarding a foreign Le.
tional who disappeared and he received this information from ao
unnamed FBI officer. Mr. Hoover demanded the identity of the FBI
officer. The CIA official as a matter of personal integrity refused to
divulge the name of his source and he also offered to the Director,
Mr. Helms, his resignation.
Senator Hunnr,EFrox. You indicate this was a one-time incident. Are
you suggesting that the CIA did not have other sources of informa- I h1��"or at
tion from within the FBI that may not have been known by the
Director, Mr. Hoover? ! Senator
bre.
Mr. ANor.E:rox. I would never call them sources. The CIA had many. I err.:::.
contacts with the FBI at various levels, . . .
Senator Hr-nnr.EsToN. Were there also instances where the CIA re-
quested of the FBI and of Mr. Hoover to undertake certain wiretaps
for domestic surveillance that Mr. Hoover declined to do?
Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator Huoraxsrox. Did this also create friction between the
- agencies?
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not think that that in itself necessarily created
the friction. IThink the friction came from the case I described earlier.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Just that one case? Was that enough to cause
Mr. Hoover to eliminate the liaison totally and formally between the
two agencies?
Mr. Axgrmrol.r. That is correct.
Senator Httinnzszox. And he did that. in fact?
Mr. ANGLETON. He did. indeed.
Senator Hrnormsray. During the early sessions of the group that
was setting up the Huston plan, was this friction evident to you as
a participant of those meetings. that the CIA and the FBI were not
getting along at the top levels as they might?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well. I do not think that the relationship at the
top levels was ever satisfactory. I believe�and this may be somewhat
of an exagfreration�but_I believe that over a period of some 25 years
I do not think there were probably more than three or four or five
meetings between the Director of FBI and the Director of CIA except
those that might have been casual, where they bumped into one an-
other in a national security conference.
Senator Hrprir,EsToN. Did this adversely affect the efficiency of our
intelligence community?
Mr. ANGLETON-. It &CI.
Senator Hroot.EsToN. no von think Mr. Hoover's concern in the
FBI's dealings with the CIA: was principally due to the questionable
legality of some of the things that. the CIA was asking him to do?
Or was it a concern for the public relations aspect of his agency?
"
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sdininistr
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58
rave problem of the security staa
World War ii.
esult in the concern that he had tlit
FI31 that were telling the CIA
link they should be telling?
u are referring directly to the o
single incident?
t in which an officer of the CIA re.
ls entitled regarding a foreign Da.
eceived this information from at
demanded the identity of the F13I
' ir of personal integrity refused to
d he also offered to the Director,
te this was a one-time incident. Are i
lot have other sources of inform& I
lay not have been known by the !
1 them sources. The CIA had many
.-els.
also instances where the CIA re.
)ver to undertake certain wiretaps i
Hoover declined to do?
also create friction between the
it that in itself necessarily created
.e from the case I described earlier. t
le case? Was that enough to cause
totally and formally between the
that, in fact?
early sessions of the group that
as this friction evident to you as t
.t the CIA. and the FBI were not
might?
link that the relationship at the
�::eve�and this may be somewhat ;
.at over a period of some 25 years
- more than three or four or five
;I and the Director of CIA except
where they bumped into one an-
, -
,-ersely affect the efficiency of our
nit Mr: Hoover's concern in the
incipally due to the questionable
the CIA was asking him to do?
lations aspect of his agency?
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oil
ea:rrivs. Well. I_ think that Mr. hoover was con,cions of all
of situations -Where the I'oireau s interebts NNT re a fleeted.
� - � N
e; 111,r it be professional, whether it be public relation. he was
hout question the number one law enforcement officer in tlw rnited
.4tatt,..and probably the most respected individual outside .the United
among all foreign intelligence and security service. And -I
;evethat. Mr. Hoover's real concern was that during the Johnson
3.11:,ini114.7).,11vp agency has to have unlimited
tights to follo�\its (mil instincts in gatlwring intelligt�nce?
Mr. ANGLETON. No: I do not.
Senator MortGAN. What limitations would you place on it.?
Mr, A Nui..Krox. I think the mail-intercept program is probably one
of the few exceptions that I could conceive of.
Senator MoituAs. But if the Agency will not obey the orders of the
President, do you have any suggestions as to what we can do to assure
obedience in the future?
Mr. ANGLETON. Sir, I don't regard the submission to the President
as being a black and white matter, because I don't know all of the
facts surrounding that. But my reading of that language had a great
deal to do with the question of gaps in the plan filled by the FBI in
the question of domestically intercepting mail, rather than as we
were doing excepting--directing it entirely to mail between the United
States and Communist countries. And I do draw that distinction. In
other words, our motive had nothing whatsoever to do with infringing,
or I mean in harming. Americans. Our problem was to try to uncover
foreign involvement in this country.
Senator MORGAN. Let me conclude by observing that I am concerned,
from the testimony we have heard today, and also from the testimony
we have heard in the past. about the fact that it seems from the testi-
mony that, many of these plans are devised and put into practice. and
then at some later date. publicly, or for the record, the plans are re-
jected. But, notwithstanding such rejection either by the President
or some higher authority, all of the plans are carried out anyway.
And it makes me wonder whether or not the rejection of such plans is
for the purpose�as Senator Schweiker pointed out�of plausible
denial. Are they really rejections of the plans, or are they rejections
for the purpose of the record? If it is a real rejection, how can we
secure compliance with it by the various agencies?
Thank you, Mr. Angleton.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Morgan.
I think just for purposes of clarifying the matter I ought to say that
we have found the CIA files on mail that has been opened, and we are
now in the process of investigating and preparing ourselves to look
into this whole question of mail opening in a much more detailed way.
At the beginning of this hearing this morning I mentioned such or-
ganizations as the Ford Foundation, Halyard University, the Rocke-
feller Foundation. and such individuals as Arthur Burns, Congress-
woman Bella Abzug. Jay Rockefeller. President Nixon, Martin Luther
King, and Senator Hubert Humphrey, Senator Edward Kennedy, and
myself whose mail had been opened, and I would like to make it clear
that these names were never on the watch list, so far as we can deter-
mine. So that it is obvious that the opening of the mail was not re-
stricted to any particular watch list, but may have gone very far afield,
indeed. - - -
I am going to get that letter I wrote to my mother. I want to see
what is in that letter that was of interest to the CIA. And I say this
because the privacy of the mail has been one of the most honored
practices in this country and it is protected by the statutes. The Su-
preme Court of the United States passed on this very early in our
1
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mcis, you just don't think it can be
eller. agency has to have unlimited
in gathering intelligence ?
tions would you place on it?
il-intercept program is probably one
id conceive. of.
:rency will not obey the orders of the
�stions as to what we can do to assure
;ard the submission to the President
ter, because I don't know all of the
-eat:ling of that language had a great
.a,ps in the plan filled by the FBI in
tercepting mail, rather than as we
it entirely to mail between the 'United
. And I do draw that distinction. In
.ng whatsoever to do with infringing,
Our problem was to try to uncover
P try.
�, le by observing that I am concerned,
. today, and also from the testimony
the fact that it seems from the testi-
re devised and put into practice, and
. or for the record, the plans are re-
th either by the President
! the plans are carried out anyway.
r or not the rejection of such plans is
chweiker pointed out�of plausible
3 of the plans. or are they rejections
if it is a real rejection, how can we
various agencies?
7 much, Senator Morgan.
rifying the matter I ought to say that
mil that has been opened, and we are
ing and preparing ourselves to look
pening in a much more detailed way.
r this morning I mentioned such or-
ion, Harvard University, the Rocke-
viduals as Arthur Burns, Congress-
President Nixon, Martin Luther
threy, Senator Edward Kennedy, and
ied, and I would like to make it clear
he watch list, so far as we can deter-
the opening of the mail was not re-
1st , but may have gone very far afield,
wrote to my mother. I want to see
f interest to the CIA. And I say this
t has been one of the most honored
is protected by the statutes. The Su-
res passed on this very early in our
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77
hist on-, back in 1877. I just would like to read a passage of what the
supreme Court said about the privacy of the mail and the rights of
.1.inerican citizens. It said:
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the _mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as It
they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.
The eonstitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their
papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus
closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can
only be opened and examined under like warrant � * �
I think one of the real responsibilities of this committee is to make
certain that in the future our intelligence agencies recognize that in the
name of protecting freedom, they had better honor the Constitution
and the laws because that is what freedom is all about.
Senator Mathias.
Senator M_ArmAs. Mr. Angleton, I suspect that there will be no wit-
nesses coming before this committee who can be of more help to us than
you in understanding the intelligence community as it developed after
World War II, in understanding the kind of work that the intel-
ligence community ought to be doing, and in helping us to see what
needs to be done in the future. But in understanding exactly how you
worked, I think we need to know some of the mundane, mechanical,
things.
For instance, when Mr. Helms was before the committee last week,
we discussed the question of compartmentation' the fact that certain
parts of the Central Intelligence Agency were totally compartmented
from other parts, and I think it is important to understand exactly
what that does to the execution of national policy. For example if a
project would come to you about which some question of legality is
raised, was compartmentation such that you could not consult the
General Counsel of the CIA for a ruling on its legality?
Mr. ArrotcroN. I would say that the custom and usage was not to
deal with the General Counsel as a rule until there were some troubles.
lie was not a part of the process of project approvals.
Senator MATHus. There was no preventative practice?
Mr. ANGLETON. Not necessarily.
Senator MATHIAS. So that on this question of opening mail, the ques-
t ion of whether it was legal or illegal never was discussed with the
legal officials of the Agency?
Mr. AN-or.zrolc. Not to my knowledge.
Senator MATHIAS. What about relationships with law enforcement
az'ncies outside the Central Intelligence Agency? For instance in
the Huston plan, Mr. Hoover appended a note to the recommenda-
tinns on mail opening in which he objected to it, and noted that it was
iliezal. and indicated that he was aware that other agencies might
he doing it. Now, if a project of that sort were undertaken, was there
any preclearance with an agency like the FBI, a law enforcement
?
1 Mr. ANGLETON. As it related to this, of course. the Bureau was fully
apprised after they were informed in 1958. The Bureau would be�
we would coordinate any domestic activity, or even with the three
ft rea s with the FBI in advance. By the same token, they would coordi-
r hate with us in advance any overseas activity, and in this respect I
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was always a firm believer that when the Bureau developed certain in-
telligence sour'. they should have the operational control over
those sources, regardless of geography, as long as there was coordina-
tion.
Senator MATHIAS. You are going to lead me to my next question.
But before I get to that, would the coordination with the FBI include
immunity?
Mr. ANGLETON. It would depend, sir, on the parameters of the op-
eration. If their own interests were impinged upon, there would cer-
tainly be coordinat ions in the community.
Senator MATHIAS. Yes. but would your operator, who might be ap-
prehended in the course of the operation, be understood to be immune
from legal prosecution as a result of the coordination with the FBI?
Mr. ANGLETON. You mean for an illegal act in the, 'United States?
Senator MATHIAS. Yes. Was there any agreement that he would not
be prosecuted, as would an ordinary citizen who was apprehended
in the same act?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I must confess that until it was brought out in
these hearings, I was unaware of the agreement between the Depart-
ment of Justice and ourselves, even though I can well understand why
there was such an agreement. But in the few cases I do know, I never
saw the Agency ever interject itself on anything frivolous. In other
words, it went to the heart of an operation or to the security of an
agent.
Senator MATHIAS. In other words, you are saying that he took his
lumps if he were apprehended in any legal difficulties?
Mr. ANGLETON. If he had not been instructed by the agency, and he
strayed, he obviously was, to my recollection�this was a subject mat-
ter for the General Counsel to take up with the Department of Jus-
tice.
Senator MATHIAS. And when the General Counsel took it up with
the Department of Justice, would it be merely to provide representa-
tion in a court of law, or would it be to make some arrangement by
which immunity would be granted because of the nature of the duties
he had been performing that resulted in the illegal act?
Mr. ANGLETON. I would assume that it would be�the purpose of this
would be for our General Counsel to disgorge all relevant facts and
all documents and papers, and present an Agency position, and that
the argumentation for any special treatment would be supported by
the facts.
Senator MArkitAS. And I have been deducing from what you say
that you made the best deal that you could at the time, under the cir-
cumstances.
Mr. ANGLETON. Not entirely. I have known of�well, I won't go that
far. But there have been cases which have involved, say, misuse of
funds or whatnot, in which the Agency, as I recall, threw the party
very much to the dogs.
Senator MATHIAS. Right. But those were the cases where there was
no relief.
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, they were cases where a superior interest of
the Government was not harmed.
Senator MATHIAS. I think I understand what you are saying. Now,
getting back to the question that you raised a minute ago, in which
1.
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�
n the Bureau developed certain in-
Ive the operational control over
thy, as long as there was coordina-
T to lead me to my next question.
coordination with the FBI include
, sir, on the parameters of the op-
impinged upon, there would cer-
;unity.
I your operator, who might be ap-
ation, be understood to be immune
)f the coordination with t,he FBI?
illegal act in the United States?
e any agreement that he would not
iry citizen who was apprehended
Less that until it was brought out in
he agreement between the Depart-
though I can well understand why
,n the few cases I do know, I never
If on anything frivolous. In other
operation or to the security of an
is, you are saying that he took his
my legal difficulties?
en instructed by the agency, and he
ecollection�this was a subject mat-
:e up with the Department of Jus-
e General Counsel took it up with
it be merely to provide representa-
t be to make some arrangement by
� because of the nature of the duties
lted in the illegal act?
hat it would be�the purpose of this
1 to disgorge all relevant facts and
esent an Agency position, and that
I treatment would be supported by
been deducing from what you say
:ou could at the time, under the cir-
.ave known of�well. I won't go that
-hich have involved, say, misuse of
\gency, as I recall, threw the party
nose were the cases where there was
e cases where a superior interest of
derstand what you are saying. Now,
, you raised a minute ago, in which
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79
you said you thought that a source that you developed belonged to
on. regardless of where it might happen to lodge geographically.
It could be within the United States, could it not ?
Mr. ANGLETON. It could be, and I think that if I might pursue that
somewhat� _
Senator MATHIAS. Yes: I wish you would tell us how you distin-
guish between CIA domestic activity that is prohibited by statute, and
,..ounterintelligence that may lead you into some domestic scene.
Mr. ANc;LETox. Well. I think there are many approaches to this.
Hut I would begin first. with the agent-principal relationship. In other
words. when we are dealing with agents, we are not dealing with pieces
of merchandise. There are very tenuous psychological reahnements be-
t ween a case officer and his agent. and therefore he is threatened even
f von change case officers, let alone the question of jurisdiction.
assuming that an agent of ours comes to the United States, we
are presented with a problem. therefore, of is he to be transferred to the
jurisdiction of the FBI? The moment that the answer is yes. we are
subjecting that individual to risk. Now, in the recruitment of that
n:an. it is quite possible�and in more cases than one�that he has
i given assurances that his identity is only known to a very limited
umber of people. And on occasions, his identity may only 1.e known
the Director, so that this is a case-by-case matter.
In other words, we are in a sense the contracting agents for the
iovernment, and we do contract, and we do accept conditions of em-
ployment. And to our wav of thinking, we must abide by it. But in
order not to jeopardize the domestic activities of the Bureau. and at
!he same time to give them the full benefits of the individual, there
a coordinating process with them as to this person. And I have
r.over really known of many cases where there. was not agreement.
Senator MATHLkS. So that there was, in fact, a gray area?
Mr. ANGLETON. It is agray area, but it is a gray area by virtue of
The actuality of a principal-agent relationship, not because of jeal-
,�;;.ies or internecine infighting. _
Senator Maxillas. And there were clearly pragmatic solutions to
7 ::( Problems that arose in the gray area?
Mr. ANGLETON. Correa..
Senator Maxillas. One final question, Mr. Angleton. If we are to
construct an intelligence community for the future. r think we have
o understand what the nature of the problem is today. How would
you assess the tensions that exist today between the United States and
potential antagonists or enemies in the world, the kind of tensions
hat. create the basic intelligence problem with which we have to cope?
Mr. ANGLETON. This would open up an extremely complicated chan-
nel of discussion.
Senator MATFIIAS. I think it is important that we try to grapple with
no matter how complicated it is.
Mr. ANGLETON. If I may go off on a tangent for a moment, I have
oI)served the hearings as printed in the press being conducted by
C�mgressman Pike; and with the exception of the security leakage
which was highlighted by a press interview and whatnot, I would say
that he is probing the intelligence community in the most productive
avenue of evaluation, and that is the question of estimates, as to
whether the American public are receiving an adequate return for their
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inve:st invnt. nd 1 �VOIllt 1 sligV.PPt t hitt if tire 1111:0111,, in sophisti-
enteki area:- of tilt world, itt arriVt� at :tvollratt, r.N�fi loO of tl ollt-
brort I; f Wa is. volt t hen have sonic slide rule as to our ability to
cover the Communist bloc. which is composed of 27 different intelli-
gence and security organizations. which deploys hundreds ofthousands
of secret police, both by way of troops and where we have the major
challenge in every aspect of the running of an agent: communications,
the possibility of leakages; and T would also note that two agents of
the. Agency were most. prodnetive for a short time, but were discovered
and executed. I call attention to the inquiry that is going there. because
I have followed it with very. very great interest. because I think it is
hitting the nerve of the problem, namely. are we getting the produc-
tion, and are we haying the proper estimates?
Now, relating this to the Soviet, our information
Senator MATHIAS. I would just call your attention. I think, to the
fact that the cost of intelligence, the cost of the product is not only
money. It can be in risk, as was demonstrated by the Gary Powers U-2
incident. It can be in damage to our own constitutional process, which
is one of the elements of cost that I think we are trying to determine
here.
Mr. ANGLETON% I think that as far as the bloc is concerned, you have
a unified approach to the United States as the main enemy. They are
bound together by ideological ties. There has been a process of de-
Stalinization which was concluded in 1959, which reconciled vast
differences, and which in essence was a. return to Leninism. There was
enunciated the policy of the main enemy. and the main enemy was the
United States._ And all agents working in bloc countries who priorly
had been working on small members of NATO were redirected against
the main target.
Recently in the newspaper. there was the announcement of the defec-
tion of a Romanian intelligence officer in Oslo, and there has been a
major flap. And one can ask oneself the question that. if Romania is so
independent of Moscow and moving away from it, why is it that their
intelligence service, which is most effective of their Central Committee,
is working hand in glove with the Soviets?
Now, this is not speculation.. These are facts. There have been agents
captured playing out these roles who are now in jail, and it has shown
total cohesiveness within the bloc in terms of strategic questionnaires
of no possible use to Romania. Romania, however, has received most-
favored-nation treatment, and it also received the visit recently of the
President, not too far distant from the arrest in Oslo of the intelligence
officer.
So I come back again to the nature of this threat. The nature of the
threat rests within some thousands of pages of interrogation of very-
high-level Soviet and bloc intelligence officers who were, in turn, very
close in their activities to the political guidance of the Central Com-
mittees. And this cohesiveness dates from the period of 1959, when the
intelligence services were changed from being the protectors or the
preservers of the cult of personality of Stalin. and reverted back again
to the days of Duchinsky and the revolution and Lenin. where every
intelligence. operation has a political objective.
And it ties together with the entire philosophy�and I do not base
this on reading information available at the corner drugstore; this
aII
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0
rat if we are unable, in less sophisti-
, at ;teem-ate evaluat,nm of the out-
some slide rule as to our ability to
is composed of 27 different intelli-
hich deploys h u ml reds of thousands
oops and where we have the major
ining of an agent : communications,
would also note that, two agents of
or a short time, but \\TIT discovered
inquiry that is going there, because
great interest. because I think it is
lamely. are we getting the produc-
estimates ?
)ur information�
call your attention. I think, to the
he cost_of the product is not. only
ronstrated by the Gary Powers U-2
r own constitutional process, which
I think we are trying to determine
.r as the bloc is concerned, yon have
tates as the main enemy. They are
;. There has been. a process of de-
�(.1 in 1959, which reconciled vast
as a return to Leninism. There was
nemy, and the main enemy was the
king in bloc countries who priorly
s of NATO were redirected against
was the announcement of the defec-
ficer in Oslo, and there has been a
f the question that if Romania is so
g away from it, why is it that their
ffeetive of their Central Committee,
�oviets?
3e are facts. There have been agents
io are now in jail, and it has shown
n terms of strategic questionnaires
nania, however, has received most-
so received the visit recently of the
the arrest in Oslo of the intelligence
ire of this threat. The nature of the
of pages of interrogation of very-
lice officers who were, in turn, very
ical guidance of the Central Corn-
s from the period of 1959, when the
from being the protectors or the
7 of Stalin, and reverted back again
revolution and Lenin, where every
I objective.
:ire philosophy�and I do not base
able at the corner drugstore; this
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81
from the interrogat ion of individuals who werc in the system .
;Hid haft positions of high responsibilty in intelligence�and the
underpinning of those regimes are their intelligence and security
conclusion. I would suggest that some day�and I know that
I have proposed many things here which will never see the light of
day�that the nature of the, threat be diagnosed with a view that this
rv, having taken stock of those problems, and being faced, as I
h;nk Dr. Sehlesinger has eloquently lint it. with the possible change
t he balance of military power; and I hope and I believe that, sonic
of his speeches on these matters were gained by him�the views�
du-in, his short. tenure as the Director of Central Intelligence, where
he was an avid reader of the secret information that I refer to.
The CrfAmr.tx. The committee's concern in this investigation is the
nature of the threat, to be sure. And an efficient intelligence organiza-
is needed for this country: that is not the issue here. What is at
H-ile here is running it in such a way that we don't slowly become the
sinil of police state you have described.
Mr. ANGLETON. I understand, Mr. Chairman. I was only responding
.0 Senator Mathias.
The CHArmr.kisr. Yes. But I just wanted to emphasize that. our con-
that, this country should never slide down that slippery slope
finally ends us up with the kind of police state you have dencribed,
amid that is the whole_reason that. this investigation has.been under-
; a ken. Now, Senator Hart.
Senator HART of Colorado. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
lir. Angleton, much of the justification for domestic intelligence
surveillance during the sixties and early seventies was based upon
fori�i�gi contacts. I would like to quote. first of all, a letter from Mr.
lehns to Mr. Hoover. dated March 2n, 197o�I think at the dawn of
file I fuston era [exhibit 50 1].
hi page 5, paragraph S. entitled "New Left and Racial Matters."
Mr. helms says. "There is already a substantial exchange of informa-
; in this field," and then skipping a. sentence, he says. "The increas-
iiirdy close connection between these forces in the United States," pres-
- numbly meaning the new left and racial groups, "and hostile ele-
nients abroad has been well established by both of our agencies."
Now. Mr. Angleton, in your deposition before this committee, you
,N id as follows: "Within the Agency itself, there were those who took
very staunch stand that there was no foreign involvement." And
skipping a line, "And these were fairly senior individuals. main-
on the overt side of the business. This attitude was very definitely
'hat was nothing to it namely, foreign contact."
re we to believe your deposition before this committee. or Mr.
letter to Director Hoover in March of 197n, as to the extent of
!',.!-,�i,rn involvement in domestic groups?
%Ir. A N-GLEToN. It is not inconceivable�I mean. I cannot reconstruct
liaranTaph and put it in the time-frame that you have posed it.
it is not inconceivable that Mr.. Helms did have disagreements
wii?i those senior people on the overt side. or that he had access to the
Talrent of mail intercept which would, of course, not be in their pos-
-i�ssion. I mean, that is one explanation.
v. 349.
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:it,nator lima of Colorado. His letter leaves almost no avenue open
for question :Ls to the degree of epntact. Ile said. "has been well
t'st abi islietL Mi. A nglet, 01, let toe rephrase the question. Was it
or was it not well established in the spring of 14)70. that domestic
groups, described as the new left and racial groups, had substantial
foreign contact'?
Mr. Amn.,F.Toic. There were a number of people from these groups
who traveled to Moscow and to North Korea, and traveled abroad.
Senator HART of Colorado. And they had contact with "hostile
elements ?"
Mr. ANGLETON. It is my understanding. not having reviewed the
mail intercepts, that it involved exhortations to violence, that it
involved sending letters from the United States to Soviet institutions,
inviting them to support the group in the United States by destroy-
ing U.S. property in Moscow and in other countries, and keeping them
advised of their own plans and actions. it's also come out in mail in-
tercept that certain groups went to Moscow for political indoctrina-
tion, and they went to North Korea for weaponry.
Senator HART. of Colorado. Then how could senior officials in the
CIA conclude that, there was absolutely no foreign involvement?
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I mean, there are many who believed that the
foreign involvement matter was immaterial to the�
Senator HART of Colorado. That is not what your deposition said.
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I thought my deposition stated that there were
senior officials in the Agency who would not buy it.
Senator HART of Colorado. They didn't say it was insubstantial;
they said it didn't exist. '.There was no foreign involvement." The
attitude is very definitely that there was nothing to it.
Mr. ANGLETON. I think it could be qualified as stating that the coun-
terintelligence data which they received�and I don't know what, they
received�did not. strike them as sufficient to go on this investigation
of leftwing groups in this-country. In other words, they were opposed
to it.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Angleton, the recOrd before us
strongly suggests that there was not only one Huston plan, but there
may have been several operating almost simultaneously. I refer to your
deposition before the committee in which you say. "What I'm trying
to explain is that people are reading- a lot into the Huston plan and,
at the same time, are unaware that on several levels in a community
identical"�I suppose you mean in the community�"Identical bilat-
eral discussions were going on." That is. between yourselves and the
FBI. In other words, the Huston plan did not affect one way or the
other the normal flow of business.
I also refer to�
Mr. ANGLETON. I don't think there was any�I'm afraid I don't have
the time sequence here. What is the question. sir?
Senator HART of Colorado. Let me complete my question.
In addition to that testimony which you have already given, I refer
to an April 12, 1971 memorandum for the files from Director Hoover
lexhibit 81 '].
See p. 272.
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82
letter leaves almost no avenue open
f contact. He said, "has been well
me rephrase the question. Was it
the spring of 1910, that domestic
; and racial groups, had substantial
lumber of people from these groups
orth Korea, and traveled abroad.
_ad they had contact with "hostile
'standing, not having reviewed the
d exhortations to violence, that it
United States to Soviet institutions,
,up in the United States by destroy-
in other countries, and keeping them
ctions. It's also come out in mail in-
to Moscow for political indoctrina-
a for weaponry.
aen how could senior officials in the
dutely no foreign involvement?
here are many who believed that the
mmaterial to the�
lat is not what your deposition said.
my deposition stated that there were
would not buy it.
hey didn't say it was insubstantial;
was no foreign involvement." The
re was nothing to it.
be qualified as stating that the coun-
3ceived�and I don't know what they
sufficient to go on this investigation
y. In other words, they were opposed
Ir. Angleton, the record before us
not only one Huston plan, but there
dmost simultaneously. I refer to your
In which you say, "What I'm trying
ling a lot into the Huston plan and,
lat on several levels in a community
in the community�"identical bilat-
That is, between yourselves and the
a plan did not affect one way or the
less.
lere was any�I'm afraid I don't have
e question, sir ?
me complete my question.
vhich you have already given, I refer
in for the files from Director Hoover
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nnel quote:
TIU-Ineeting had been requested by Mr. Helms and was for the purpose of
a broadening of operations. particularly of the very Nuiddential type
In covering intelligence, both domestic and foreign. There was some discussion
von the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage of mail.
Then I also refer to the Helms letter that I quoted in the previous
Question that was a March 1970 letter._
What all of this suggests. Mr. Angleton�and I think the committee
would be interested in whether the facts support that�that not only
;en:- the so-called Huston group the inter-agency task force operating
tile question of what restraints should be lifted. but. in fact, there
on
were constant contacts going on. formally and informally, between the
(�1 A. the FBI. NSA and perhaps other agencies about similar ongoing
'ion:esti,. intelligence. programs. Is it safe for us to conclude that not,
are we dealing with one Huston plan. but in fact, less formally,
w; !I perhaps several?
ANGLETox. Since the creation of the Agency, there has been
discussion of operations and improvement of collection. so
� are i- nothing unusual in this happening at this time, the fact that
� from 1947 on. was still taking place.
of Colorado. Was it possible Mr. Huston was just
:2 �Inned by the .A.!-rency into thinking that the White House was
of what was going on. when, in fact. the agencies were having
ssian of their own behind the back of the White House officials
;0 what should be done about domestic surveillance?
Mt. ANGLETON. Well I think that answer could only be had if Mr.
11;1; on had been asked to explain in great detail. chronologically, his
with the FBI and the subjects of discussion. I do not believe
� �!�1 t he could have met with Mr. Sullivan. and not have been exposed
of these matters of operations a year prior to the Huston plan.
know Mr. Sullivan very well. and he doesn't usually waste his time.
-..11f1tOr HART of Colorado. Mr. Huston has testified under oath. and
.in�pfore subjected himself to perjury charges. that he didn't�
M r. ANGLETON. I'm not suggesting that the actual language he used
�,01,1 not be also interpreted to remove any taint of perjury. am
stating that I have known for a long time that he was very
o,f in Mr. Sullivan. and I do know what e'Mr. Sullivan's concerns
�,,:ere in terms of gaps within the community. And simply because there
t-a- a 'Huston plan, there were a number of ongoing bilateral discus-
every day with other elements within the intelligence community.
may or may not have duplicated the broad, general plan that
1.1ton brought about.
S.mat Or HART of _Colorado. One final question.
Mr. Angleton. are you familiar with the name Thomas Riha,
Mr. ANGLETON. lam. indeed.
4,.1.fit Or HART of Colorado. And you are aware of the fact that the
- ��1 loc.] Thomas Riha ensp nlayed a key role in the breach of liaison
� v:Pen the CIA and the FBI?
Mr. ANGLETON. lam.
senator HART of Colorado. Do you have any information for this
orra:iittee as to what happened to Prof. Thomas Riha ?
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Mr. ANGLETON. What has happened to the subject?
Senator HART of Colorado. He has disappeared.
Mr. ANGLETON. I haven't heard anything. I have not actually in-
quired, but I have no knowledge. I think I heard speculation at one
time, but it was back, more or less, in the res gestae .of this trouble,
that he was in Czechoslovakia, but I do not know.
Senator HART of Colorado. In your previous deposition you stated
that the counterintelligence information was only as good as relations
between the FBI and the CIA. That is a paraphrase of what you
said. And since there was a termination of relationships between Mr.
Hoover, the FBI and the CIA in the spring of 1970 over the Riha case,
I think the committee might look into this termination with some de-
gree of intensity. That is all. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ANGLETON. I would like to suggest. Senator, that it was much
deeper than that. It was a cutting off of all liaison within the intelli-
gence community with the exception of the 'White House.
Senator HART of Colorado. Over this one case?
Mr. ANGLETON. Over this one case.
Once having established the principle with us, then it was simply
a matter of a short period of time when the liaison office itself was
done away within the Bureau.
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Chairman. I have a matter of com-
mittee business that I will take up at the appropriate time.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the matter you want to bring up?
Senator HART of Colorado. It has to do with an additional witness
before this committee on this subject. But if there are further ques-
tions, you may want to go to those first. I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. If there are further questions let us
take them first. Senator Tower?
Senator TOWER. Mr. Angleton, was the mail intercept both for Intel-
ligence and counterintelligence purposes?
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes, sir.
Senator TOWER. Was there a feeling that the Soviets relied on a lack
of authorization from the Government to open mail, and therefore,
widely used the mail system?
Mr. ANGLETON. My assumption is that much of the mail and the con-
tent of the mail would not have come to us if they had been aware of the
program.
Senator TOWER. Now returning to the comment at page 29 of the 7
Huston plan [exhibit 1 1], the report noted that "covert coverage had
been discontinued due to publicity arising from congressional hear-
ings on privacy." You have testified that you believe this referred
to FBI mail openings. Is that correct?
Mr. ANGLETON. I say that it is my impression that the thrust of that
related directly to the Bureau's having abandoned the mail-intercept
program domestically.
Senator TOWER. Is it your belief that disclosure of the CIA's contin-
uing intercept to a working group, including representatives of other
agencies, might lead the Soviets and othersto discontinue use of the
mails, and thus, deprive the United States of an important source of
intelligence?
I See p. 141.
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que
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and
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intel
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iden:
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84
ened to the subject'?
has disappeared.
rd anything. I have not actually in-,
e. I think I heard speculation at one
ess, in the res gestae ,of this trouble
t I do not know.
your previous deposition you stated
rmation was only as good as relations
. That is a paraphrase of what you
iination of relationships between Mr.
he spring of 1970 over the Riha case,
k into this termination with some de-
Chairman.
:o suggest, Senator, that it was much
icr off of all liaison within the
intelli-
;ion of the White House.
-er this one case'?
.ase.
principle with us. then it was simply
ime when the liaison office itself was
:r. Chairman, I have a matter of com-
p at the appropriate time.
Latter you want to bring up?
has to do with an additional witness
ubject. But if there are further ques-
e first. I don't know.
If there are further questions let us
1, was the mail intercept both for intel-
purposes ?
feeling that the Soviets relied on a lack
ernment to open mail, and therefore,
m is that much of the mail and the con- !.
zome to us if they had been aware of the
ing to the comment at page 29 of the
mport noted that "covert coverage had ,
icity arising from congressional hear-
estified that you believe this referred
rrect ?
s my impression that the thrust of that
s having abandoned the mail-intercept
lief that disclosure of the CIA's contin- t
oup, including representatives of other
ts and others to discontinue use of the
nited States of an important source of
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85
3fr. ANGLETON. I'm sorry, I don't quite get the - thrust of this
questioning.
Senator TOWER. Well, in other words, did you continue to do this
and did not let anyone else know that the Agency was intercepting
mail because you felt that the Soviets might get wind of it and, there-
fore. discontinue the use of the mails, thereby denying us an important
intelligence source?
Mr. ANGLETON. I would say that does represent my analysis of the
situation because I am quite confident�for example, we had in the
Weathermen case, Cathy Bouclin, who, in Greenwich Village, was
a part of the Weathermen group building bombs. The bombs went up,
and she and another person, a woman, fled from the house, and she was
identified as one of the people fleeing from the house. And those were
the facts�the only facts�in possession of the FBI dealing with a
bomb-making house in Greenwich Village.
Now, when we went back and continued�or went back into our mail-
intercept program, we found that she had written from Moscow some
30 to 40 letters to people in the United States, and these were the only
leads that the FBI had that were in any way important. And to this
lay she is a fugitive from justice. It would raise in anyone's counter-
intelligence mind as to whether she is in Moscow, but she is an active
I u ti ve from justice.
Senator Tow. During working group qe-ssions, did anyone, at any
time, ask you whether the CIA was conducting covert mail coverage?
Mr. ANGLETON. I don't recall, myself. I mean, I don't recall that and
I don't recall details on how we arranged with the Bureau�or the ver-
biage in that report�in a way that would hide our use of the mails.
Senator Tow. Did you at any time receive instructions, or attempt
on your own initiative, to mislead the President on the issue of covert
mail coverage conducted by the CIA?
Mr. ANGLETON. It is very difficult for me to respond to that because
I do not have the facts as to the�as to what we were going to do re-
4:arding this question of including within the Huston project the fact
that the FBI were recipients of our mail coverage.
I find it. therefore, very difficult to know how to reply to your ques-
tion. I do know�and I think that this was my conviction at all times�
that if there was ever an audience with the President of the United
States to go over internal security in this counterespionage matter,
t }Hire would never be anything withheld from him.
Senator TOWER� So you were never ordered to, nor did you ever on
()lir own, attempt to mislead the President in this matter?
:\ I r. ANGLETON. I did not.
senator TOWER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator -Mondale?
S-riator MONDALE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Angleton. would
In. fair to say that startint.7. say, in 1967. with the rise in antiwar
rotf.sis. that the CIA. the FBI and the other intelligence agencies
..tere p]aeed under tremendous pressure by the White House to investi-
nif. and determine the source of these protests?
Axot,Erox. That is correct.
I ator MONDALE. SO that while we ask questions about what you did
r)i,r department, it has to be placed in the context of what you re-
to earlier as the mood and the temper and the fear of the times.
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Mr. ANGLETON. That is correct.
Senator Mon:Lux. I think that has to be understood, because I think
it is quite obvious that the Presidents�starting with Mr. Johnson in
the beginning of the high rise in protests�tended to interpret those
protests as being foreign-inspired. I don't have all of the documents
with me by any means, but here is the memorandum from Mr. Huston
to the President on June 20, 1969 [exhibit 61], stating�this is to the
Director of the FBI. but he quotes the President:
The President has directed that a report on foreign Communist support of rev-
olutionary protest movements in this country be prepared for his study. . . .
"Support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Com-
munists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protests. . . .
And then I have a document here [exhibit 73] which we have just
obtained from President Nixon's files, entitled "Presidential Talking
Papers," on June 5. 1970 [exhibit 633], and this is the description of
what he apparently told Mr. Hoover, Helms, General Bennett and
Admiral Gayler.
He said�
We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our country, one which
we know too little about. Certainly hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans,
mostly under 30, are determined to destroy our society. They find in many of the
legitimate grievances of our citizenry opportunities for exploitation which never
escape the attention of demagogues. They are reaching out for the support�
ideological and otherwise�of foreign powers, and they are developing their
own brand of indigenous revolutionary activism which is as dangerous as any-
thing which they could import from Cuba, China or the Soviet Union.
And then, among other things, he says, or his talking papers indi-
cates he planned to say�
Third, our people, perhaps as a reaction to the excesses of the McCarthy era,
are unwilling to admit the possibility that their children could wish to destroy
their country, and this is particularly true of the media and the academic
community.
In other words, this is a reflection of the President's attitude that
there was a possibility that thousands of American youths desired to
destroy this country.
Do you have any doubt that that is the motivation of Presidential
orders and the temper of orders during that time?
Mr. ArToLrroic. None whatsoever.
Senator MONDALE. If that is their view, namely, that the American
people increasingly�including the media and the parents�could not -
be trusted to perceive this threat, isn't a series of agencies, uncon-
trolled by the law, reaching out to apprehend a threat which they
perceived to threaten the very survival of democracy, an exceedingly .
dangerous tool indeed ?
Mr. Arratzrox. Would you repeat the first part of that question?
Senator MONDALE. If I were a President, and I believed there were
thousands of American youths wishing to destroy American society,
and the parents couldn't see what the kids were up to. and the media
wouldn't understand what they were up to, wouldn't I likely proceed
to use agencies such as the CIA to move in most exaggerated and inten-
sive ways to try and meet this threat?
g See p. 204.
2 See p. 205.
g See p. 396.
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55
has to be understood, because I think
tents�starting with Mr. Johnson in
. protests�tended to interpret those
I. I don't have all of the documents
the memorandum from Mr. Huston
) [exhibit 6 1], stating�this is to the
the President:
port on foreign Communist support of rev...,
country be prepared for his study. . . 4
41 to include all activities by foreign Com-.
ist revolutionary protests. . . .
iere [exhibit T 2] which we have just
files, entitled "Presidential Talking
t 63 3], and this is the description of
oover, Helms, General Bennett and
and grave crisis in our country, one which
indreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans,
-troy our society. They find in many of the
opportunities for exploitation which never
They are reaching out for the support�
a powers, and they are developing their
-y activism which is as dangerous as any-
Cuba, China or the Soviet Union.
,, he says, or his talking papers incli-
.ction to the excesses of the McCarthy era,
that their children could wish to destroy
rly true of the media and the academic
ction of the President's attitude that
:sands of American youths desired to
hat is the motivation of Presidential
luring that time?
7er.
heir view, namely, that the American -
the media and the parents�could not
at, isn't a series of agencies. uncoil- .
it to apprehend a threat which they
urvival of democracy, an exceedingly �
peat the first part of that question?
L President, and I believed there were �
wishing to destroy American society,
at the kids were up to, and the media
were up to, wouldn't I likely proceed
o move in most exaggerated and inten- 1
reat ?
v
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87
Mr. Aicor,rrox. I think that is correct, and that is the reason why
earlier I referred to the strong statement made by Mr. Huston to us
that. we were not complying with the President's request.
I do not have a record of those first meetings as to anyone raising
problems or political differences, but I know there was�the question
of political implications was raised and discussed and they were
knocked down by him.
Senator MoNnALE. Yes. Because I think while we probe, as we should,
in hard and intensive ways, with persons such as yourself who have
worked in these agencies, the truth of it is that this problem began in
the White House with the concern on the part of the President that
these protests came not from legitimate concerns of Americans against
tile war, but probably were inspired by foreign support and leader-
-hip. Their protests were considered to be compromised and corrupted
i�Npressions, rather than the good faith protests of Americans concerned
about that war. I think that attitude shows now dangerous it is to have
:wencies which themselves do not feel that they are bound by the re-
strictions of the law. That attitude, that fear, that distrust of the
A merican people, coupled with agencies which feel they are not re-
-; ra medl by the law. I think is a road map to disaster.
Mr. ANGLF:TON. Senator, I would like to make just one comment. I
it�ve that the depths of the President's feelings were, in part, justified
horause of the ignorance, so to speak, in the West regarding these
;natters. In other words, the quality of intelligence going to him he
ft ,und totally unsatisfactory.
Senator MosnALE. That's right. Because it did not square with his
paranoia that the American people were trying to destroy the country,
and in fact, there was never any evidence of any significance that that
paranoia was justified. That is what, I think, has been the traditional
di,-pute in maintaining a democracy�whether you restrain power lest
it In turned on the people, or whether you restrain power because you
; rust the. people in the long run as the primary salvation of society.
T think this document, expressing as it does enormous. unrestricted
t;�;; noie fear about the American people, is an excellent expression of
v,-hy we have to have laws that restrain the action of the President.
Bemuse, really, you were an agent of the President in all of these
matters.
Nfr. ANGLETON. Mr. Senator, I do believe that it is difficult to judge
bn President on the basis of that document. I am certain that anyone
who has his responsibilities, and was receiving in-depth, around the
,Inek reports from all over the United States, of bombings and civil un-
rest. and murders�and I can go all the way down the long, grizzly
1i4-
SPnator MONDALE. Oh, yes. But�
paranoia.
Mr. ANGLETON. You can induce that, but it was not, in my view,
Fzenator MoynALE. Do you think the possibility that there were
rnon.-ands of American children under 30 determined to destroy our
:irwiety is not paranoia?
Mr. Arrotzrox. I will not take that out of context. The overall pur-
Pose of that talking paper was to address it to intelligence collectors,
'he heads of agencies. And it was to give them a hot foot of getting
down to business and supplying facts. And those facts were very die
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88
cult to come by. Outside of the mail-intercept program. there was very
little hard, incontrovertible evidence. There was nothing known re-
garding Cleaver's operations, his stay in Algiers, his dealing with
Soviet bloc countries, his going to North Korea, and other activities of
this sort. And these were hard facts.
Senator MONDALE. But as an old law enforcement officer, Mr. Angle-
.
ton, I can tell you there are ways of going after those people based on
probable suspicions entirely consistent with the laws and the Constitu-
tion, without undertaking efforts of the kind that were recommended
here that were shotgun, unrestrained and unconcerned with the Con-
stitution. We have ways of taking care of people who resort to violence
in this country, and this way is not one of those permitted by the
Constitution.
There is one other problem that bothers me, and that is this: what
was really the problem in 1967, until the end of that war? Was it that
Americans were bad people and therefore had to be spied on, or was
it that we had a bad war that needed to be stopped? What I think
this reflects is, instead of Presidents asking themselves, "is there some-
thing wrong with this war that is creating these protests?" Instead of
that, they said, "there is something wrong with the protestors. They
are getting foreign money, foreign directions, foreign spies, and there-
fore what we need is more counterintelligence." That may have delayed
the day when Presidents realized the need to change and end that war.
The CHAIRMAN. I might just say, Senator, I think your point is
well taken and we might just remind ourselves of the constitutional
duty of the President. It is not just to perceive threats and then think
up ways to deal with them outside of the law. The constitutional duty
of the President is that he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. And when he takes his oath of office as President of the
United States, he takes the following oath: "I do solemnly swear that
I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States
and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States." Those are his duties.
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes; I understand.
The CHAIRMAN. And when Mr. Nixon approved the Huston plan,
he forgot those duties. And when Mr. Mitchell, the Attorney General
of the United States, was informed of the illegal opening of the mail
a year later, as the chief law enforcement officer of the United States,
he forgot those duties, too. Are there further questions?
Senator Mathias?
Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Angleton, I think you raised a very im-
portant and useful question when you pointed to the issue of measur-
ing the value of the intelligence you received against the cost of
producing it, and I have always felt, from the inception of this study,
that that would have to be one of the major elements of our considera-
tion. I would suggest, as I did a few minutes ago, that that cost has to
be measured in more than just dollars. It has to be measured in the
financial cost�what it costs the taxpayers�it has to be measured in
the kind of risks that it exposes the United States to, risks of various
kinds. It may be loss of personnel, loss of equipment, loss of face, loss
of prestige, various kinds of risks ultimately. the risk of war. And A
finally, of course, it involves the third element which you have just been
discussing with Senator Mondale, the question of the cost in terms of
erosion of the constitutional process.
t h�
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88'
ail-intercept program, there was very
lence. There was nothing known re-
is stay in Algiers, his dealing with ,
D North Korea, and other activities of
;ts.
Id law enforcement officer, Mr.
s of going after those people based on
istent with the laws and the Constitu-
s of the kind that were recommended
ined and unconcerned with the Con-
g care of people who resort to violence -
s not one of those permitted by the
at bothers me, and that is this: what
tntil the end of that war? Was it that
therefore had to be spied on, or was
needed to be stopped? What I think
nts asking themselves, "is there some-
s creating these protests?" Instead of
ing wrong with the protestors. They
?,-n. directions, foreign spies, and there-
rintelligence." That may have delayed
the need to change and end that war.
say, Senator, I think your point is
emind ourselves of the constitutional
u.st to perceive threats and then think
le of the law. The constitutional duty
take care that the laws be faithfully
is oath of office as President of the
wing oath: "I do solemnly swear that
ce of President of the United States
ity, preserve protect and defend the
i." Those are his duties.
and.
r. Nixon approved the Huston plan,
n Mr. Mitchell, the Attorney General
led of the illegal opening of the mail
orcement officer of the United States,
:here further questions?
:ton, I think you raised a very irn-
n you pointed to the issue of measur-
ce you received against the cost of
felt, from the inception of this study,
f the major elements of our considera-
few minutes ago, that that cost has to
dollars. It has to be measured in the
taxpayers�it has to be measured in
the United States to, risks of various I
el, loss of equipment, loss of face, loss
sks; ultimately, the risk of war. And I
bird element which you have just been .:
e, the question of the cost in terms of
)cess.
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89
But for our purposes today I am wondering if you could tell us
how you, in your career, went about assessing the cost of intelligence
that V011 felt might be procured in terms of risk to the United States.
How- would you make that delicate balance between what you wanted
to know and thought would be useful for this Government to know,
against what we might lose in the process of getting it?
Mr. A.NGLErox. Well, sir, I think those of us who were in the war
had the advantage of having been backstopped by thousands of troops
in the event of error. And I might add that. that is a testing ground
t hat younger people in intelligence have not had. In other words, when
they embark on operations, they are apt to not have the period of trial
and error. I would say that all of the officers I have known in my ex-
perience in the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly in Counter-
utteiligenc,e, have a very acute sense of making this judgment factor.
That is. we have handled so many cases that it builds up sort of a
body c: expertise in its own right as to how much you will risk to go
f t er certain targets.
Naturally, the highest quality of intelligence that exists is in the
livid of radio signals and related. matters. And then it goes in descend-
order of documents and to individuals who have had great access,
access. Now, all of these matters have to be brought to bear on what
h. expectancy-Will be, what one expects from the operation.
When the risks get very great, without exception that is taken to the
hrector. And then, if he has to seek outside guidance or consultation,
he does so. And Mr. McCone was a great stickler for being brought in
whon anything reached
a Cabinet-level decision.
Senator MATinAs. Now, when we talk about a risk being very great,
:ire we talking about the chance of losing an airplane and a pilot, or
..re we talking about the chance of involving this country, in a serious
way� with another government? I'm trying to get some scale of values
tiiat would be considered.
Mr. ANGLETON. Obviously, anything that sets back the prestige of
r 1 iS country is almost controlling in terms of the Director's final deci-
-ion. I mean, if the risk is one that is going to undermine the prestige
�,r the United States, I don't know of any Director who would not
take that up with Dr. Kissinger, or with the National Security Couri-
11. or the Forty Committee, or with the President.
But I think there is great responsibility within the Agency. I mean.
I niake no excuses regarding going ahead on the matters of illegal
!nail coverage, but that is a very small part of our activity, and I am
Not excusing it.
Senator MATmAs. Going back into history, to pick up another ex-
�Ltnple in which this kind of evaluation of what you might learn as
:,,,zainst what you might risk is involved, do you know how that was
ighed in the Gary Powers flight?
r. ...A.NGLETON. It is purely hearsay. It is simply that a decision was
. t� le by the President.
Senator MATmAs. We are not bound by the hearsay rules here.
Mr. ANGLETON. Well, I at least would like to so label it. But it is my
�:nderstanding�and I know Mr. Dulles quite well in this regard, he-
r.anse later on it was my man who handled Gary Powers as to his
,:.Phriefing�and what happened. it is my understanding that the que,s-
'Ion of the U-2 flights�and I may be wrong on this�were cleared
with the President in terms of his own activities�.-in this case, his
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90
travels to Paris to meet Khrtislichev. And I would say the history of
the Agency is sprinkled with cases which have gone forward and
which have been canceled or changed because of some overriding
political factor.
Senator MATmAs. So it is your considered judgment that the ques-
tion of the exposure of an important national interest is consistently
weighed when a project is undertaken?
Mr. ANGLETON. Yes: but I would like to draw attention to the recom-
mendation of the Rockefeller Commission, of which I happen to be
much in favor. And that is that there be two Deputy Directors who
would be approved by the Congress, one military and one civilian.
And I would say there is very much need to have accessible a Director
who can take the time to go into the nuts and bolts. because his ab-
sence means that there will be this slippage. And I think there is more
than enough business for two Deputy Directors to be fully occupied.
Senator MATHIAS. Deputies who can measure this element of cost
before
Mr. ANGLETON. But who are looking into the Agency. Not being in
the Agency looking out into the community. And there is a very
proper role for the overall DCI. But I think Mr. Colby would be the
first to admit that the burdens which he has had since lie assumed
the directorship�that he has been able to give a very small percentage
of his time to the actual workings of the Agency.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hart?
Senator HART of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, the so-called Huston
plan has been called one of the most dangerous documents in the
history of this Republic. Mr. Huston testified that the President did
not know that questionable surveillance techniques were being used
prior to the development of this plan. that he thought when the order
was given to terminate them, that they were terminated. There is
other testimony and evidence about what the President knew or did
not know. As I think all of us have tried to indicate to the
people of this country, the principal part of our concern is the ques-
tion of command and control. Who is in charge? Who gives what
orders? Are they carried out? And if they are not carried out, why
not?
I think it comes down, in this case, to a phrase that one of our dis-
tinguished members used in another context with regard to the same
President. What did he know, and when did he know it? I have felt
since the beginning, as a member of this committee, that we stand in
constant danger of repeating a kind of perennial Government pattern
that when something goes wrong, or when there are governmental
abuses, the politicians and elected officials take it out on the ap-
pointed people, the career people, in various departments or agencies.
And I think we, particularly, stand in constant danger of doing that
in this case, and in other cases that we will be looking at.
I frankly don't find it very tasteful. and I don't think the Ameri-
can people will. If all we accomplish is public and private thrashing
of people like Mr. Angleton and Mr. Huston and others, whether they
deserve it or not, that is not our particular function.
I think the question comes down to: Who was giving what orders?
What people at the highest levels of government, particularly the
elected officials, knew or did not know about this plan and other activi-
/.
11
11
b.
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tiSt
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62-685
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9D
:they. And I would say the history of
mses which have gone forward and "
:hanged because of some overriding
r considered judgment that the ques-
rtant national interest is consistently
taken?
Id like to draw attention to the recom-
ommission, of which I happen to be
, there be two Deputy Directors who
gress, one military and one civilian. *,
uch need to have accessible a Director
:o the nuts and bolts, because his ab-
is slippage. And I think there is more
.eputy Directors to be fully occupied.
vho can measure this element of cost
ooking into the Agency. Not being in
he community. And there is a very
But I think Mr. Colby would be the
which he has had since he assumed
m. able to give a very small percentage
3 of the Agency.
Hr. Chairman, the so-called Huston
le most dangerous documents in the
uston testified that the President did
veillance techniques were being used
plan, that he, thought when the order
that they were terminated. There is
)out what the President knew or did
us have tried to indicate to the
cipal part of our concern is the ques-
Who is in charge? Who gives what
k.nd if they are not carried out, why
case, to a phrase that one of our dis-
ther context with regard to the same
,nd when did he know it? I have felt,
r of this committee, that we stand in
ind of perennial Government pattern
ng, or when there are governmental
7,ted officials take it out on the ap-
e, in various departments or agencies.
:and in constant danger of doing that
iat we will be looking at.
asteful, and I don't think the Ameri-
iplish is public and private thrashing ,
Mr. Huston and others, whether they
.articular function.
wn to: Who was giving what orders?
vels of government, particularly the;
know about this plan and other activi-
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91
ties? Were the causes shared equally among, or in part, by elected
officials with appointed officials?
Consequently, Mr. Chairman, although I do not intend at this point
to seek its immediate consideration, I would move to ask this com-
mittee to consider usincr all methods within its authority and control to
seek the presence of former President Nixon before this committee.
The CHAIRMAN. I think the point is well taken, and I personally con-
cur in the Senator's views. I think that in the Huston plan, Mr. Nixon
was the central figure. We can get and are getting testimony as to what
lie appeared to have known, and the representations that were made to
him. and what he appeared to authorize and then revoke. But he is the
best witness as to what his intentions were, and he is the ultimate wit-
ness as to what he was told and what he was not told, and for that
reason I concur fully in the Senator's view.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Tower.
Senator Tow. I think this is a matter that should be taken up in
a closed business session of the committee so it can be fully discussed
in that context as not to engage in a discussion of it here or a resolu-
: Inn of the matter here.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, the matter has been raised. As I understood
Senator Hart to say he is not going to press for an immediate vote.
Senator, have you made a motion?
Senator HART of Colorado. The motion is made, and I do not intend
to press it in this session.
The CHAIRMAN. At this time.
Is there any further discussion that members would like to�
Senator MATHiAs. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can only say that I per-
-onally asked Mr. Nixon about the Huston plan. and I hope the com-
mittee has more luck than I have had as an individual in getting any
information on it.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have also asked for other information, and
e have had to subpena some of it, as the Senator knows. I think that
v.�(, will just have to find out if the former President is willing to come
and tell us about this and his part in it. what he knew about it.
Senator MATHIAS. I do think this, Mr. Chairman, if you would yield.
The CHAIRMAN. And ultimately, of course, we have the question of
:t subpena in the event that he declines to do so.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we should discuss that
here and raise publicly the threat of a subpena because I think the
matter can be resolved privately and should be. If we get into the busi-
r t.SS of a subpena, we are looking at a long court battle that could go
on well beyond the life of this committee as authorized by the Congress.
There are ways to do things and ways not to, and I think we ought to
Pxnlore every means short of that before we even suggest that we con-
er a subpena.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think that the Senator is not going to press
his motion at this time, and I feel we should take it 1113 more fully
and consider the proper step to take, and that then the committee
.1.0111d make its decision, and that decision will be announced pub-
irly as soon as it is made. Is that agreeable to the committee?
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eILLLur111A1.11.1Ab i. WOU1(1 JUST make this comment, that this of
course is not the first time that the question of Mr. Nixon's testimony
has been raised in this committee. We have talked about it on several
occasions, and I think it was Marlowe who said, "But at my back I
always hear Time's winged chariot hovering near." Now, this com-
mittee has got to someday make a report. Time is moving very rapidly,
and I would suggest to the Chair that we schedule the appropriate
amount of time to discuss this subject and then make a decision one
way or the other.
The CHAIRMAN. 'Very well, that will be done, if there is no further
objection. That is the decision of the Chair. As soon as the committee
has reached its decision, an appropriate announcement will be made.
If there are no further questions�
Senator HrnmEsToN. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, Senator Huddleston, do you have a further
question?
Senator HUDDLESTON. May I ask one further question that I did
not get to during my allotted time?
Mr. Angleton. the Huston plan was an operative policy of the
White House for some 5 days.
MT. ANGLETON. Yes, 5 days.
Senator HUDDLESTON. During that time were there any internal
instructions or memoranda or direction given within the CIA relat-
ing to implementing that plan?
Mr. AxorJorox. None to my knowledge.
Senator Hunnt,r..sTox. None to your knowledge. After the Presi-
dent rescinded his authorization, following that time were there any
internal memoranda involving instructions or directions within the
CIA?
Mr. ANroLrrox. No.
Senator HEDDLESTON. So it is accurate to say that the Huston plan
presumably could have been implemented by the CIA without any
further directions in addition to what they were already doing, and
that there were in fact no directions canceling any effort that might
have been started relative to that plan? It is almost as if the status
quo were maintained from the beginning to the end, before and after
without any actions being taken.
Mr. ANGLETON. With one exception, Senator, and that is that the
plan marched up the hill and then it marched back again, and this
was one of the few times that any programs involving counterintel-
ligence. interagency counterintelligence, were ever read by a President.
Senator HIIDDLESTON. That was the plan itself.
Mr. ANGLETON. The plan itself, but it had its own�
Senator FIUDDLESTON. The paper went up the hill and back.
Mr. ANGLETON. It had certain impact.
Senator HEDDLESTON. The paper went up the hill and back, but the
plan, the activities related in that plan. in fact, did continue.
Mr. Aii-or.mrox. I do not think all the activity continued. I think
there were a number of activities of the Bureau that fitted within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau that were not rezoned. .
Senator lirmnixsrox. But there were mail opening's.
Mr. ANGLETON. The mail openings were within the Agency.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Wiretaps, surreptitious entries.
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92
93
just make this comment, that this o
,t the question of Mr. NixOn's testimony
ttee. We have talked about it on several
Marlowe who said, "But at my back I
hariot hovering near." Now, this corn-
-e a report. Time is moving very rapidly,
Thair that we schedule the appropriate t
s subject and then make a decision one
that will be done, if there is no further ;
of the Chair. As soon as the committee t
apropriate announcement will be made.
hairman.
ar Huddleston, do you have a further
I ask one further question that I did
me?
plan was an operative policy of the
ng that time were there any internal
direction given within the CIA relat-
.
:nowledge.
to your knowledge. After the Presi-
on. following that time were there any
2. instructions or directions within the
is accurate to say that the Huston plan
implemented by the CIA without any
to what they were already doing, and
actions canceling any effort that might
hat plan? It is almost as if the status
beginning to the end, before and after
n.
xception, Senator, and that is that the
then it marched back again, and this
any programs involving counterintel-
elligence, were ever read by a President.
was the plan itself.
self, but it had its own
aper went up the hill and back.
n impact.
aper went up the hill and back, but the
hat plan. in fact, did continue.
ink all the activity continued. I think
ies of the Bureau that fitted within the
were not rezoned.
iere were mail openings.
,enings were within the Agency.
aps, surreptitious entries.
1
Mr. ANGLETON. I do not think there were any surreptitious entries,
but I am giving an unqualified answer. But I understand your point,
sir.
Senator HITDDLESTON. But I think the evidence indicates there were.
But that is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Cumin/IAN. Yes, it is almost as though from the state of evi-
dence to date that the President were really an irrelevancy.
Tomorrow, we will meet again at 10 o'clock, and our witness tomor-
row is Mr. Charles Brennan of the FBI.
Thank you, Mr. Angleton, for your testimony.
Mr. ANGLETON. Thank you, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 1 :05 p.m. the select committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, September 25, 1975.]
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